The Effects of the Treaty of Versailles on the United States - Essay Example

The effects of the Treaty of Paris on the United s 2008 The effects of the Treaty of Versailles on the United s Introduction The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 – 1920 brought together the most influential people in the world whom determined the political situation not only in Europe but across the globe at that time. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States, the Prime Ministers of France, Italy, Australia and Canada, the Queen of Romania, and many other national leaders spent almost six months debating the outcomes of World War I as well as economic and political implications of that conflict for each country involved. The overall outcomes of the Conference have been usually labeled as failure because the treaties signed during the Paris negotiations did fail to secure peace in Europe in the long-term (MacMillan & Holbrooke 2001). The reasons for the failure were at least twofold: (1) the range of problems the negotiating parties had to deal with at that difficult time were too complicated and often defied effective solutions; (2) although several nations participating in the conference benefited more than others under the conditions of the peace treaties the amount of disagreement and controversy involved in each negotiated issue was huge, particularly in such critically important aspect as treating Germany. Although the common goal of the leaders involved in the Paris negotiations was apparently to restore peace and stability in Europe, the Conference immediately exposed serious disagreement between the Allies concerning how to treat Germany. The views were highly contradictory with the Big Three leaders balancing between the long-term political benefits for their countries, almost always varying and often conflicting interests of their partners, and the public opinions of their nations (Henig 1995). As a result, majority of the participants failed to full achieve their goals, and the effects of the Treaty on each nation were vastly different. Main Discussion The seriousness of President Wilson’s intentions during the Conference was evident: he became the first American President to ever visit Europe while in office (McMillan 2001: 3) while the US mission in Paris included almost 1300 members at its peak (Gelfand, 1963). Wilson came up with the famous Fourteen Points program that was supposed to become the foundation for a peace program. The Fourteen Points included the following items: 1. Stopping the practice of secret agreements between nations. 2. Free navigation of all seas. 3. Removal of economic barriers between nations. 4. Disarmament. 5. Impartiality of decisions relating to colonial territories 6. Removal of the German Army from Russia Empire to let the Russians build their own political system. 7. Independence of Belgium. 8. Full liberation of France and return of Alsace-Lorraine region 9. Italians must be allowed to live in Italy 10. Self-determination for nations under Austria-Hungarian rule. 11. Self-determination and guarantees of independence for the Balkan states. 12. Turkish government of the Turks and self-government for non-Turk nations living on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. 13. Creation of independent Poland with access to the sea. 14. Creation of a League of Nations, an international entity that must be a guarantee of the political and territorial independence of all states (Wilson 1918, p.680-681). However, the Fourteen Points of President Wilson reflected his excessively idealistic and pacifist views on the political situation in Europe. Perhaps that is the key reason for largely unsuccessful effort of the American mission during the Conference. Firstly, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles held Germany liable for the damages done during the war: “The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of a war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies” (The Versailles Treaty 1919, Art. 231). Although this provision, in fact, reflected the actual state of affairs, the Germans perceived this War Guilt as an example of injustice and biased attitude toward their state openly demonstrated by the winners. This was largely the result of continuous efforts made by the German propaganda machine to convince the nation they fought a war of defense (Crozier 1997). Wilson was aware of the situation, but still had strong hopes to establish peace and stability in Europe and eventually globally and, therefore, tried to persuade other participants to adopt a milder formulation. However, he failed to convince the Allies accept his position. Particularly, an exact monetary figure Germany was obliged to pay to the Allies never appeared in the Treaty, and the truth was “the Treaty of Versailles had left [Germany] largely intact, with a population almost double that of France, and with no powerful east European neighbours” (Henig 1995, p.52). Reluctance of other participants to accept the US stance was absolutely understandable: the United States joined the war late and did not suffer the huge losses Europe did while its involvement in the territorial conflicts between European states (another highly controversial subject of debate during the Peace Conference) was minor. As a result, the War Guilt clause included in the Treaty despite Wilson’s resistance created a fertile soil for the growth of strong nationalist movement in Germany as well as the desire and ability to revenge. Secondly, the United States together with Britain was extremely concerned with the revival and further expansion of international trade (Egerton 1978). However, the interests and hidden concerns of Britain associated with this goal differed substantially from those of the United States. Thus, Lloyd George understood that Germany ruined by excessively hard economic claims of France and other Allies would negatively affect marketability of British goods in the European market (Henig 1995). Besides, British representatives also viewed Germany as a potential “barrier-fortress against the Russians” (Henig 1995, p.8-9) and reasonably considered that only country with healthy economy tied by strong trade-based relationships could effectively fulfill such mission. Britain had its interests satisfied more than other participants, including the United States. Thirdly, the territorial issues between the Allied Powers were largely resolved without taking into consideration opinion. In terms of land, Germany lost 27 thousand square miles and, in terms of human resources, between 6.5 – 7 million people which corresponded to 10 to 13 percent of the country’s pre-war population (Crozier 1997). At the first glance, looses were rather serious, but closer analysis clearly, but despite the mentioned decrease in the economic capacity (estimated as 13.5 percent) the industrial potential of Germany remained largely intact and, what was even more important, Russia stroke by the communist revolution and civil war disappeared as a powerful political player in the eastern and southern Europe. That created a large opening for Germany to fill in the political sphere in the long-term perspective (Henig, 1995). Although the territory of Europe changed substantially, Wilson’s goal to provide each nation with the right for self-determination was achieved only partially. Fourthly, the Versailles System envisaged very serious restrictions for Germany in terms of military potential. The general staff had to be dissolved with the officer corps not exceeding 4 thousand while the overall number of troops was limited to 100 thousand. Germany was allowed to maintain only 6 battleships and no submarines; the country was not allowed to have any air forces (Crozier 1997). Evidently, this restriction was extremely painful for the nation that had been known for its established military tradition. Given the traditionally isolationist attitude of the United States that preferred not to interfere with European states and European interests in the Eastern Hemisphere, one might think that these developments had little effect on the United States. However, the truth was that virtually every provision of the Treaty had certain implications on the political, economic and military sectors of the country’s life. The effects of the Versailles Treaty on the United States were two-fold. On the one hand, the primary goal of Wilson who held too idealistic position during the negotiations, namely to establish global system of peace, was never achieved. The Versailles System turned out to be the product of serious disagreement between the Allies and, in fact, was based on their failure to find the right juste milieu. As a result, the structure of peace established under the Treaty was too flexible and too unreliable to ensure any kind of long-term stability. For example, the military restrictions envisaged for Germany were rather serious, but the System did not allow to effectively control whether those restrictions were actually observed. The Rearmament and open aggression demonstrated by Germany toward its weaker neighbours soon after the Conference became the brightest illustration of this inability. The shortcomings of the Versailles Peace were obvious even to the contemporaries: the amount of criticism poured at the Treaty was genuinely impressive. As one contemporary brilliantly observed in regard to the new system, “…if we made war to end war, we have certainly made peace to end peace” (Crozier 1997, p.37). Although some criticism might not be relevant the fact that the Versailles system set the framework and defined the nature of political developments in Europe in 1919 – 1939 could hardly be questioned as well as the fact that those development had finally resulted in World War II, the largest and bloodiest military clash ever. Since the warfare took place in Europe, the US industrial base remained intact, and even had grown impressively taking advantage of the opportunity to supply the states involved in the War (Friedman & Schwartz, 1963). The Versailles Treaty further opened the door to the post-war process of expanding and rebuilding of the country’s economic system. Unfortunately, this potential opportunity failed to materialize because the United States Senate refused to approve the treaty signed by Wilson. As a result, the most essential provisions either were not implemented or unraveled catastrophically during the next decade. Furthermore, the controversial poorly defined economic reparations provisions mentioned in the above resulted in economic chaos both in Europe and the United States (Ferguson 1996). The League of Nations that was supposed to become the cornerstone of the Versailles system of global peace and was intensively promoted by Wilson lacked effective enforcement mechanism. Consequently, it failed its principal purpose to ensure global peace and was eventually dissolved in 1945 after the end of World War II (Fleury, 1998). On the other hand, the United States the apparent effect of the Versailles system was that the United States emerged from the war as the most powerful country in the world with so huge economic authority that no other nation could challenge. Consequently, the political influence of the United States expanded not only in the Western Hemisphere where the country actively implemented the Monroe Doctrine, but also in the Eastern Hemisphere. This meant the end of isolationism and emergence of the United States as the global leader even despite the fact that the American public opinion still held the traditional viewpoint that Europe had almost nothing to do with Americas (Egerton, 1978). Importance of this outcome is difficult to overestimate which clearly demonstrates that Wilson’s desire to actively involve the United States in international affairs using the League of Nations as the instrument in doing so was absolutely reasonable and prudent. Furthermore, developments that took place in Europe during the period from the Peace Conference to the end of World War II suggested that the United States were interested in the tense situation in Europe to secure its role “….as a future interventionist power in Europe: Germany, fighting a world coalition while having only weak allies, had been overcome only through American help” (Scheck 2008, p.126). The Treaty left Germany powerful enough to soon again represent a threat to its neighbors, which gave the United States a perfect opportunity to further intervene in European affairs exactly in the way it did during the First World War. The fact that it happened during the Second World War clearly demonstrates that the long-term political outcomes of the Versailles Treaty were very favorable for the United States. Conclusion Wilson failed to fully capitalize on the highly favorable position of the United States. The essence of this position was perfectly summarized by Keynes (1920): “The American armies were at the height of their numbers, discipline, and equipment. Europe was in complete dependence on the food supplies of the United States; and financially she was even more absolutely at their mercy. Europe not only already owed the United States more than she could pay; but only a large measure of further assistance could save her from starvation and bankruptcy” (p.38). Such situation suggested that the United States could dictate its will to the rest of negotiators, but poor negotiating and too idealistic vision, coupled with the lack of domestic support to the concept of deeper involvement in European affairs resulted in mediocre results. At the same time, despite the failure to get the best for the United States, one should also remember the huge amount of controversies and complexities created by the global war. Therefore, the core trend in recent historiography is rehabilitation of Wilson as poor negotiator and highly idealistic politician. Although many of the Fourteen Points were rejected or satisfied only partially during the Conference, an important outcome was that Wilson and his program still managed to somewhat reconcile the aggressive position of France and other Allies with the idealistic viewpoint of American delegation. Therefore, the overall effects of the Versailles Treaty on the United States were mainly positive or at least the number of negative effects was less than that of positive implications. References The Versailles Treaty, June 28, 1919 [available online at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html] Crozier, A. J. 1997, World War, 1939-1945: Causes, Blackwell Publishing. Egerton, G. W. 1978, ‘Britain and the Great Betrayal’: AngIo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920’, Historical Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 885-911. Fleury, A. 1998, "The League of Nations: Toward a New Appreciation of its History," In W. Boemeke, G. D. Feldman, and E. Glaser, (eds), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, Washington DC: German Historical Institute. Ferguson, N. 1996, “Constraints and Room for Manoeuvre in the German Inflation of the Early 1920’s,” Economic History Review, XLIX, pp. 635-666. Friedman, M., & Schwartz, A. J. 1963, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gatzke, Hans W. 1954, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. Gelfand, L. E. 1963, The Inquiry, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Henig, R. 1995, Versailles and After: 1919 – 1933, London: Routledge. Keynes, J. M. 1920, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, London: Macmillan. MacMillan, M. & Holbrooke, R. 2001, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World, New York: Random House. Scheck, R. 2008, Germany and Europe, 1871-1945, Berg Publishers. Taylor, A.J.P. 1996, The Origins of The Second World War, Simon & Schuster Wilson, W. 1918, "Speech on the Fourteen Points," Congressional Record, 65th Congress 2nd Session, pp. 680­681 [Reprinted in Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield, (eds.), 1994, The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Vol. II, Boston; Houghton Mifflin, pp. 384-386. Read More