Was Iraq Doomed from the Start Not to Become a Nation - Essay Example

Name Task Title Date WАS IRАQ DООMЕD FRОM THЕ STАRT NОT TО BЕСОMЕ А NАTIОN? Introduction When the British defeated the Ottoman and claimed Mesopotamia after World War 1, they established a new state by combining three large provinces namely Baghdad, Mosul and Basra to create the present day Iraq.1 An administrative mandate over it was granted to Britain by the League of Nations during the year 1920 and after independence in 1932, the Britons oversaw the installation of a Britain-friendly monarchy that lasted until a 1958 coup, and yet another coup in 1963 brought the Arab Nationalist Baath Party into power.2 While Iraq has existed for almost a century however, national harmony has not been achievable, mainly due to politicized ethnic and sectarian tensions. Although there were ethnic differences within the Iraqi society since colonial times, the promotion Al-Tikriti, ‘Was there an Iraq before there was an Iraq?n of such differences by leadership in consolidating power prevented nationhood. This paper discusses why it has so far been difficult for Iraq to become a nation. The Turkish Ottomans ruled the area covering present day Iraq between 1515 and 1918. Loyalties were mostly towards denomination, and not ethnic or national affiliations. In order to manage the tensions arising, the Ottomans allowed denominations to rule themselves without interference. Although this did not efficiently establish an imperial identity across the territory, it ensured tranquility. Identifying the Ottoman ruler as both Sultan and Caliph ensured loyalty from the majority who were Muslims, as a result of which the people ended up not really feeling that they had been ‘occupied’ by the Ottomans as happened under the British later on.3 British colonization helped to slightly ease ethnic tensions as various groups came together to resist its oppressiveness. There was a subsequent revolt in1920, and this united various tribes that valued freedom. The Sunni and Shi’ite tribesmen fought together during the liberation war.4 During their rule, the British were considered to be foreign occupiers, and the measures that they put in place to dominate the locals were strongly resisted. The British at that point realized that the Ottoman approach to local leadership had been effective and tried to promote the idea of tribal leaders but it failed. The unity that the Ottomans had put in place had disappeared, and in its place, there was ethnic rivalry. The rivalry did not however stop the uprising against Britain. Since then, Iraq seemingly became structurally unstable for good.5 Sunni and Shi’i sectarianism since colonial times strongly characterized politics.6 The Sunnis were predominant in the military and politics.7 After 1921, the country was ruled by an imported monarchy and the bureaucracy was mainly made up of Sunni Arab elites who were by then the best-educated though a minority. State organs were created and political party formation allowed. However, the government was never a liberal monarchy. It also needed a national army, and this was constituted as from January 1921. The British were meanwhile responsible for the country’s defense. The army remained an internal-security formation and in the 1920s and 1930s was supported by the British. The British would retain their military decision-making power until 1932.8 The prominent role of the military in public affairs within the background of ethnic competition worsened the country’s unity.9 Military and security organs were closely associated with the subsequent state formation as from 1921. For a long time, the leadership in Iraq misused military power against both foreigners and their own people. Such misuse may be attributable to mistakes that were made by its British colonizers who established the state in 1921, and upheld by successive rulers.10 The military was traditionally created for dealing with internal issues, and would from then henceforth become very effective in fighting the ‘enemies’ of the state. In addition, the middle ranks of the military were political, so that it became easy for military interventions whenever there was instability in civil-military relations. Because the earliest officers were keen on fighting off British control and corruption in government, they ended up preoccupied and later experts in intrigues. They therefore took so much time playing politics at the expense of professionalism, and the monarchy on its part politicized them further by manipulating promotion and transfers, and even spying on the officers.11 As the Iraqi army grew, the officers became increasingly radicalized due to the humiliation of being dominated by foreigners and exclusion of some groups. Between 1958 and 1968, there was a period of republicanism.12 In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown by the army but the new military ruler, General Abd al-Karim Qasim was not able to create strong institutions and tackle the rising ideological differences between communist and pan-Arab nationalists. He was overthrown in 1963. This was the Arab Baath Party that pursued Pan-Arab nationalism, socialism and state-capitalism at a go. All along Sunni Arab soldiers dominated politics with their pan-Arab-nationalism. They tended to be conservative and in some cases religious, with the religious ones having links to the Muslim Brotherhood. This was a fundamentalist group that had won some Iraqi Sunni membership.13 Kurdish soldiers lost their relevance unlike the case during the monarchy.14 Many left and joined northern rebel groups, further reducing their presence in Iraq’s military, especially in 1961. As a result, Kurds were henceforth mistrusted by the state. Loyal Kurd officers were viewed with suspicion. Even though the number of Kurd soldiers reduced, that of Shi’is was not increased. This marginalization especially in middle and higher ranks made many of them opt to join political parties to push for their group interests. Many went to the Baath party, while others went to the Iraqi Communist Party and others established their own Islamic parties to resist secularism. The there was some institutional discrimination of Shi’i soldiers. Few were recruited and promotions or transfer to prestigious units was minimal. This trend would later be copied by Iraqi leaders. The main source of division in the ideological and political fields during the monarchy and afterwards was the tension between Iraqi nationalists and Pan-Arab nationalists. The two groups were however never consistent, and would change their approaches to issues depending on the situation. The Iraqists were generally more ideologically sophisticated while the Pan-Arabists tended to be more diverse. A large number of Sunni conservatives drifted towards Arabism due to sectarian sentiment that was against non-muslims and Shi’ites. Many army officers were part of this.15 It would be expected that having a predominantly Muslim element would be a unifying factor. However, sectarianism always had the effect of ensuring that this did not happen. The Sunni-Shi'ite differences indicate how complex the situation is, with the Shi'ites ending up agitated throughout history. Their main grievances were inadequate political representation and economic weaknesses. They also had to deal with secular cultural encroachment by Arab nationalists and being considered to be outsiders whose citizenship amounted to Iranian interference with Iraq.16 Iran was a major traditional rival to Saddam Hussein for instance, and he mostly believed the international community would give it advantage over his country, especially with regard to weapons.17 Tribal divisions were established and reinforced early during the country’s history. The British enhanced the role of tribes and shaykhs, and this would later fuel the hostility of nationalists. Tribal administration was implemented by an ad-hoc group of shayks and other tribal "elders". The kinship unit was culpable for an offender’s mistakes, and compensation was the main way of settling such cases. Tribal regulations remained until the end of monarchy rule in 1958. Democratic and nationalist leaders believed that tribalism and tribes were undesirable elements of feudalism. After the1958 revolution, there were land reforms that changed the recognition of the two aspects. The Baath regime also rejected tribalism and called for unitary national solidarity in place of multiple power centers as from 1968. This however changed during the 1990s when with the Kuwait war and subsequent sanctions, the regime became weaker and opted to reconstruct tribes, shaykhs and tribal judicial tribunals.18 Saddam Hussein was part of the Baathist coup that had taken place in 1963. He in turn engineered a bloodless coup in 1968 that made him the country’s ruler. His rule however marked a turning point for sectarian tensions in the country.19 The rise of Saddam Hussein reinforced the role of the military, in the process making ethnic and sectarian tensions even worse. Saddam acknowledged the threats posed by an uncontrollable military and sectarianism. To deal with ethno-sectarian resistance, he opted to use military violence, supported by intelligence and security services. He transformed the military from handling internal to a modern, well-equipped force that he believed would protect the entire Arab world if necessary.20 Saddam became totalitarian in controlling his party, with all aspects of society being monitored by the party ranks. The intelligence conducted a lot of surveillance and military officers were divided so that they could not rise against the government. Political officers were set within the military and new ideologies heavily imparted on the people. Fear was also instilled in the officers through periodic purges and even executions. He installed his relatives, clan members and people from Sunni backgrounds into the high ranks of the security service, and these would be well rewarded financially. With the country, ever so polarized, Kurdish guerillas would continue fighting the government during the 1970s.21 Sectarianism was promoted during the Baath years, especially after the War with Iran and the Iranian Revolution during the 1980s. Although there were many Shi’ite leaders in government including the cabinet, sensitive posts were reserved for Sunnis. The regime tried to eliminate every possible center of economic and social power that it was not control, but could still not completely suppress the Shi’i factor. A dramatic confrontation would occur in the south in 1991 when anti-Baath groups revolted. Although it was mainly military, it gradually became sectarian. The regime’s reaction was unfortunately extreme destruction and violence against Shi’i regions, shrines and cities.22 From the time when Saddam got to power until 1979, Kurds and Shi’ites were not included in government and were at times brutally oppressed by the government. After the Kuwaiti War, the United States offered to support their uprising against the Saddam regime, and when it backfired, the Shi’ites suffered heavily. The Kurds benefited when a no-fly zone was announced in their area. However, the Shi’ites had to face Saddam's elimination and suppression policy. Many of them fled to Iran and with support from the Iranian government, organized opposition movements that sought to remove Saddam from power. Among these was the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq headed by the al-Hakim family and the Dawa party led by Ibrahim Jafari and Nun al-Maliki.23 By the new Millenium, the splintering of Iraq along sectarian lines was an inevitable feature in every step that was made. US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld would for instance anticipate the possibility of ethic strife among Kurdish, Shi’i and Sunni groups. Such would be easy if for instance Iraq attacked the Shi’i using chemical weapons then blamed the US.24 Polarizing insurgencies were fuelled by Saddam’s rule. He turned Iraq into a totalitarian state that wrongly based state power on a small minority of Sunni. His government applied extreme coercion while terror was unleashed on non-Sunnis. After the Kuwait War and the sanctions that followed it, Saddam sought other ways of strengthening his grip on power in the 1990’s. His party lost its secularist character and allowed the both Shi’a and Sunni-related Islamist groups to establish support networks. Radicalism therefore grew and tribal leaders that showed loyalty to the president were co-opted and their activities funded. There was therefore the worsening of tensions between groups that were for and those that were against the government, hence continuing tensions.25 For a long time, Iraq provided a sense of power balance in the region, and its collapse was feared to be likely to bring in outside interests to the detriment of creation of a nation. Iraq’s regional neighbors also had a stake in stability or instability, as for instance Iran or turkey could intervene and possibly fragment the country if there was no strong power in Baghdad. Turkey could want to crush Kurdish rebellion and stop a likely breakaway from Iraq and creation of a Kurdish state. Iran could, in the Eastern side decide to try and access Iranian opposition groups that are sheltered in Iraq, for instance the Mujahidin El Khaq (MEK).26 The military and security force composition during Saddam’s era ensured the continuation of insurgency and therefore instability. The government ensured that Saddam’s loyalists, especially those from his clan and its linkages, staffed the key institutions that it relied on. Because of the many effective operations that they conducted, especially in coup-detection and handling of Shi’i and Kurdish insurgencies, the organs gained a lot of intelligence, counter-intelligence and security experience through the years. Such organs later became useful in the planning and execution of insurgencies after the fall of Saddam.27 After the fall of Saddam, Sunni groups and their neighbours have been unable to come to terms with a Shi’i government. The Iraqi Sunnis would for instance refuse to participate in the parliamentary elections, instead opting for insurgency. This may be understood from the fact that after having been in charge of the country since the Ottomans rule and oppressing Shi’is resistance is expected. Cooperation between the two groups has continued being difficult. The push for an independent Kurdish state also remains alive, and Sunni neighbours of Iraq such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have generally not been for a Shi’i government. With such pressures, becoming a nation seems difficult.28 Considering the challenges that have been faced by Iraq over the years, the making of a nation appears difficult. This is mainly because even the regime change that was witnessed was not the result of strategic choice or socioeconomic conditions. Rather, it arose from foreign intervention. Normally when this happens, there are various advantages that include reconstruction funds and assistance in the process of political reconstruction. The success of such measures is usually guaranteed where the targeted regime that was brought down was internally strong, as was the case for instance in Afghanistan. Iraq under Saddam Hussein however had a low level of political autonomy. The civil society also had limited autonomy and the rule of law was not really upheld. It was a typical totalitarian regime and because civil liberties, the rule of law and democratic opposition was not present, defeat in war was the only way to effect a regime change, and the effect would never be unifying. The country therefore remained in turmoil.29 The fragility of Iraq due to a weak centre was a cause for fear even among the military leaders that sought to deal with Saddam. Secretary of state Donald Rumsfeld for instance expressed the probability of the United States being unable to manage the situation after Saddam’s overthrow, as a result of which the country could split into two or more parts hence negatively affecting the Middle East as a region while benefitting Iran.30 In conclusion, the undermining of Iraqi nationhood started during the colonial times and was after having been reduced for a while, reintroduced and strengthened by the Saddam regime as from 1968. Strong ethnic and sectarian differences were the main reasons why Iraq was not able to become a nation. Although the challenges they posed were traceable to the colonial era, their effects would however have been minimal if the post-independent governments had been keen on democratization and unification of the country. The divisions were instead worsened throughout successive military regimes. The Baath party had the chance to change everything, and even started doing so, but the need to consolidate power later led to Saddam’s resolve to marginalize others more. Ethnic and sectarian discrimination of the sort experienced under Saddam definitely made some groups to felt threatened and become more attached to their smaller identities, hence a recipe for continuous instability. Bibliography Primary Sources U.S. Central Command., Desert Crossing Seminar: After Action Report, June 28- 30, 1999 Donald Rumsfeld., Snowflake, An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to Be Considered and Addressed, ("Parade of Horribles"), October 15, 2002 Federal Bureau of Investigations, Saddam Hussein Conversation with FBI Agent George Piro, June 11, 2004 Secondary Sources Al-Tikriti, Nabil., Was there an Iraq before there was an Iraq?, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol. 3 (2), 2009, pp.133-142 Gunter, Michael., Iraq: People, History, Politics, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61 (4), 2007, pp. 719-720 Hashim, Ahmed., Military Power and State Formation in Modern Iraq, Middle East Policy, Vol. 10 (4), 2003, pp.29-47 Hughes, Geraint., The Insurgencies in Iraq, 2003–2009: Origins, Developments and Prospects, Defence Studies, Vol. 10 (1-2), 2010, pp. 152 - 176 Noorbaksh, Mehdi., Shi’ism and Ethnic Politics in Iraq, Middle East Policy, Vol. 15 (2), 2008, pp. 53-65 Rayburn, Joel., Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2014) Sassoon, Joseph., Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Stradiotto, Gary., Democratic Prospects in Iraq: A Comparative Approach, International Politics, Vol. 43 (5), 2006, pp. 574-595 Zubaida, Sami, Davis, Eric and Bashkin, Orit., Iraq: History, Memory, Culture, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 44 (2), 2012, pp. 333-345 Read More