Decision Making Process of European Union: Federal or Intergovernmental - Research Paper Example

DECISION MAKING PROCESS OF EUROPEAN UNION (EU FEDERAL OR INTERGOVERNMENTAL Introduction European Union could be regarded as one of the most influential international organizations of present times. As far as the decision making process of EU is concerned, a number of actions and actors are involved. The actors include governments of different nations, different intuitions of Europe, and numerous interest groups including experts of policy, lobby groups and some other organizations not owned by governments. The decision making process of EU is often regarded as loose and imprecise for it incorporates within itself numerous principles and approaches. While a section of people regard the whole policy making and implementing process as Federal, some others associate with intergovernmentalism. Often the process is also associated with neo- functionalism and supranationalism. This feature is often referred by the word ‘Brussels’. From a general point of view, the European Parliament, Council and Commission are the most important bodies in EU’s decision making process. The member states of EU are bound together by certain common objectives and interests of their respective nations. Macroeconomics politics and foreign policies are also considered during decision making process of EU. One of the chief characteristics of EU is that, it varies its policy framing process according to the field of policy. This often compels EU to adopt a combined approach of different processes (Duhr, Colomb and Nadin n.d., p. 146). The decision making process of EU involves judgment of numerous other nations or actors. These actors are referred to as veto players. These veto players oppose foreign proposals and also bring about regulatory change. The decision making process of EU incorporates the decisions of “Directorates General within the Commission, Members of the European Parliament, and individual Member States within the EU Council”. These veto players have differentiated policy preferences (Ziegler 2012, p. 60- 61). This paper reviews the Federal and intergovernmental features of EU and investigates its decision making process and policy implementation procedure. At the same time, this paper also examines the decision making process of EU in details and tries to classify it as Federal or intergovernmental. Role of European Parliament and European Council The European Parliament has a vital role to play in EU decision making process. The Parliament is held as co-legislator with the European Council as well as the European Commission. Regulatory cooperation, which focuses on prevention, has two major veto players in the form of Council and Commission. The European Commission looks after regulatory proposals and bilateral negotiations. This takes it beyond any international agreement. In general form, every single proposal of regulatory activity requires to be approved both by Parliament and Council (Allerkamp 2010, p. 3-6). In the initial process, the proposals of Commission are judged by taking into consideration the economic, social and environmental issues. The impact assessment, which is made by the Commission, jots down the probable merits and demerits of proposed policies. After the initial drafting of proposed policy, the European Commission informs the interested parties and also consults with them. The interested parties not only include the non- governmental parties, but also delegates from different industries, civil societies and respective local authorities. Through this way, people could exercise their power over legislation of proposals. Not only the general people but groups, business and associations could also participate and give advice on legal and technical issues through EU’s official website. This provision is helpful in solving issues by avoiding unnecessary complications of red tape. There are also provisions for consultation process where parliament of any nation could offer their opinions on national level rather than discussing the issue on EU level. The task of reviewing and adopting the proposed policies is done by Parliament and Council after it has been passed by the Commission. Either of these two bodies could propose amendments to bills. After the initial stage of amendments, either the Parliament or the Council or both could again recommend revision of proposed policy. It is only after agreement of two bodies that a policy is implemented. In case where the two bodies could not arrive at some common matter, a conciliation committee is set which tries to chalk out a just and valid solution. However, the Parliament as well as the Council is vested with powers of blocking the proposed policy at this final stage of approval (How EU decisions are made 2012). EU: nature and functions As a matter of fact, European Union does strictly follow any particular tradition. In that regard, it could not be classified as a traditional organization, as its functions oscillate between state responsibilities and international activities. As compared to intra- EU policies, the regulatory policies are considered less as far as external relations of EU is considered, like the World Bank or the United Nations. However, the regulatory policies find more relevance in trade policies. The governance and administrative body of EU has a complex nature in the sense that EU exists as a body without any traditional governance or set principles. Some of the features of decision making bodies of EU are- no executive elected to exercise public authority, existing of no definite political party and initiation of policies always take place within EU. In this sense, the policies are domestic in nature, but area- wise they are associated with non- elected European Commission. Thus, according to Ongaro et. al, (2010, p. 15- 16), the decisions proposed and implemented by EU are indirectly the opinions of public authority but which come into effect without the spirit of democracy. Contradictory views argue the decision making process of EU, as it inhabits with national governments. That is to say, the exercising governments which have formed EU, could not be rejected or replaced under any circumstance, leaving intertwining process as the only possible option. The member governments collectively cast they influence on EU, making it non- provisional for government of any single nation to adopt unilateral power, or ‘pooler sovereignty’ over EU. The process works vice versa also. EU has been responsible for influencing numerous domestic policies of member governments. Such policies are adopted at EU level and are regulated according to regulation policies if EU. The Parliament and Commission are credited for limiting their duty to framing of policies, their implementation is carried out though EU’s judicial system. In case of foreign policies, governments of different nationals operate at different environments for foreign policies are not subjected to European Court of Justice. All these makes EU endorse a bipolar type of governance system. While on one hand it supports member governments in putting up a supranational institution, on the other hand it gives importance to opinions of governments of individual nations, especially the governments of powerful nations. Thus, the principles of federalism often are contrasted with the elements of confederalism (Ongaro et. al, 2010, p. 14- 16). Federal characteristics within EU The term ‘Federal’ denotes the idea of unity in spite of difference. The Constitution of EU maintains that the member states could compete with each other even if they are directed towards achieving a common goal. Though EU does not support supremacy of member states, the Constitution supports their dominations. This further confirms presence of sovereignty within EU, though EU itself is not a sovereign entity. Community level of member states decides the approach of sovereignty that is to be employed to attain the objectives. All these are ‘managed’ by EU by means of public power. On the contrary, the fact that establishment of EU does not rest on hands of people, prevents it from being a Federal body. Features of federalism and European integration The Federal features of EU are measured from three chief criterions – the legal, the technological and the institutional. A common features shared by all three is that they supports competencies among governments of different nations. The technological criterion further supports unity within diversity. Other fields of interest remains shared identity and autonomy. Thus, this criterion assumes a multilayered system. Often EU faces legal complication for it does not possess a written constitution. The fact that it does not even possess a clear distribution about level of discrepancies and competencies makes the whole decision making process even more complicated. However, harmonized integration highlights Federal features of EU’s decision- making process. The Treaty of European Union and certain regulations of Court of Justice form the constitutional foundation of European integration. Constitutional regulations, categorized in sets of three are responsible for making the policy making process of EU a Federal one. The first rule regulates the relationship of EU and the member states. The second one highlights provisions of distribution of power and the primary laws, among EU and its member states. The third law emphasizes importance and control exercised by EU law and their direct implication at national levels (Maior 2009, p 6- 8). Power division among Commission, Council and Parliament allows provisions for diverse interests. While the Parliament and Commission maintains the supranational interests, the Council follows the intergovernmental principles. This implies ‘unity amidst diversity’, within a wide range of interests, a typical feature of Federal system. The decision making process, as per the norms of federalism enables participation of numerous interest groups. At the same time, dominion or exertion of peripheral units are prevented. As has been stated by Maior (2009, p 7- 8) the co- decision procedure ensures that stronger implementation of legislative process occurs within political domain of EU. Supranational practices of the whole policy- making process further instill Federal characteristics into the whole system. Decision making power The ultimate decision depends on right of determining and procedural rule. The party which decides for any constitutional modification, as well as members of certain states always strongly influences the decision- making process of EU. Most agendas of EU are based on international treaties. Thus, their alteration induces a sense of competition among the member states. Like other Federal constitutions, EU adopts a ‘qualified’ process and also supports provisions for amendments. Federal characteristics are highlights as this hinders any unilateral process of decision taking or amendments of contracts. However, EU lies in the centre for the member states and could not decide a proposal unless and until the proposal is framed by members of European Parliament and representatives of governments. Thus, every proposal and their subsequent decision making process goes through exclusive supervision of EU. This feature deviates from traditional principles of federalism. Moreover, unlike Federal conventions, EU does not have provisions for its member states to abandon the assembly solely by their individual decision. Rather EU supports the provision after a member nation has served a transition period of two years (Schmitz 2004, p. 5-11). Intergovernmental characteristics of EU Even after implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, there was no significant change in EU’s hybrid system, making its decision making process intergovernmental in nature. Intergovernmentalism approach has proved to be useful at present times as because it supports liberty in international relations. Liberal intergovernmentalism supports integration as a derivation of bargaining done on the international level by governments of different nations. Intergovernmentalism supports diversity in the sense that it has different values of governmental actions for governments of different nations. One of its features is that it deals with vital issues which are included within common interests and the compensation for loss is not derived from other gains. The present practice of liberal Intergovernmentalism in EU is characterized with liberal theory dealing with national preference, analysis and negotiations among the member- state themselves and finally an assumption of relational behavioral State discourse. The decision making process has legal sovereignty too. Furthermore Intergovernmentalism supports the legitimate stakeholders and their opinions for they have political legitimacy. Thus the whole idea of intergovernmentalism goes in line with integration of EU for the actions and interests are determined by European states who are members of EU. These states chiefly safeguard their own geopolitical interest. EUs decision-making process Political will, too, is beyond a conventional Intergovernmental body. (EU Integration: Intergovernmentalism versus Supranationalism). As far as EU’s decisions making process is concerned, cooperation is the chief aspect. This stage involves balancing of powers and opinions of European Parliament and the European Council. In Council, the voting process is held more randomly and frequently. The liberal intergovernmentalism supports bargaining of national governments as chief actors who have equal access to information and decisions. Three features that are common to these governments are interdependence on specific issues, asymmetric features characterizing the whole bargaining process and finally institutional judgment as far as necessity of credible commitment is concerned (Tosiek n.d., p 2- 9). Intergovernmentalism theory emphasizes that bargaining powers rests on relativity of national governments, and that the governments also have their own opinions when it comes to interstate negotiations. Incidents in EU, the ones like the beef incident or the taxation policy have weakened the position of Commission in past few years. As governments of different nations act to protect their own interests, it might take place that interest of one clash with the other. Under such circumstances, more integration is supported in order to specify the aims of policy. This state is generally referred to as ‘low politics’. Retention of independence is a chief feature of low politics. This makes the European institutions assume a less important place than the States themselves who only yield to supranational powers. This holds true for all types of EU integration. Integration chiefly involves economic interests of each state from an international perspective. The domestic constituents, credibility in maintaining and implemental interstate commitments are the chief aspects of EU integration. Thus, the decision making process of EU supports the logic of diversity and brings out best results as far as empirical domain is concerned (Duhr, Colomb and Nadin n.d., p. 96- 97). The existing political mechanism, especially the policy making process of EU in present times, ensures that the voices or opinions of member states are felt at European level. Limited political space and their representation during drafting of policies further supports intergovernmental features of EU and its decision making process. On more frequent occasions, intergovernmentalism is regarded as the last bastions for solving problems of international politics as well as issues of national concern. However, it has to be noticed that the European governance extends its aid only to its member states and that too within the European level. In this regard, the principles of intergovernmentalism could also be regarded as an antithesis of the principles of federalism (Ham 2002, p. 108). Drawbacks of intergovernmentalism: EU Though the intergovernmentalism approach adopted by EU has supported its policy making process, at the same time, it has also produced some challenges. Analysis of preference formation is quite often subjected to criticisms for it operates only at national level. This makes understanding of decision making process, rather the policy making process a bit more difficult thereby making it create numerous challenging levels and access points as far as interest groups are concerned. Representatives from different governments and interest groups take interaction process at European level. Also the supranational associations exert significant level of control and are not just limited to lowering transaction costs only. The policy positions that are supported by representatives of national governments are the outcomes of an endogenous process. Thus, the policy making and implementation process of EU faces challenges as the whole procedure takes place at multiple levels- the European level, the national level as well as sub- national level. Furthermore, the supranational features and supranational levels of authority add up to complexities of EU decision- making process. All these end up in creation of “multiple arenas, venues, and access points for interest groups”. This implies that the whole process of decision making and policy formulation is multilayered, but the contemporary practices reveal that relatively powerful and developed nations, collectively, has the final say in a decision making process. As a matter of fact, the Committee of Permanent Representatives serves as the common meeting point of different interest groups. Irrespective of being Federal bodies or individual groups, the interest groups mostly operate at national levels. Disparity is created as the structures of interested groups differ with the member states. This in turn generates differentiated lobbying style. This difference is further influences the interests and objectives of individual member states, precisely their functional and political preferences. Thus, from a comparative perspective, the policy making process demands national coordination from each of the levels (Coen and Richardson 2009). Conclusion After examining the whole decision making and policy implementation process of EU, it could be inferred that the decision making process is chiefly intergovernmental in nature. This is because the features of intergovernmentalism are more prominent throughout the process. Interplay, interdependence and collective responsibility characterize EU’s decision making process. Intergovernmentalism is more useful than federalism for it supports unanimity in voting in certain aspects or fields. Intergovernmentalism could be defined as an integration process which is set by governments of European nations with an objective of meeting common interests in an institutionalized way. Under this system, the governments of respective nations remain as the only authoritative bodies. One of the chief features of intergovernmentalism is that it supports retention of national veto, rather than supporting traditional norms of majority voting. In EU, intergovernmentalism decision making process is adopted to achieve stability in international cooperation without completely surrendering to powers of individual nations or governments (Oudenaren 2005, p 8-9). The concepts of intergovernmentalism and neo- functionalism got associated with decision making process of EU. As the concept expanded, it resulted in development of intergovernmental cooperation which in turn led to development of ‘variable geometry’ in different domains. (Duhr, Colomb and Nadin, n.d. p. 158) Thus, it could be inferred that EU intuitionalist functions, especially their political systems and general power structure is hugely influenced by their division- making process as it reflects the nature of interest- representation of member states of EU. Over the years EU has achieved significant amount of success in offering practical solutions within single internal market. Though EU follows a combined approach of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, the actors and vetoes stress more on intergovernmental features, by vesting decision making powers on members governments. Furthermore, intergovernmentalism, viewed from a neo- liberal perspective highlights supremacy, dominion and power of member state governments. The policy- making process of EU thus, is inclined more towards national arenas as well as national interests over European processes. References 1. Allerkamp, D K 2010, ‘The Council(s) Beyond Intergovernmentalism: The Transformative Power of ‘Intergovernmental’ Council Decision‐Making’, ECPR SGEU– Porto, viewed 11 June 2013, Read More