Otto von Bismarck Character - Essay Example

Some people have argued that the military was the most important element determining the character of the German nation after 1871. Do you agree or disagree with this assessment? Why? The development of the military in Germany was the most important element in determining the character of the German nation after 1871. While other factors such as international diplomacy, the individual personal qualities of the leadership class and rapid industrialization were also important, it was the military that ultimately defined the character of nation by 1914. However, that was not initially the case. Militarism took time to develop because under Bismarck military endeavours were not encouraged. Indeed, Bismarck promoted almost a sense of isolationism believing that Germany’s best interests lay in essentially removing itself from the international game of diplomacy all together. Yet, with Bismarck’s demise in 1890 there was a significant change. The new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, encouraged by sections of the armed forces, sought to create a military the equal of any in Europe. This was done not only to foster his Imperial ambitions, but also to try and quell internal dissent by attempting to unify the German population against a common external foe. By the outbreak of war in 1914 the military was almost in complete control of all elements of German society. Militarism had come to dominate the German character. Otto von Bismarck played an important role in determining the character of the new German nation. Initially, that character was one of isolationism and conciliation rather than militarism as Bismarck sought to consolidate the nation after unification in 1871. The economic crash of 1873 brought about a movement away from liberalism in Germany. Increased protectionism as a result of the worsening economic crisis led to an increased fear of those deemed different or at odds with Germany’s new found unity.1 Indeed, Bismarck came to believe that internal enemies were trying to subvert Germany.2 Catholics, Jews and socialists were the main targets of this anti-liberal assault. Bismarck especially considered the small but growing numbers of German socialists as ‘the enemies of Empire’.3 After two failed attempts on the German emperor’s life, neither of which were undertaken by socialists) Bismarck implemented laws that effectively outlawed socialist meetings within Germany.4 Catholics too were attacked for their supposed devotion to Rome. The campaign (Kulturekamp – cultural struggle) was designed primarily to reduce support for the newly formed Catholic Centre Party.5 While certain aspects of pan-Germanism should have appealed to Bismarck’s overall desire to unify the various disparate elements of the new Germany – especially those in Austria and Southern Germany – he considered Catholics too greater threat, especially after Rome announced in 1870 that the Pope was now Infallible.6 New laws were introduced reducing the authority of the priesthood over education, while the state attempted to take control over the ordination of new priests.7 Bismarck was adamant that, at least publicly, this was not an attack on religion as such, instead he argued that this was “essentially a political decision … it is a matter of the conflict which is as old as the human race, between monarchy and the priesthood”.8 However, Bismarck’s attempts to unify the nation in many ways failed to create a singular German character – indeed, it appears that instead of unifying he actually helped create political disunity and individualism as a character trait. Indeed, in the end Bismarck failed to create dissension among even Catholics. The Centre Party went on to become one of the major influences in German politics for years to come. The role of the military was limited in this affair, as it was in many of Bismarck’s domestic policies; yet, in the end it was the military that helped end his political career. In 1890 Bismarck found himself in conflict with the new emperor, Wilhelm II, over the worsening relationship between Germany and Russia and domestic constitutional reforms designed to limit the power of socialists.9 For the latter Bismarck required the support of the military which not only refused his request but then demanded that Wilhelm dismiss Bismarck entirely.10 Consequently, after designing a constitution that effectively gave the German military an ambiguous position of power it was the military that forced the chancellor to resign in 1890. Consequently, the military did not initially exert power over all elements of German society, nor unduly influence its character. However, one of the reasons the military was to play such a large role in post 1871 Germany was because the new constitution failed to properly place safe guards upon the armed forces. Under the new constitution individual states within the new German Confederation had considerable autonomy when governing on internal matters, however in foreign policy and military affairs it was Prussia that had the final say.11 As the largest state in the Confederacy Prussia effectively had veto powers over all other members, however, within the top tier of the Prussian hierarchy the army held the most constitutional power simply because their role was not carefully defined.12 Indeed, the war minister himself was not answerable to the Reichstag ‘on matters concerning the largest contingent of the armed forces, the Prussian army’.13 The army itself even had control over such things as its own budget. Consequently, the military itself had considerable power over German foreign policy decisions which in turn led to a cultural shift within Germany itself after 1890. This was one way that the military became the most important element in determining the character of the German people after 1871. As mentioned, before the fall of Bismarck the military had some authority, however it was after 1890 that it had the most influence on the character of the German people. Germany underwent rapid industrialization during this period, partly financed by the rapid expansion of the army and navy. The formation of the Navy League in 1898, and the Pan-German League founded a few years earlier in 1893, allowed the military to exert considerable pressure upon the government; especially when they had the support of two of the largest employers in the country; Krupp and Stumm.14 The growth of the navy itself was helped by popular support for Germany’s small but growing empire and its increasing economic competition with England.15 By the turn of the century militarism, not Bismarckian appeasement and conciliation had become the most important prevailing ‘cultural given’ within the German state.16 Consequently, the rise of militarism can be directly linked to changes in German foreign policy. The shift in foreign policy direction with the removal of Bismarck in 1890 was dramatic, and it led directly to the military having the most powerful influence over many elements within German society. Bismarck, while obsessively concerned with the potential for France to take revenge upon Germany for its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, had a conciliatory approach to foreign policy.17 As Stephen Lee has suggested, with the unification of Germany Bismarck considered Germany a “sated power” with “further additions of territory … unnecessary and undesirable”.18 Indeed, Bismarck thought Germany should divorce itself from thoughts of empire entirely and concentrate instead on its position within Europe: The risk is too great for me. Your map of Africa is a very fine one, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. There is Russia; on the other side is France; we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa.19 Bismarck instead intended Germany to consolidate its power on the continent and “cultivate what (it) had won”20 and not waste energy and resources on competing with other European nations in the pursuit of empire.21 Consequently, under his leadership the German military played a considerably lesser role than it was to play under Wilhelm II. After 1890 the military began to influence the direction and culture of much of the German state. Concerned about the possibility of revolution by the working masses the Kaiser and the military elite set about fostering militarism; a sense of patriotism geared towards an extension of German military and economic power.22 As the German Foreign Minister, Bernard von Bulow, explained in 1897; “I am putting the main emphasis on foreign policy. Only an assured foreign policy can help to reconcile, pacify, rally and unite”.23 Thus the military, supported by arms manufacturers like Krupp, began to gain considerable power over all elements of German society. Indeed, the rise of militarism can be seen as a direct reflection of government policy, policy that was ultimately governed by the military.24 The main target for the military’s newly created wrath was Britain. Britain, it was thought, was in direct competition with Germany should the latter seek to acquire an overseas empire. Consequently, with support from large sections of the population, and under the direction of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, secretary of State of the Imperial Naval Office, Germany sought to build a navy that would significantly threaten British naval dominance.25 Arguably, it was this naval arms race, brought about by the changing nature of German character, which ultimately brought Germany into conflict with France, Russia and Britain in 1914. However, what is important to stress here is that the decision to expand the navy was a direct policy initiative by the military. Concerned with internal dissent, and seeking the political prestige that comes from controlling large and powerful armed forces, the military directly set out to dominate all elements of German society; and in doing so gathered considerable public support within many elements of German society. Indeed, the military sought to change the nature of German culture and instil a sense of militarism within the German character. Towards the end of the century the Kaiser himself began to influence how the military was perceived among elements of German society. He projected a martial bearing by being seen in full military regalia and making sure that the public knew that his closest advisors were members of the armed forces.26 Moreover, he believed that the best way to gather domestic support for foreign policy adventures was to stoke the supposed burning hatred the German people had for Britain.27 In this he may have over-anticipated the true extent of such feeling, but nonetheless, the Kaiser’s intentions were obvious – he intended to cement the military as the most important element in German society. Considering how enthusiastic the German populace embraced war in 1914 the evidence suggests that to a certain extent he proved successful. In the years immediately proceeding 1914 control by the military had become almost complete. The arms race with Britain had resulted in a belief that war was looming, indeed it was Germany’s arms build up that was most responsible for forcing an alliance between Russia, France and Britain – the very thing that Bismarck had earlier sought to avoid. By the end of 1912 the head of the army, General Helmuth von Moltke, lent his support for a pre-emptive war against the gathering forces encircling Germany, but it appeared the Kaiser required little prompting.28 By the beginning of August 1914 Germany was at war and the domination of the military over most of the elements of German society was complete. This was the triumph of militarism. At the beginning of 1881 the position of the military within German society was significant yet not overpowering. Under Bismarck’s leadership Germany sought to remove itself from the world stage and concentrate instead on consolidating the gains it had won after unification. Starved of foreign opposition the armed forces had to be content with reliving past glories while competing with other elements in German society for power and recognition. However, with the demise of Bismarck in 1890 there was a profound shift in German policy. Supported by industrial concerns the military offered itself to Wilhelm II as saviours of the German people. Exploiting fear of foreign invasion, combined with the fostering of public excitement over future imperial ambitions, the military soon became the pre-eminent force in German politics. By 1914 it was the military that was advising an already belligerent Kaiser, claiming that war was not only possible, it was desirable. Consequently, while not initially a dominant force in shaping the character of the German people the military ended the period as the most important factor in the lives all Germans. Bibliography Primary Documents: Bismarck to unknown explorer on the lack of German interest in colonies in Africa: http://www.archive.org/stream/developmentofmod007381mbp/developmentofmod007381mbp_djvu.txt accessed, 04.10.2010. Secondary sources: Balfour, M, Germany: The Tides of Power, NY, Routledge: 1992. Cecil, Lamar, “The Bismarck Papers”, Journal of Modern History, 47, (1975): 505-511. Clark, Christopher, Iron Kingdom: The rise and downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947, London, Allen Lane, 2006. Crankshaw, Edward. Bismarck, NY, Viking Press: 1981. Fulbrook, Mary. A Consise History of Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1991. Lee, Stephen J, Aspects of European History, 1789-1980, London, Routledge: 2007. ———— Imperial Germany, 1871-1918, NY, Routledge: 2005 Ozment, Steven, A Mighty Fortress: A New History of the German People 100 B.C. to the 21st Century, London, Granta, 2004. Sturmer, Michael, The German Empire; 1871-1919, London, Pheonix, 2000. Williamson,, D. G., Bismark and Germany 1862-1890, London, Longman, 1986 Read More