Intelligence and Warfare - Article Example

Intelligence and Warfare Introduction Intelligence refers to the information relevant for the formulation, and implementation of policy by the government to further its national security interests and deal with threats posed from actual or potential enemies1. In this regard, it pertains to providing staffs and commanders with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive and tailored intelligence information about the enemy and other aspects of their area of operation. The most important role of intelligence is to help enhance operations by supporting the commander’s decision-making. Based on this definition, it becomes apparent that there is a close relationship between intelligence and the conduct of the war. The role of intelligence in relation to war and security has become vital to the U.S. and the world at large. Understanding where the adversary is, what they are doing, their equipment, and capability has always been of immense advantage to a party. This has particularly been evident after the end world wars and the cold war. The objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between intelligence and the conduct of the war. It will also examine whether there is any traditional perspective on this relationship, and how this has changed in a world of increased complexity. This paper will also discuss whether intelligence officers and the military co-located in a world of complexity and why this could be so. The relationship between Intelligence and the conduct of war As earlier stated, intelligence gathering forms an integral part of war in the world today. Arguably, no single successful war has ever been reported that has no element of intelligence. The role of intelligence in the modern arena can be traced back to the cold war era and has more recently been witnessed in the war between the US and its allies and Iraq. All these wars have only been won due to the role of intelligence in providing commanders with timely, accurate, predictive, relevant, and tailored information about the enemy. This argument is supported by two modern writers, Michael Handel and John Ferris from North America, who have reflected extremely on intelligence in war. The two writers concluded that intelligence is knowledge, and knowledge cannot be measured, and that intelligence involves forecasting. Ferris on his part described the chain of small advantages that excellent intelligence can provide arguing that in the Pacific War, American Signal Intelligence played a crucial role as it allowed the US to defeat Japan faster and without incurring high costs than could have otherwise been were it that the US had directly engaged Japan in the war using atomic bombs and without amphibious assaults on Kyushu. Hinsley also concluded that Bletchley’s high-level code breaking reduced the period of the European war by between two and four. These statements suggest that it is easy to win a war when there in good intelligence in place2. There is a widely accepted assumption among many historians that intelligence is an optimizer of military force during wartime. Handel in his study concluded that “Good intelligence acts as a force multiplier by promoting a more focused and efficient use of force… whereas poor intelligence only operates as a force divider by eroding and wasting power3. Multiplier for intelligence is taken in the perspective of a metaphor and not a calculator as to the quantity and quality that intelligence can produce. The idea of intelligence as an optimizer is very powerful. This is because one introduction to knowing a land campaign is to establish whether commanders received their portions rightly or wrongly is prima facie a sign of quality of intelligence or commanders’ willingness to listen to it. Ferris points out that in the Second World War; there is a direct connection between the triumph of the intelligence service of Germans and actions throughout the three years of combat4. In this case, Ferris noted that whenever German forces did correctly assess the intentions of its adversaries its forces had their maximum effect. On the other hand, had the German forces possessed the Allies’ intelligence, this might well have forced a stalemate in Europe. During war, commanders always require intelligence about the enemy and other aspects of area of operation before the start of execution of operations to effectively accomplish their missions. It is here that intelligence helps the commanders visualize the area of operation, organize their troops and control operations to accomplish their objectives. It also supports protection by alerting commanders to potential threats and assisting in preserving and protecting the force. It is argued that the US was able to defeat USSR due to its strong intelligence services, which helped provide the necessary information to its troops as they go to war. This was also the case during the cold war with Germans. At present, the US intelligence services with the assistance of the United Nations are working tirelessly in Iran, and North Korea to establish the capability of these two nations in manufacturing nuclear weapon as a way of preventing any potential danger to nations in future based on the fact that these nations have been found to sponsor terrorist activities according to US intelligence service report5. Intelligence is also used as a predictor of anticipated key adversary events, and reactions, which assist in developing branch, plans to counter them. Predictive intelligence is very crucial in averting any war as it helps a country through its commanders to strategize well. Any failure on the part of the intelligence service may prove detrimental to the national security of a country and the world at large. It can be said that the September 11, 2001 terrorists attack on the US World trade center might have occurred due to failure of US intelligence service to provide timely information of the imminent threat of Al-Qaida operatives6. Traditional perspective on the relationship between intelligence and conduct of war, and how has this altered in a world of increased complexity. The traditional perspective of intelligence was that a spy provides the war plans of the enemy7. However, with the emergence of new threats that never existed before during the cold war due to complexities and advancement in technologies all over the world, intelligence cannot only be viewed to concern war plans. It is for this reason that, some governments and experts are questioning whether the focus of CIA and other intelligence agencies should still remain fixed to traditional intelligence requirements. It is reported that during the cold war, it was only the Soviet Union that was viewed as being capable of destroying the US using nuclear. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the focus of US intelligence agency shifted away from USSR in which the traditional spy of enemy plan was employed. This is because the world is becoming more complex with fresh perils, and lingering threats such as terrorism that were never given much attention during the cold war. More countries have also acquired sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, which poses a lot of threat to the US and the world at large. This new threats that are emerging have considerably changed the conduct of the intelligence service as regards prevention and fighting the war. As one specialist points out with respect to public health intelligence, infectious diseases are potentially the greatest threat to human security prowling in post-Cold war era. As a result, in addition to the use of satellites that were once directed towards the USSR during the cold war, the US currently invests a lot of money in the gold-plated collection system, equipped with every conceivable bell and whistle. This equipment is said to provide a more timely and accurate information that may help combat security threats to the country8. It is revealed that the emergence of terrorist attacks directed at the US and its allies in the recent times have also changed the Congress focus on intelligence9. For instance, after 9/11 terrorist attacks, Randol reveals that the US Congress has focused considerable on how intelligence is collected, analyzed and disseminated as away of protecting the Homeland land security against threats of terrorist attacks. In fact, before 9/11, it was easy to distinguish between domestic intelligence and the foreign intelligence. However, threats to US homeland posed by terrorists are now considered a national security threat. As such, intelligence outside the US is often very relevant to the threats environment inside the US and vice versa. This has led to the establishment of numerous intelligence collection disciplines in the US to help mitigate the potential threats that are emerging in the world today. This include measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Other non-technical means have also been established. These include open source intelligence (OSINT) and human intelligence10. Are intelligence officers and the military co-located in a world of complexity? Intelligence officers and the military are co-located in a world of complexity because intelligence officers are required to provide the commander with the vital data to exploit the opposition. Effective intelligence must be created to guarantee the success of the military officers. In addition, intelligence activities are essential responsibility of command. Lack of proper intelligence services leads to command failures-just as operation failures are command failure11. The military approach to intelligence demands that commanders be personally involved in the intelligence activities. The commander is able to specify requirements and provide necessary assistance to guarantee a timely and useful intelligence product. However, the military commander must understand the practical capabilities and limitations of intelligence officers, systems, procedures, and products. The military commander is useful in intelligence activities because he provides the guidance and directions that are useful for effective conduct of intelligence operations. In addition, the commander comes up with priority requirements that must be achieved by the intelligence officers for the military operation to be successful. In the case whereby the military commander does not clarify the intelligence requirements, the military combat operations may fail to achieve their objectives. Further, the military commander is also expected to make the final synthesis of intelligence to make necessary decisions. The decision making process arising out of intelligence activities are the commanders responsibilities; it is the military commander who determines the meaning of the intelligence provided and how to use it. Consequently, the commander ensures that overall intelligence efforts are supervised to guarantee success in the military12. The military commander is also important in the intelligence activities because he ensures that intelligence requirements support the requirements of the subordinate soldiers. There are instances when the intelligence reports are unsatisfactory to military officers, however, cooperation should be enhanced between the intelligence officers and military officers in coming with the best solution.. Importantly, the military commanders must assess the intelligence training of all officers. The training of the intelligence officers must honor the military operations.13. The relationship between intelligence officers and military officers should be very close. The military involvement in the intelligence activities should not be viewed as micromanaging the intelligence section or assuming the job of intelligence. Instead, the military officers, especially the commander, must provide guidance and supervision necessary for the intelligence officers. Intelligence officers should always be involved in identifying enemy capabilities. In addition, intelligence officers are useful because they estimate enemy courses reactions. Further, intelligence officers provide necessary support to military operations by identifying vulnerabilities that the enemy can exploit. The intelligence and military operations officers must cooperate in the planning and execution of military activities. The military officers and the intelligence officers can never achieve success without cooperating with each other. There are situation when the intelligence officer must give guidelines which disagrees with the expectations of the military officers, such disagreements should not lead to disunity14. Intelligence cooperation between the United States and France has assisted in eliminating terror threats. The intelligence corporation was necessitated as early as 1994 when Algerian terrorists captured an airplane and planned to crash it into Eiffel tower. The terrorist attack did not succeed. In addition, the American CIA had to work closely with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq to fight the terrorists. Intelligence officers’ reports have been used in killing the terror group leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. Without intelligence reports, the military cannot be successful in carrying out combat operations. The military officers and the intelligence officers must be co-located in a world of complexity15. Intelligence officers are important to the military because they possess an intimate knowledge of the fighting tactics of the enemy, capabilities, organizations and tendencies. The co-location of military officers and intelligence officers in the same place necessitates mutual support. Just as intelligence officers determine opportunities to be exploited by the military officers, the military officers also provide the stimulus for the intelligence officers. Military officers are in need of additional information about the enemy and the environment. All these details must be provided by the intelligence officers. The contribution of the intelligence officers can be learnt from the experiences of Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the battle of Britain. Intelligence officers were placed throughout the organization down to the squadron level by RAF. The intelligence officers helped the aircrews receive important information during pre-mission briefings. However, the Luftwaffe deployed the intelligence officers at the wing level only. The German defeat was due to marginal intelligence support to the flying groups and the squadrons16. The co-location of military officers and the intelligence officers leads to successful military operations. Intelligence activities try to uncover enemy weaknesses that can be exploited by the military. Opportunities identified by the intelligence are important in developing the concept of military combats during planning stage and to leads to specific tactical actions in the execution stage17. Effective intelligence unit helps the military officers to learn enemy weaknesses rather than fighting ignorantly against enemy strength. For instance, the invasion of Tinian during World War II shows the benefits of intelligence activities. Intelligence officers had identified one landing area for the amphibious assault. However, the town was heavily guarded by the Japanese soldiers. As planning progressed, the intelligence officers determined that it would be fatal to attack the town across the beaches. Further, landing on undefended northern beaches was also considered. The amphibious assault was successful due to intelligence reports on the availability of safe landing beaches in the north. Intelligence reports are necessary for air force military officers in finding suitable locations to stage attacks, failure to use the intelligence reports can be disastrous18. Intelligence reports to the military generate tempo. Tempo is important in maneuver warfare. The intelligence reports help the military officers generate a higher tempo than that of the enemy. Tempo is necessary in winning any battle. Tempo can be achieved in the military by prioritizing tasks to be achieved as stated in the intelligence reports. Collection, processing, production, and dissemination operations can only be effective if they are executed as stated in the intelligence reports. In addition, tempo can also be necessitated through decentralization. Intelligence reports must be decentralized to the subordinate military staff. Decentralization ensures that military officers have intelligence resources needed to recognize and exploit enemy vulnerabilities as they arise in the battlefield19. American intelligence organizations do not operate against enemies alone. The American army and the navy have intelligence officers in the friendly states as well. Countries such as Britain, Russia, Iran and Israel are major destinations for American intelligence officers in leaning the current developments in weaponry technology. Scientific breakthroughs, especially those dealing with nuclear energy are important for the United States to design weapons that can counter terror threats. Intelligence officers normally require information concerning high velocity ammunition, ammunition loading techniques, and trace round manufacture. Intelligence activities are therefore important in developing technologically advance weapons that can counter the threats posed by the enemy weapons. Without intelligence reports, advances in weaponry technology in the military cannot be successful20. Bibliography Ferris, John. ‘Ralph Bennett and the study of Ultra’ Intelligence and National Security. Vol. 6, No. 2. April 1991. Ferris, John. Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays. Abingadon, Oxon: Routledge. 2005. Herman, Michael. Why does Military Intelligence Matter? Oxford, Changing Character of War Seminar, Oxford, 27 Nov. 2007. Jackson, Peter & Siegel, Jenifer. Intelligence And Statecraft; The Use And Limits Of Intelligence In International Society. New York. Greenwood Publishing Group. 2005. Keegan, John. Intelligencer in War: Knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to al-Qaeda London: Hutchinson. 2003. Leonard, Raymond. Secret Soldiers of The Revolution; Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918-1933. New York. Greenwood Publishing Group. 1999. Mahnken, Thomas. Uncovering Ways of War; U.S Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation. London. Cornell University Press. 2002. Posner, Richard. Remarking Domestic Intelligence. New York. Hoover Press. 2005. Randol, Mark., Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches. Congressional Research Services, January 14, 2009. Shulsky, Abraham, & Schmitt, Gary, J, Silent Warfare: Understanding the world of Intelligence (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc. 2002. United States Marine Corps. Intelligence (Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication). New York. Willside Press LLC. 2005. Read More