Clausewitzs Conception of the Relationship between War and Politics Useful for Understanding Warfare Post-1990 - Essay Example

Is Clausewitz’s conception of the relationship between ‘war’ and ‘politics’ useful for understanding warfare post-1990? Contents Introduction 3 Discussion 4 Conclusion 8 References 9 Introduction Clausewitz himself once said that war is the representation of continuing policy by all other means and so the contribution of politics in his life cannot be denied. His conceptions are helpful to understand war in recent times despite numerous technological improvements and proliferation of numerous non-state actors. Clausewitz had a direct approach in his definition of war. He states that war is used as a means to force our enemies to follow our instructions and concludes that the outcome that follows is the result of political activities. Policy determines war in a sense because it is used as a rational tool of violence which is used to achieve pre-established objectives. War is used as a political instrument which helps policies to reach desired outcomes. The objective of military force is not only defined by policy but also it defines the means by which to achieve it. If one is to understand the importance of politics in Clausewitz’s life, one has to look at his Trinitarian conception which comprises war, violence and play of policy and chance. In this regard, the first element should not be understood by any physical violence act but by the emotions that trigger the conflict. Hostility and passion play an important role in the realm of war which is irrational in affecting the deeds of men during actual conflict. The probabilities and the odds that shape up the war constitute the play of chance. These factors which are external refer to actual hardships imposed by our physical world such as technological and geographical conditions. After going through realms of irrationality and chance, it can be said that war is recognized as a phenomenon which also should have a rational driver. No one intends to start a war without being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve through this war or how he intends to conduct it. One has to be very specific and precise under such circumstances. The rational element is policy in this regard in a sense, because it is considered to be the subordinate of war to rationality. Discussion But Clausewitz’s critics claim that the arguments are limited to the time period in which Clausewitz lived. War is an extension of politics and that the governments are only capable of that is an idea made by many (Bassford, 2007, p. 28). They also claim that Clausewitzian trinity comprises government, people and army and that it is only possible within a state framework. To continue with this thought, it can be said that war has been conducted by numerous “entities”. It can also be said that claiming war as a political instrument of the state is unrealistic because it doesn’t include the conflicts caused by non-state actors (Keegan, 1992, pp. 69-73). The wars that we see nowadays are referred to as “conflicts of low intensity” and those are not between states. For example, organizations such as Al-Qaeda gained prominence in the 21st century. But Creveld states that these conflicts are “nontrinitarian wars” and that that they couldn’t be analysed by Vom Kriege (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 23). Actually he misunderstood the elements of trinity and took them literally such as state, people and army which served only demonstrative purposes as they are absent in the enumeration of trinity paragraph. Kalder also made the same mistake as Creveld when she limited the theory of Clausewitz as something which does not have any applications to inter-state conflict. Kaldor has argued that globalisation which has brought social change, changed the characteristics of war (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 134-139). Globalisation has failed to maintain monopoly over any violence that is organized and that mainly has led to the failure of state. Many armed transnational groups are fighting new wars between themselves and also with states but there are no wars between states. She also states that behind these conflicts there are political goals which have shifted from political ideas to political identity (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 38). Wars, in the first case, were fought to unite numerous groups that are different under a common roof. But the latter one is a bit exclusive than the first. It is based upon nostalgia which has its base on a forgotten past. Fear and insecurity are the weapons of identity politics and it considers people who are “different” as a threat. She also states that a new approach is required for the changes that are inherent in military tactics and also for the increase in numbers of targeted civilians. There is a growing importance for the civilian population which signals war which is “absolute” in its kind. But the Clausewitz’s theory is also able to analyse those changes (Bassford, 2007, p. 81). The strategy of targeting civilians is considered to be a demoralization technique with the main objective of undermining the resolve of opponents. There has been a tremendous support for the civilian population either morally or financially and it is also essential for the war. Clausewitz has three elements in his concept such as policy, violence and play of chance and he also established a relationship between the three. But he has not established the relation to be a balanced one. So in this case, growing importance in the population could have a direct impact on the hostility of actors or that it could also damage credibility of decisions taken by the governing body (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 213). But this doesn’t change the approach to war and so it also cannot discredit the trinity of Clausewitz. Clausewitz also recognized the fact people are very much central to war like the army and the government. The question that is really important is whether Clausewitz’s trinity can be applied to modern conflict. The example of Al-Qaeda is a good instance to test the relevance of the trinity of Clausewitz despite the changes that have been brought by the globalisation process. Echevarria says that the changes bring the elements of Clausewitz’s trinity in a relationship that is very tight (Strachan, 2007, pp. 145-158). The changes in the subjective character of war such as weapons, military forces and technology have resulted in changes in distribution of objective aspects. Clausewitz’s trinity can be considered as objective because it is universally present in every conflict. The elements of trinity may be present in a different proportion but that doesn’t undermine the relevance of each (Creveld, 1991, pp. 49-50). The relevance of each elements of Clausewitz’s trinity remains the same. It may be noted that Clausewitz only argued for the relationship factor and not for the balance factor between the elements of trinity. The war between the United States of America and Al-Qaeda shows the hostile emotions of the two parties involved in the conflict (Overy, 2006, pp. 217-219). In the case of the US, the hostility is the result of 9/11. For Al-Qaeda, the hostility can stem from specific events such as “years of perceived repression and injustices” due to certain policies adopted for the Middle East. This sentiment is quite strong to drive people and their leaders. Al-Qaeda has used this situation to their advantage to gain support of the communities throughout the entire region (Creveld, 1991, pp. 51-60). It has solved some socio-economical issues which the governing body at that point in time in that region has neglected. By doing such actions which helped them gain the sympathy and assistance of the communities and also sometimes by the use of intimidation and fear, terrorist organizations establishes powerful links with communities vital for their survival. Then to move to the second element which is called “play of chance”, one has to look back at the technological evolutions that were made in the last decade (Overy, 2006, pp. 99-109). Information technologies have amplified the war worldwide instead of reducing it. The possibilities of deceiving enemies have multiplied and so armed conflict has become a matter of making judgements and assessing probabilities. A number of drone attacks killed only civilians and also the fact that Bin Laden hid there for so long are examples of the situation. The importance of the role that intelligence plays in providing greater access to a number of information sources makes it an useful tool in deciding the right course of action (Bassford, 2007, p. 85). It is very important to clarify the roles of both the actors who are present in the conflict before moving to the third element of Clausewitz’s trinity. Al-Qaeda made it very clear that their main objective is to put an end to the dominance of the US in the Middle East and also to make the Islamic nation more powerful in the region. Their main aim was to reform the entire region according to Islamic law. The United States of America had a broader objective in their mind and their focus was to put an end to terrorist organizations. They didn’t focus exclusively on Al-Qaeda. The United States of America tried to put an end to all sorts of terrorist activities and also persuaded other nations to follow a similar approach. Ideology and culture played an important role in this regard. These two factors played an important role in deciding the way each party chooses to wage war against the other party but the strategy that was adopted is linked to their objectives (Van Creveld, 1991, pp.73-89). Clausewitz described war as an “extension of politics by other means” is well known. But it was misinterpreted and it was thought that war was just a weapon of the state policy to achieve certain political objectives. This misinterpretation is the result of the word ‘Politik’ which has dual meanings such as politics and policy. But Clausewitz also should be blamed for this misunderstanding because he didn’t define it in a language that is very simple. Kessel also argued in this regard and told that ‘Politik’ has both objective and subjective elements (Matloff, 1986, pp.169-177). The former comprises political interrelationships, emotions, and dominant ideas which are considered to be unique to a given place and time. The latter consists of the choices and preferences of the leadership regarding what type of war to be waged and what are the specific objectives that are to be pursued. Clausewitz actually had used numerous historical examples to demonstrate how political forces and policy have shaped up war from the past to the present modern age (Echevarria, 2007, p. 216). There are major advances in the field of technology, but Clausewitz’s trinity will be still relevant in future years in respect to war. But this relevance will not require the addition of the technological component as a fourth element in the trinity. War is considered as multi-dimensional by Clausewitz which comprises both objective and subjective elements. Technology resides within the three elements of the Clausewitz’s trinity without altering their basic interrelationship within it. The main point to be noted here is that the basic interdependency among the various elements of trinity will not get altered (Strachan & Herberg-Rothe, 2007, pp. 45-57). Clausewitz trinity is still valid even after the development of nuclear technology. His statement which described war as an extension of politics by other means remains as valid in the nuclear conflict as it is to traditional- style warfare. Conclusion There is a relationship between “politics” and “war” and the second term is seen to be an instrument of the first. But it is important to look at policy making as something that is inherent to non-state actors and not as a weapon exclusive to states. This view has been challenged by some authors such as Kaldor and Creveld and they interpreted it to be composed of army, government or state, and people. This interpretation is the result of the misreading of the Clausewitz’s theory of war and this is what that limits its scope of analysis. It was Clausewitz who first recognized that war has a changing nature. There are elements that are universal and always present, even if it is in different proportions. Clausewitz’s theory of war is a very valuable and important tool to understand wars of the twenty first century. It is also demonstrated here by the application of Clausewitz’s trinity in the conflict between the United States of America and Al-Qaeda, a non-state actor. But a part of the Clausewitz’s military thought has lost relevance. But Clausewitz’s conception of war, his trinity, and his knowledge on the relationship between war and Politik will always remain valid. References Bassford, C, 2007, The Primacy of Policy and the Trinity in Clausewitzs Mature Thought.  In: Strachan, H. and Herberg-Rothe, A. eds. (2007) Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clausewitz, C. V. 1976, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, abridged ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press. Echevarria, A, 2007, Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In: Strachan, H. and Herberg-Rothe, A. eds. 2007, Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaldor, M, 2006, New & Old Wars. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity. Keegan, J.1992, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6th-August 25th, 1944, London: Pimlico. Matloff, M. 1986, ‘Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945’, In: Peter P., 1976, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Overy, R., 2006, Why the Allies Won, rev. ed., London: Pimlico. Strachan, H, 2007, Clausewitzs On War: a biography. New York: Atlantic Montly Press. Strachan, H., & Herberg-Rothe, A. 2007, Clausewitz in the twenty-first century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Creveld, M, 1991, The transformation of war. New York: Free Press. Read More