The Lebanon Crises (1958) - Term Paper Example

The Lebanon Crises (1958) Introduction In Lebanon, the big problem was the fragile nature of the social and political structure of the country. Lebanon was a multi-confessional state with Christians and Muslims sharing power. The new Government appointed by President Chamoun in 1956 seemed to tilt more towards the West. On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower appeared before Congress to announce a new US policy for the Middle East. He asked Congress to pass a resolution authorizing economic assistance and the use of US forces to prevent a Communist takeover in the Middle East (Meo 132-144). Lebanon was the only Arab country to announce publicly its support for the doctrine. The decision by President Chamoun to endorse the new US policy, and accept aid under the terms of the Middle East Resolution, caused a major foreign policy rift between the Government and the opposition in Lebanon and led to the formation of the united National Front, an opposition grouping composed of Muslims and Christians (Meo 132-144) This rift coincided with Chamouns plans to amend the electoral law before the elections in June 1957. The passage of the new law increased the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and had a direct impact on the outcome of the elections, outside influences also affected the outcome. The United States provided covert funds for pro-Government candidates, while Egypt and Syria supported and funded the opposition (Eveland 248-250). Since assuming the Presidency, Camille Chamoun had made a determined effort to destroy the power of the feudal landowners who formed the backbone of the Lebanese political system. The electoral reform bill passed in November 1952 only accomplished part of what Chamoun wanted to achieve. In 1957, however, many of these prominent feudal leaders lost their seats and charged the Government with rigging the elections (Meo 146). It was Lebanons feudal leaders who challenged President Chamoun and prevented the passage of the constitutional amendment that would have permitted Chamoun to succeed himself as President in 1958. The Lebanese civil war of 1958 was the result of tension that had been building ever since the elections in June 1957. The defeat of the feudal leaders, and rumours that President Chamoun would seek a constitutional amendment, and a second term of office, added to the resentment of a large segment of the population which had seen little or no benefit from Lebanons economic boom. Body The Lebanese civil war of 1958 underscored the instabilities of the region. President Chamoun was a staunch ally of the West. He was a man of great ambition who was unwilling to share power with the legitimate political and traditional leaders of the various sects in Lebanon. He excluded them from the political process by changing the electoral laws to his own advantage, and then using those laws to weaken his opponents. In 1957, the elections were rigged and Chamoun packed the Chamber of Deputies with his supporters, compared to men, such as Abdullah al-Yafi, Kamal Jumblat, Rashid Karami and Saib Salam, the new men were of a different caliber to the zuama whose power emanated from their community (Johnson 75). Chamoun saw Lebanon as the trading and banking center of the Middle East resting on a strong alliance with the West. His economic policies encouraged foreign capital to flow into Lebanon, but his social policies did little to improve the standard of living in rural areas and city slums. This contributed to the intensity of the opposition to his government. Chamoun viewed the Eisenhower Doctrine as evidence of the US commitment to the Middle East. He saw the doctrine as a chance to win more US support for his government. To this end, he sought US assistance in financing his candidates in the elections in June 1957. His purpose was to ensure the election of a loyalist Chamber of Deputies, so that it would reelect him in 1958. Chamouns support for the doctrine further alienated Egypt and Syria which launched propaganda attacks on Chamoun and accused him of betraying Arab principles. Within Lebanon, as a result of the Suez crisis, the political climate remained tense and the decision to endorse the doctrine increased the tension and upset many community and political leaders, Muslims and Christians alike. The Opposition accused Chamoun of violating Lebanons traditional neutrality in foreign affairs, as defined by the National Pact of 1943 (Meo 146). The doctrine, and Chamouns ambiguity in regard to the general elections and his own reelection as President, were the direct causes of the civil war. The murder of Nassib Matni, a prominent Maronite journalist, on May 8, 1958, coming just a few hours after Chamouns decision to stand for reelection as President, underscored Lebanons fragile state and triggered the civil war (Qubain 68). The Lebanese elections in June 1957 stripped the veneer off the Lebanese political structure to reveal its weaknesses. Politics in Lebanon were based on a confessional agreement between the various communities living in the country. This agreement served Lebanon well as a stabilizing formula. By ignoring the delicate balance of the Lebanese political structure, and exploiting its weaknesses for his personal ambitions, President Chamoun precipitated a showdown with the Opposition and plunged the country into a civil war that threatened to destroy Lebanons internal balance of power. It would be too simplistic to say that the civil war was just a confessional conflict between Muslims and Christians. The clash between President Chamoun, himself a Maronite, and the Maronite Patriarch, was but one example of Chamouns rejection by his own community. The country did not divide along Muslim and Christian lines, because there were Christians, as well as Muslims, who were opposed to Chamoun. Henri Pharaon, who from the outset opposed Chamouns reelection, and Raymond Edde, who turned against Chamoun for allowing the country to slide into a state of anarchy, are further examples of alienated Christians. On the other hand, there were Muslims who stood with Chamoun, such as Prime Minister Sami Solh, who lost his position as a leader in his community because he had supported Chamoun. The conflict was about restoring the confessional system whose rough balance for many years did much to ensure the stability of Lebanon. This stability was shattered only when the confessional balance was disturbed. As seen from Washington, the crisis in Lebanon was a battle between President Chamoun, an embattled US ally, and a mob of Communists and radical Arab nationalists influenced by Nasser (Eisenhower 266). To internationalize the crisis, Chamoun called immediately on the United States to intervene with force to protect his regime. The United States was reluctant, and encouraged him to solve the crisis with the help of other Arab nations. The Arab League and the United Nations were brought into the Lebanese crisis, but it was obvious from the start that Chamoun had a minimal interest in solving the crisis with the help of the League. By going to the United Nations, Chamoun and Charles Malik were able to internationalize the crisis and place the blame on the United Arab Republic (New York Times, May 13, 21). Nasser used the Lebanese civil war to expand his influence, and as he enhanced his position with the formation of the United Arab Republic, he gained more ground in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. These successes were based on the myths and illusions of Nassers promises of an Arab revival under his leadership. The impact of this added an external dimension to the internal problems of Lebanon and increased the pressure on President Chamoun, who had fallen out with Nasser over Suez (Meo 97-99). Nassers interference in the Lebanese civil war took the form of propaganda attacks and assistance to the opposition which was mostly channeled through Syria. President Chamoun claimed that the intervention by the United Arab Republic was massive, but the degree to which the UAR had interfered in Lebanon was never fully determined. Dr. Malik argued Lebanons case in the United Nations on the basis of a list of subversive activities supposedly carried out by the UAR against Lebanon (Agwani 172-181). A similar list was circulated by the state Department to members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee in order to justify US actions in Lebanon. But the United Nations Observation Force in Lebanon reported that it could not prove the allegations of massive infiltration by the United Arab Republic. The UN findings angered Chamoun who was using these charges as evidence that the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon was threatened by the United Arab Republic and Communist subversion (Urquhart 273-274). The bloody coup by radical nationalist Army officers that took place on July 14 in Baghdad shocked the United States and Britain because it threatened to destabilize the entire Middle East. Events in Iraq presented the United States with a new set of circumstances, the consequences of which were not yet clear. The US reaction was to move swiftly into the region, using a standing invitation from the Chamoun government to land US forces in Lebanon (Eisenhower 269-273). The US intervention was carried out under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the Middle East Resolution, which recognized "as vital to the national security interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East" (Oron 104) The US intervention in Lebanon was the first us airborne-amphibious operation in peacetime and the most massive show of force between the Korean and Vietnam wars (Spiller 44). It sent a clear message to President Nasser and the Soviet Union that the United States regarded the Middle East as a vital strategic interest. It also served to reassure US allies around the world that the United States was a dependable ally (Spiller 44). The United States relationship with Chamoun extended to supporting his reelection as President in 1958. This situation arose because the United States did not fully understand the intricacies of Lebanese politics and the precarious balance of power within the country. US Ambassador Robert McClintock, who arrived in Beirut in January 1958, recommended that Washington support the reelection of Chamoun. But with the outbreak of the civi1 war, McClintocks perspective on the situation changed. His contacts with politicians outside Chamouns circle, including members of the opposition, had given him a better understanding of the political reality, and he advised Washington that it would be unwise to support Chamouns reelection (Murphy 371-405). In dealing with the Lebanese crisis, McClintock showed that he had formulated a better understanding of Lebanons problems. At the invitation of Lebanese politicians occupying the middle ground of the political spectrum, McClintock and his British and French colleagues became involved in lengthy negotiations to find a political solution to the crisis and an end to the fighting. Chamouns refusal to clarify his position in regard to his reelection complicated the negotiating process, and from his point of view, it did not help the relationship that US officials were in contact with members of his Government and the opposition (Murphy 371-405). McClintocks most difficult moment came after the US landings, when radical elements in the Lebanese Army threatened to challenge the entry of US Marines into the port of Beirut. The US military appear not to have taken into consideration the delicate political situation in Lebanon, so that it was left to McClintock and General Chehab to persuade these rebellious elements in the Lebanese army to abandon their plans. In the course of this, McClintock upset US military commanders and word got back to Washington that there was political interference in the military operation. It was McClintock, however, who was largely responsible for preventing a clash between the Lebanese army and the US Marines and his actions can be viewed as the high point of his involvement in the Lebanese crisis (McClintock 109-114). On the Lebanese side, the situation was saved by General Chehab. For the entire civil war, Chamoun put pressure on General Chehab to use the army to attack the opposition and their armed followers. Chehab refused to allow the army to take sides in the fighting. The army would retaliate when attacked, but it would not interfere in fights between the militias supporting Chamoun and the Opposition. Chamoun believed the army should be on his side, not recognizing that by having his own militia support, he had stooped to the level of the Opposition, and therefore, in the eyes of Chehab, no longer remained above the fray. Chehab earned the contempt of Chamoun who at one point in the crisis seriously contemplated firing him (Murphy 371-405). In taking a strong stand against Chamoun, Chehab revealed himself to be a man of principle and wisdom and therefore the logical choice to succeed Chamoun. Because Chehab commanded the respect of the Lebanese, he was able to heal the wounds of the civil war and re-unite the country. Also, to his credit, Chehab earned the rather grudging respect of the Americans who had criticized him for being indecisive and equivocal throughout the crisis (Murphy 408). Chamoun, on the other hand, revealed himself to be stubborn and ambitious, and with "an unbridled taste for power" (Kerr 69). Because he had broken ranks with those who brought him to power, he had many political enemies of every religious denomination. Eisenhower had never met Chamoun, but he considered him to be "the ablest of the Lebanese politicians" (Eisenhower 266). Hammarskjold, however, as a result of his dealings with Chamoun, considered him a very inept politician and blamed him for the crisis in Lebanon (Urquhart 265-285). To the United States, its involvement in Lebanon marked the convergence of international, regional and local interests. On the international level, the United States looked upon Lebanon as an ally in the Cold War. On the regional level, the United States had an interest in protecting Lebanon from the effects of radical Pan- Arabism and ensuring the continued existence of a pro- Western government. On the local level, it was the US interest to maintain the status quo in Lebanon. What were the risks of the Eisenhower Administration doing nothing in the Middle East after the crisis caused by the Iraqi coup? From the intelligence reports, it seems that both Chamoun and Hussein were threatened and risked being overthrown by military coups (Eisenhower 251-266). In the case of Lebanon, the US intervention prevented Chamoun from being overthrown. It stabilized the country and allowed the election of a new President to take place within the framework of the Constitution. Conclusion Lebanon crisis of 1958 was the result of Chamoun and his social policies. He was a man of great ambition who was unwilling to share power with the legitimate political and traditional leaders of the various sects in Lebanon. Eisenhower Administration would have liked to see a continuation of the Chamoun regime in Lebanon, or a similarly pro-Western regime, but it had no desire to intervene militarily to procure that result. President Chamouns decision to involve the United States in the crisis was a complicating factor for the Eisenhower Administration which saw in the situation in Lebanon a threat to its other interests in the Middle East. US involvement in the process was inevitable because Washington sympathized with Chamouns desire to serve a second term, but the civil war had forced the United States to change its policy in Lebanon. Such was the antagonism displayed by some Lebanese towards President Chamoun that the United States could no longer support his candidacy without damaging us prestige and regional interests. The United States had no alternative other than to accept General Chehab as successor to Camille Chamoun because Chehab was the only candidate acceptable to all parties in Lebanon. Work Cited "Riots in Lebanon," New York Times, May 13, 1958, p. 21. Agwani, M.S. The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary study. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965. Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963. Eveland, Wilbur Crane. Ropes of Sand: Americas Failure in the Middle East. New York: W.W. Norton, 1980. Johnson, Michael. Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese state, 1840-1985. London: Ithaca Press, 1986. Kerr, Malcolm. "Coming to Terms with Nasser: Attempts and Failures," International Affairs, 43, No.1 (January 1967), 65-84. McClintock, Robert. The Meaning of Limited War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. Meo, Leila M.T. Lebanon: Improbable Nation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965. Murphy, Robert D. Diplomat Among Warriors. New York: Doubleday, 1964. Oron, Yitzhak. Middle East Record Volume 1, 1960. Qubain, Fahim Crisis in Lebanon. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1961. Spiller, Roger J. Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon. (Leavenworth Papers No.3). Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 1981. Urquhart, Brian. Hammarskjold. New York: Harper Colophon, 1984. Read More