Philosophical Thoughts on the Notion of Justice - Essay Example

Today our society is preoccupied with notions of democracy, liberty, and justice, which we may tend to view as symbols of modernity. In this regard, we can forget that to a large degree our society rests on the rich heritage of philosophers and thinkers who in the course of the several last centuries have laid the ground for what we perceive as modern democratic institutions and practices. However, during a relatively recent period of time there also were scholars whose historical significance can be likened to that of the classical political philosophers. One of such greatly influential political philosophers of the twentieth century was John Rawls, who is thought by many to be the most important political philosopher of his time in the whole English-speaking world. More specifically, Rawls, influenced by such liberal and legal theorists as Isaiah Berlin and Herbert L. A. Hart, is widely known as the author of the almost revolutionary work "A Theory of Justice" (1971) in which he erased disciplinary lines and elaborated views which resurrected the academic interest to political philosophy. In fact, Rawls obtained the unique position among modern political philosophers as he is often referred to by politicians and in the courts. One of the main achievements of Rawls was his formulation of the two famous principles of justice as a proper solution of problems of distributive justice, which is preoccupied with determination of justice in the field of the allocation of goods and benefits within a society (Talisse, 2001, pp.3-22). However, there is a criticism of the approach of Rawls which, among other things, claims that Rawls cannot prove all the assumptions on which he builds his theory of justice. Let us take a closer look at the Rawls` principles of justice, and try to see whether the mentioned objection to Rawls constitutes a fatal one for his theory of justice. The main task of Rawls` "A Theory of Justice" was to offer a satisfying interpretation of the notion of political obligation under which citizens are compelled to follow the rules created by the state. While views of Rawls can be generally attributed to the rich social contract tradition, for him such a contract assumes a peculiar form as Rawls states that the social contract can be truly just if every member of society would agree with its terms without knowing beforehand which social position he or she would adopt. To prove his case, Rawls starts off his line of reasoning with mounting of a hypothetical case with which he attempts to show a possible scenario of how such a general agreement between people could theoretically be reached under equal conditions and with no variance in initial bargaining positions. This hypothetical case is called the original position and it demands our ignorance of our future social positions and fortunes in relation to the distribution of assets and our inborn abilities as a precondition before deciding on what social laws would be just. Therefore, due to the existence of what can be called the veil of ignorance the rules which would form a just society can be formulated, because to procure our benefits we would all equally agree to create a system of protection for every member of society (Rawls, 2001, pp.14-17). Naturally, such a mutual agreement legitimises the power of the state and makes it a universally accepted force. Rawls called this general theory of finding just social forms as justice as fairness. However, we should remember about the hypothetical nature of the agreement based on our initial ignorance in the original position. This means that principles which could be offered by the parties behind the veil of ignorance are not what actual parties have been agreeing to. In this light, the conception of the original position is a certain idealisation, and it is not necessary to try to find concrete historical examples of such agreements (Nagel, 2002). Nevertheless, that the idea of the original position is hypothetical does not mean for Rawls that no practically applicable principles can be derived from it. On the contrary, Rawls infers from his considerations of the original position two principles which should be adopted as underlying the regulation of social duties and rights for the sake of the just distribution of goods and benefits within a society. The first such principle of justice requires that everyone should have an equal right to the most extensive list of basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for others. Among such basic liberties are for example the right to vote and participate in the political life, the right to possess property, freedom of assembly, expression, and thought. Being related to such fundamental values, the first principle of justice is absolute and can never be violated. But at the same time, as the mentioned liberties might sometimes be mutually exclusive there may emerge the need to find a proper balance between them in order to have the most extensive system of rights. Therefore, this principle leaves room for doubt as to exactly what it requires because we can think of various combinations of liberties that would correspond to it. The second principle of justice advanced by Rawls specifies that social and economic inequalities must be dealt with in such a way as, firstly, to use them to the maximal utility of all social groups, and especially the disadvantaged ones, and, secondly, to make them open to all through conditions of fair equality of opportunity. In the first part of this principle of justice Rawls actually postulates that it may be justified to violate equality in relation to primary social goods only if such a violation would better the situation of the disadvantaged members of society, who would otherwise remain in a more disadvantaged position under the rules of equal distribution. Thus, Rawls` attitude is egalitarian but with a reservation that equality cannot be promoted by worsening the situation of the disadvantaged. At the same time, Rawls implies in this part of his principle of justice that he treats our possession of natural faculties as not a sufficient reason to claim all the benefits which we obtain from them. The second part of the second principle of justice that requires fair equality of opportunity not only demands that social positions be equally available to people with corresponding merits, but implies that everyone should have a chance to obtain those skills that would enable them to accumulate such merits. In general, the second principle of justice can be illustrated by an example of a justification of a situation when a teacher earns more money than a white-collar worker, because otherwise nobody would become a teacher, a situation disadvantageous even for a white-collar worker, who in this indirect way benefits from the higher salary of teachers (Rawls, 2005, pp. 60-74). Now, as we have mentioned, doubts have been voiced as to whether Rawls can really prove the assumptions on which he builds his amendments to the theory of distributive justice. In fact, there are two general groups of theories of distributive justice - end-state and entitlement. In order to decide whether the distribution is just, the end-state approach pays attention to the results of the distribution of benefits and goods within a society at a concrete period of time. This approach is present in Rawls` principles of justice. In its turn, the entitlement theory examines how the existing situation came to its present state, and on ground of that decides on whether it is just. For instance, if you have purchased something on a free market from a seller who had owned the object of purchase, then it is just that the purchase is yours, and the changes that may arise in the distribution of goods or benefits after the purchase are of no significance here (Nozick, 1974, pp.150-154). This attitude to justice is held by Robert Nozick, a scholar representative of a libertarian world view who promotes the minimal involvement of the state into the social life. In his work "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" Nozick offers some counter-arguments to Rawls. One of the important objections of Nozick relates to an issue of just distribution within a group of the additional gains which were obtained due to the group co-operation. In contrast to Rawls, Nozick states that people are entitled to their natural faculties, and therefore to those benefits, including their income, that are produced by their natural faculties. On ground of this, Nozick attempts to show that it is not just to deprive people through distribution of their holdings which were obtained in a rightful way. Such requirements underlie the conflict of Nozick`s views with Rawls distributional measures against inequality. Another objection of Nozick is represented by his attack on the way Rawls justifies his principles of justice as based on the fairness. Nozick disproves that a procedure of realisation of fairness necessarily endows the resulting rules with fairness. He likens the original position of Rawls to manna (which symbolises goods and benefits) that is about to fall to the earth. Nozick agrees that in an ideal situation, when manna is not yet owned and when it would not fall to the earth until there has been reached an unanimous agreement by those existing in the original position and unable to influence their prospective share of manna, participants might indeed subscribe to the principles that Rawls offers. However, Nozick observes that the original position also ignores the fact that in reality goods and benefits are already distributed, which would inevitably influence the prospects of implementation of Rawls` principles. Nozick also believes that even if principles of justice of Rawls could constitute the basis of a society, they would perpetuate the interference of the state into lives of people, because every change in the pattern of social life would require careful inspection of the observance of those principles (Nozick, 1974, pp.160-203). Still, one might respond that one of the main premises of Nozick that people deserve the products of their faculties is not sufficient to fully disprove the logic of Rawls. While this premise is hardly disputed in the real life, it must be pointed out that while Nozick attacks Rawls for ignoring this principle, he himself in the end is seemingly unable to offer a solution for common real-life difficulties of judging about a just distribution of excess gains that result from co-operative efforts of individuals who think that those gains had emerged at least in part due to their own natural faculties. Here, we again face the problem which Rawls was dealing with in the first place. Therefore, objections of Nozick may turn out to be applicable only to a limited portion of real-life cases that require just interpretation. Similarly, while for Nozick the postulate of Rawls that the condition of a certain disadvantaged person must never be compromised under changing social arrangements is not evident, Nozick nevertheless does not provide another basis for social justice as he himself says: ". . . question of fixing a baseline needs more detailed investigation . . ." (Nozick, 1974, p.177). Finally, as a prominent scholar in the fields of philosophy and politics F. A. Hayek remarked: "In . . . a system in which each is allowed to use his knowledge for his own purposes the concept of `social justice is necessarily empty and meaningless . . . In a free society in which the position of the different individuals and groups is not the result of anybodys design . . . the differences in reward simply cannot meaningfully be described as just or unjust" (Hayek, 1978, pp.69-70). This observation confirms the fear of Nozick that attempts to control distribution of justice within society may lead to over-regulation, and also rightfully suggests that the efforts to define what is just may not always be completely successful. Now, on ground of this, we may conclude that there are indeed serious objections to the validity of assumptions that Rawls uses in his theory of justice, and to its real-life applicability in light of Rawls` references to some hypothetical situations as the basis of his line of reasoning. However, the authors who point out at the deficiencies in Rawls` theory of justice are also unable to offer a completely unobjectionable account of justice. Therefore, I believe that if we interpret some of the disputable assumptions of Rawls as methodologically indispensable elements of his theory of justice, and try to find merits in his practical conclusions, this attitude may turn out to be the most rewarding one as it is beyond dispute that the scholarly heritage of John Rawls will continue to be among the most influential factors within not only academic circles, but as well political, and legal spheres. Sources Hayek, F., A. (1978). Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice. University Of Chicago Press. Nagel, T. (2002). Concealment and Exposure: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books. Rawls, J. (2005). A Theory of Justice. Belknap Press. Rawls, J., Kelly, E. (Ed.). (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Belknap Press. Talisse, R. (2001). On Rawls. Wadsworth Publishing. Read More