Political Analysis of the Peace Treaty of Versailles - Essay Example

Political analysis of the Peace Treaty of Versailles Introduction The Treaty of Versailles, signed after the end of World War I, was enforced on Germany by the UK, the US and France (three main democratic powers within Allied forces). This treaty officially marked the end of war between Allied forces and Germany, and was signed in 1919. However the treaty failed to create a stable foundation for establishing long-term peace in the region, and after the ratification there were many instances of economic and political crises that took place during the next two decades, with only a brief period of stability in the mid-1920s. The two aspects of Versailles that took into account financial (economic) clauses and territorial clauses turned out to be more of “horrendous failures by any standard one wishes to employ” (Feldman, cited in Boemeke, Feldman, and Glaser 441). Discussion Amongst the various provisions within the treaty, a major clause that turned controversial made it mandatory for Germany to assume all responsibilities for starting WWI (under Treaty of Trianon and Treaty of Saint- Germain-en- Laye, and articles 231–248 also referred to as War Guilt clauses). Besides this, there were provisions for disarmament, significant territorial losses through surrender and heavy fines (reparations) to the Triple Entente (France, the UK and Russia). At the time of treaty, in and around 1920, the reparations (as war damages) were held to be nearly ?32,000 million, an amount that was deemed extremely high and damaging for Germany economy (Keynes 70). In this context Keynes commented that “the policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable”(Keynes 107). This created to a situation in which Germany was left with a strong bitter feeling, yet provisions and clauses in the treaty could not weaken the country for a long period, which proved to be a major factor in causing World War II. France, the only power amongst the chief allied forces to share a common border with Germany, remained focused on placing protective measures to repel any future German attack. The French Prime Minister, during this time, Clemenceau expressed the overall French sentiments regarding this issue by stating, “America is far away, protected by the ocean… [the US and UK] are both sheltered; we are not” (cited in Keylor 34). Clemenceau wanted to develop a kind of buffer using Rhineland that would protect France, however, the proposal was rejected, and instead Rhineland was made to give up on all sorts of military presence, despite the US not signing this part of the mandate. In this context Keynes claimed that “so far as possible, therefore, it was the policy of France to set the clock back and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which the depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed. If France could seize, even in part, what Germany was compelled to drop, the inequality of strength between the two rivals for European hegemony might be remedied for generations” (Keynes 34). Since France had suffered severe damages in WWI, it remained firm on its reparation claims from Germany, despite strong opposition from the US, and even attacked Ruhr for non-payment of fines by Germany. The UK, despite suffering very little in the war, more or less made similar demands like France, while the US was completely against meting out a harsh treatment to Germany and its allies through the Versailles treaty, and was more interested in rebuilding the socio-economic framework of war-torn Europe. The chief contents of the treaty that were enforced on Germany (leading to severe restrictions) comprised of Article 227 that charged German Emperor Wilhelm II for crimes against overall humanity and moral values, while Articles 228–230 also made it possible to frame charges against other Germans to be tried as war criminals. The Article 231 (also referred to as War Guilt Clause) placed the entire responsibility for WWI on Germany, thus making it accountable for all enormous war time damages (reparations) to aid the affected civilians of France and the UK. Under part XIV of the Versailles Treaty the Rhineland was placed under the control of Allied force for 15 years (Firstworld.com, “Treaty of Versailles,” Articles 227-231). Part XV of the treaty deals with military clauses under which there were severe restrictions on Germany’s use of armed forces and ammunitions. Under the territorial provisions as was made in the treaty, Germany was forced to yield control over many of its colonies and it lost a great deal of territories within Europe. West Prussia became a part of Poland, which separated East Prussia from Germany turning it into an isolated domain. Under Article 22, many of the European colonies (and even non-European colonies) under German control were taken away by the UK, France, Japan, and Belgium, with guarantees created that would disallow returning of these regions to Germany in future (under Article 119) (Firstworld.com, “Treaty of Versailles,” Articles 22 and 119). The reparations imposed were heavy, and Germany with its weak economy at that time failed to pay, which led to France and Belgium forces moving in occupy Ruhr. Despite the Versailles treaty being viewed as a major cause that led to WWII, there are conflicting theories amongst scholars on whether the treaty was harsh (Carthaginian) on Germany, as had been claimed by Keynes. Modern economists contended that with strong restrictions on German military (under which it could maintain a small army), its domestic expenditure would have been small, making it possible for to pay the fines imposed, while it also did not face complete occupation by Allied forces. In this context, Barnett (British historian) commented that the treaty was “extremely lenient in comparison with the peace terms that Germany herself, when she was expecting to win the war, had had in mind to impose on the Allies” (Barnett 392). Conclusion Despite the conflicting economic or military based analyses, there are no doubts that the treaty led to widespread resentment in Germany, which created a favorable atmosphere for forming the Nazi party. Peukert (German historian) remarked that that treaty (even though fair to some extent), was largely unpopular in Germany, where the citizens believed that the treaty terms were unjustified, and this general ‘perception’ led to discontent, and later the WWII (Peukert 278). References Barnett, C. “The Collapse of British Power.” London: Pan, 2002. Print. Boemeke, M., Feldman, G., and Glaser, E., (eds.). “The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years.” Cambridge: CUP, 1999. Print. Firstworld.com. “Treaty of Versailles.” Primary documents. 2009. Web. 23rd October 2012. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles227-230.htm Keylor, W., (ed.). “The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919.” New York: Cengage, 1998. Print. Keynes, J. “The Economic Consequences of Peace” (1919). July 2002. Web. 22nd October 2010. http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/keynes/pdf%26filename%3Dpeace3.pdf Peukert, D. “The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity,” trans. Richard Deveson. New York: Hill and Wang, 1992. Print. Read More