Sources of Mali Crisis and Causes of Military Intervention - Research Paper Example

SOURCES OF MALI CRISIS AND CAUSES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION of Affiliation SOURCES OF MALI CRISIS AND CAUSES OF MILITARYINTERVENTION Mali is a West African country that, apart from off-and-on ethnic grievances, has previously enjoyed peace. However, the year 2012 set a stage for simmering battle between the government and the Tuaregs who have for a long have had grievances regarding ownership of land1. No sooner had these rebellions started than some military officers led by Capt. Amadou Sanogo, who were angered by government’s inability to contain rebellion, staged a coup d tart ousting the then democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré. In January 2012, the French government resorted to intervene in Malian crisis that was then getting worse with each new day2. This unilateral French military intervention, though not directly under instructions of the UN Security Council, has been seen as a reprieve not only by the Malians but a majority of global nations. However, it is worth noting that this foreign military intervention had little to do with the ethnic grievances of the Tuaregs. Instead, there are a number of underlying factors, forces and groups that orchestrated the intervention. In this research paper, I seek to find out the sources of the recent military intervention in Mali. Special attention is given to the main issues of the conflict that include conflict management and security. To begin with, one major reason for global military intervention is linked to the vulnerability of the transitional Malian government. After the coup, the government in place had the duty to oversee the developments of the country in efforts to regain normalcy. Unfortunately, the civilian-led government based at the capital city, Bamako, has been made ineffective by internal conflicts and military interference. In addition, corruption that has been deep-rooted in most of the state institution has weakened the structures in place to ensure that the government is running efficiently and effectively. Whereas all this was taking place, the simmering ethnic battles in the northern Mali saw over 350,000 people displaced resulting in serious human and political crises. The people who were leading the rebellions were mostly the Tuaregs who were returning back to their country after the revolution against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Most of them were serving in the Gaddafi army and as such carried alongside with them an assortment of arms. Also, since they had just returned from a revolutionary war in Libya, these returnees were still motivated by their combative instincts to propagate the same war in Mali3. The Malian government, as well as the military, was caught unawares by the events. Their army was too weak and incapacitated to contain the insurgents. That aside, a large group of foreign Arab fighters, who are also linked to Al Qaeda, were infiltrating Mali at the same time. It is this unfolding that supposedly inspired United States and France to push for regional military intervention in Mali through the UN Security Council. The extremist groups in Mali operating in Mali are regarded as outright threats to the security of the entire world. There are three major armed Islamist groups operating in the northern Mali. They include AQIM, Ansar al Dine, and MUJAO. The origin of AQIM is traced back to the 1990s civil conflict in the nearby state of Algeria. As per now, this group has been in existence in the northern Mali for close to a decade. It is linked with the numerous and constant attacks and kidnapping of Westerners. They do this mainly in a bid to demand for ransom for their release. In 2007, AQIM is linked with the bombing that wrecked Algeria, which also included an attack on U.N. office in Algeria’s capital Algiers. The leader of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel, remains widely at large although there are reports indicating that he could be cased somewhere in Timbuktu. This group has been among United States designated Foreign Terrorist Organization for close to a decade now4. The other group is the MUJWA whose emergence is traced to in the latter parts of 2011. It was born as a splinter faction of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and is also reported to be engaged in kidnappings and terrorist attacks in the region. Towards the close of 2012, United States included MUJWA as well as their leaders under “Specially Designated Global Terrorists.” The last of the terrorist groups is the Ansar al Deen. However, this group has not yet been named among the “Designated Terrorists.” In fact, in late 2012 U.S. was in support of negotiations with its leaders in a bid to resolve the crisis in Mali. Nonetheless, this position is most likely to change considering that this group was also involved in the insurgent movement towards the south. Also, it is evident that the decision by France to intervene was greatly inspired by this development. In the recent years, Mali has been characterized by crises emanating from the political, humanitarian and security dimensions. After the democratically elected Malian government was subjected to a coup, d tart in March 2012, insurgents took advantage of the power vacuum that ensued. They expanded their operations by seizing substantial regions in the northern territory that is both vast and sparsely populated. For instance, as of January 2013, it is estimated that an area the size of Texas was under the control of three loosely linked terrorist groups. Among these groups include the infamous Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organization5. Whereas the number of these terrorist organizations seems to be small, they have becomes fortified in the recent past to the extent of ousting the ethnic Tuareg separatist group. It is worth noting that these groups were previously allied as they both recruited adherents from the local populations. Francois Hollande, the current president of France, has defended France’s intervention in Mali citing a request of assistance from the Malian government. The Malian government had evidently become wary of the advances made by the insurgents towards the capital Bamako. As such, foreign intervention was necessary as an effort to prevent Bamako from falling into the control of the terrorist. In addition, the deployment of the French military was indispensable in the protection of the over 6,000 French citizens in this capital. Since the insurgents’ primary intention is to bring the entire nation into their absolute control, there was sufficient reason to affirm their effort to destabilize or attack the Mali’s interim government. In a press statement released by Laurent Fabius, French Foreign Minister, the government of France indicated that their operation in Mali was “a question of weeks” before being halted. Nevertheless, other media reports released at the same time indicated that the extremist Islamic group were far much better equipped and trained than it had been initially anticipated by the French Forces6. Another source of the current intervention emanates from the fact that the Malian military is currently experiencing internal divisions. As such, it lacks the ability to effectively project worthwhile force against the insurgents. The same army has been previously implicated in a various human rights abuses that include torture of civilians and rape cases. Furthermore, the incapacity of the Malian army is made even worse by the fact that its number stood at 7,000 troops before defections and military defeats in the years that proceeded. As such, it remains uncertain even to date if the Malian forces will be able to effectively secure and hold territories after the French military launches the strikes. Before France ultimately opted to intervene, the leaders belonging to ECOWAS as well some Western countries had raised an alarm over the ever rising threat to international security linked to the growth of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These extremist Islamic groups have notably expanded both in its scope of operations as well as influence in Mali thus threatening to instigate a spread of violent extremist principles, and state fragmentation. Furthermore, these Islamic groups appeared to be fortified and in organized cooperation aimed at taking over Mali. Led by the AQIM, Ansar al Deen, which is also referred to as Defenders of the Faith, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) appeared to stop at nothing else other than toppling the interim government. Based on the attacks in launched in northern Mali, it became evident that there existed a clear co-ordination and sharing of personnel amongst these extremist groupings. Information regarding presence of other foreign fighter in Africa and beyond has increased concerns on global security matters. As a matter of fact, it is reported that there are links between these extremists groups and transnational smuggling networks who deal in both illegal armory and drugs7. In one of the reports released by the United Nations, it is approximated that the number of “core combatants” in northern Mali stands at 3000. The report goes further to assert that the insurgents were in an active process of recruiting more adherents, who also include child soldiers, and had “comparatively sophisticated arms obtained from Libya” as well as Malian stocks8. On the other hand, there are also other reports which suggest that the numbers of extremist forces could be roughly 15,000 combatants9. These groups are accused of imposing harsh rules and conditions touching on behavior and dress codes on the local residents of the northern Mali10. Among the worst cases of human right abuses include forceful amputation and executions, which are mostly inspired by the extreme conservative position in so far as interpretation of sharia law is concerned11. In addition, these groups have directed their attacks on historic and cultural sites, which also include UNESCO World Heritage-designated ancient mosques and tombs. Therefore, it is evidently clear that the sources of conflict in Mali trace their root to two main factors. First, the return of Tuaregs who were fighting for Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in a revolution that saw his leadership toppled and himself killed. These Libyan ex-fighters were heavily armed and orchestrated a massive rebellion in northern Libya. They claimed historical grievances as part of their reason for demanding for the separation of the northern Mali with the southern Mali. The second factor of conflict emanates from the presence of Islamic extremist groups that want to forcefully convert Mali into an Islamic state. These groups include the AQIM, Ansar al Deen and MUJAO. They have extreme conservative interpretation of the Islamic law (Sharia) thus propagating all forms of human abuses on those people who contravene their commands. These three groups seemingly work in collaboration and have international links with other global terrorist groups including Al Qaeda. The rebellious actions from the Tuaregs as well as the joint forces of the extremist Islamic groups were sufficient reason to call for urgent external military intervention in Mali. The weakened and ineffective Malian army as a result of internal wrangles could hardly contain the advances of the militants towards the Bamako. United States and France become certainly wary of the impacts of the advances of these groups. This is because they can easily establish links with the extremist Islamic group of the northern Nigeria and destabilize the entire West African region. Since 2012, United States has expressed concerns over AQIM attempt to seize the entire Mali. State officials assert that AQIM in conjunction with its affiliate parties can leverage on their presence in most parts of Mali to expand their influence by recruiting more adherents as well as linking up with Nigerian Islamic rebels12. In conclusion, military intervention in Mali was a product of the security concerns that the insurgents were posing not only to Mali, but also regional states as well as the entire world. First, the choice of French to intervene is mostly linked to the fact that the Malian government directly called for its assistance to contain the insurgents. Secondly, in a bid to secure over 6,000 French citizens in the war torn Mali, former colonial masters had no option other than to intervene13. As for the United States, two out of the three extremist Islamic groups are labeled among “Specially Designated Global Terrorists.” They are further linked to Al Qaeda which is associated with terror activities targeting U.S. These factors pose a serious security risk if it is not contained in the initial stages. As such, foreign military intervention in the Malian crisis was inevitable. References Arieff, A. (2013). Crisis in Mali, Congressional Research Service, January 14, 2013. Washington, DC: Government Press service. Agence France Presse (AFP), “‘Mali Islamists Much Stronger Than Expected,’ France Says,” January 13, 2013; Associated Press (AP), “US Helping Support French Mali Operation” and Reuters, “U.S. Sharing Intelligence on Mali With France, Eyes Other Support,” January 14, 2013. French Presidency, “Déclaration du Président de la République sur la situation au Mali,” January 11, 2013. “Mali: Report on Jihadists’ Military Capabilities, Weapons,” Jeune Afrique, November 12, 2012; “French Endeavor HRW Report by Corine Dufka, “Addressing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North,” December 5, 2012. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, U.N. doc. S/2012/894, November 29, 2012. Mali country report in State Department, 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), March 7, 2012. “Mali: Rising Ethnic Tensions Threaten New Violence,” December 20, 2012. Geoff D. Porter, “AQIM’s Objectives in North Africa,” CTC Sentinel, February 1, 2011. May Ying Welsh, “Mali: The ‘Gentle’ Face of al-Qaeda,” Al Jazeera, December 30, 2012. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, U.N. doc. S/2012/894, November 29, 2012. Read More