Was the Treaty of Versailles Doomed to Fail From the Moment It Was Signed - Essay Example

Was the Treaty of Versailles doomed to fail from the moment it was signed? Introduction The Treaty of Versailles was a document that aimed at restoring peace and security in Europe and by extension globally following the unprecedented devastation experienced by both the Allies and Germany and Austria-Hungary after the First World War. In addition to securing a peaceful settlement, the Treaty also created the League of Nations to ensure that war on the scale witnessed would never have to be experienced again (Best et al 2008). However, on the contrary the Treaty ended up serving as a catalyst for chaos and war in Europe. Various reasons have been cited as responsible for the failure of the Treaty, with the most common being that the Treaty lacked an enforcement mechanism (Henig 1995). This essay will argue that the Treaty was doomed to fail from its very inception, the moment it was signed. The essay will specifically discuss three factors to support this claim. First, the Treaty of Versailles was more of a compromise by the big three Allied powers’ interests than a peace treaty. Secondly, the ideological rift between and among the Allies left the Treaty vague and weak in enforcing its terms and conditions. This was compounded by the rejection of the Treaty by the United States which severely limited the chances of its success. Lastly, and most significantly, the essay will argue that the Treaty’s terms and provisions were unacceptable to Germany who felt that they had been harshly judged and unfairly treated by the Allies in the form of harsh and impossible punishments such as reparations. This only bred resentment among Germans and motivated them to continuously violate the provisions of the Treaty while secretly disarming. Conflict of Interests One of the key elements of the Treaty of Versailles which suggests that it was doomed to fail from its inception is that the Paris Peace Conference which preceded the signing of the Treaty was a compromise on the narrow self interests of the Allied powers. As a result, its terms and provisions could not guarantee its primary objective of ensuring global peace and stability and preventing the devastation which would occur due to the outbreak of war on the scale that had been witnessed. An instrumental precursor to the Treaty of the Versailles, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference is where the final terms and conditions of the Treaty were finalized by the “big three” leaders of the Allies, United States’ Woodrow Wilson, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George (Henig 1995). The negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference highlighted some of the practical challenges of achieving global peace and stability and the outcome would eventually contribute significantly to the failure of the Treaty. The negotiations in the build up to the Treaty of Versailles were marked by conflicting interests among and between the negotiating parties, primarily between France and Britain. Naturally the outcome reflected a series of compromises and trade-offs to accommodate the narrow interests of the Allied Powers (Best et al 2008). Each of the big three had their own aims or narrow self interests approaching the negotiating table and as result the outcome was more of a compromise than a comprehensive, sustainable and practical solution for peace. France, in close proximity to Germany, considered Germany its greatest security threat. In addition, Clemenceau hoped to use the negotiations as a platform from which France would be able to restore her prestige in Europe by reversing all the gains made by Germany and by dismantling the German economy. Therefore, France approached the negotiations proposing harsh penalties for Germany and long term reparations by insisting that among other punitive measures such as disarmament, Germany should cover the costs of restoration of the invaded territories and repayment of war debts which serve the dual purpose of keeping Germany economically and militarily weak hence neutralizing its threat (Andelman 2008). For example, the French demanded the German frontier end at the Rhine for security reasons, proposed disarmament and a long period of stiff repayments. On the other hand, the British who had suffered considerably less in terms of loss of land in the war were more interested in potential economic benefits of trade with Germany and did not support the harsh treatment of Germany which they feared would adversely affect the British economy. The British feared that a severely weakened and heavily indebted Germany would not purchase its imports in sufficient quantities and compromise its economic prosperity. According to Henig (1995), the while France looked at Germany and trembled at seeing 66 million potential soldiers, the British saw 66 million potential customers. Compounding the conflict of interest, Wilson and the United States had approached the negotiations intent on distancing America from European affairs and seeking a Treaty based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points which had been articulated as the principles that shaped America’s entry into the war and ultimately became the basis for German surrender (Keynes 1920). The contentious issues in the Fourteen Points included the general reduction of armaments, reduction of barriers to trade and the adjustment of colonial claims in the interests of the inhabitants as well as the colonial powers. Lloyd and Clemenceau were skeptical of the Fourteen Points, with France insisting that Germany had unfairly disadvantaged France and ejecting general disarmament. The eventual terms of the Treaty would greatly differ from the Fourteen Points not only resulting in the Germans feeling deceived but more significantly contributing to the eventual rejection of ratification of both the Treaty and the League of Nations by the American Congress (Henig 1995). Without the support of the United States which had effectively guaranteed the Allies victory, the enforcement of the Treaty would prove to be practically impossible. As Best et al (2008) and Andelman (2008) conclude, the Paris Peace Conference only served as a platform for the big three to conduct trade-offs and compromises on their own narrow and selfish interests at the expense of the pursuit of world peace during times of great political upheavals. As Wilson himself would argue, the great powers had first “parceled” the helpless parts of the world among themselves” before forming the League of Nations (Andelman 2008). Lack of Credible and Coherent Enforcement Mechanisms The conflict of interests between the Allies would also negatively impact on the enforcement of the terms of the Treaty. With the refusal by the United States to ratify the Treaty or even join the League of Nations, enforcement of the terms of the Treaty such as German disarmament was effectively left to France and Britain (Sharp 2005). The Treaty itself was very vague about penalties and sanctions to be imposed on Germany and weak in specifying the measures to be applied against Germany for infractions against the Treaty. For example, in April 1920, France reacted to German violation of the Treaty when her troop movements were considered a threat to peace and security under Articles 42 and 43 and acted independently to occupy the five German towns of Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Hanau, Homburg and Dieburg (Sharp 2005). These ad hoc and isolated reactions created confusion over the enforcement of the Treaty as each of the Allies repeatedly adapted Treaty provisions to justify their own actions and interests which were dubious in their legality. Enforcement was also severely hampered by the withdrawal of the United States and it was impractical to enforce the Treaty without the financial and military muscle of the Americans who had effectively delivered the Allied victory and were the guarantors of the Peace Conference (Henig 1995, Keynes 1920). In retrospect, the absence of the American deterrent encouraged Germany to continue flouting the provisions of the Treaty. Therefore, in the absence of a coherent mechanism to enforce the provisions of the Treaty, Germany was able to exploit these loopholes and secretly rearm itself. Organs such as the Interallied Military Control Commission (IMCC) set up to monitor the disarmament lacked sufficient powers of inspection and disarmament to be effective as each of the Allies preferred isolated remedies against Germany (Carroll 1966). The Treatment of the Germans Another important element of the Treaty that shows it was doomed to fail from the moment it was signed is how the Allies treated Germany and how this treatment would later ferment German nationalism which the Nazi Party under Hitler would take advantage of leading to the second World War in 1939 (Marks 1976). As previously indicated, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points were presented to the Germans by the Americans as their terms of surrender. However, the Allies effectively locked out Germany from the Treaty negotiations at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The final terms and conditions of the Treaty after the Peace Conference were substantially different from the Fourteen Points and subsequently, Germans felt betrayed and deceived by the Allies (Keynes 1920). The terms of the Treaty would evoke strong emotional reactions from the Germans and ferment hostility towards the Allies who they felt had not only deceived them but also treated them unfairly. The Treaty effectively laid the blame World War 1 principally on Germany and to a lesser extent on Austria-Hungary and this “war-guilt” clause was the major cause of resentment towards the Treaty by the Germans. Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty specified that the Allies had affirmed that Germany accepted responsibility on her behalf and of her allies for the loss and damage suffered by the Allies as a result of German aggression (Henig 1995). According to the Germans, this “war-guilt” clause embedded in the Treaty was an unacceptable departure from the promise of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and was the main cause of resentment towards the Allies in Germany (Marks 1976). The Germans deeply resented what they saw as excessively harsh treatment by the Allies and subsequently viewed the penalties in form of reparations, territorial losses and legal restrictions as outrageous. Germany was required among other things to pay 226 billion Marks (equivalent of present day US $ 442 billion or £ 284 billion) (Best et al 2008). The Treaty also imposed that Germany cede territories such as Alsace Lorraine to the French in addition to handing over her colonies in Africa such as present day Cameroon, Togo, German East Africa-Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi and limit its armed forces to 100,000 troops in addition to prohibitions on weapons manufacture, importation or exportation (Andelman 2008, Keynes 1920). Although opinion remains divided on whether these penalties were indeed harsh or unfair to the Germans, the Germans themselves had a strong conviction that the terms of the Treaty were not only unjust but also impossible. British economist John Maynard Keynes was a key proponent of the view that the Treaty would cripple the German economy and that by overlooking the critical issues such as economic recovery, food, fuel and finance the Treaty would only exacerbate Germany’s situation and fuel German resentment towards the Allies (Keynes 1920). The issue of reparations as consequences of German guilt would subsequently become a major source of friction between Germany and France, the chief advocate of even harsher penalties against Germany at the peace negotiations. Germany would eventually refuse to accept the terms of the reparations altogether. Therefore, from its very inception, Germany felt that the Treaty was unjust and punished them disproportionately, a conviction which only served to unify German Communists and Socialists together in unanimously condemning the Treaty and labeling it as a betrayal (Henig 1995). Rather than maintain the peace and security that the Treaty had intended to, it ended up as a document which the victors of the war used to punish the losers. The Treaty would thus become a catalyst for chaos and conflict in Germany and Eastern Europe. As Keynes had put it, the Treaty would consign a whole generation of Germans to servitude, degrade the lives of millions of human beings and deprive an entire nation of happiness (Keynes 1920). This would only intensify the nationalism and class struggles that had fermented in Europe leading to the First World War. Keynes’ prophecy would be fulfilled when Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party took advantage of German discontent with the terms of the Treaty, questioning its legitimacy and ascending to power on the platform of undoing the injustices of the Treaty imposed by the Allies (Marks 1976). In addition, Germany repeatedly disobeyed the disarmament clause of the Treaty in the absence of time limits on disarmament. The preamble to the Treaty had stated that general disarmament was only possible if Germany were to be disarmed first, a fact that made the Germans bitter (Henig 1995). In effect, the motivating factor for German aggression was revenge against the Allies. Conclusion The failure of Treaty of Versailles and by extension of the League of Nations to maintain global peace and stability can be attributed to fundamental flaws present in the Treaty from its very inception. The Treaty’s terms, finalized in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, was a product of compromise between the big three Allied powers and more of a reflection of their interests as opposed to a peace making treaty. As predicted by John Maynard Keynes, a Treaty which merely intended to punish the losers of the war at the behest of the victors and consign an entire population to servitude and unhappiness was not moral or just and was more likely to ferment resentment and catalyze imminent conflict by intensifying the nationalism and class struggles which had led to the outbreak of the war itself. The Germans felt aggrieved by the “war-guilt” clause of the treaty and this bitterness provided the impetus for German nationalism which Hitler was able to take advantage of. In addition, from its very inception, the Treaty also lacked a coherent, legitimate and credible enforcement mechanism bereft of the support of the United States. The ad hoc and dubiously legitimate enforcement allowed Germany to violate the disarmament provisions and the conflicting positions of the Allies over whether to accommodate Germany or to crackdown on her allowed her to secretly rearm in the confusion. Therefore, it can be argued that due to these fundamental flaws, the Treaty was doomed to fail from its inception. References Andelman, D 2008, A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today, John Wiley and Sons, New York. Best, A., Hanhimäki J.M., Maiolo, J.A. & Schulze, K.E. 2008, International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond (Second Edition), Routledge, Oxford. Carroll, A.B 1966, ‘Germany Disarmed and Rearming’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 3, No.2, pp 144-124. Henig, R 1995, Versailles and After: 1919 – 1933, Routledge, London. Keynes, J. M 1920, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, New York. Marks, S 1976, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918 – 1933 Penguin, London. Sharp, A 2005, ‘The Enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles 1919-1923’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp 423-438. Read More