Franco Prussian War of the 19th Century in Europe - Essay Example

FRANCO PRUSSIAN WAR 19TH CENTURY EUROPE By Franco Prussian War 19th Century Europe Introduction The Franco-Prussian war is a notable era in the history of Europe because of the impact the events that preceded the war had on the entire continent. Before the war broke out in 1870, France had engaged Prussia in a number of conflicts in the form of Napoleonic wars, consequently annexing its territories and taking a number of Germans to serve in the French army (Wawro, 2005). The acts angered the Prussians and they adopted a wait and saw tactic, to find a perfect opportunity to attack the French. However, a generation down the line after the first Napoleonic war broke out, the Prussians consistently grew both politically and militarily as was demonstrated by their victories against Denmark and Australia. It is from this premise that the French became apprehensive of the aggressive resurgence of Prussia’s military, which was growing at an astonishing rate and thus perceived it as a threat to the French supremacy, which had regarded itself the strategic military powerhouse of Europe (Wawro, 2005). France, therefore, planned to act promptly to bring Prussia under control by trying to bring its military to its heels to avert any possible threat from that state. During the time, Napoleon III had been duly elected as the president of France but the constitution of the country provided that presidents should only lead for a term of four years. Therefore, when his term was about to elapse, he staged a coup and declared himself the Emperor of the Empire (Schwartz, 2011). Notably, Napoleon III enjoyed broad support, especially from the peasants in the rural areas but the elite majority in the urban areas were against his autocratic rule and thus he conspired to engage Prussia in a brief war to restore confidence in his empire, as well as, restore the pride and prestige of France as the limitary powerhouse of Europe. However, despite the military prowess and technological advancement of the French, they were defeated by the Prussia that had minimal technology advancement in its operations (Badsey, 2014). The paper examines some of the key issues that led to the defeat of France in this particular war despite being the better side. The Franco-Prussian war of the 1870 that marked the fall of France as the military powerhouse of Europe was a significant period that led to the unification of the German states. Factors Explaining Prussia’s Defeat of France In 1870 War The Franco-Prussian war of the 1870 would have broken out much earlier than it did because the stage was already set after Prussia defeated Australia in the 1866 war. Prussia demonstrated that its military superiority had come of age but to the French, it was a threat that had to be averted with the earliest opportunity possible. Despite the stakes for the war being high since 1866 the war delayed until 1870 since Napoleon III needed more time to undertake military reforms in his army while Bismarck, the Prussian Prime Minister, required some time to unify the Northern and Southern Germany states in order to face the enemy in a consolidated and more confident manner. The primary reason that the French went into this particular war was to quiver the growing aggression of the military strength of Prussia while the Prussia needed the war to facilitate the German unification process as well as to recover part of its territory that had been annexed by France during the Napoleonic wars (Wawro, 2005). One of the significant reasons that led to France’s defeat in the 1870 war was the haphazard military reforms enacted by Napoleon III prior to the war. Firstly, the victory of Prussia over Australia was the central premise from, which the military reforms were founded. Napoleon wanted to enact reforms to strengthen his army to combat Prussia’ rising victory in war and to diminish its military superiority so that France would retain its continental military power (Wawro, 2005). Under the reforms, Napoleon proposed the use of chassepots and militarise as the chief weapons for all France’s future conquests since at that time, the nation had experienced major technological revolutions, which would enable it to invent more superior and sophisticated weapons to use during war (Shann, 2014). However, Napoleon III allowed the French national assembly to vet all funds meant for military modernisation, implying that any artillery upgrading exercises, had to wait for the legislature to approve its budget before it was undertaken (Wawro, 2005). Thus, the move derailed and often led to under allocation of resources to the French army to undergo rapid modernisation or to upgrade its arsenals. Moreover, under the very military reforms, Napoleon utilised millions of Francs on baseless adventures such as the Mexican invasion money that would have otherwise been used to modernise the army and strategically position it as the continental powerhouse. On a personal level, Napoleon III misappropriated public money for personal use and thus forced the army to work on a limited budget that limited the initiation of most of its activities (Barry, 2009). Similarly, Napoleon III spent a substantial amount of capital on France’s Navy in an effort to match the naval superiority of the English navy instead of maintaining a learner fleet and providing manpower to other army corps and using the rest of the money to modernise the artillery of the French army. The notion of military reforms was a hurried venture that was conducted promptly by Napoleon III without counsel from advisors. The issue of misappropriation of funds was at the centre stage of the entire reform process as money was channelled to unnecessary projects while the critical .priorities such as artillery modernisation were ignored. Thus, it is critical to note that had the French Empire invested in modernising its arsenal, the outcome of the war would have been different since France enjoyed all aspects of advantages compared to Prussia (Wawro, 2005). Prussia’s pre-war planning was a significant factor that contributed to its victory over France, which lacked any form of contingency planning in its approach to the war. Prior to the war, Bismarck the Prussian prime minister worked hard to consolidate the North and South states of Germany to face France. The consolidation of the German states gave Prussia advantage of the France by enabling Bismarck to mobilise about 400,000 armies against France’s 200, 000 men. Moreover, this enabled Prussia to receive a consistent supply of reserve army personnel to the battlefront that was facilitated by the use of railroads (Wawro, 2005). Conversely, Bismarck was educated and had witty advisors who formulated elaborate policies and strategies for the war in advance by ensuring everything was in place before the provocation of France into war (Shann, 2014). On the other hand, Napoleon III was uneducated, and only sought advice from his senior military men, most of whom comprised his supporters and friends that had limited knowledge on the battlefield. Thus, because of inadequate and poor planning, the French’s logistical system collapsed and the army that had advanced in the battlefield away from their deposits, suffered from starvation and lack of ammunition since there was no elaborate system that was in place to replenish the suppliers. Therefore, the situation led to a compromised French army and as result the men grew weaker and weaker due to starvation and lack of ammunition, thus made them susceptible to the Prussian army who were well equipped since their military structure had elaborate systems for replenishing supplies through the use of railroads. Therefore, the failure of the French logistical system gave the Prussian army an added advantage over the limited number of the French army, which had grown weaker and lacked ammunition. That notwithstanding, the situation led to the loss of morale among the French military since they were operating in adverse conditions that would not enable them to fight well on the battlefield (Badsey, 2014). Technical defects demonstrated by the French army were the other factors that led to the defeat of France by Prussia in the 1870 war. Despite the fact that France was technologically advanced compared to Prussia, it opted to utilise chassepots as their main artillery on the battlefield in line with the military reforms that were initiated by Napoleon III (Barry, 2009). On the other hand, despite the Prussians’ technological inferiority they employed more superior artillery compared to their counterparts. For instance, the Prussia Army utilised the German Krupp Breech loaders that earned them a 6-30% shooting range advantage compared to the chassepots that were used by the French army, which had a 0-37% firing frequency power (Wawro, 2005). Notably, the technical differences manifested by the two parties made the French army adopt a defence oriented approach rather than aggressively combatting their enemies. Rivalry and political infighting were another significant factor that characterised the relationship of a number of senior French generals because Napoleon often promoted his close confidants and supporters to lead the army. Thus, by overlooking the military hierarchy that was in place he unknowingly created a recipe for the downfall of the French army, which ultimately led to his defeat in 1870 (Barry, 2009). Moreover, the acts of Napoleon III led to a situation in which senior officers in the armed force were subordinated by junior commanders who were inexperienced due to their close association with the Emperor and this led to poor command and planning in the army during the war, thus leading to Napoleon’s defeat. Similarly, the French military had been traditionally indoctrinated to a system in which they employed a defence oriented tactic in their war strategy. They would always wait, for the Prussians, to pursue them before they would respond to repeal their advancement. The approach made them forego numerous opportunities in which they had a superiority advantage over a smaller Prussian target, to attack and subdue them. This contributed to the overall resurgence of the Prussian army since their small number organisations would not allow the French military to lay ambushes unlike in the case of the French (Shann, 2014). Conversely, the Prussian command structure was quite elaborate with good advisors who were offering informed insights to the generals. The level of coordination and efficiency on the ground was enhanced as the troops were highly mobilised due to the availability of elaborate leadership structures throughout the course of the war. Therefore, the Prussian command structure was far much superior compared to that of the French. The Prussian military devolved its chain of command from the senior generals to the front line officers on the battlefield and thus enhanced the coordination and cooperation among the troops in the various war fronts (Barry, 2009). Thus, this allowed the military to have the flexibility and freedom to resort to techniques that fitted the situation as decisions would be made promptly by the front line officers leading them (Wawro, 2005). In contrast, the French army employed a rigid form of command whereby the general was the only individual that was mandated to give orders or directions in the field. The idea brought about numerous bottlenecks that hindered the efficiency of the military in their activities as the process of critical decision making was significantly slowed down because decisions had to come from the headquarters to the battlefield (Badsey, 2003). This played to the advantage of the Prussians as they had a humble time to launch attacks before the French army settled on a course of action. In addition, the French army lacked a clear command structure since Napoleon III always looked upon his General Bazaine to make technical decisions yet he had no adequate military experience to make such important decisions. For instance, the two leaders would often exchange responsibility by expecting the other to do certain roles, thus exposing the army in the battle front to danger from the Prussian army. This led to them suffering constant Prussian attacks as they would respond in good time (Wawro, 2005). Conclusion In a nutshell, the defeat of France by the Prussia in the 1870 war cannot be attributed to the superiority of the Prussians rather to the failures of the French military and government in general that led to inadequate preparation and execution of duties during the operation. The French had a superior army both in numbers and experience, but their planning and execution suffered a number of failures that gave the Prussian army advantage to conquer them. The French army that participated in this battle was the most proficient to have ever encountered the Germans in the 1870 war since the causality rate stood at 0.7 French soldiers to every Prussian compared to the 1914 in which the rate was 3.8 to 1, and the 1940 in which the rate was 2.6 to 1. Ultimately, it is prudent to conclude that internal inefficiencies among the French were the primary factors led to their defeat in the 1870 war against Prussian. References Top of Form Bottom of Form Badsey, D. S., 2014. The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd. Barry, Q., 2009. The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71 1 1. Solihull, England: Helion. Badsey, S., 2003. The Franco-Prussian War, 1870 - 1871. Oxford: Osprey. Schwartz, V. R., 2011. Modern France a Very Short Introduction. Oxford, USA: Oxford University Press. Shann, S., 2014. French army 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War (2) Republican troops. London, LA: Osprey Pub. Wawro, G., 2005. The Franco-Prussian war the German conquest of France in 1870 - 1871. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Read More