USA responsibility for fostering the growth and development of the EEC - Article Example

USA responsibility for fostering the growth and development of the EEC of the School] of the To gain some understanding of the process of economic integration in Europe and of its effects, as well as to see the participation of the United States in the European integration, I will begin with an examination of the origins of the European Economic Community. In the early 1950's, many European statesmen believed that the development of an integrated Western Europe through new institutions was necessary to provide for the economic health of the area, to guarantee external security, and to ensure internal political stability. In addition, they believed that an integrated Europe could play a greater political role in the world. The economic gains to be derived from European integration were recognized long before the postwar era, but post-World War II developments made them greater and more visible. The benefits come from expanding the size of the market open to producers. They are thus able to obtain the economies of scale resulting from mass production and specialization, and the economy as a whole can gain from the effects of greater competition. The advantages of integration assumed greater importance in the 1950's because technological developments that occurred during and after the war increased the size of the market necessary to support efficient industry. Competition from large U.S. business firms seemed insurmountable to European firms faced with small, fragmented markets and equipped with obsolete machinery. Larger markets and protection from the competition of U.S. products were thought necessary to sustain rapid European growth. Both could be obtained through economic integration. The political gains from integration seemed at the time to be even more important than the economic ones. The destructive war in Europe was not followed by peace but by cold war. Under Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union threatened the very existence of European governments. Germany was divided and faced a powerful Russian army on its frontier. Italy and France both experienced great uncertainties from having large Communist minorities within their borders. In this situation, only the military power of the United States maintained security. But the Europeans felt that they had to make an important contribution to their own defense, both to avoid being totally dependent on the United States, and to prepare for the day when U.S military forces would be removed from European soil. Integration through supranational institutions was thought to be both a means of ensuring efficient expenditure of the resources Europeans felt they could devote to security, and a way of downgrading independent military establishments. In Germany, particularly, integration was viewed as a means of providing sufficient strength in the West to convince the Soviet Union that nothing could be gained from a continued division of Germany, in the hope that reunification would eventually be permitted. Conflicts over the goals of European unity and over the degree of supranationality of its institutions have marked the European movement during the postwar period. Indeed, the most far-reaching attempts to institutionalize unity through the European Defense Community (EDC) and the companion European Political Community (EPC) foundered on issues directly related to these conflicts. In order to circumvent this problem, the promoters of the "European idea" decided to concentrate their efforts on economic integration. European governments ( France in particular) could enter into agreements in the economic sphere, as demonstrated by the formation and continued existence of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), but were not prepared to accept a direct attack on national sovereignty, as shown by the defeat of the EDC proposal. Thus, the Rome Treaty establishing the EEC is devoid of provisions for political integration. (Nugent, 2006) However, political motives were paramount, and the ultimate objective of the EEC is still political unity. As frequently stated by Walter Hallstein, the long-tenured first president of the EEC, "The EEC is in politics, not in business." (Nugent, 2006) But, because of the limitations of the EEC, the desired political ends can be achieved only through economic means. The history of American-European relations after the Second World War appears to present itself as an endless series of conflicts. Even after the formation of NATO, when cooperation was supposedly the closest, the crises seemed almost continuous: the Korean War and West Germany's rearmament in the early 1950s, the latter including the defeat of the EDC in 1954; the Suez crisis in 1956; General de Gaulle's coming to power in France in 1958 and his rejection of British membership in the EEC, and the signing of the Franco-German treaty in January 1963; France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966; the problems caused by America's war in Vietnam and by Germany's Ostpolitik in the late 1960s-early 1970s; the American-European bickering over Kissinger's Year of Europe initiative in 1973-4; in the Carter years there were the feuds over the neutron bomb and Afghanistan; in the Reagan years there were Poland, the Soviet pipeline, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and Libya; under Bush there were problems involving the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, and the search for new missions for NATO. Under Clinton there were serious American-European disputes over Bosnia, over a whole array of trade issues, over NATO enlargement, and over a European Defense and Security Identity (ESDI). Under George W. Bush, on the one hand, there has been Washington's growing unilateralism, as seen in its plans for a (National) Missile Defense (MD), in its rejection of several important international agreements, and in many aspects of its response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, certainly including the war with Iraq. (Nugent, 2006) The Europeans, on the other hand, while divided, responded negatively to America's growing unilateralism and have become increasingly ambitious in their integration, seeing it also as a way to reduce their dependence on the United States. Finally, almost always, there were American-European quarrels over the Middle East: the creation of Israel, Suez, the Yom Kippur War, relations with the oil states, Europe's growing sympathy for the Palestinians while the United States remained Israel's primary supporter, etc. Before the war the United States had no allies and no US troops were stationed on territory it did not directly control; after it Washington entered into numerous alliances, and bases were established in the most disparate regions of the world. Geographically the postwar expansion was least noticeable in Latin America, because this had traditionally been the US backyard. The Monroe Doctrine had been Washington's unilateral proclamation of its special role in the Western hemisphere, and in 1940-1 Franklin D. Roosevelt extended the Doctrine hundreds of miles out to sea, implied that Canada fell under it, and even broadened it to cover Greenland (1940) and Iceland (1941). Privately the President believed that the Canaries, the Azores, and even West Africa should be covered too because of their strategic importance for the Western hemisphere. (Reid, 2005) Washington promoted European integration in three main ways. The first, and most obvious one, was by explicitly pushing the Europeans in the direction of integration. The second and even more important was by insisting, first, on the reconstruction and, then, on the equality of the western zones of Germany in European affairs. Nothing illustrated the crucial American role in Europe better than the fitting of emerging West Germany into the wider Western European context. European integration was the obvious solution. The third way in which the United States promoted European integration was through its role as Europe's ultimate arbiter or pacifier. The Europeans could undertake their integration on the premise that the United States was the ultimate pacifier in Europe in general and the guarantor against anything going seriously wrong in West Germany in particular. (Lundestad, 1998) Yet, at the same time, the United States clearly protected its own preeminent position, and this obvious fact was also reflected in its attitude on European integration. Two points are particularly important. First, while the United States was indeed different from other Great Powers, it did not pursue its pro-integrationist policy primarily for the sake of the West Europeans. Washington certainly thought its policy best also for them, but naturally it had its own motives for supporting an integrated Europe. None were more important than the "double" containment of Germany and the Soviet Union. Of the two, the Soviet threat was presented most explicitly-Washington's abiding concern about the role of Germany was kept much quieter, but was still striking. (Lundestad, 1998) Second, while the United States supported an integrated Western Europe, this was not to be an independent Europe in the sense of the "third force" often discussed, particularly on the European left. In the American perspective, the integrated Europe was always to be fitted into a wider Atlantic framework. Through this Atlantic framework, the United States would presumably be able to protect its leading role within the Western world, although this could not be absolutely guaranteed once a supranational Europe had been established. It would also be able to protect its substantial economic interests. (Lundestad, 1998) During and immediately after the Second World War the United States was actually largely skeptical toward European integration. The Roosevelt administration feared that such integration might lead to independent spheres of political influence and economic autarchy, and also that Germany might come to dominate an integrated Europe. "When in late 1945 Washington began to modify this skepticism, the emphasis was at first on loose all-European integration in the form of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The ECE included the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and came to deal largely with minor practical matters." (Lundestad, 1986: 263) With the Marshall Plan the United States came out firmly in support of Western European integration. This integration ought to be on as comprehensive a scale as possible. The Soviet Union and Communism had to be contained. The western zones of Germany had to be integrated with a revitalized Western Europe in general and with France in particular. When the Europeans did not set up the kind of effective organization to administer the Marshall Plan assistance that the Truman administration had hoped for, they were pressured into making a new report, although even the new report proved rather disappointing from an American integrationist point of view. From 1947 to 1950 disappointment pretty much described the American reaction to what the Europeans were doing. No customs union was established, except the union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries), and this union was not really an American initiative. (Lundestad, 1998) In any case, the OEEC was too weak, since the so-called free lists for trade among its members took too long to work out and there were too many reservations. Thus, although progress was made on integration, Washington thought this progress slow, much too slow. The Truman administration clearly felt there was a lack of leadership on the European side. The natural leaders, the British, were holding back, as their relations with Western Europe had to be carefully balanced by their relations with the Commonwealth and with the United States. This applied both politically and economically. Britain's traditional distance toward the European continent was increased by the political distance between Labour ruling in Britain and more conservative forces dominating the governments on the continent. To many in Britain, not only on the left, the continent seemed to be dominated by "conservatives, capitalists, clerics, and cartels." (Nugent, 2006) The different war experiences were certainly relevant (with nationalism having been discredited in many quarters on the continent, but not in Britain). London's firm conclusion was that while it supported looser forms of European integration, it was entirely opposed to any form of European integration that smacked of supranationality. The Americans were generally happy to stay in Europe. America's dominating position in the world after 1945 depended in considerable part on its unique relationship with Western Europe and, increasingly, also with Japan. The Americans frequently underlined that they were involved because the Europeans wanted them to be; they would presumably pull out as soon as the Europeans suggested they do so. The truth was more complicated, as was obvious from Secretary of State Dean Rusk's comment in January 1963 that the United States was in Europe "because we believe our presence there is essential to the defense of the US"; Washington just could not permit de Gaulle "to force us out of Europe without the greatest effort to resist such a move." (Lundestad, 1986:267) On a few occasions the United States used rather direct means to make the Europeans behave in the "right" way (Lundestad, 1986:268). Suez in 1956 was the most dramatic incident, when Washington forced London and Paris to stop their invasion of Egypt in the middle of the operation. This humiliating put-down had quite different long-term effects in London and Paris. London would repair relations by once again emphasizing the importance of the "special relationship" with the United States; in Paris the humiliation strengthened determination to pursue European integration, in part to make Europe stronger but also vis-'-vis the US. In 1963 the pressure Washington put upon West Germany led to the modification of the Franco-German treaty just signed; it also stimulated the fall of Adenauer and led to the selection of Atlanticist Ludwig Erhard as new Chancellor. The Americans were all for European integration, but American sovereignty could not be limited. This was one important reason, but certainly not the only one, why Atlantic integration could never be an alternative to European integration. Those parts of NATO that were to be binding even on the US had to reflect rather exclusively American ideas. This was most clearly seen on the strategy side: when the Eisenhower administration adopted "massive retaliation", NATO did the same; when the Kennedy administration then changed to "flexible response", NATO, with some delay this time, did the same, although many Europeans were quite skeptical about this latter change. (Baylis, 1992: 384) As the economic, political, and military position of Western Europe improved in the 1950s and 1960s and as the United States began to experience balance of payments deficits and even trade deficits, the American-European relationship had to be redefined. The Europeans insisted on greater influence, the Americans on more burden-sharing. Such redefinitions of influence and burdens can break alliances; yet, in the larger picture it has to be said that even these disputes were usually well-contained. The much more dramatic redefinition of influence and burdens that will have to result after the end of the Cold War is going on right now. In the final chapter I shall be speculating about where this process could be taking the American-European relationship. The importance of a common ideology and culture should also be stressed. In a global context, to start with the obvious, it certainly counted that both the United States and Western Europe were dominated by white, Christian males. This made understanding so much easier, as could be seen in America's and Europe's not so close relations with non-white, non-Christian leaders. (Baylis, 1992) Under the influence of Cold War revisionism there was long a tendency to downplay the role of ideology, or, rather, to downplay the importance of a democratic tradition and instead play up anti-Communism as the bond that united Washington and most European capitals. Both elements clearly contributed. In recent Cold War history and even more in political science there has been a steady trend to upgrade the importance of ideology in general and of democratic rule in particular. The basic line of division during the Cold War was between Communism and democracy. Allegedly, democracies do not go to war, at least not against each other; democracies are better at promoting economic development and preventing hunger, better at protecting the environment, etc.; but, while correlations certainly appear to exist, more work is needed to explain the cause-and-effect relationships. The fact that the United States and Western Europe had so many basic interests in common made cooperation relatively easy. America's concentration on a few overall objectives and its willingness to compromise on most other matters did the same. The Europeans realized that the Atlantic community needed a leader and that there was no alternative to the United States. Therefore, some of the procedures and standards that applied to national politics were actually transferred to the Atlantic level. To stretch a point, in some cases the Europeans could almost be said to have been added to the complicated federal process in the United States, since, in a way, the allies represented another layer of bodies and lobbies that had to be taken into account. Consultation became an influential norm on important matters, although a standard far from adhered to in every important matter, with Suez an obvious example of how the norm could break down. "Sometimes transnational coalitions were formed where individuals and institutions in different countries cooperated against other individuals and institutions in the same countries." (Baylis, 1992: 388) The economic side has normally been seen as divisive in American- European relations. True, there have been many economic quarrels between the United States and European countries: the bargaining under the Marshall Plan; the "chicken war" of 1962; the off-set negotiations with West Germany in the 1960s; the many quarrels about the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC/EU; the Soviet pipeline dispute under Reagan; the differences concerning many of the directives of the Single European Act (SEA); fights in the various General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) rounds; the American Helms-Burton and d'Amato Acts limiting trade with "rogue" states and the strong EU reactions to them; and, finally, the more recent feuds over Boeing-Airbus, bananas, hormones, genetically modified products, taxation, and last, but not least, steel. And the list rapidly keeps getting longer. In the end, the United States have played an important role in the European integration, especially after the World War Two, when the Economic European Community was created to stimulate integration of European countries. Important benefits of a single, unified European market were achieved by cutting out red tape, breaking down protectionism, and removing obstacles on cross-border activities. This means economies of scale, more jobs, inflation-free growth, and healthier competition for EC and United States corporations. Bibliography: 1. Baylis, J., ''The United states and Europe' in J. Baylis & N. Rengger (eds), Dilemmas in World Politics: Routledge (OUP, 1992), pp.384-405. 2. Lundestad Geir. "The United States and Western Europe since 1945" Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 263-277 3. Lundestad, G., "Empire" by Integration: The US and European Integration, 1945-1997, 1998. 4. Nugent, N., 2006. The Government and Politics of the European Union, fifth edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 5. T. R. Reid. (2005). The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy. Penguin. Read More