Iran and Israeli Current Situation - Research Paper Example

Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Evolution, Current Developments and Implications for Each Other Iran and Israeli Current Situation Introduction While the roots of Israeli-Palestinian (Arab-Jewish) conflict could be traced back to ancient times, the Iranian nuclear ambition is an understandably more recent phenomenon, which originated at some point during the Cold War as part of the Eisenhower Administration’s decision to share nuclear technology with some foreign nations – then America’s allies – that vowed not to develop nuclear weapons (Roe, 2007). Even though both issues appear prima facie cases of mainly regional concern, they have enormous potential for creation of problems worldwide and significant deterioration of the international relations’ system. This paper is intended to examine both issues in order to present an insight into the reasons for their origin, possible developments and interrelations between them. Iranian Nuclear Program - Historical Background Being launched in the 1970s under the Shah, the series of Iran’s ambitious nuclear projects heavily relied on the U.S. and European assistance – Iran had struck a deal with the West-German company, KWU, to build two 1 200 megawatt reactors and negotiated the construction of another two 900 megawatt reactors with the French ‘Framatome’ (Iran Watch, 2012). The goal set by the Shah had been for the country to produce over 20 000 megawatts of electricity from nuclear power stations within the next twenty years (Iran Watch, 2012). Following the revolution in 1979 and the war with Iraq that started in 1980, the nuclear energy program had been abandoned and the existing infrastructure – considerably damaged. However, since the late 1980s, Iran’s nuclear program had been revived and given a fresh impetus via the assistance from Russia and China (Iran Watch, 2012). Two bilateral nuclear cooperation protocols, signed with China in 1985 and 1990 respectively, were followed by a protocol with Russia, dealing with the completion of the reactor at Bushehr – already started by KWU – and a possible supply of a uranium enrichment plant; by that time, Iran allegedly received uranium enrichment technology via the black market activities of the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan (Iran Watch, 2012; Cronin, Kronstadt and Squassoni, 2005). Both actual progress and probable scope of Iran’s nuclear program became clear, to a degree or another, in 2003, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted a series of safeguards inspections, along with verification of Iran’s activities in the area of uranium enrichment, intended to set off implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the country (IAEA, 2003). Having found no evidence of activities related to development of nuclear weapons by then, the Agency emphasized the necessity of further inspections, enough time and Iran’s full cooperation, in order to be able to conclude that Iran’ nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes (IAEA, 2003). In 2004, however, Iran was rebuked for failing to cooperate with IAEA’s inquiry and agreed to suspend most of its uranium enrichment activity under a deal with the EU; nevertheless, uranium conversion was resumed at Isfahan plant in 2005, and Iran was accused of violation of NPT (Aljazeera, 2012). From 2005 to 2009, there were a series of breaches in Iran’s promises and the agreements with IAEA concerning the uranium enrichment activities, accompanied by sweeping U.S sanctions against the country, Iran’s rocket-test launches, including such of a of a long-range missile capable of reaching Israel, and a UN Security Council resolution on Iran’s uranium enrichment program (Aljazeera, 2012). Following the new disclosure of an underground enrichment facility at Fordow, nearby Qom, and Iran’s rejection of the international demand for freezing the project, several important developments took place in 2009, including an IAEA report that suggested for the first time Iran might be chasing nuclear weapons capability (Reuters, 2012). The talks between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany were resumed in Istanbul with Iran’s promise to put forward new initiatives (Reuters, 2012). Iranian Nuclear Program – Current Situation Since November 2011, the IAEA long-expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear program has taken much more definite shape, with the Agency’s report presenting new evidence claiming Iran is secretly working to acquire a nuclear capability; the claim was based on alleged Iranian activities ‘relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device’, including testing of explosives, experiments on detonating a nuclear weapon and computer modeling on the behavior of a nuclear device (BBC News, 2012). Iran’s nuclear program facilities network includes several key sites as follows – the uranium mines at Saghand and Gachin; the Ardakan ‘yellowcake’ production plant (ISIS, n.d.); a uranium conversion plant, currently under construction at Isfahan, which is intended to convert yellowcake into three forms – hexafluoride gas used in gas centrifuges, uranium oxide used to fuel reactors, and metal, often used in the cores of nuclear bombs; a heavy water plant near Arak; Bushehr’s nuclear power station, with two pressurized water reactors at the site; the uranium enrichment plants at Natanz and Fordo – near the holy city of Qom; and, most notably a suspected nuclear weapons development facility at Parchin (BBC News, 2012). Although the latter had been subjected to limited inspection by the IAEA in 2005, which found no proof of nuclear weapons activity, it appeared to be of considerable concern for the international community due to the possibility of being used for testing high explosives as part of nuclear weapon devices (BBC News, 2012). There are also research facilities at Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center, Tehran and Ramsar, as well as the alleged Rudan conversion facility at Fasa, Fars province (BBC News, 2012; Cordesman and Seitz, 2009). Another round of key negotiations between Iran and the P+1 formula – the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany – are scheduled to take place in Istanbul in April 2012, which, being described as ‘positive’ move toward a break in the hitherto impasse, would account for the latest important development concerning Iran’s controversial nuclear program (BBC News, 2012; Nasr, Takeyh, Perkovich and Sadjadpour, 2012). Polarized Views – the Iranian Position Iran has always declared its nuclear program to be peaceful and within the limitations imposed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which a signatory state is allowed to enrich uranium for the purposes of civil nuclear power (BBC News, 2012). Thus, Iranian leadership repeatedly stated that the country will enrich uranium only for nuclear power station fuel and other peaceful purposes, accusing the UN, US, and EU decisions, resolutions and actions concerning its nuclear program of being politically motivated (BBC News, 2012). Iran’s arguments included a fatwa, reportedly issued by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei some time ago, forbidding development of nuclear weapons; meanwhile, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran “will not succumb to bullying, invasion and the violation of its rights” (BBC News, 2012). Polarized Views – the Position of the US, EU and Israel The US view on Iran’s nuclear program could be best described as being determined by two main factors – the US position in the UN Security Council and the US foreign policy goals in the region of Middle East. While the UN Security Council is primarily concerned that Iranian nuclear program, uranium enrichment in particular, had been hidden for nearly two decades, and therefore Iran’s intentions would need be soundly clarified (BBC News, 2012), the US policy objectives in the region appear to tell a bit different story. Iran is seen as a major regional troublemaker, whose covert operations, substantial conventional military force in the Persian Gulf and proxy organizations in Lebanon, Iraq, etc. pose a significant threat to both US interests and key allies, including Saudi Arabia and Israel (Friedman, 2012). On the other hand, Iran’s close relations with China and Russia have the potential – from American point of view – to alter the balance of power in the region. Therefore, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities that would considerably increase its military and political weight in the international arena, especially in the region of Middle East, might be logically viewed as a US foreign policy goal of paramount importance. The EU position on the issue is apparently close to that of the United States, however, with some important stipulations. Insofar as the foreign trade with Europe accounts for nearly one third of Iran’s imports and the EU imports from Iran amounted to 14.5 billion Euros in 2010 (European Commission, n.d.), the EU appear much more vulnerable to possible shock waves in region, than the U.S. On the other hand, Europe has no distinguished geostrategic interests in the region, although France and the UK seemingly are willing to maintain global-power status. Therefore, both countries, along with Germany, are noticeable part of the international pressure on Iran in regard of its nuclear program. Some analysts, however, define the probability of Europe’s concerted action of any sort as unlikely (Friedman, 2012). Israel, in turn, would undoubtedly appear the most likely target, if Iran actually acquired nuclear weapons and ran the risk of using them. Given the fact that the very existence of the Israeli state could be at stake, along with the everyday necessity of dealing with Iranian proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, its aversion to, and suspicions of, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are quite justifiable. Not surprisingly therefore, Israel has repeatedly hinted, especially recently, that may carry out pre-emptive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities (BBC News, 2012). The Coin’s Third Side – Russia and China’s Positions The position of China on Iranian nuclear issue is considered to have been determined by both its ever-increasing energy demand and self-awareness as a rising global power. While Beijing is Tehran’s largest trading partner, with about 20 % of Iranian crude oil going to China’s economy (Pei, 2012), it’s also inevitably tempted to balance against the US influence in the region. Thus, China has taken middle course, recognizing Iran’s right to civil nuclear power under the international rules and treaties, as well as objecting to the use of sanctions both in general and in this particular case (Pei, 2012). Russia’s position on the issue could be defined as rather ambiguous, insofar as Russia has helped Iran to build the nuclear facilities at Bushehr, but also voted in favor of the UN Security Council sanctions against Iran (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). On the other hand, Russia was chosen to enrich Iran’s uranium according to a deal struck in 2009 between Iran, the US, France and Russia (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). Besides Russia’s growing economic relationship with Iran, there is also considerable diplomatic and military cooperation, and even a firmer friendship based on common political agendas; Russia sold air defense missile systems to Iran and called for Caspian states to keep Western influence out of the region (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). Additionally, Russia has warned the US against undertaking military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities (Farrar-Wellman, 2010). The Oil Sanctions Against Iran Given the fact that oil exports are a substantial part of the Iranian economy, the approved introduction of fresh oil sanctions on Iran by the US administration, including measures against buyers and banks that still deal with Iranian oil, would significantly hamper, even devastate, Iran’s economic development (BBC News, 2012). These measures are thought to put pressure on heavy importers of Iranian oil, like China, India, Japan, Turkey and South Korea; additionally, the EU oil embargo is expected to come into effect in June 2012, while Turkey announced a future cut in oil imports from Iran by 20 % (BBC News, 2012). Nevertheless, big consumers of Iranian oil, like China and India, are deemed to get round the sanctions by barter operations (BBC News, 2012). However, if successfully implemented, the oil sanctions would undoubtedly produce the desired effect on Iran’s willingness to negotiate with the international community over its nuclear program. Iran’s Nuclear Program – Possible Developments The future of Iran’s nuclear program depends on several factors, including the determination of the global powers to follow the hitherto course of action, the possible military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, whether by US, Israel, or both, as well as Iranian leadership’s determination to follow its own plans, no matter what those appeared to be. North Korean nuclear issue might serve as an example, insofar as the economic isolation was not enough to prevent the country from developing their nuclear program. The military option is also a bit controversial, to the degree that limited strikes would delay but not wipe out Iran’s nuclear program. Of course, there is another possibility, namely Iran to comply with the international law, most notably NPT and IAEA safeguards. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - Historical Background The year 1948 is generally accepted as the official outset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although the origins of the strife could be traced back to much earlier times. The Second World War and the Holocaust, however, became major catalysts of Europe-wide Jewish immigration on a Biblical scale, which not only mounted the pressure on Arab-Jewish mutual tolerance, but also physically and ideologically reinforced the existing, and gave rise to new Zionist clandestine groups and organizations (Isseroff, 2010). Following the British withdrawal from the Mandate of Palestine and the UN Partition Plan adopted in 1947, the smoldering Jewish-Arab conflict received a fresh impetus with the creation of the Israeli state and the consequent 1948 “Nakba’ war (Isseroff, 2010). The Sinai Campaign in the autumn of 1956 and the foundation of Fatah – the Palestine Liberation Movement – in 1957, along with the creation of PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization – by the Egyptian President Nasser as a ‘tame’ alternative to Fatah, might account for the escalation of the conflict, and more or less logically led to the 1967 6-Day war, which inter alia has profoundly changed the balance of power in the region, creating entirely new reality (Isseroff, 2010). The Yom Kippur War in 1973 appeared to have confirmed that reality, in terms of Israeli military superiority over the neighboring Arab states; but also produced an unexpected result, paving the way of Yasser Arafat and the PLO to the UN General Assembly, mainly due to European diplomatic moves aimed appeasing the Arab World and preventing another jump in oil prices (Isseroff, 2010). The glimpses of hope for a lasting peace in the region, which followed the Cap David Treaty between Egypt and Israel signed in 1979 and the 1981 ceasefire between Israel and PLO, were soon annihilated by the outburst of the 1982 War in Lebanon, aka Peace for the Galilee, and the rise of Iran-sponsored Hezbollah – the party of God (Isseroff, 2010). The First Intifada, which had begun in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1987 and resulted in massive Israeli repression, laid the seeds of further violence in the region. The Oslo peace process led to Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza strip and most West Bank cities by the early 1996, and the transfer of control over these territories to the Palestinian authority; as of January 1997, Israel and PNA (Palestine National Authority) signed an interim agreement on Hebron, against the background of continuing attacks on Jewish targets conducted by Hamas militants (Isseroff, 2010). Having started in 2000, the Second Intifada marked another eruption of violence, including suicide attacks and Israeli reprisals, which continued into 2002, despite the attempts at restoring the calm (Isseroff, 2010). Meanwhile, the UN Security Council resolution 1397 called – for the first time since 1947 – for creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel; the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield, launched in an attempt to destroy the terrorist infrastructure, succeeded to decrease the number of suicide attacks, to degree or another, but not to stop them (Isseroff, 2010). Violence escalated in 2003 during the US-led invasion in Iraq, despite the election of a new Palestine PM – Mahmoud Abbas – and the agreement known as the Geneva Accord, which proposed major concessions by both sides and was logically rejected by both Israeli government and Palestinian extremists (Isseroff, 2010). The adoption of the Security Barrier concept and the sign assassinations of important Hamas figures, like Sheikh Yassin, along with the chaos that ensued in the Palestinian territories in 2004, taken together, appeared to have played rather controversial role in the development of the Middle East conflict. The death of Arafat and the election of Abbas as President of PNA led to certain improvement in the situation insofar as Abbas called for a truce agreement; at a summit conference hosted by Egypt in 2005 both sides announced an end of the violence, followed by the disengagement plan approved by the Israeli Knesset and the London Conference, which was intended to assist in organization of Palestinian security (Isseroff, 2010). Hamas electoral victory in 2006, the Second Lebanon war, aka Operation Just Reward, and the renewed violence in the Gaza Strip once again worsened the prospects of peace in the region, until the truce announced by Israel and Palestinians on November 26 (Isseroff, 2010). Internecine fights between Hamas and Fatah militias escalated throughout 2006 and 2007, along with declining popularity of Hamas in the Gaza Strip; while the Annapolis Conference provided recognition of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian leader, Israel and the Palestinians agreed on renewal of the peace negotiations (Isseroff, 2010). An outburst of violence marked 2008, including the assassination of the notorious Hezbollah number 2 - Imad Moughnieh, the Israeli strike in Gaza and Operation Cast Lead; the settlement freeze and indirect negotiations, accompanied by diplomatic row between Israel and the U.S. over the settlements issue, were characteristic of 2009 and 2010 (Isseroff, 2010). Again in 2010, the ‘Free Gaza’ flotillas, sent to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and attacked by Israeli commandoes, sparked off a wave of protests against Israel, which finally led to certain mitigation of the blockade regime. Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks were scheduled to begin in May 2010, with the mediation of the US special envoy George Mitchell, intended to resume the peace process (Lazaroff, 2010). Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – the Current Situation As of 2011, there was increased international pressure on Israel for the so-called “two-state solution”; meanwhile, a reconciliation accord was signed by the rival Palestinian fractions, Fatah and Hamas, which, in fact reorganized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Wood, 2012). In a speech delivered on May 19, 2011, President Obama declared that the borders before the Six-Day war of 1967 should be the basis of the peace between Israel and the Palestinians; the Israeli government, however, protested immediately, defining the return to the pre-1967 borders as ‘indefensible’ (Wood, 2012). On 23 September 2011, the Palestinian President Abbas officially requested a statehood bid at the UN Security Council; in indirect reply, the Israeli PM, Benjamin Netanyahu, stated that the Palestinians “want a state without peace” (Wood, 2012). On April 17, 2012, Benjamin Netanyahu met with delegation of PNA officials and received a letter detailing Palestinian’s demands for restarting peace talks between the two sides. The US and EU Position on the Conflict The U.S. position on Israeli-Palestinian conflict is thought to have considerably evolved over the years. Against the background of continuous US military, technological and financial support for Israel as a key American ally in the region of Middle East during the Cold War and thereafter, the initial isolation of the Palestinian Liberation Movement had undergone a serious transformation to the present-day pressure on both sides to get back to the negotiating table, and on Israel to accept the two-state solution. The possibility of peaceful resolution to the longest conflict in modern human history would appear extremely tempting for the present US administration – not only because of the probable internal political benefits, but also, and especially, due to the rising regional challenger personified by Iran, and the spread of Islamic extremism worldwide, since a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians would make both Iran and Islamists a bit short of a cause. The EU position, in turn, is thought to have been determined by two main factors – the colonial past of Britain and France, along with Germany’s reminiscences of the Holocaust, and the crude oil leverage of the Arab World. That would explain, to a degree or another, the European efforts to bring Israel and PNA back on the peace path. The Arab Point of View The Palestinian cause has always been a rally-round-the-flag issue for the Arab World. From the times of Nasser’s pan-Arabism to modern-day jihad, too many political and religious leaders considered the very existence of the Jewish state to be the essence of the problem. While the post-Six-Day war realities appeared to have sobered some of them up, others, like Iran’s religious and political establishment, still regard the use of force, including terror and covert operations, as the only option open to them for dealing with the problem. The Palestinian leadership, in turn, appears more concentrated on the possible Israeli concessions, rather than considering real steps toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – the Future Given the hitherto history of the conflict, along with the Palestinian demands and Israeli unyielding position on the border question, there is real possibility the current talks to end locked in stalemate, or an outburst of violence, being sparked off by one reason or another, to annihilate all progress that has been achieved. The latter could be more or less easily done by each and every one part concerned, which regard the Palestinian cause as a banner, but not a problem to be dealt with. Or ideally, all parties concerned could simply abandon their differences, aversion and religious intolerance, and strike a deal, which to last a bit more than the previous ones. Conclusion If Israeli-Palestinian conflict found its peaceful solution in the foreseeable future, Iran’s political and religious establishment would lose one of the biggest reasons for development of nuclear capabilities, namely the necessity of opposing Israeli ‘aggression’. On the other hand, some analysts would consider Iran’s nuclear issue a major distraction from the real US, EU and Israeli problems, namely the peace negotiations with the Palestinians, economic crisis, etc. Given the current state of affairs in the region of Middle East, however, both issues – the Iranian nuclear program and Israeli-Palestinian conflict – are more likely to continue reinforcing each other while representing major deteriorating factors in the system of international relations. References Aljazeera, April 2012. 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