The Versailles System and World War II - Essay Example

Versailles Treaty and World War II 2008 The Versailles System and World War II The Second World War was the bloodiest event in the history of 20th century and one of the most important turning points in the history of modern civilisation. The largest military conflict ever dramatically changed the face of Europe and put an end to the famous Versailles System of peace established after World War I. There is a common agreement among the researchers that the responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War rests almost solely with Hitler and his ideology of Nazism. While this point of view relies on abundant historic evidence and can hardly be questioned, it must also be remembered that despite numerous restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty Germany managed to accumulate huge military and economic potential within only two decades. Evidently, such thing could hardly have happened unless the system was initially flawed, and precisely those flaws might be amongst the key reasons for the outbreak of World War II. Introduction More than sixty years since the end of World War II, the causes of the overwhelming military event continue to produce intensive discussions among scholars. The debate revolves around such issues as the nature of German policy in the 1930s, the role of the Soviets in the outbreak of the war, the date which can actually be considered the beginning of the Second World War, a policy of appeasement conducted by the UK and France towards Germany, which allowed the latter to fully recover and accumulate power, competition for resources between the European powers, etc. However, neither of these causes and preconditions that undoubtedly played a role in setting up the scene for World War II can be properly understood without analysis of the system that shaped political life in Europe during the two pre-war decades. The Versailles System was the structure of peace in Europe established during the Peace Conference of 1919: the system took its name from the main treaty signed during the conference, the Treaty of Versailles (Henig 1995). The Versailles System replaced the Bismarckian Alliance system to govern Europe until World War II. Despite being commonly addressed as the system of European peace, the Versailles System apparently failed to fulfil its noble mission: the story of the causes of World War II is largely the story of this political system's failure. Discussion One of the first attempts to analyze the pre-war developments in Europe from a non-traditional stance was made in 1961 by A. J. Taylor. The author's main argument was that Hitler's aggressive international policies during the 1930's owed a debt to the political situation in Europe as well as the policies conducted by other European powers within the framework of the Versailles System. In Taylor's opinion, Hitler was not actually driven by the Nazi ideology of expansionism but performed as a typical German statesman who cared about strengthening the country and reestablishing it as the leading European power (Taylor 1996). Such controversial point of view produced a wave of sharp criticism with Taylor being accused of trying to whitewash the Nazi leader. However, the reality was that no solid arguments could be found to dismiss Taylor's point of view that the Versailles System might be one of the major root causes of World War II. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 - 1920 brought together the most influential people in the world whom determined the political situation not only in Europe but across the globe at that time. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States, the Prime Ministers of France, Italy, Australia and Canada, the Queen of Romania, and many other national leaders spent almost six months debating the outcomes of World War I as well as economic and political implications of that conflict for each country involved. The overall outcomes of the Conference have been usually labelled as failure because the treaties signed during the Paris negotiations did fail to secure peace in Europe in the long-term (MacMillan & Holbrooke 2001). The reasons for the failure were at least twofold: (1) the range of problems the negotiating parties had to deal with at that difficult time were too complicated and often defied effective solutions; (2) although several nations participating in the conference benefited more than others under the conditions of the peace treaties the amount of disagreement and controversy involved in each negotiated issue was huge, particularly in such critically important aspect as treating Germany. Although the common goal of the leaders involved in the Paris negotiations was apparently to restore peace and stability in Europe, the Conference immediately exposed serious disagreement between the Allies concerning how to treat Germany. The views were highly contradictory with the Big Three leaders balancing between the long-term political benefits for their countries, almost always varying and often conflicting interests of their partners, and the public opinions of their nations. French Prime Minister Clemenceau perceived Germany as a potential threat to stability and peace in Europe, and a threat to security of his country. Therefore, France claimed that Germany was obliged to "cover the costs of restoration of invaded territories and repayment of war debts [and that] a long period of stiff repayments would have the added advantage of keeping Germany financially and economically weak" (Henig 1995, p. 20). Such claim clearly demonstrated the reasonable fear of France that light penalties would result in rapid recovering and further strengthening of Germany. The Fourteen points of President Wilson reflected his excessively idealistic and pacifist views on the political situation in Europe: perhaps that is why Wilson failed to convince the Allies accept his moderate position on the economic obligations of Germany. On the other hand, Britain was extremely concerned with the revival and further development of international trade which constituted the cornerstone of the country's economic potency (Egerton 1978). Lloyd George understood that Germany ruined by excessively hard economic claims of France and other Allies would seriously undermine marketability of British goods in the European market: "While the British government saw 66 million potential German customers, the French government trembled at the prospect of 66 million German soldiers and possible invaders" (Henig 1995). The British representatives also viewed Germany as a potential "barrier-fortress against the Russians" (Henig 1995, p.8-9) and reasonably considered that only country with healthy economy tied by strongly trade-based relationships could effectively fulfil such mission. The territorial issues also sparked intensive discussions between the Allied Powers. Georges Clemenceau demanded that the regions of Rhineland and Saar should come under exclusive French control citing security reasons. Lloyd George expressed fear that such solution might soon lead to another serious conflict between resurging Germany and France (Kitchen 2000). The British standpoint seemed to dominate when the Allied Powers compromised to keep the Rhineland region under international control of the Allied troops for 15 years only. Britain also took control over some German colonies in Africa, namely German East Africa and a part of the German Cameroon (MacMillan & Holbrooke 2001). Evidently, while none of the major players had its interests fully satisfied, the economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles came closer to satisfying the requirements of British delegation. An exact monetary figure Germany was obliged to pay to the Allies never appeared in the Treaty, and despite the claims of Britain and Germany that the terms of reparations were still too harsh, the truth was "the Treaty of Versailles had left [Germany] largely intact, with a population almost double that of France, and with no powerful east European neighbours" (Henig 1995, p.52). Statistical data convincingly demonstrates that Henig was absolutely right. In terms of land, Germany lost 27 thousand square miles and, in terms of human resources, between 6.5 - 7 million people which corresponded to 10 to 13 percent of the country's pre-war population (Crozier 1997). At the first glance, looses were rather serious, but closer analysis clearly demonstrates that Germany the fears of France were absolutely reasonable. Firstly, many of the losses suffered could have been easily anticipated at the time Germany entered the war: they were not unexpected. Secondly, despite the mentioned decrease in the economic capacity (estimated as 13.5 percent) the industrial potential of Germany remained largely intact and, what was even more important, Russia stroke by the communist revolution and civil war disappeared as a powerful political player in the eastern and southern Europe. That created a large opening for Germany to fill in the political sphere in the long-term perspective. The Versailles System envisaged very serious restrictions for Germany in terms of military potential. The general staff had to be dissolved with the officer corps not exceeding 4 thousand while the overall number of troops was limited to 100 thousand. Germany was allowed to maintain only 6 battleships and no submarines; the country was not allowed to have any air forces (Crozier 1997). Evidently, this restriction was extremely painful for the nation that had been known for its established military tradition. Furthermore, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles held Germany liable for the damages done during the war: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of a war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies" (The Versailles Treaty 1919, Art. 231). Although this provision, in fact, reflected the actual state of affairs, the Germans perceived this War Guilt as an example of injustice and biased attitude toward their state openly demonstrated by the winners. This was largely the result of continuous efforts made by the German propaganda machine to convince the nation they fought a war of defence (Crozier 1997). As a result, the War Guilt created a fertile soil for the growth of strong nationalist movement in Germany and the desire for revenge. According to some authors, Stresemann, the German Foreign Secretary from 1924 to 1929 was the first German politician whom tried to use the flows of the Versailles System to restore the potential of Germany as a leading European power (Henig 1997). In doing so Stresemann pursued the same set of strategic goals Bismarck did, namely: (1) to create a peaceful German facade; (2) to create defensive alliances; (3) isolate the potential enemies (Gatzke 1954). A series of smart political manoeuvres within the newly established Versailles System of peace allowed Stresemann to achieve noticeable success in his efforts thus paving the way for his successors. As a result, Hitler who came to power in 1933 had an effective template to continue strengthen the military potential of his country as well as reinforce its political positions in Europe. The fact that other European leaders readily negotiated with Hitler and without any considerable attempts to restrict further restoration of German power, demonstrated the flawed nature of the Versailles System. In 1935, the inhabitants of the Saar region voted to return to Germany, and conscription was introduced although it openly violated the key provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, in 1936 and Anschluss with Austria 1938 also infringed the Treaty; the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia were incorporated into Germany as a result of the Munich conference of October 1938 and soon Czechoslovakia disappeared from the map of Europe (Henig 1997). The weaknesses of the Versailles Peace were obvious even to the contemporaries: the amount of criticism poured at the Treaty was genuinely impressive. As one contemporary brilliantly observed in regard to the new system, "if we made war to end war, we have certainly made peace to end peace" (Crozier 1997, p.37). Although some criticism might not be relevant the fact that the Versailles system set the framework and defined the nature of political developments in Europe in 1919 - 1939 could hardly be questioned as well as the fact that those development had finally resulted in the largest and bloodiest military clash ever. Conclusion Evidently, the Versailles System was the product of serious disagreement between the Allies and their failure to find the right juste milieu. As a result, the structure of peace established under the Treaty turned out to be too flexible and unreliable to ensure any kind of long-term stability. Thus, the military restrictions envisaged for Germany were rather serious, but the System did not allow to effectively control whether those restrictions were actually observed. The Rearmament and open aggression demonstrated by Germany toward its weaker neighbours became the brightest illustration of this inability In fact, Stresemann and Hitler pursued the same goal Bismarck did several decades before: to create/restore Germany as the leading European power. The most essential difference was probably that Bismarck created the political system that allowed him achieve his goals himself while the Versailles System that made it possible for Stresemann and then Hitler to repeat Bismarck's success was created by other states. Therefore, the revolutionary nature of methods and strategies used by Hitler to achieve his goals did not seem to be the primary reason for his success: it was rather the framework within which Hitler could effectively apply his methods that made Germany so dangerous and eventually led to World War II. References The Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919 [available online at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html] Egerton, G. W. 1978, 'Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': AngIo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920', Historical Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 885-911. Henig, R. 1995, Versailles and After: 1919 - 1933, London: Routledge. Henig, R. 1997, 'The Origins of the Second World War', New Perspective Vol. 3, No. 1 Kitchen, M. 2000, Europe Between the Wars, London: Longman. MacMillan, M. & Holbrooke, R. 2001, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, New York: Random House. Crozier, A. J. 1997, World War, 1939-1945: Causes, Blackwell Publishing. Gatzke, Hans W. 1954, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. Taylor, A.J.P. 1996, The Origins of The Second World War, Simon & Schuster Read More