Robert Nozicks work entitled How Liberty Upsets Patterns - Essay Example

Robert Nozick’s work en d “How Liberty Upsets Patterns” Nozick’s writing offers a rebuttal on Rawl’s justice theory by eliciting the dialogue between liberalism and libertarianism. The justice theory in Nozick’s writing is sketched into distinctive steps that attempt to affirm the philosopher’s theory of distribution and justice in distribution. In the reading, Nozick uses few examples to offer support for his argument. Clearly, Nozick’s theory of distributive justice follows the non-patterned principle by choosing to steer away from patterned standards of justice such as utilitarianism and egalitarianism, which conform to patterns that follow the norm “to each according to…” (Sandel 2007, 360). This paper will analyze Nozick’s work, “How Liberty Upsets Patterns”, identifying his primary arguments and conceptions whose purpose is to prove that liberty does, indeed, upset patterns. Nozick begins his argument by poising that people who have contrary beliefs regarding distributive justice, particularly those who abide by notions of patterned distributive justice such as utilitarianism and egalitarianism, should not refute his distribution theory of justice, especially with regard to holdings. Nozick’s theory takes a non-patterned consideration into the element of justice in holdings. According to Nozick, the repeated application of justice in holdings typically results in entitlement of holdings. Nozick bases his argument squarely on the concept of non-patterned principle of distributive justice, which attempts to elucidate the fact that patterned conceptions regarding justice in distribution are typically unable to work well with notions of liberty. Nozick uses the now famous argument of Wilt Chamberlain to demonstrate the manner in which patterned principles that deal with just distribution are essentially irreconcilable with all notions of liberty. Nozick poises that Rawl’s difference principle fails to provide a real description of the society today (Sandel 2007, 359). The society runs on distribution patterns, which are defined by the desires of people who in it. Various distribution patterns are entirely just because they are based on the desires of the society. However, Nozick argues that, while an alternative distribution pattern in society does not typically conform to the favored patterns of people within the society, the alternative distribution pattern is still just. According to Nozick, the Wilt Chamberlain example essentially demonstrates that no standard patterned tenet of distributive justice can be well-suited with liberty. This is primarily because, in order to conserve the patterns provided for by patterned distribution where the society’s desires dictate distribution patterns, the state will need to interfere with the capacity of people to exchange freely their instinctual distributive justice on a constant basis. This is primarily because, as Nozick argues, all exchanges of distributive justice in patterned principles essentially require the constant violation of the patterns for which they were originally formulated. Nozick concludes that end-state, as well as a vast majority of patterned distributive justice principles provide for unfair ownership of people, their labor and actions. As a consequence, such principles provide for the shift from the notions of self ownership to those of limited property rights in the actions and beings of other people (Sandel 2007, 358). In essence, this means that, under patterned distributive justice systems, the example of Wilt Chamberlain shows that third parties will have a just claim on other people (Chamberlain) provided that the third parties transfer something valuable to the individual in question. Under patterned distributive patterns, third parties have legitimate shares in the individual since their shares cannot be changed. From the reading, several misunderstandings become clear; the greatest source of concern is the Wilt Chamberlain example because the existence of anarchy in a society only serves as a defense of capitalism. However, if anarchy defends capitalistic tendencies and capitalism as a whole, it is unclear why an argument for capitalism would be short of some of the most critical elements of capitalism such as financiers, capital markets and risk capital. It is unclear why Nozick chose to use the example of Wilt Chamberlain, a gifted basketball player rather than other conventional instances such as a visionary entrepreneur or a CEO. Nozick’s example effectively does away with the vital element of team owners or capitalist who are merely afforded a passing reference yet are vital to the existence of the market in which Chamberlain and customers operate (Sandel 2007, 359). Nozick appears to peter out nearly all acceptable elements of capitalism such as production means, collective bargaining, labor, owners and capital. On the other hand, Nozick’s argument seeks to maximize only one element of capitalism; the capacity to direct money and resources to people considered as uniquely and immensely talented. In Nozick’s example the concept of liberty is dissimilar to the system, which resourcefully pays off the talented individual (Sandel 2007, 360). Evidently, this argument is a mixed up non-sequitur since Nozick’s writing does not primarily focus on defending the prospect of capitalism, but rather to buttress his inference that liberty essentially upsets standard patterns. In this sense, patterns refer to elaborate justice theories, which poise that certain distributions are essentially just and departures from these distribution patterns are unjust. Nozick seeks to demonstrate the unacceptability of continuous interference, which is necessitated by patterned libertarian notions of liberty. Nozick argues that it is this constant interference and not the justice inherent in the system, which continually awards massive amounts of money to those uniquely talented such as Wilt Chamberlain. The last key step of the argument is Nozick’s assertion that patterned forms of justice are upset when people have free will, even within the social and societal milieu. This means that patterned distributions can only be considered as just based on the manner in which things end up. However, in order for a distributive justice system to be just, it should be based on moral worth and intelligence within the society rather than talent alone. The basic assumption held by Nozick is that if the evaluation of justice within a distribution pattern in the society is pegged on how things wind up, there will be a need to interfere with the liberties of other individuals on a constant basis (Sandel 2007, 361). Taking into account the Wilt Chamberlain, in order for the distribution system to be just, it is imperative to deter other people from going to see Chamberlain or denying Chamberlain the opportunity to play basketball. However, both options violate the liberties held by all parties affected by the situation, thereby showing the need for constant interference so as to deter injustice. Works Cited Sandel, M. J. ed. Justice: A Reader. Boston: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print. Read More