The Shift from the Stagnation of Integration - Essay Example

College: What explains the shift from the stagnation of integration of European Union in the 1970s to its revival in the 1980s The European Union (EU) is essentially a political unit wrapping a bulky fraction of the continent of Europe. It was set up upon several treaties and has duly grown to the height that has carried it from an initial six member states to current twenty seven; a greater part of nations in Europe. There is quite an elongated roll of high historical characters, which, in pretty diverse ways, trailed an idea of integrated Europe. These personalities are Charlemagne, Napolen, Charles V, and Metternich. Incidentally, even the infamous and notorious personages as Adolf Hitler, did intend to deliver a wicked thought of one Europe. However, the idea of Europe cannot be entirely appreciatedwithout having the mentality of historical evolution of the Europe continent prior tothe periods of World War II and by extension the recent integration process that has been realized in the United States of Europe. By definition, stagnation in economic sense implies that there is a noticeable cease in motion, progress or generally activity. The progress as well as stagnation has been both customary and yet understandable stages in the expansion of the European Union and its antecedent, the European Communities (EC). European integration has had a kind of stop-and-go or an oscillating developmental pattern since the inception of the idea after the First World War (Louis Meuleman 2008; p. 401). Several factors have worked in a bid to understanding and shaping the composition and the future of the Union, for example issues like the adoption of a Constitution for the EU; the extension of EU membership to slot in ten new Member States; the ballot vote to the European Parliament; as well as the recommendation of a novel European Commission. In the 70s there was huge realization of lack of advancing the idea of EU among the member states. Citizens of independent member states were duly considered the then obstacles to the strong establishment and expansion of the EU. For instance, citizens of nations like the Netherlands and France at one time are in record having voted for their countries to pull out of the EU, leaving the reform process. In this regard at least according to Cini, (2007, 442); Citizens continue to disengage from the EU institutions, including what is ostensibly 'their' Parliament; the richer member states are seeking to reduce their contribution to the EU budget rather than increasing it to allow equitable treatment of the then new entrants in cohesion and agricultural aid. In fact the EU integration crisis in 70s Cini, (2007, 442) continue to declare, precipitated a situation dabbed Eurosclerosis. Eurosclerosis she explains further that it is the time period when the political integration in Europe mired. Fundamentally, it was the outcome of authority decisions in member states and by extension acute prevailing lack of public concern in regarding the condition of the European integration. There was also member state party politics as well as ethnicity issues (Bache, Ian & Stephen George 2006; 273). The principal issue here was how member states made policy decisions to shape their preferences regarding the EU (Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, & J. Norberg, 2005; 361). The independent member states held varied political culture as well as big picture opinions of their national interest and preferences. These factors are by extension shaped by complicated bundles of issue-specific factors which further depends on negotiations between the EU27 members and the apparent constantly shifting patterns of domestic politics within each member states. A pretty good example, according to Cini (2007, p. 450) is the French 'Non' to the Constitutional Treaty motivated by the then president. The French resisted the recommended liberalization of services in the Single Market which has been a prime EU policy, commonly called Bolkestein Directive. There is therefore divergent views on various issues among member states depending on domestic electoral politics and a shift in ideology in the case a new government comes into fore beside the very imperative economic matters (Cini 2007, p. 456). The member states economic performance also contributed to stagnation of European Union growth. There was amongst member countries; Germany in particular, a mentality that 'why should we pay for others' (that is, the supposedly less successful, less responsible, less thrifty one, and so on) in the then government of Helmut Kohl who then was the Federal Chancellor (Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm, 1993, pp163). Such resentful voices were actually obstacle to progress towards integration. Germany also then had her own squabbles on matters of land and being an integral and instrumental partner as well as figure in the formation of one Europe, its then lack internal unity on matters of land caused a stand still to the prospect of EU formation. The disintegration in Germany into East Germany and West Germany caused delay in integration since there were struggle for land as well as class issues in the two segments of Germany and even within each portion Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm, 1993, pp148. For instance in the West Germany who considered themselves well-off, there were minority poor who wanted equalization and equity to be entrenched and all these mounted to a crisis. The stagnation phase, also known as 'stop' phase is prompted by the European integration proceeds of a given economic sector. There was a class factor in Europe. Some member states felt strongly that they were economically stable; like the Germany and thus needed no partnership at all. The underprivileged interest groups will drive member regimes to protect adjacent policy quarters in opposition to outside intrusion and at the same time to shift government intervention en route for those areas, hence a harbinger to the "stop" phase. As authorities act, they instead breed policy rivalry amongst themselves. These policies eventually will turn out to be ironically self-defeating. At such a point which commonly they find themselves in, the states will be promptly aggravated to run away from the unnecessary high costs of competition by turning to transformed European integration. This scenario of events finally drive the states to the subsequent 'go' phase and seeming the cycles continued up the 'go' stages of the 80s from the 'stop' stages of 70s. Handley (29May2006, pp335-364) wrote in the journal that the public hold up as well as attitudes gearing in the direction of European integration, the 'go' phase and by extension a factor like the Common Market both acted strongly as a collection of integrative institutions to traverse a predicament during the 1970s which few suspected. Reliable evidence is exists which with promptness suggested that amalgamative efforts may perhaps have gravely lost argument rather than purely stand still as was anticipated by the more distrustful theorists as well as forecasters of the 1960s (Bache, Ian & Stephen George 2006; 387) . The decline turn down in support for integration can reliably be associated with both integration-related dealings such as the efforts generated to make bigger the Community and most importantly the then economic crisis, in particular, that of the mid-1970s. The situation of the economies of the majority member states was so critical that the members were rendered mere subjects of speculators of the eventual implication if a merger could materialize. They took a wait-and-see position which merely reduced them to spectators in such a big undertaking. However, by the closing stages of the decade, the fall in common support of EU integration seemed to have been reversed ushering in the integration phase. Integration generally stands for merging the parts of a thing so that they labor as one or form a complete. The 'go' phase is actually the integration stage. Apparently, during the 'go' phase, member state governments form albeit a weak coalition which is not in favor of their own manufactured interest groups. That is how often the 'go' phase is initiated. According to Handley (29May2006, pp335-364) probably the rise again in support for integration was because of the express European ballot vote as well as economic situational improvement in the majority European states. On the other hand, the support for the Union notably continued to decline in the early 1980s. But in the mid-80s integration revival regained momentum. The main contending theories of EU integration are twofold: the Intergovernmentalism and the Neofunctionalism (Karma). However, Dorette, in his article, Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European integration postulates four integration theories which include neofunctionalism, supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, as well as the domestic politics approach. Even though these two theories have seriously been disapprove of, altered or even discarded, they do hold two muscular theoretical integration arguments (Karma). Firstly Neofunctionalism did propose the theory of "spillover". Mikkelsen, 1991, p4) stated in the Journal of International Studies that the theory of Neofunctionalism argued that integration in a sector will be inclined to result in its own thrust and thereby multiply to cover other sectors. He further explained that intergovernmentalism anticipated the Logic of Diversity. Moravcsik (1993, 203) in his work hints that it is the Logic of Diversity (Intergovernmentalism) which promptly set confines to the measure that the "spillover" course can actually limit the liberty of exploit of the member state governments. According to this logic of diversity, there is implication that losses are not paid by benefits and profits on other subjects on vital concerns (Hoffmann, 1966, p 882). Spillover is that concept which states that to benefit from the full gains of integration of the first sector a state needs to integrate the associated and closely related sectors. For instance, the ECSC developing into other power sectors and at the same instance forming Euroatom. Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm (1993; p181) states that there exist three forms of spillover namely; functional spillover, Political spillover and cultivated spillover. Functional spillover, regards spillover in the context of economics. For illustration, this may perhaps entail integrating steel and coal and by extension integration of transport structures so that steel and coal are moved more easily. For the political spillover, the political actors would be needed to shift their loyalty to a new centre. A good example originates from the move of national parliament to the city of Brussels. Mikkelsen (1991: P5) adds further that the Political Spillover concept duly makes translation for the fact that national elites will promptly undergo a studying process, increasing the perception that their interests and welfare will be served better by seeking and acquiring supranational rather than independent member states' national solutions. Finally, there exists cultivated spillover. Here, there is profound idea that institutions need to drive further the integration by being in performing. For instance, the growing autonomy of the European Commission. EU integration as well as ethno-regional enlistment is considered as two fundamental and the most central forces which undercut state sovereignty and also perturb member alliances within the affiliated states of the wider EU. From the mid-1980s, a good number of ethnic parties in Europe have quickly changed their anti-EU position by pledging personal commitment to a profound European integration. In some states, this shift was pursued by the ballot box election triumphs of ethnic parties. According to Wallace (2001; pp 68-86), he mid-80s revitalization of the EU as well as the revival of tribal parties is not a coincident. In fact the economic force of European integration is indeed a catalyst for such a sudden adjustment by supporting the creation of common local interests which crosscut the conventional left-right ideological cleavage (Kim, 2004-01-08). Kim hints that the "multilevel" control system adopted by the EU which raises the standing of areas and legitimizes political load of regional sovereignty is an extra proximate cause for the upshot of ethnic parties. In Response to neofunctionalism, supranationalists laid their prime focus on the states, which make the crucial decisions to integrate (Dorette). Supranationalists main explanatory idea is the system of decision-making (Cini 2003; pp.109-127). Methods such as wrap up deals and subject linkage, part of the so-called community method, persuade or compel member states to restate their national interests are employed. According to the Supranationalists, the iteration of meetings triggers an education or learning process, hence facilitation and achievement of cooperation and compromise. Supranationalists theory of decision making does imply that, even in situations where absolute unanimity is achieved, each member country still has only a little determining responsibility to play and eventually will be an undue casualty to the dynamics of the decision-making process. As a consequence, notwithstanding its emphasis on nations as principal decision makers, supranationalism unduly denies member countries a role in decision making. The society methods permits widespread policy to go beyond the least common denominator; member countries are projected to hand over a proportionate quantity of leverage. Originally, supranationalists approach was apprehensive with clearing up just progress. However, according to Dorette (March 22, 1995) the modern scrutiny of high point negotiations has promptly and dependably revealed that the decision-making arrangement might also be responsible for stagnation of achieving the United States of Europe, earlier mentioned. He further hints that such kinds of expansion of supranationalism for sure assist to put in plain words why the decision-making scheme in certain cases has been unsuccessful and yet has succeeded in others, but not why such perceived success and/or failure keep on alternating. By shunning the query of why member states are agitated and motivated to go into negotiations in the first instance, advancement is inadequately elucidated (Corbey, Dorette, March 22, 1995). Furthermore, limiting the integration progression merely to decisions to amalgamate capitulate an idealistic depiction since many constructive decisions failed implementation test. The analysis and synthesis of domestic politics time and again has been supported and used as a way of coping with the limitations caused by intergovernmentalism. Domestic policy arrangements are distinguished either as units that sieve the brunt of the international environment or merely as autonomous factors swaying EU policy (Cini 2003; pp.109-127). Just like intergovernmentalism theory, the domestic approach theory does conceive of the EU as a structure for the chase of national preferences. On the other hand, unlike intergovernmentalism, it does analyze members' national policy regarding the EU not as a foreign policy other than as part of domestic policy (Gower 2002; pp 37-49). This implies that the governments are obliged to promptly reconcile and harmonise European policy with the domestic preferences as well as interests (Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, & J. Norberg, 2005; 361). Vigorous domestic activities do necessitate certain degree of control over the external environment. By just placing focus on state politics as well as constraints, domestic study may perhaps clarify the inclination of state governments. Conversely, a supposition to make clear the procedure of integration duly requires some conception of why related preferences do come forward in most cases concurrently and by extension in the majority of the member countries (Corbey, Dorette, March 22, 1995). In consequence, when explaining the expansion of amalgamation, the domestic political affairs theory is quite restraining. Under domestic approach theory, integration is estimated to occur only if, by any chance, diverse domestic circumstances at the same time lead twelve or fifteen governments to go for a like EU policy (qualified majority) (Andreas Bieler, 2003; pp1-14). It is therefore apparent there is unlikelihood that the foundation of convergence on policies and politics can be established at the domestic stage. The role and responsibility of the EU as a probable basis of policy convergence is over and over again neglected by members, a fact that further contributes to stagnation. Sadly, the negligence is deliberate particularly in the sense that during summits no one mentions the idea of converging policies. Incidentally this occurs when intergovernmentalism theory focuses on universal transformation to clarify the convergence of interests and preferences whereas the domestic theory approach evaluates intrastate relations (Corbey, Dorette, March 22, 1995). As earlier mentioned in this paper the integration trend has been that of stop-and go. Hence time is actually the chief element comprising the oscillating or stop-and-go beat. There is need therefore to fully incorporated time into integration theory. The spillover effect appears to apply anyway. References: Andreas Bieler, 2003, European integration and eastward enlargement: the widening and deepening of neo-liberal restructuring in Europe. University of Nottingham, School of Politics.pp1-14. Andrew Moravcsik, 1993, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' Bache, Ian and Stephen George, 2006, Politics in the European Union, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. p 387. Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm 1993, Federalism, unification, and European integration. Volume 1;Volume 3 of German politics. Publisher Routledge. Charlie Jeffery and Roland Sturm, 1993, Federalism, unification, and European integration Volume 1;Volume 3 of German politics. Routledge. pp 161-178. Cini, M. (ed.), 2003, 'New Theories of European Integration', Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.109-127. Cini, Michelle (ed), 2007, European Union Politics, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp 440-458. Corbey, Dorette, March 22, 1995, Dialectical functionalism: stagnation as a booster of European integration. International Organization. European integration and the social science of EU studies: the disciplinary politics of a sub-field', International Affairs, 2007, 83(2), 231-252 (2007). Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg, 2005: Adaptive Governance of Social-ecological Systems.p 361. Handley H. David, 29May2006, Public Opinion and European Integration: The Crisis of the 1970s European Journal of Political Research Volume 9 Issue 4,Pages335-364. University of Geneva, Switzerland. European Consortium for Political Research. Hoffmann, 1966: The fate of the Nation state and the case of Western Europe, P882. J. Gower (ed.), 2002, 'Theories of Political Integration', The Union European Handbook (2nd edition). Chicago and London Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, pp.37-49. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991: Journal of International Studies P4. Karma. With Regard To European Integration, Which Is The More Convincing Argument, The Logic Of Spillover (Neofunctionalism) Or The Logic Of Diversity (Intergovernmentalism) Kim, M. , 2004-01-08 "European Integration and Ethnic Voting: Electoral Fortune of Ethnic Parties in Seven European Regions"Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online . 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67683_index.html> Louis Meuleman, 2008: Public Management and the Metagovernance of Hierarchies, Networks and Markets: The Feasibility of Designing and Managing Governance Style Combinations. Contributions to Management. Publisher Springer, p 401. The Uniting of Europe and the Foundations of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas, Journal of European Public Policy 12 (2),237 - 254(2005). Wallace, J (ed.) 2001, 'Functions, Levels and European Governance', Interlocking Dimension of European Union.Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.68-86. Read More