On Justice and Liberty - Essay Example

25 November Rawls and Nozick: On Justice and Liberty Justice and liberty are two concepts that are important to one’s life because they can affect if and how much individual rights are compromised for the protection of collective or social rights. Two philosophers explore the meaning and implications of justice and liberty, John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Rawls and Nozick talk about natural gifts and talents and if people deserve them and the gifts derived for them. They also explore the impact of government equality policies on liberty and justice. Rawls and Nozick have different conceptions of justice and liberty because of their divergences on deserts, government’s role in ensuring justice, and whether justice or liberty is more important than the other. The paper asserts that Rawls has a more superior theory of justice than Nozick because he relates his theory of justice to liberty and rights and justifies the importance of justice to liberty, while Nozick’s framework of justice may improve liberty’s basis for individual rights, but his theory can lead to gross inequalities that can be justified as moral. Rawls says that we do not deserve the talents and natural gifts we are born with and the products we get from them because we are all born with some form of social advantage/disadvantage in one way or another, but such social inequality can be fixed to promote justice. He asserts that people start from biased positions in life that impact their social status, which, in turn, shapes his conception of justice. Rawls says that a man is not born equal with another because “[h]is character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit” (Rawls 219). People are not born equal if they are born with varying levels of social advantage or disadvantage. Furthermore, Rawls explains that people do not deserve all the products they get from their talents and natural gifts because they are not natural to begin with when they come from social disadvantages and fortunes. He is not implying that justice can never be attained, but that social inequality as it is “…are simply natural facts” (Rawls 218). Rawls asserts that, in the real world, the fact is that injustice exists and is prevalent, but there is a way of redressing this situation. He argues that people with more social and wealth endowments should sacrifice for the poor to reduce injustice in the world. Rawls underlines the role of the government and institutions in addressing inequality: “What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts [of injustice through inequality]” (Rawls 218). In particular, Rawls stresses that what is just is to redistribute wealth to benefit the most worst off: “Those who have been favored by nature…may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out” (Rawls 218). In other words, Rawls is saying that people do not deserve what they get from their talents and natural gifts, if others in society are worse off than they are, and to correct this, the government must step in to redistribute wealth that can lead to greater equality. To do this is to just, according to Rawls. Nozick disagrees with Rawls and argues for private property rights where we deserve our talents and natural gifts and the products we get from them. Nozick asserts that a particular distribution of goods is just depending on how it came about (110), where people are seen as ends, not means to an end, whatever that end may be. He states: “An end-state view…would express the view that people are ends and not merely means” (104). The paper interprets that, if people are ends, then the state should not see them as means of improving justice. In addition, Nozick offers three kinds of justice to argue that people deserve the talents and natural gifts they have and the products from them. He asserts the first form of justice, where a person who acquires property “in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding” (Nozick 107). An example from the view of the paper is that, if a person is naturally fortunate or worked for his large revenues, then, he deserves his wealth. Nozick also states that, in the second form of justice, when a person gets property/wealth through the “principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding,” the former is also “entitled to the holding” (107). He gives the example of Wilt Chamberlain, who, in a different payment pattern, gets more revenues from people who pay more for watching him play (Nozick 116). Nozick explains that this pattern is still a just one because people are voluntarily distributing money that they are already entitled to, to begin with (116). The third form of justice applies only 1 and 2. In addition, Nozick argues that, if people deserve their gifts/talents and products from them, redistributive actions are unjust constraints on people’s liberty. If the government enters the scene and applies wealth redistribution pattern through taxation, it treats them as means to an end, especially when he sees the concept of “distributive justice” is never “neutral” (Nozick 106). For Nozick, redistributive justice is wrong because it always affects someone to a degree that disadvantages them (106). Nozick asserts that justice should respect people’s (natural) rights, in particular, their rights to property and their rights to self-ownership first and foremost (115). The government is impinging on liberty if it prioritizes equality over individual rights over their properties. The paper interprets that Nozick wants more liberty than more justice. Rawls states that society should create a more level playing field and take positive measures to resolve the natural disadvantages that some people are burdened with because the principles of justice must be assigned and justice means fairness. The principles of justice must be actively assigned because people are born in a historically socially unjust society and active corrections are necessary. Rawls explains that society has unjust wealth patterns: “The existing distribution of income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets” that social circumstances and chance favor or disfavor (215-216). The society is naturally unjust, but Rawls stresses that the state can do something about it. The state must create a social system that can result to procedural justice in distribution of wealth: “[There is a need to] impose further basic structural conditions on the social system” that lead to regulation of economic activities and preservation of social conditions “necessary for fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 216). Some examples that the paper can think of are affirmative policies and providing social welfare for the poor. These policies help the poor access more opportunities of improving their socio-economic status in life. In addition, Rawls argues for a democratic interpretation of equality. He states that “the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society” (217). The paper interprets that, for Rawls, democracy means that it opposes and resolves social inequality through its redistributive approach to justice. Rawls also asserts that a democratic interpretation of equality includes the principle of redress which ensures fairness, and fairness is just. The principle of redress “[holds that in order to treat all persons equally], society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favorable social positions” (Rawls 217). To redress, the paper understands from Rawls, is to address inequality by correcting it. However, the creation of a fair playing field is difficult because Rawls is wrong in his claims about the principles of justice. The paper argues that not all people will choose liberal principles of justice, as Rawls claims (204), such as religious fundamentalists. Some people do not think that some religious groups deserve better even if they are poor. If they are poor, these fundamentalists would argue that it is because God willed it to be so. In reality, what is fair to liberals is not always fair to other non-liberals, so not all will agree to Rawls’ principles of justice. Furthermore, inequalities are not always just, if a small number of people are getting richer and the poor are increasing in number. Rawls argues for redistribution of wealth as part of the principle of redress, but this is not always enough in engaging sufficient, just redistribution in real life, such as when taxation alone results to programs that only give trickle effects to the poor. Redistributive taxation can also be seen as a form of injustice for those who worked hard for the products of their talents and labors. An example is taxing people who earn more, which mean that it is a disincentive for them to work harder, since they are getting lesser anyway. Nozick is right that distributive justice is not neutral, and so it does not mean that it is fair. Despite weaknesses in Rawls’ principles of justice, Rawls has a more superior theory of justice than Nozick because he relates his theory of justice to liberty and rights. Rawls’ first principle of justice includes liberty. He states that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty with others” (214). He does not say that patterns of justice must negate other people’s liberty. The second principle of justice for Rawls is that: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all” (214).The second principle is interpreted as stating that the society must resolve social and economic inequalities, but these actions must not affect other people’s liberty in any way. Nevertheless, Rawls puts justice over liberty in ensuring redistributive justice. Rawls explains this further when he states that the ordering of the principle indicates that “a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages” (214). The paper interprets that liberty must not result to more advantages for one person over another, which indicates that, although Rawls preserves liberty in his concept of justice, he does not want it to contribute to injustice. Nozick’s theory is important in asserting that people deserve their talents/gifts and their products, thereby preserving liberty to own properties that one deserve. However, he does not consider the consequences of not redressing social inequality, specifically the maintenance of social institutions and practices that result to gross inequalities. On the one hand, Nozick is right that redistributive justice is an impingement on people’s liberty. He says that “…no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives” (117). The paper notes that Nozick rejects Rawls’ idea that, with redistribution, justice can be attained, because flouting other people’s liberty is also unjust. On the other hand, Nozick does not consider the consequences of poor social interventions in cases where injustice is high. He says “…that every patterned (or end-state) principle is liable to be thwarted by the voluntary actions of the individual parties transferring some of their shares they receive under the principle” (118). The paper believes that Nozick indicates that people have liberty to resist patterns that are unjust to them. Nevertheless, the paper asks, how about injustice in tyrant societies, such as in places where corrupt politicians connive with rich people to maintain an economic system that benefits them the most, while only giving enough for the poor to survive? The paper agrees with Rawls that there is a historic basis of inequality, so in order to promote justice in the world, the systemic causes of inequality must be dismantled and the poor must be provided some advantages to advance their position. These advantages can be seen as unfair to the rich, but it is fair for the poor, whom if society can help, can increase the general welfare of the society, and that is greater total fairness in the long run. Thus, the paper notes that Rawls has a utilitarian approach to justice and liberty, where liberty can be sacrificed a little, if it can lead to greater justice in society in the long run. The paper maintains that the superior theory of justice is one that is able to prioritize wealth redistribution that can increase total social welfare and liberty over liberty and individual human rights. Rawls is correct to say that equality is needed to attain liberty for those who are not well endowed in wealth or fortune. The poor cannot experience the full extent of their rights if they live in unjust world. They cannot be free if there are systemic hindrances to their self-determination. And the society cannot be just, if so many poor remain poor because of lack of just access to opportunity for self-development. Works Cited Rawls, John. “A Theory of Justice.” A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap O of Harvard U P, 1971. Print. Nozick, Robert. “Moral Constraints and Distributive Justice.” Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic, 1974. Print. Read More