How the Decision Makers Went to War in the Persian Gulf - Essay Example

How the Decision Makers Went to War in the Persian Gulf Introduction             This paper will discuss the events of the Persian Gulf war, by examining the motivations George HW Bush and his advisors, as well as examining the motivations of Saddam Hussein in invading Kuwait as case studies. On one side was President Bush he was in the middle of a domestic crisis; his own constituents thought that he was a wimp and lacked vision; his country was through with the Cold War, which means that the military industrial complex needed to find some reason to exist; and he had a bent toward punitive measures when he thought that there was evil afoot, and he clearly thought that Hussein was evil. His advisors, including Dick Cheney, who was the Secretary of Defense, were concerned about the issue regarding the end of the Cold War, and they were well aware that the American people were questioning the necessity of a large military budget at that time, seeing as the Soviet Union was on the verge of complete collapse. On the other side was Saddam Hussein he felt that Kuwait was guilty of a multitude of transgressions, which included the fact that Kuwait had depressed oil prices by selling cheaply; that Kuwait was demanding that Iraq pay a debt, even though Hussein felt that the debt should?e been forgiven, because Hussein had defended Kuwait against aggression earlier; and that Kuwait was selling oil that Hussein thought was on the Iraq side of the border. When Hussein made noises towards Kuwait to try to engage them in negotiations over these issues, Kuwait ignored him, which made Hussein all the more angry. Combined with the fact that Hussein was feeling more and more powerless for a variety of reason, not the least of which was the fact that he couldn? rely on the Soviet Union to help him out anymore, and the situation became a virtual powder keg. Hussein invaded Kuwait, and the United States intervened and made war on Hussein, and this is what caused the Persian Gulf War. This essay will examine the decision-making process of the key players in this conflict. Definition of Foreign Policy The grounds for examining the Persian Gulf War is in accordance with the theories set forth by Hudson (2006).1 She explains that international relations has a ground for its field of study, and that is that what occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in the decision-makers acting singly or in groups.2 That means that the individuals who are a part of the major decisions have a certain way that they perceive and look at the world, and this world view is what impacts their decisions. They are shaped by the world around them, and this is the basis of concern for Hudson's analysis. She states that the analysis may be multifactorial, which is taking into account different levels of decision-making, and there also may be an agent-oriented theory that grounds the decision-making process. This is assuming that human beings are the true agent, and that international politics and change comes from the world view of these agents.3 This is the theory upon which this paper is based. Bush and his Advisors Reasons for Going to War             Liberman (2007)4 proposes that punitiveness was one motivation behind the decision-makers decision to go to war in the Persian Gulf. In his article, he examines the nature of moral punitiveness, then suggests that President George H.W. Bush might have been motivated by this when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Moral punitiveness has a basis in social psychology, explains Liberman (2007).5 Retribution is another word that Liberman (2007) uses interchangeably with moral punitiveness, and states that retribution is the basis for many moral decisions in public life.6             Liberman (2007)7 states that one of the decisions that is shaped by moral punitiveness is the death penalty, and whether one believes that it should be legal or not. He states that a large percentage of people who believe in the death penalty believe in it because it is proper to give a life for a life. That the people who are for the death penalty are for it for emotional reasons, such as retribution, as opposed to pragmatic reasons, such as the death penalty deters crime or decreases the prisoner expenditures, is shown by the fact that a great many respondents who are for the death penalty indicate that they would continue to be for the death penalty even if it was proved that the crime rate would not decrease or even if it proved that the death penalty actually increased crime.8 Even so, the respondents were hesitant to phrase their support for the death penalty in such stark terms as ?etributionor ?engeance.The survey respondents were much more willing to answer that they believe in a ?ife for a life,or ?unishment fits the crime,then to answer that they believe in the death penalty because of ?engeanceor ?etribution,even if their answers were essentially vengeance or retribution related. Liberman (2007)9 states that the people who believe this way that retribution and vengeance are suitable reasons for support of the death penalty really are resolving their own anger and sense of injustice through supporting the ultimate punishment of death. For them, executions gave them a ?ersonal sense of satisfaction(Liberman, 2007, p. 7).10 They enjoy taking revenge for offenses, both minor and major, for their neural pleasure centers are activated when they are able to take revenge, according to a study cited by Liberman (2007).11             In extrapolating the findings regarding the death penalty and moral retribution to war, Liberman (2007)12 states that decision-makers who have strong retributive tendencies would be more likely to have motivated biases towards war. Just like the death penalty proponents who overlooked information that would count against the death penalty such as the fact that the death penalty doesn? deter crime because they felt so emotionally about the issue, so, too, do decision-makers who feel emotionally about foreign policy slights. If a decision-maker, such as the President, has moral punitiveness in mind when dealing with an action such as that taken by Saddam Hussein, then he is likely to ?verlook incentives for restraint13 This kind of moral justification is especially pertinent where, as was the case with the Persian Gulf War, there is uncertainty about the benefits that might accrue if the nation goes to war.             In looking at the Persian Gulf War, in particular, while examining the effect that retribution most likely had on this conflict, Liberman (2007)14 stated that there is evidence that President George H.W. Bush was at least partially motivated by retribution and punitiveness when deciding to go to war against Saddam Hussein. This was because the actions of Saddam Hussein were morally reprehensible he suddenly conquested and annexed Kuwait, he treated the Kuwaiti citizens brutally, and he tried to hold US and other Western citizens hostage. To these acts, George H.W. Bush proclaimed that Saddam was displaying ?aked aggression. It? good verses evil; we have a clear moral case herenothing of this moral importance since World War II15             Yet, high ranking officials are supposed to be less morally retributive when examining reasons for going to war than their constituents. They generally should have sound reasons for going to war that would benefit the country that is being led. National interests should be at stake in some way.  They have information that the public doesn? in making this decision.  However, Liberman (2007)16 found that the public had a certain level of moral outrage and retributive impulses regarding the war, and that 169 Defense and State Department officials had no less of a retributive impulse when considering whether to go to war than the public did. And George H.W. Bush had a predisposition for moral punitiveness. This is shown by the fact that was a long-standing supporter of the death penalty and law-and-order issues, and that Dick Cheney, his Defense Secretary, described him as being ?omeone who holds grudges and settles scores17 Bush also had written in his diary, on Christmas Eve, 1990, that ? think of the evil of this man. He has to not only be checked, but punished, and then we worry about how to handle our relations with the Arab countries(Liberman, 2007, p. 24).18 Other people stated that Bush was furious and disgusted by Saddam Hussein, and that he ?emonizedhim.19             Liberman (2007)20 went still further to psychoanalyse why George H. W. Bush felt so morally outraged by Hussein that he felt the need to go to war against him. Liberman (2007) stated that George H.W. Bush mysteriously did not feel any sense of moral outrage when, earlier, Saddam Hussein was brutalizing the Iraqi Kurds in 1986-1989. This was far worse brutalization, according to Liberman (2007), then Saddam Hussein had displayed towards the Kuwaitis. Yet, the brutalization of the Kuwaitis is what sparked Bush? fury. Liberman (2007) suggests that this is because Bush was more sympathetic to the Kuwaitis than the Kurds, due to Bush? own involved and past experiences in the area. Another explanation is that when Saddam invaded another country, this brought back, psychologically, Bush? experience with Hitler, when Hitler invaded Poland. Since Bush was a World War II veteran, this parallel might have been a powerful force in deciding to appease Saddam? aggression.21 What was clear was that Bush was extremely angry with Saddam, and this is at least part of the reason why he was in front of his advisors in clamoring for war. Chief of Staff Colin Powell thought that Bush? determination to go to war was premature, as Bush apparently was pushing for war long before there was a full debate within the Pentagon and White House to go to war. This anger was shown in both Bush? statements about Saddam as being evil and the fact that Bush deliberately pronounced Saddam? name Sawdom, emphasing the first syllable this changed the meaning of his name from ?ne who confrontsto ?ittle boy who cleans the shoes of old men22 Briggs and Briggs (2007)23 suggest that perhaps Dick Cheney? motivation to go to war was also at least partly based upon anger, as they indicate that Cheny is a very angry man. Montgomery (2007)24 similarly looked at the psychological processes and other motivations of Bush in going to war. He stated that there were four major theories that would explain why Bush decided the way that he did about the matter. One is the rational actor model. Two is the cognitive model. Three is the domestic politics model. And four is the groupthink model. The rational actor model would explain that Bush chose to go to war because it benefited the country for instance, there was a threat to the oil supply because of the invasion of Kuwait, and the fact is that oil often motivates foreign interests in the Middle East region.25 The actors make a rational choice based upon matters like the threat of the oil supply or other objectives and options which are available. The actors then look at the strategic objectives of the state in relation to the perceived national interest.26 The cognitive model is more like how Montgomery (2007) analyzed the situation, and that was that the impetus for action would come from the mind of the decision-maker, and this would take all the biases and deviations from rationality into account. In other words, the cognitve model takes into account the emotional response of the decision-maker. These biases come into play because the decision-makers are overtaxed, psychologically, so they have to take mental shortcuts to boost their confidence in their decision-making process. Under this kind of analysis, Montgomery (2007) stated that Bush might have been motivated by World War II that, just as Neville Chamberlain appeased Hitler, which resulted in disaster, so, too, would appeasing Saddam Hussein result in disaster. This is what Montgomery (2007) referred to as the decision-maker creating his own version of reality, and this simplifies the decision in Bush? version of reality, Saddam Hussein was literally another Hitler, therefore had to be stopped.27 Otto (2007) states that Bush? alternate reality is what framed his decision making, which affected his domain of gain, which, in turn, made him more likely to take a risk in the situation.28 Domestic Politics model is another model that could explain Bush? reasons for going to war. That is, that the domestic policy concerns affects the political motivations for going to war. In this case, Montgomery (2007)stated that the decision-makers, not just Bush, but the officials in the Pentagon, was motivated by domestic policy concerns to go to war. The fact of the matter was that, after the end of the Cold War, there was little justification to keep the military complex at the level that it was at during the Cold War. In other words, there had to be a new threat to justify their existence, and Saddam Hussein became that new threat. This would clearly be what would motivate Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, as their positions were most tied to whether or not there is a clear and present danger to justify the extent of the military complex.29 Williams (1991) would suggest that this strategy surely worked, as 88%  of the American people felt that the military gained respect because of their performance in this war. At the same time, Bush was also motivated by domestic politics, because he was seen as a wimp and as a man without vision.30 He had problems articulating his vision for the country, preferring to rely on pragmatics and tackling problems as they come, and he was suffering from the perception that he was a wimp because he raised taxes, when he promised not to.31 Moreover, as Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated, there was a problem because the budget battles made the entire administration seem incompetent.32 Therefore, Bush had to do something drastic to take away the perception that he was a wimp and a non-visionary, and going to war with Saddam Hussein was just the thing to help him do this.33 Groupthink was another motivation that Montgomery (2007) examined in determining why there was a decision to go to war. Basically, the thought was that Bush surrounded himself with old friends the group of eight, which was listed above, were all friends of his from way back. He had nobody to challenge him, and the fact that the group was in a very stressful environment made this homogeneity all the more dangerous to the decision-making process. That said, Colin Powell andJames Baker did present reservations about going to war Powell thought that Bush should consider other options, and Baker thought that economic sanctions should be examined. But the rest of the group were intent on going to war, so the overall group think prevailed over the two men who had cooler heads.34             Yet Bush did not go all the way and invade Baghdad. Liberman (2007) stated that this decision was incongruent with the hypothesis that Bush? primary motivation in going to war was retributive if Bush declared war out of retribution, then Bush should have ordered his troops to march into Baghdad, take Saddam by force and make sure that he got his just desserts.35 That is the question that was pondered by Montgomery (2007). He looked at not just Bush? decision-making on this matter, but also the people who were also decision-makers Vice-President Dan Quayle, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, White Chief of Staff John Sununu, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Assistant to the President Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell. Montgomery (2007) stated that this decision was the result of group think it occurred because Bush and his team of security advisors all rapidly agreed that their objectives in the war were met. Two voices who were hesitant about ending the war so soon James Baker and Brent Scowcroft were overruled by everybody else.36 Hussein? Reasons for Invading Kuwait             While there are a host of reasons why the United States felt the need to go to war with Saddam Hussein, Hussein? own reasons for the invasion should also be examined. Sharon (1996)37 suggests that Hussein invaded Kuwait because he wanted power, and also because he felt slighted by Kuwait. The slight was felt because Hussein had defended Kuwait? and Saudi Arabia? interests against Iran, and Hussein felt that, in return for his support of this country in these conflicts with Iran, Kuwait should forgive the debt that Kuwait was trying to collect from Hussein. Moreover, Hussein felt that Kuwait was unfair because it had large reserves of oil that it decided to sell cheaply this benefited mainly them, at the expense to other oil-producing countries who did not have the same level of oil reserves and had to deal with the depressed prices that were the result of Kuwait selling its oil so cheaply. These issues, combined with the fact that Kuwait was overproducing oil from the Rumalia oil fields, which were fields that were on the Kuwait-Iraqi border, which Hussein felt should be his, because there was a border dispute that centered on these fields, and Hussein felt justified to invade Kuwait.             Sharon (1996) would suggest that Hussein was extremely frustrated by the issues listed above, and his frustration was compounded by the fact that he was feeling more powerless by the day. He used to be able to rely on Soviet support, but that was waning, as the country was breaking up. So, at an emergency summit of the Arab League, which took place in May of 1990, Hussein attempted to rally support for his view that he should be the leader of the region. This attempt, of course, did not allow him to accomplish his objective of being the leader of the Middle East region. While his sense of power was slipping away, he continued to press the issues he had with Kuwait about the oil fields, the debt and the depression of oil values, and Kuwait acted like it couldn? care less. This caused Iraq to decide to go ahead and ramp up its military power to try to make Kuwait address the concerns that Iraq had with the country, and attempted to couple this with diplomatic pressure.38             Moreover, Hussein, according to Sharon (1996), woefully miscalculated several different factors. One major factor that he miscalculated was that the Soviet Union would keep the United States out of the conflict. In the past, the risk of engaging the Soviets in a conflict is what caused to United States to stand down from declaring war on Soviet allies. However, at this time, the Soviet Union was in the process of collapse, so it couldn? keep the United States out of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Hussein also miscalculated the extent of the United States army his calculations was that the Americans could not stomach casualties in the war, so the US would stay out of it. Hussein also thought that his military was strong enough to fight the United States, when clearly this was not the case.39 Sharon (1996) also states that Hussein might have had an alternative universe in his head when he decided to invade Kuwait, in that he was a dictator, therefore he thought that his country was more unified than it actually was. Since a leader? sense of his nation? internal unity is a basis for going to war, this is one miscalculation that might have done him the most harm. At the same time, Hussein miscalculated the internal unity of the United States as well he figured that the American people wouldn? support military intervention, and he did not foresee that Bush would be able to rally the America people in the manner that he did (Sharon, 1996).40             Meanwhile, Goldman (1996)41 stated that Saddam blurred the distinction between Iraq? national interest and his own personal interest. This is because he was a dictator, and this is a common phenomenon with dictators, and there is the issue of Hussein? overall level of paranoia. Hussein felt that the state was him, and he was the state, and that the Iraqi people were subordinate to him. With this type of mentality, the interests of the country would necessarily be conflated with the interests of Hussein himself, as he failed to separate himself from the state. Goldman (1996)42 also noted that Hussein had calculated about Soviet support, but that it wasn? necessarily a miscalculation, which is what Sharon (1996) thought it was that Hussein felt that the balance of power was still in play, with the Soviets on one side, neutralizing the United States, but that the balance would soon shift, and Hussein felt that he had to invade Kuwait while the balance was still in play. Sharon (1996) thought that this was a reasonable calculation, in light of the fact that the United States was making signals in that direction in July of 1990.43 Conclusion             There are clearly reasons why countries go to war that have little to do with rationality. A rational decision is one that is based on a calm and cool reflection of the facts, and the foremost reason to go to war under a rational model is that the war would clearly be in the best interest of the nation. While this certainly must have motivated Bush somewhat, there is ample evidence that Bush went to war for reasons other than national interest. He felt that Hussein equaled Hitler, and that he must be punished for being evil. He felt that he had to burnish his image with the American people after he got a reputation as a wimp. He felt that he had a bloated military budget that was in search of a raison d?tre. There were any number of reasons why Bush went to war, and these reasons did not have to do with national security. On the other hand, Hussein invaded Kuwait for better reasons than Bush had for making war on Iraq at least Hussein? reasons had some relation to national interest. He felt that Kuwait was being unfair in selling cheap oil that was being drilled from disputed lands, and that Kuwait should forgive Hussein his debt, as Hussein had backed up Kuwait in conflicts. That said, Hussein wasn? entirely rational either, as he had confused the fact that he was separate from Iraq he felt that if his feelings were hurt, then this is a good enough reason to go to war, because Iraq was hurt as well. In short, the psychological processes of the people involved show that war is not always rational. Considering the high cost in blood and treasure in a war, one would think that the decisions being made would be more rational than they are.   References Briggs, J. & Briggs, JP (2007) Dick Cheney? psychology. Truth-Out.org.   Goldman, Stuart D. The Statecraft of Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War, 1990-91. No. NDU/NWC-96-E-3. NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC, 1996. Hudson, V. Foreign Policy Analysis. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. Le Billon, Philippe, and Fouad El Khatib. "From free oil to ?reedom oil Terrorism, war and US geopolitics in the Persian Gulf." Geopolitics 9, no. 1 (2004): 109-137. Liberman, Peter. "Punitiveness and US elite support for the 1991 Persian Gulf War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007): 3-32. Montgomery Jr, Lawrence K. The Decision to Not Invade Baghdad (Persian Gulf War). TEXAS UNIV AT AUSTIN INST FOR ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, 2007. Otto, Ty. "Psychology, Risk, and the Decision to Launch the Persian Gulf War." Sharon, Patrick J. The Merchants of Mesopotamia and the Causes of the Persian Gulf War. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES, 1996. Williams, Pete. The Press and the Persian Gulf War. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) WASHINGTON DC, 1991.               Read More