United States support for European Integration - Term Paper Example

?Running head: UNITED S AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION United s support for European Integration (school) United s Support forEuropean Integration Introduction After the end of the Second World War and with the advent of the Cold War, a European integration soon became a major political consideration for Europe. This integration was based on political and economic gains, stemming from the benefits which the countries would acquire from their combined economic resources and financially viable measures. While the European integration unfolded during the Cold War, the United States expressed and entered its support for a more united Europe. Much issue was attributed to such support, primarily because of the fact that a united Europe might eventually create a potential diplomatic and strategic rival to the United States. However, others are quick to point out that such support was extended because the United States has always been supportive of European success. Various theories have been suggested explaining the US support for European integration. This paper shall discuss two of these theories, and it will establish how these theories would explain this series of choices, and how the two theories would tend to agree and disagree with one another on this question. This essay would also evaluate how, based on these explanations, and what would be expected for the future of US-EU relations. It shall also consider which explanation and which theory’s predictions would I find more compelling, and why. Body The United States supported the European integration because it believed that a united Europe would be within the purview of the United States and its national security (Ekovich, 2009). They believed that an integrated Europe would further support the region’s democratic goals. Under the integration, Greece, Spain, and Portugal were soon encouraged to discard their dictatorship regimes and with Germany soon gaining strength in its democracy, it also found a more secure political system supported by other democracies in the region (Ekovich, 2009). Under these conditions, a stronger European region was soon made possible. The United States also saw European integration as the tool with which easier relations between France and Germany could be forged (Ekovich, 2009). These two countries have had stormy relations with each other for a long while, further exacerbated during the Second World War. Americans saw European integration as a means of forging renewed relations between these two countries. The Americans also believed that the integration would provide a venue for more American businesses in Europe, thereby also helping to manage decision-making processes (Morgan, 2005). The integration has made negotiations easier, with one individual speaking for several countries in order to establish significant decisions. In effect, separate and multiple negotiations were negated in the long run. American also believed that a stronger European integration and economy was in the best interest of the US and Europe (Morgan, 2005). The integration simplifies business transactions, making Europe a more favorable recipient of American investments. Emotional affinity can be significant in managing views on political actors and objects, especially when other cognitive standards of reference do not sufficiently apply (Chong, 2000). Possible aversion toward the European integration is not based on cost/benefit evaluations or cognitive mobilization; however it is based on the fear of other cultures (McLaren, 2002, p. 553). The foundation of such approach or decision is even more persuasive due to the fact that the European Union is not just an international regime which is meant to decrease barriers to trade, or decrease the costs of transaction in intergovernmental bargaining. In fact, the EU is shaping up as its own policy-maker, and seems to pose a threat to the national integrity and sovereignty of the region (McLaren, 2002). America does not support such possibility, however it does favor the role attributed to policy-makers, and the European integration ultimately seeks to support independent policy-making in a globalized economy. An evaluation of fundamental works which relate to classical realism is needed for the assessment of the issue being discussed herein. The primary insight for classical realism is based on the fact that the international system features anarchy where there no rules established by central authorities bind members (Morgan, 2005). The states, in other words are left to their own devices. As a response to the materialization of a powerful state, other countries will want to balance such power. The global balance of power for some would be considered stable and more or less peaceful; for others, it may be not (Morgan, 2005). A polarized world made up of strong and weak states can be reliable and peaceful; however disturbances in the balance can lead to wars. For bipolar worlds, stability and peace between two superpowers may not lead to violent skirmishes, especially where conditions of accepted deterrence are in place (Marks and Hooghe, 2003). Unipolar worlds are unstable and other powers may rise to establish balance. Various political economists and analysts have written their assessment of the situation and have admitted that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, other powers would soon rise to provide some form of balance to the United States (Marks and Hooghe, 2003). Based on realist arguments, a unipolar world can be peaceful and stable. Instead of balancing the unipolar power, the more prudent choice would be to establish a more congenial relation with the unipolar power, seeking to establish cost-free security which the unipolar power already provides (Marks and Hooghe, 2003). This would be one of the foundations for American support for European integration based on realism. Realism supports the notion that supporting a unipolar world through the establishment of congenial relations may be the more prudent option in establishing peaceful and stable economic relations (Morgan, 2005). Moreover, these realists believe that the unipolar power also provides economic security which it can use in order to establish its own set of economic options and policies. Various instances to explain the realist view can be seen in the case of Japan and China who could have responded to the emergence of lone superpower United States by merging their economic policies and power with the end goal of tempering the impact of US in Asia (Morgan, 2005). Such behavior or decision would have helped establish a balancing for the unipolar economic state. However, both countries have gone their separate ways in terms of their economic progression. The overall place of the US based on various measures is one of dominance and this would likely be the trend for many years (Lindberg, 2007). The most significant economic threat to its place is China. However, it would seem to take many years before the power relations which the US and the USSR established would reach such stage for Japan and China. The US has already long established the policy which seeks to prevent the rise of any peer competitors to US military strength (Reid, 2004). Therefore, there seems to be no significant threat to the US in its dominance, and this is where Europe seems to play a huge role. The European Union or integration represents a significant population and a huge share of the GDP (Reid, 2004). Under these conditions, the European Union already outranks the US in various categories. The European Central Bank already controls the euro which is a huge threat to the US dollar (Morgan, 2005). Various scholars have spoken of the favorability of a European balancing tool to the US and a preference for a multipolar world within the post-Cold War era (Nye, 2002). The supporters of the European integration as a means of providing a counterweight to the US have been very visible, especially to those who would view the activity as a crucial element in US interests. They see Europe as a partner and also believe that standing with the US, not against it is the more prudent option (Nye, 2002). Although the US has accepted the possible consequences of its support for European integration, such acceptance is based on sound business and economic decisions which, in the long run, would likely benefit both regions. In other words, the options and outlooks are better under a more balanced economic setting, especially where a counterbalance is provided for the US under less competitive settings. American support for the European integration may also be based on liberalist principles, especially those which seek to support the right of countries to self-determination, to establish decisions based on their own purposes and goals (Civitas, 2011). The United States has a strong support for European integration because they also have a liberal outlook on the integration. They believe in the intergovernmental possibility in Europe, the reduction of the impact of the nation state and the pooling of national sovereignty (Civitas, 2011). They also support the notion that an unrestrained sovereignty would ultimately be an unfavorable concept for Europe and the United States. They therefore support America’s power to manipulate to be further harnessed by the UN and various international treaties, including the Treaty of Rome (Gardiner, 2011). Americans admire the sacrifice being made by the European countries in their national sovereignty, more so as they also believe that American liberalism must also be superseded by liberal internationalism which supports supranationalism more than the state power (Gardiner, 2011). Americans also believe that a united Europe will decrease the burden of global leadership on the US, especially in relation to allocations in defense. With a strong European defense, the US believes that securing global safety would be an easier process (Gardiner, 2011). The economic integration of Europe can be associated with liberal intergovernmentalism. The United States supports the notions established by this theory as it believes that there are political actors, aside from national governments which have a major impact in integration (Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998). In the realm of national politics, interest groups impact on government decisions, however, there are also other bodies or government parties who would provide pressure on political decisions. There is acceptance however of the fact that national governments are the main decision-makers and that they may be considered influential for various reasons (Sandholtz and Sweet, 1998). As these governments establish legal tenure over their country, they also gain legitimacy in the officials elected. The intergovernmentalist theory explains how the installation of national interest has been one of the primary reasons for supranational bodies gaining strength and influence (Rosamund, 2000). This theory does not care much for strongly independent states because integration unfolds on a level based on intergovernmental processes. This theory supports the notion that states can be seen as rational, departing based on realist ideals or notions of governance (Rosamund, 2000). Liberal intergovernmentalism was established by Andrew Moravcsik in his book ‘The Choice of Europe’ and to a certain extent, Americans supported his notions because they also believe in the idea that national governments are important actors in integration (Civitas, 2011). This theory also includes the liberal aspects of formation, especially as national governments have a strong concept of what their preferences are and seek these services in negotiating with other member states. These intergovernmentalists also believe that the bargaining strength of member states is crucial in supporting integration, and package deals also help in the process of negotiations (Civitas, 2011). Institutions help establish strong commitments among member states, in other words, as a means of ensuring that governments establish deals which will support their side of the bargain. Neofunctionalism helps explain European integration. Based on the work of Leon Lindberg, as well as Jean Monnet, this theory believes in regional integration based on three main causal elements interacting with each other – growth in economic interdependence among nations; organization efficacy in the resolution of disputes; and supranational rules which support national regulatory schemes (Haas, 2004). The early Neofunctionalist theories supported a reduction in nationalism and the nation-state; and it also supported the notion that, eventually, elected officials and large commercial activities within states would find favor in seeking welfarist objectives as supported by political integration at the supranational level (Haas, 2004). Neofunctionalists believe that there are some states which would support integration – positive spillover, transfer of domestic alliances, and technocratic functionality. The positive spillover effect is based on the idea that the integration among states in one area would also create motivations for integration in other sectors (Haas, 2004). More transactions and improved negotiation would then occur along with increased regional integration, often creating institutions which work well without deferring to local or smaller governments. Neofunctionalism is also based on the idea of a pluralistic society within specific nation states and that as a means of integration, interest groups and associations among pluralist states will soon shift their allegiance away from national agencies and towards European agencies (Haas, 2004). Under these conditions, newly formed institutions would be the more secure means for seeking material interests. Intergovernmentalism is part of the notions of realism (Haas, 2004). It is considered the alternative political thought to integration. In this theory, the power in international organizations is based on the power of member states and the opinions and decisions of a greater majority. It is used by various organizations today. It also rejects neofunctionalism ideas of integration. The theory suggests that governments control the speed of European integration (Haas, 2004). Any rise in powers for the supranational level comes from the direct decisions of governments. He also believed that integration, triggered by national governments was often founded on domestic and political issues. This theory does not accept the spillover impact of neofunctionalist principles. It also does not support the idea that supranational organizations have the same level or impact as national governments (Sweet, et.al., 2001). Neofunctionalists have also criticized intergovernmentalism based on their theories and on empirical grounds which indicate that intergovernmentalism cannot explain the elements and the direction of European integration. Intergovernmentalism is a strong counter-argument against neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalism is founded on realist concepts of the state and its functions, including their government in terms of international relations (Sweet, et.al., 2001). Neofunctionalism is criticized based on the beliefs that integration has to be seen based on a global context and regional institutionalism was a smaller element of the globalized system (Bache and George, 2011). The main flaw of neofunctionalism is based on the unavoidable and continued integration based on the internal processes which believe that international background processes would remain as they were. This assumption is considered inconsistent with the shifts in the economic climate during the 1970s (Bache and George, 2011). Even as national interests may be the reason to integrate with some elements of government, such process will not include higher forms of politics including national security. Moreover, the goal to preserve national interest prompted governments to participate in integration; in effect, the national governments controlled the impact and speed of integration, opposing the neofunctionalist notion that states were defeated by the pressures coming from interest groups (Bache and George, 2011). American support for European integration is strong because they support the principles of intergovernmentalism or realism. Intergovernmentalism highlights the impact of the nation state in integration and supports the idea that the nation state is not becoming outdated because of the strong possibility of European integration (Civitas, 2011). The national governments of member states have been the main actors in European integration, and rather than being made weak by such integration, they instead were made stronger by the process. This is due to the fact that in some policy areas, it is within the interests of the member states to establish pooled sovereignty. Intergovernmentalists are also able to understand moments of radical change in the EU, especially when the interests of member states merge and unite under common goals and during times of economic slumps where government goals cannot agree (Toje, 2008). Americans believe in emphasizing the role of national governments and the importance of bargaining which can be carried out during moments of integration. Commentary Based on the above explanations, we might be expecting a more integrated US and European relations. Despite the possible negative impact of a European integration on the US, the latter strongly believes in the role of supporting integration because of the eventual benefits which integration can provide. The future of US and EU relations would also be based on less competitive activities, and more towards integrated processes which can ultimately seek to establish and fulfill greater economic goals. The EU-US relations would also be geared towards the expansion of the global economic supply chain. In effect, all the benefits which the relationship would entail would also be experienced, along with its pitfalls. This would likely set-up both a favorable set-up during times of economic prosperity, but a highly disastrous one in times of economic downturns. Nevertheless, the long-term goals for a more sustained political and economic framework can be ensured by supporting European integration. Conclusion The ideas set forth by intergovernmentalism are more compelling to me because the United States already functions under such a system. The US already functions based on the ideals of intergovernmental processes with the economies and policies of one state supported and reinforced by other states. The economic impact of these activities is far-reaching and extensive. Applying such activities and concepts to Europe would likely improve the economic status of the region. I find the concepts of intergovernmentalism more compelling in explaining American support for European integration because the US has always been supportive of processes which seek to bolster economic and political cooperation while still maintaining the principles of sovereignty. I believe that although the US does recognize the fact that supporting EU integration may not be economically profitable for its economy in the long run, it however supports the notion that a wider range of economic cooperation would eventually achieve more benefits for more countries and regions of the world. In the end, such situation would have a longer and more substantive economic impact for America. References Bache, I. George, S. & Bulmer, S. (2011). Politics in the European Union. New York: OUP Oxford. Chong, D. (2000). Rational lives: norms and values in politics and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Civitas (2011). Theories of European Integration. Retrieved from http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/OS/OS16.html Ekovich, S. (2009). American views of European integration: A brief history. Retrieved from http://oliver.efri.hr/~euconf/2009/docs/Session4/4%20Ekovich.pdf Gardiner, N. (2011). Why The New York Times and American liberals worship the EU superstate. 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