Napoleon I as a Liberator in Conquered European Territories - Coursework Example

Napoleon I as a liberator in conquered European territories As opposed to twentieth century Europe, the nineteenth century was one of relative peace with the exception of the Napoleonic wars during its first fifteen years. Those years, along with the last years of the eighteenth century, were dominated by the armies under the leadership of a man named Napoleon Bonaparte. His unremitting military conflicts involved almost all the European countries. And since the political objectives of those European peoples who were discontented with their current situation had the greatest, if not the only, chance of having these objectives fulfilled was through a broad and wide-ranging revolution, the Napoleonic wars were a great opportunity for many of them. It is no contradiction to conclude that Napoleon was considered a liberator by many indigenous peoples in selected instances such as within the Italy and Poland campaigns. Though condemned by many as a subjugating dictator and indiscriminate invading conqueror, Bonaparte claimed that he was a liberator and that he united the peoples of Europe under liberal administrations. While it making no secret that he held ultimate power for himself, Bonaparte enforced within the nations his army occupied such innovative concepts as a constitution, law codes and effective governments. He also promoted universal education in literature, the sciences and the arts. The reforms that he had already installed in France had become part of a large-scale military effort to bring these liberating developments to other lands. His officials instituted the ‘Code Napoleon’, organized a corps of civil servants, increased employment and equalised taxes. Forced labour was abolished as were manorial dues along with the courts of nobility. “Freedom of religion was permitted, guilds were abolished, uniform systems of weights and measures were established, roads and canals were built, and secular education was promoted” (Kreis, 2000). In addition to the philosophical reasons for invading other countries, Bonaparte subscribed to the popular notion that the newly formed French government could not achieve or retain its sovereignty by simply defending their own borders. They were surrounded by countries that had kings and emperors who would fiercely attempt to keep their populous from trying to instigate their own version of the French revolution. These rulers were certainly opposed to the new government following the overthrow of the French monarchy. Bonaparte and the majority of his countrymen perceived that they had been forced to take an offensive position as a means of self-defense. Bonaparte’s army was never a total stranger to any lands of Europe as they were made up of several nationalities speaking at least six languages. This army that spread its opposition to tyranny grew directly from the French Revolution. The French Army believed earnestly that it was fighting for not only the freedom of France itself but the honorable quest of exporting their newfound freedoms and more humanitarian social and political ideals throughout the world. Napoleon and his army’s noble mission were to defend liberty against the oppressive tactics of a monarchy. Thus, others in neighboring countries, which had been suffering the same fate as the French, welcomed Napoleons army as heroes and as liberators. The occupation of Italy by the French army replaced tyrannical Spanish conquerors and, in general, seemed to be a positive step in the direction of nationwide unification. Bonaparte’s acceptance by the Italian people was further enhanced by the fact that he was of direct Italian descent and still retained the accent. Though successful in the Italian campaign, Bonaparte was especially embraced by citizens of East Central Europe as a liberator as these people had been suffering under foreign suppression and control.      Polish citizens that were exiled from their native land by enemy governments quickly gave their support and loyalty to Bonaparte. Poles, under the direction of General Dabrowski, a leading figure in the ongoing insurrection, succeeded in being accepted by General Bonaparte as a Polish legion fighting under his command in 1797. This unit performed well in the Italian campaign as they hoped that “his struggle against a coalition which included Austria and Russia would weaken these partitioning powers and eventually lead to a situation where they would be forced to give up part of or all their Polish acquisitions” (Halecki & Simon, 2001). For close to ten years, these hopes of the Polish troops were frustrated by temporary peace treaties signed with Poland’s aggressors by Bonaparte. He utilised the Polish forces in whatever faraway lands that he needed troops but he had not the slightest interest of broaching the Polish situation. As a result of these inactions to liberate Poland, other Poles began to anticipate a more encouraging outcome for liberation with alliances with Czar Alexander I, who appeared to begin his reign with generous, liberal ideas. In 1804, Alexander went as far as to make the Polish prince Adam Czartoryski, nephew of the disposed king, his foreign minister. Czartoryski succeed in mapping out a significant plan for a reorganization of Europe based upon justice for all nations and including the renovation of Poland under Alexander, in a special coalition with Russia. These tangible proposals, which the czar made to the British Government in 1804 were not given serious consideration. Alexander I was likely never quite genuine with the Poles as he was commonly changing his policies and determined in 1805 to opt for the conventional Russian-Prussian cooperation. This was a shock to the Polish people and a devastating setback for Czartoryski’s reorganization plan, eventually leading to his resignation as foreign minister. Thus, many of the countries that bordered France in Western Europe did not view Bonaparte as a liberator. The fulfillment of what he thought was his destiny was at the expense of these people. To them, he was nothing more than a foreign invader, not the bearer of liberation and their actions against his army were an effort to be liberated from him. In addition, Bonaparte clearly intended to rule the territories as he liberated them from their oppressive rulers. “Those who in such a fashion become conquerors in spite of themselves are surely entitled to declare that their conquests are achieved in the name of liberty” (Ludwig, 1915, p. 57). In spite of Napoleon’s victory over the emperors of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz, the latter continued the war in alliance with Prussia during the following two years. France defeated Austria and Prussia in Germany in 1807 and pushed the Russians eastward finally reviving Polish aspirations of liberation (Wilson-Smith, 2002, p. 249). Bonaparte and his army finally garnered support when they arrived in Polish territory fighting against the two principal enemies of the Poles. Prussia was soundly defeated with an army from France that consisted of mainly Poles. This, along with political negotiations involving re-organisation, resulted in the liberation of the country. The Polish Constitution of 1791 was replaced by a new French-modeled constitution and, as a result of French-Russian negotiations, Alexander I and Bonaparte agreed to sign the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. Trying to appease Alexander I, “Napoleon limited the new body politic which was created in the very heart of East Central Europe to Prussia’s share in the second and third partition and called it not Poland but the Duchy of Warsaw. Danzig was made a free city and the district of Bialystok was ceded to Russia” (Halecki & Simon, 2001). The Tilsit agreement between the two emperors was meant to divide the continent between them (Wilson-Smith, 2002, p. 55). But as an unintended result, this agreement facilitated further conquests by Russian troops in East Central Europe. One of these invasions, the conquest of Finland, came under eastern influence but the Russian government apparently tolerated the subsequent upsurge of Finnish nationalism following the invasion. In spite of the large autonomy granted to Finland, this occupation was seen by Fins as a serious threat of ‘Russification’ for its future generations. After Tilsit, Russia was also “free to continue a new war against Turkey, started a few years earlier, which was to end in 1812 with the annexation of Bessarabia” (Halecki & Simon, 2001). During this time period, a crucial alteration came about in the relationship between Alexander and Bonaparte which affected not only the fate of the Poles but all the Central European nations as well. Austria was forced to make great territorial cessions following their second defeat by Bonaparte’s army in 1809. Those Austrians that lived in the southwestern portion of the Austrian Empire (the so-called Illyrian provinces) would realize actual liberation for the first time in many years because they were annexed by the French Empire. During the years of French administration under Marshal Marmont, the nationalist expansion of the Croats and Slovenes was encouraged and thus developed in a cultural community of all Southern Slavs. In the north, the Polish participation in the war was rewarded by adding Austria’s share in the third partition, including Cracow. For her invented role in the campaign of 1809, Russia received a small compensation, the district of Tarnopol. Nevertheless, Alexander I was so distressed by the sheer prospects of a restoration of a sovereign Poland that in 1810 he appealed for Bonapart to give him a sincere promise that this would never occur, which he was reluctant to do. The differences of opinion of the two emperors in the drafting of this declaration were typical of their growing animosity toward each other. The Polish situation is considered one of the central reasons for their break in 1812 and for a subsequent war which Napoleon referred to as his second Polish campaign. The Polish people were profoundly convinced of their impending complete liberation, which was proclaimed in advance by a French/Polish confederation created in Warsaw, but Bonaparte himself discussed Poland’s liberation in exceedingly ambiguous terms. A few partisans of cooperation with Alexander still remained in the region such as in parts of Lithuania but the great majority of people hailed Bonaparte, the emperor of the French, as a liberator who would restore the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Parts of Russia also were seeking liberation by the French army at this time such as in the Ukraine. Those faithful to the Cossack tradition were ready to join Bonaparte’s army which they hoped would then march through and conquer these southern areas of the Russian Empire (Halecki & Simon, 2001). Eager to have Russia regain its control of the entirety of Poland, Alexander I tried to persuade the more prominent Polish leaders to his way of thinking. But, in contradiction to Czartoryski, who had never allied with Napoleon, Joseph Poniatowski was determined to save at least a portion of Poland’s honor and remained faithful to France until he was killed in action during the battle of Leipzig in 1813. Polish alliances continued even after the conquests of Poland as there were Poles with Bonaparte in the battle of 1814, in Elba, and during the Hundred Days War. For many peoples of East Central Europe the Napoleonic period with these numerous territorial changes and varied expectations had few, if any, lasting positive consequences with the exception of the Russian advance in Finland and the formation of a closer relationship with French philosophies. The Poles made the greatest sacrifices and suffered the greatest frustrations and remained enchanted by the Napoleonic legend even more so than the French. Poles were not only enthralled by heroic romantic experiences of fighting for their homeland, but they also justifiably appreciated that thanks to Bonaparte, the Polish situation had been reexamined immediately after the final partition of 1795. The artificial boundaries then established were modified twelve years later, then again in 1809. The Poles remained confident that another European war would again bring their country an opportunity for liberation. Poles believed in this notion even more so because of the peacemaking efforts following the Napoleonic wars. However, the re-examination of the Polish problem by Alexander and Bonaparte did not succeed in solving it (Halecki & Simon, 2001). While Bonaparte was occupied in the attempt to conquer Lombardy and Italy for France, he issued a succession of manifestos to inform the inhabitants of the territories he was invading that he came to free them from those factions that were oppressing them. He firmly believed that all who have been disconnected with the old order would become incited to action against these tyrannical regimes; that the oppressed masses had longed to be liberated from their rulers. By this time, he and his army and its mission had become well known throughout Europe and he believed that Italians would rally with the French to overthrow the Spanish influence. Bonaparte was correct in this assessment as young Italians, who had longed for freedom, quickly united in the efforts. The malcontents in Italy were eager to greet the invading French army and wholeheartedly backed them in their undertaking. Bonaparte was of direct Italian heritage and spoke fluent Italian. He was not a French soldier in the minds of the Italian people. He was viewed as heralding the cause for liberty and equality (Ludwig, 1915, p. 58). To ensure the trust of the people of the lands his army invaded, Bonaparte placed his men on their honor by instructing them to “swear by me to spare the peoples of the world you are liberating otherwise you will be the scourges of the people. Your victories your courage, the blood of our fallen brothers will be lost; honor and glory too. I and the other generals would blush at leading an undisciplined army” (Ludwig, 1915, p. 59). While he bolstered France’s influence in Italy, he also consolidated his own power in Paris. Although he neither advocated popular freedom nor believed Italy was ready for it, he insisted upon the creation of a republic even though he always intended to use Italy as a pawn in the French game. This is the first occasion on which Bonaparte built up a political structure from a centralised force. He would then repeat the process, on an ever grander scale of creation with the intention of establishing a united Europe. When his armies had conquered a half dozen small states of northern Italy, he arranged their constitution while appointing and dismissing various local officials. He remained a dictator throughout his campaigns, yet acted on rational principles and allowed for flexibility in matters of local governmental detail. He issued proclamations announcing these states were to be free whether they wished it or not and that they were to pay him promptly in hard cash for the privilege of liberation. The French Republic had sworn hatred of the tyrants that continually besieged its neighbors and instituted the principles of the newly formed constitution within the psyche of the army as well. Their animating principle was the respect for property, humanity and religion of cultures they conquered. The victorious army of Bonaparte spread terror among the vanquished while waging war to the death against these enemies, gave the pledge of friendship to the peoples it had set free (Ludwig, 1915, p. 79). References Halecki, Oscar & Simon, Andrew L. (July 2001). Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe. (2nd Ed.). New York: Simon Publications. Kreis, Steven. (2000). “Europe and the Superior Being: Napoleon.” History Guide. Retrieved 19 April, 2006 from < http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture15a.html> Ludwig, Emil. (1915). Napoleon. Eden and Cedar Paul (Trans.). New York: Random House. Wilson-Smith, Timothy. (2002). Napoleon: Man of War, Man of Peace. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers. Read More