The Italian Campaign - Essay Example

The Italian Campaign The allied decision to invade Italy was done as a means of ensuring that there was a final pushto defeat the axis powers of Italy and Germany in the European theatre of the war. The planning for this invasion was done despite a lot of opposition from different sides of the allied powers which believed that such an invasion had to be put off in favour of other sectors of the European war. While this may have been the case, the main intention of the war was to ensure that the German forces in Europe were drawn from the conflict in Normandy and concentrated instead in Italy; therefore, securing the allied invasion of German positions in Europe through placing a firm foothold in France. With German distraction in Italy, the strategist among the allies believed that it would be much easier for them to attack and move quickly through the rest of Europe until such a time as Berlin was captured. The Italian campaign therefore consisted of the landings made by the allies in the southern parts of Italy and their advancement over the next two years northwards towards Germany in a bid to ensure that the latter fought a three front war which would not only deplete its resources, but also ensure that it did not have enough focus to fight the allies in a concentrated manner (Carver 2001, p.195). In this way, the allies were able to ensure that not only were the western and eastern parts of Germany threatened, but also its southern flank, based in Italy, so that the invasion that began in Normandy spread across France, another led by the Russians moved in from the east, and the Italian campaign took place in the south. While it was a strategically sound idea, the Italian campaign was one of the most costly battles in the European theatre of the war with a large number of allied troops being killed in the treacherous terrain formed by the Italian mountains. The idea for the Italian campaign began even before the end of the North African campaign but this was set against a background of disagreements between the various allies concerning whether the invasion of Italy was the best means of dealing a blow on the axis powers. The British were the biggest proponents of the Italian invasion believing that the more traditional strategy based on naval power was the best means of bringing down the axis powers because they would be able to weaken the latter in a gradual manner. This is the reason why the British chose to base their operations on the invasion of Italy because of the easy access to the Mediterranean which would ensure the swift movement of troops and supplies to the battle zone (Hosch 2009, p.122). However, the British approach was met with strong resistance from the Americans who believed that the best strategy was to go directly after the Germans in northern Europe. The Americans were more confident in their troops because they has a bigger army which was well versed in land warfare and this is the reason why they felt that the main force of the Germans had to be dealt with in a swift manner so that they could be decisively defeated. However, despite the American desire to go after the Germans in continental Europe, the main problem of such an initiative was that the war on the Atlantic had to be decisively concluded because without such conclusion, there was a likelihood that the Germans would have attained naval supremacy, essentially blockading the allies. The Latin American countries which supported the allies believed that the best place to start would be with the invasion of Spain because Francisco Franco, while having remained neutral during the conflict was very friendly with Germany and Italy and it was feared that when the allies least expected it, Spain would end up assisting the axis powers. However, while the Americans and the British disagreed on the strategy of defeating the axis powers, they eventually came to the conclusion that the best means of ensuring a victory was by creating more fronts of the war so that the axis armies, which were numerically inferior, would be divided and would therefore not be able to coordinate themselves properly. Therefore, with a large presence of troops in the Mediterranean who had been trained in amphibious warfare, the argument of the British won out and the Italian front of the war was opened by the allies. In this way, the British, the Americans and other allies invaded Italy with the intention of dealing this country such a blow that it would have to withdraw from the war. This invasion took place because Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States was persuaded that in order to keep the troops of his country active in the European theatre, there was the need to ensure that Italy was eliminated from the conflict. The allies also realized that if Italy were removed from the war, it would make it possible for the British navy to completely have dominance over the Mediterranean, meaning that Germany would no longer have plenty of places where it could exercise its naval power (Jackson & Gleave 2004, p.400). The importance of the Italian campaign lay in the belief that if the Italians were no longer a threat, the allies would be able to dominate the lines of communication not only to Middle East, but, through the Suez Canal, the allies would be able to project their power into Asia; ensuring that they were able to effectively fight and eliminate Japanese aggression in the region (Blaxland 1979, p.284). Moreover, it the Italian campaign was relevant in making sure that the Germans concentrated on the allied forces on the southern coast of France as well as the Italy, essentially removing some of its troops from the Eastern Front. The result would be that the Soviet military would have less pressure in their advance towards Germany and Berlin. In addition, Italy, which had also sent its troops to the Soviet Union along with the Germans, would have to withdraw in order to defend the homeland from allied invasion resulting in a faster Soviet advance into Eastern Europe. The Italian campaign, also known as Operation Husky, started with the assault of Sicily where there were both aerial and amphibious landings on its southern shores (DEste 1990, p.38). It was mainly because of this invasion, which had been completely unexpected by the Fascist regime, that the latter lost even a smattering of credibility as people realized the dilemma into which this government had put Italians by allying itself with Germany. The result was that Benito Mussolini, the Fascist leader and his government was overthrown with the former being arrested two weeks into the allied invasion. A new government under Marshal Pietro Badoglio was formed in Rome with the new leadership immediately getting into secret negotiations with the allies to withdraw Italy from the war (Ellis 1993, p.255). While this was taking place, however, the allied forces kept on their advance through Sicily and by the middle of August 1943, they had captures the major Sicilian port of Messina where they expected to fight a significant battle. The expected fight did not materialize because a majority of the Italian and German troops on the island had evacuated to the mainland, meaning that despite the swift movement of the allies, the axis powers had received relatively few loses. Because of the few axis loses in the battles on Sicily, the allied victory came to be undermined by their failure to either capture or kill the fleeing axis forces to the mainland, meaning that they would have a harder fight ahead. While the allies were launching their Italian campaign in Sicily, the German moved sixteen additional divisions to Italy in order to prevent the allied forces from gaining a foothold on the mainland. The German leader did not want the southern parts of Germany to be vulnerable to the allied air forces if the latter were to establish airbases on the Italian mainland. Furthermore, some of the German oil supplies came from Romania and if the allies were able to capture Italy, these supplies would be vulnerable, hence the swift German move to halt the allied advance in this country. Field Marshal Kesselring, the German commander of the divisions in southern Italy was ordered to ensure that the allied advance proved as costly as possible so that they would not easily get a foothold in Italy. The allied advance in Italy was nearly brought to a halt by the Germans who within a few weeks had essentially taken over the defence of the country. The fact that the Germans, seeing the need to protect their interests, were determined to hold on to Italy for as long as possible so that they would be able to keep Germany safe from an allied incursion. They therefore undertook a massive build-up of forces on the Italian mainland in anticipation of the allied advance and when it did take place, the Germans drove back the amphibian forces to the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea (Clark 2007, p.608). Through this move, the German troops were able to entrench themselves at Cassino, high in the Apennine Mountains where they ensured that the allies, who had previously had a relatively easy time in the Italian campaign, were brought to a halt for several months. The weather also seemed to be on the side of the Germans because they ensured that the allied push inland became bogged down. The result was an intensification of German air raids over the grounded allied troops as well as the continued confusion of the allied command on how to make their next move in the campaign (Orgill 1967, p.5). The weather conditions ensured that the invaders had a hard time making advances while helping the defenders to better cover their positions and make life difficult for the allied forces coming against them. Kesselring’s resourcefulness made it possible for the Germans to hold their positions for longer than they would otherwise have been able to and this was despite the logistical superiority of the allied forces. He set up defensive lines across the Italian peninsula and these practically ground the allied advance to a halt. In order to break these lines, the allies took several months and difficult battles to ensure that they got through the profoundly fortified Monte Cassino and the southernmost of the German lines known as the Gustav Line (Keegan, 2005 p.368). With the allies managing to break the most difficult of the German lines, they moved to trap the Germans using the forces advancing from Cassino and Anzio. This, however, turned out not to be the case because the American General Mark Clark disregarded his own orders by instead moving to capture Rome, essentially leaving the Germans an open line through which to escape (Parker, 2005, p.117). This escape made it possible for the Germans to continue their campaign in Italy for much longer and Clark’s move ended up keeping the resolution of the Italian campaign harder for the allies as more lives than necessary ended up being lost. Because of the priority given to the Normandy landings during the time when General Clark moved towards Rome, the Italian campaign was relegated to the background. Some allied divisions were moved from the latter campaign to act as supporting troops for the landings in France and this ensured that the Italian campaign all but ground to a halt. The result of the prioritization of the Normandy landings was that the German units in Italy continued to fight as with many casualties being received by both sides. The heavy autumn rains further hampered any meaningful moves in Italy by the allied forces and this enabled the Germans to hold on to their positions for a while longer since their moves had turned out to be more defensive than offensive. In a bid to ensure that the German forces in Italy did not move out in defense of their homeland, the allied forces remaining in Italy were instructed to pin them down for as long as possible so that the allies could move on Germany unhindered. The Italian campaign ended after the allies had pushed the German forces into Northern Italy where the latter surrendered, possibly after receiving communication about the impending fall of Berlin (Brooks 2003, p.254). The Italian campaign, with its end, had served its purpose of ensuring that the German divisions were kept away from the war in Germany and in this manner, the allies were able to advance more swiftly than they would otherwise have done towards Berlin. Keeping the German units from the Soviet held Eastern Front ensured that the Red Army’s advances pushed the Germans from most of Eastern Europe and this resulted in the removal of the axis threat from the latter region. Therefore, the Italian campaign made sure that the German forces were stretched to the limit because instead of avoiding a two front war as Hitler has desired, Germany ended up fighting a three front war because of the opening of a third front when Italy was invaded and his ally’s government removed from power. In this way, Germany was obliged to take over the defence of Italy because this was the only way through which it could cover its southern parts from an allied invasion. The Italian campaign, while it was launched with much optimism, especially considering that the allied had been victorious on the North African front, quickly turned into one of the most brutal parts of the European conflict. This campaign turned out to be very protracted and costly and it was only with the imminent capture of Berlin that the German forces in Italy conceded defeat and surrendered. The difficult battles in such places as Monte Cassino pushed many of the allied troops to their limit and it was only their determination to keep on going that made them carry the day. As has been seen above, the idea for the Italian campaign began even before the end of the North African campaign but this was set against a background of disagreements between the various allies concerning whether the invasion of Italy was the best means of dealing a blow on the axis powers. However, once the campaign was decided on, it was carried out wholeheartedly by the allies and their swift move ensured that they had a foothold in Italy. It was mainly because of this invasion, which had been completely unexpected by the Fascist regime, that the latter lost even a smattering of credibility as people realized the dilemma into which this government had put Italians by allying itself with Germany. The Fascist government suddenly lost its authority and was overthrown; a more moderate government taking its place. However, the allied advance in Italy was nearly brought to a halt by the Germans who within a few weeks had essentially taken over the defence of the country but this was rectified by the brilliant tactical moves by its commanders. Finally, because of the priority given to the Normandy landings during the time when General Clark moved towards Rome, the Italian campaign was relegated to the background but the forces pinned the Germans down in Italy until the war ended. References Blaxland, G. 1979. Alexanders Generals (the Italian Campaign 1944-1945). London: William Kimber. Brooks, T.R. 2003. The War North of Rome (June 1944-May 1945). Cambridge: Da Capo Press. Carver, Field Marshal Lord. 2001. The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Italy 1943-1945. London: Sidgwick & Jackson. Clark, M. 2007. Calculated Risk. New York: Enigma Books. DEste, C. 1990. World War II in the Mediterranean (1942-1945 Major Battles and Campaigns). Algonquin Books. Ellis, J. 1993. The World War II Databook: The Essential Facts and Figures for all the combatants. London: Aurum Press. Hosch, W.L. 2009. World War II: People, Politics, and Power. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group. Jackson, W.G.F. & Gleave, T.P. 2004. The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume VI: Part III - November 1944 to May 1945. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press. Keegan, J. 2005. The Second World War. New York: Penguin. Orgill, D. 1967. The Gothic Line (The Autumn Campaign in Italy 1944). London: Heinemann. Parker, M. 2005. Monte Cassino: The Hardest fought battle of World War II. New York: Anchor. Read More