Neorealism and European Integration - Essay Example

"An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of neorealist, neoliberal and social constructivist approaches on European integration and European security" Chapter 2. European Integration Introduction In this chapter I focus on the failure of neorealists to take account of contemporary alterations in EU integration and policy as well as the burgeoning role of social constructivism in this debate. (Smith, 2000, p.40) (1) Neorealism and European integration Whilst neorealists and neoliberals viewed the EU as a by-product of the Cold War, they differed in terms of their views of the future prospects for European cooperation and development. For example, Mearsheimer expected that the end of the Cold War would undermine the prospects for cooperation between the European states given that there was no longer a tangible threat from the ex-communist bloc (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.46-47). In this context, the role of the EU was to facilitate interstate cooperation - the agenda being driven by the most powerful states. (Rosamond, 2000, p.133) Neorealists based their expectations on two key arguments. Firstly, the end of the Cold War would increase relative gains concerns among the European states, creating barriers to cooperation. Secondly, institutions could not overcome this barrier to cooperation. (Smith, 2000, p.40). In Mearsheimer's view international institutions were 'merely an intervening variable in the process' by which the balance of power mechanism leads to war (Mearsheimer, 1995a, p.13). Neorealist Joseph Grieco (1995) argued that the successful negotiation of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 1992) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rebuked the neorealist theory that states hold international institutions in low esteem (Rosamond, 2000, p.133). Further, a more likely explanation of the EU's longevity was the post-Second World War balances of power politics (Rosamond, 2000, p.134). Grieco stated that throughout the last 20 years: "The Europeans [have intensified] their cooperation through institutions ." (Grieco, 1996, p.283-4). Grieco's alternative hypothesis offered a potent explanation for the intensification of European integration in the 1980s/1990s. For Grieco EMU negotiations were an interstate bargain without initial supranational sponsorship. This questions how and why states came to choose the mode of EMU development in the TEU (Rosamond, 2000, p.134). Grieco offers a 'voice opportunities' hypothesist: "if states share a common interest and undertake negotiations on rules constituting a collaborative arrangement, then the weaker but still influential partners will seek to ensure that the rules so constructed will provide sufficient opportunities for them to voice their concerns and interests and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate their domination by stronger parties". (Grieco, 1995, p.35) The key question for Grieco was "why did the EC countries undertake such an ambitious risky, programme of institutional innovation as is envisioned by the Maastricht Treaty, and especially its elements on EMU" (Grieco, 1995, p.23) More specifically, Grieco argued that neorealism faced "an acute need" to explain why "key middle-rank" EU members, particularly France and Italy, decided to "join with a potentially hegemonic partner in an economic balancing coalition" (Grieco, 1996, p.304). Grieco proffered a revised neorealist argument about secondary states and the interests that might lead them to cooperate with stronger partners through international institutions (1995, p.24). There were economic and policy influence benefits for doing so (Grieco, 1996, p.287). The 'voice opportunities' associated with participation in institutions offered states a means both to encourage the 'compliance of stronger partners' and to address any unequal distributions of gains which may arise in the course of cooperation (Grieco, 1996, p.288). Grieco believed that 'neorealism should be amended to ascribe significance to institutions' because the 'voice opportunities thesis' suggested: "for weaker but still salient states, institutionalisation might constitute an effective second-best solution to the problem of working with, but not being dominated by, a stronger partner in the context of mutually beneficial joint action (the first-best solution would be to become more powerful and thus be on more equal terms with the stronger partners, or perhaps even not to acquire cooperation) (Grieco, 1996, p.289). However, Grieco's state-centric assumptions of neorealism failed to acknowledge the impact of supranational institutions on state interests and behaviour (Smith, 2000, pp.44-45). For writers who sought to problematize the role of states, viewing states as rational actors choosing to participate in 'voluntary cooperation' did not accord with the nature of European 'governance'. Jachtenfuchs counter-argued that: 'governance by and within the European Union is developing towards a model of political organisation which cannot be adequately described anymore by the concept of the externally and internally sovereign state.[the] rational decision of sovereign states to cooperate can be recised at any time ." (Jachtenfuchs, 1997, pp.39, 41). (2) Neoliberalism and European integration Given the nature of contemporary member states cooperation, neorealist concerns of anarchy and relative gain could no longer be given credence - particularly given the lack of threat of force among the member states. (Smith, 2000, p.41) Not only did institutional cooperation allow member states to predict each other's behaviour and intentions (Keohane, 1993, p.288), but it also assisted states to move away from 'rational egoist' behaviour (Smith, 2000, p.42). Further, Keohane and Martine argued that 'distributional conflict [rendered] institutions more important' since 'institutions [could] facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains [were] evenly divided over time' (Keohane and Martine, 1995, p.45-46). How well has neoliberals theory been applied to European integration in terms of the single market During the 1980s, neoliberal superiority saw a shift to the political right within the EU, as France, Germany and the UK moved toward single market policies (Lucarelli, 1999, p.135). The "social market" policies of the Christian and Social Democratic coalitions were undermined by unacceptable levels of unemployment and economic stagnation, (Lucarelli, 1999, p.135), and could no longer be legitimized, according to neoliberalists (Heywood, 2003, p.54). This model of economic belief transformed the prevailing state regulatory policies, such as the welfare state, Keynesianism and industry intervention, into the demands of transnational corporations based in Europe (Lucarelli, 1999, p.135). The neoliberal strategy was accompanied by a set of policy-led initiatives. As Lucarelli pointed out, the EU sought to harmonize these deregulatory measures at national level through regulation at supranational level (1999, p.138). The EU adopted the Single European Act (SEA) in June 1985 and the Commission's detailed legislative plan for completion of the single market in 1992 (Hix, 2005, p.239). Majority voting in the Council of Ministers complemented this process of economic and legal coordination. Subsequently, the SEA linked the liberalization of the internal market with practical reform. Although the Luxembourg Compromise of 1967 - which had protected the powers of national veto over Community legislation - was temporarily suspended, Community, constitutional and legal prerogatives were only restricted to legislation related to the SEA (Lucarelli, 1999, p.137). Dinan claimed that, "a single market is the most advanced form of economic integration between sovereign states" (1999, p. 352). The 1992 programme evidenced a shift from a common cultural identity to forceful integration in order to achieve economic cooperation based on the greatest liberty of exchange, free movement of goods and services (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.18). The 1992 programme became the fundamental Community policy and was regarded as one of the most determined and far-reaching examples of neoliberal policy, since it involved the abolition of national rules and the liberalization of national markets (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.18). Grahl and Teague argued that the 1992 programme represented a climax of neoliberalism in Europe (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.20). The 1992 programme was neoliberal both in its objectives and its methods (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.19). The goal of the programme was pictured in terms of the range for liberated private business interaction across national frontiers. The methods proved the neoliberal belief by operating the unified economic space without depending on new Community political institutions. Instead it would be realized by the abolition of 'frontiers' between the member states (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.19). Administrative, legal or regulatory procedures which inhibited transactions across frontiers would be denied to national governments without any new powers being accorded to the central bodies of the Community (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.19). A single market was defined as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured" and also the strict enforcement of effective competition policy (Hitiris, 2003, p.64). Physical barriers refer to "customs and immigration posts at border crossings between member states" (Wise and Gibb, 1993, p. 70). Customs formalities, paperwork and inspections between member states were abolished by the end of December 1992 (Hix, 2005, p.239-240). Technical barriers, such as the use of different product standards, testing and qualifications in each member of state, posed chief problems to intra-European trade. Removing technical barriers minimized the confusion of quality of goods and resources (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.30). A significant ruling in 1979 by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) regarding the principle of "mutual recognition" (Wise and Gibb, 1993, p.76), ruled that "any product that met the standards of one member state could be legally sold in another" (Hix, 2005, p.240). The Commission proposed a 'new approach to technical harmonization', where harmonization remained essential, for example, protection of health and safety (Dinan, 1999, p.356). Fiscal barriers mainly focused on Value Added Tax (VAT) (Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.30). In 1992 the Council adopted a framework for harmonizing VAT including "a standard minimum VAT rate of 15 per cent in each member state, the abolition of luxury rates and VAT would be paid, in the case of cross-border trade, in the country of destination" (Hix, 2005, p.241). In the same month the Council harmonized excise duties, eliminating restrictions on cross-border purchases of goods such as alcoholic drinks and tobacco, and in 1999 duty-free sales on planes and boats were abolished (Hix, 2005, p.241). Wise and Gibb claim that free market competition policy is: "the best stimulant of economic activity, the most efficient way of producing an ever greater flow of goods and services to ever larger numbers" (1993, p.232). As a consequence there has been increased enforcement of competition law to prevent "price fixing and market sharing between firms as well as by rampant government intervention" (Dinan, 1999, p.380). Sir Leon Brittan, a former competition commissioner, described the "Brussels School" of competition policy: "It includes rules on state aids and on firms granted special or exclusive rights, and has special concerns to promote market and European integration"(Brittan cited in Dinan, 1999, p.380). This legitimises Dinan's claim that competition policy has a political purpose in the EU. According to Dinan, "as well as policing the marketplace, EU competition policy seeks to break down barriers between national markets, thereby promoting European integration" (1999, p.380). Tinbergen suggested that the 1992 programme offered "negative" integration, since the focus was on removing barriers to free exchange in the private sector. 'Positive' integration would focus on developing common institutions and coordinating public policies (Tinbergen cited in Grahl and Teague, 1990, p.51). The most significant 'positive integration' policies developed were environmental and social. These policies replaced national rules with common EU rules and are referred to as re-regulatory policies (Hix, 2005, p.260). A Europa article states: "EU environment policy is based on the faith that high environmental standards motivate innovation and business opportunities. Therefore economic, social and environment policies are closely incorporated" (Europa, 2007). EU re-regulatory policies have led to the "cooperation of existing national regulations with a single market, integrated European regulatory framework in various areas", and the harmonization is found in the case of "production standards, such as technical specifications, environmental protection and labeling [sic], and other consumer protection rules" (Hix, 2005, p.260). In several other fields EU re-regulatory policies have led to shared European norms and values that go beyond the narrow market failure explanation (Hix, 2005, p.260). For instance, some of the EU's environmental policies reached the highest standards in the world and in social policy the EU embarked on a mission to regulate "process standards, such as workers' rights, industrial relations practices and non-discrimination in the workplace" (Hix, 2005, p.260). From Leibfried and Pierson's critique of re-regulatory policies, we discern an effect on indirect redistribution shaping the level of the European 'welfare state' (1995, p.43-44). The EU does not have the direct redistributive ability of national welfare states, but the emerging re-regulatory regime indicates particular welfare cooperation at the European level that restricts existing welfare compromises and alternatives at the domestic level. This brings descending pressure on member states with high labour market standards, such as Germany and Scandinavia, and upwards pressure on states with low labour market standards, such as the UK and states in Southern Europe (Hix, 2005, p.261). Therefore, as Hix said: "although EU environmental and social policies do not redistribute resources directly, they do lead to a 'reallocation of values' in European society" with some citizens' values being promoted at the expense of others' (2005, p.251). Neoliberalism has been legitimized through the formation of the deregulated single market. Mutual recognition and harmonization has led to the elimination of tariff barriers between member states and to the liberalization of most parts of the European economy. The neoliberalists agenda has been augmented since national governments are no longer free to use trade barriers, state assistance or special operating licenses to defend their industries and national interests. In order to facilitate a single market regime, Hix believed that harmonization of national product standards was required to ensure efficient policy outcomes in the European public interest and to achieve redistributive policy outcomes (2005, p.269). Lucarelli counter-argued that social policies played a minor role in the exercise of Community strategies (1999, p.140). (3) Social Constructivism and European Integration Smith argued that constructivist arguments are more fruitful than traditional neorealist theories (Smith, 2000, pp.49, 51). Neorealists are too narrow and unquestioning of the status quo with regard to civil society, politics and economics. This is in direct contrast to constructivism, which deals with fundamental questions regarding European governance (Smith, 2000, p.51). Clearly, constructivism's norm-based account of institutions overcomes many of the weaknesses of rationalism (Smith, 2000, p.51). The rationalist view has a major limitation, namely that it provides no satisfactory account of the contemporary agenda of European integration, nor does it query its own rationale (Smith, 2000, p.48). Marlene Wind notes it is becoming increasingly "unfruitful to distinguish neorealist and neoliberalist approaches to European integration rather than to work with them as one single rational-institutionalist position.The main point of divergence remains the rather artificial dispute over relative and absolute gains" (Wind, 1997, p.24). Risse points out that social constructivist's position on the mutual constitution of structure and agency have significant consequences of the study of the EU (2004, p.161). The prevailing theories of European integration, whether neo-functionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism, are firmly committed to an agent-centred concept of rationalist ontology. A social constructivist perspective complements rather than substitutes these approaches by emphasizing that the interests of actors cannot be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure. Political culture, discourse and the social construction of interests and preferences matter more (Risse, 2004, p.161). Rationalist institutionalism view the EU as primarily constraining the behaviour of actors. These actors follow what March and Olsen called a 'logic of consequentialism' performing given identities and interests and trying to recognize their preferences through strategic behaviour (March and Olsen cited in Risse, 2004, p.163). The goal of action is to optimize one's interests and preferences. Institutions constrain or widen the range of choices available to actors to realize their interests. For example, the EU's liberalization of the telecommunications market broke up state monopolies while empowering foreign companies to enter the markets of their competitors. In contrast, social constructivism emphasizes a different logic of action, which March and Olsen termed the 'logic of appropriateness' that suggests "human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations" (March and Olsen (1998) cited in Risse, 2004, p.163). Those who start from rationalist premises will argue norms are followed because it is in our interests to do so and therefore support the logic of consequentiality. From a social constructivist point of view, it is important not to undervalue the impact of norms. The very fact that they are broken demonstrates their existence (Steans and Pettiford, 2005, p.185). Risse points out that rule-guided behaviour is different from calculated and instrumental behaviour in that actors try to do the right thing rather than maximizing their given preferences. The logic of appropriateness involves actors trying to figure out the appropriate rule in a given social situation (2004, p.163). According to Onuf, rules are essential to the practice of the co-constitution of people as social beings and of society, because they allow people to be active participants in society, and they give any society its distinctive character. Onuf states that "rules define agents in terms of structure and structures in terms of agents". According to him, "as rules change in number, kind, relation and content, they constantly redefine agents and structures, always in terms of each other" (Onuf cited in Gould, 1998, p.80). It follows that social institutions including the EU are not viewed as external to actors any more. Rather actors including corporate actors are such as national governments, firms or interest groups are deeply affected by the social institutions in which they act (Risse, 2004, p.163). The emerging constructivist research agenda in EU studies also pays attention to the ways in which European level norms and discourses enter into the a range of national polities that make up the EU (Rosamond, 2003, p.122). Constructivists are interested in European integration as a process. They focus in particular on "questions of identity and the ways in which European norms are established and play out within the EU institutions and the member states" (Rosamond, 2003, p.122). Thus constructivists emphasis that: "the EU [so] deeply affects discursive and behavioural practices that it has become part of the 'social furniture' with which social and political actors have to deal on a daily basis. Such a view implies that EU membership entail socialization effects (Risse, 2003, p.163). At least, actors need to know the rules of suitable behaviour in the Union and to take them for granted in the sense that 'norms become normal' (Risse, 2004, p.163). Constructivism has the potential to contribute to the study of integration two key areas: learning and socialisation processes at the European level; and the soft/ normative side of Europeanization at the national level (Chechel, 2001, p.53). Commentators on EU studies have argued that EU institutions shape the behaviour and the preferences and identities of individuals and Member States within Europe (Pollack, 2001, p.234). Christiansen et al argue that constructivism is 'particularly well suited for research on European integration. [Since] european integration itself has changed over the years, and it is reasonable to assume that in the process agents' identity and subsequently their interests and behaviour have equally changed. While this aspect of change can be theorised within constructivist perspectives, it will remain largely invisible in approaches that neglect processes of identity formation and/or assume interests to be given exogenously" (Christiansen et al, 2001, p.2). They go on to argue that a constructivist perspectives is based on a 'broader and deeper ontology' than rationalist approaches, and can therefore offer a basis for understanding a broader range of 'social ontologies, i.e. identity, community, and collective intentionality' (Christiansen et al, 2001, p.3). In this view, states influence the development of international institutions and exert influence on foreign policy behaviour too. Social constructivism recognises that international reality is a social construction driven by collective understandings, emerging from social interaction. In this respect, the development of the institution recognises the existence of both material and normative grounds of foreign policy action. It differs from Neoliberal Institutionalism because in this theory as well as in Realism collective interest is assumed as pre-given and hence exogenous to social inter-action. In contrast, we suppose that social interaction ultimately does have transformative effects on interests and identity, because continuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjective meanings (Nabers, 2002, p.3). Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, both Western and Eastern Europe has evinced more solidarity with greater emphasis on defining what 'Europe' actually refers to. Europeans increasingly perceive themselves as 'we' in contrast to outsiders (Nabers, 2002, p.20-21). German president Richard von Weizacher, in his 1990 Bruges speech, argued that Europe was faced with an obvious set of alternatives: either integration or a return to nationalist and authoritarian destabilisation; and the European Commissioner for enlargement, Gunther Verheugen, said that bringing in new members would "contribute strongly to the creation of stability and security in Europe - the best prevention against tensions, violence and conflicts" (Nabers, 2002, p.21). Behind all this stands an emphasis on collective identity and consistency (Nabers, 2002, p.21). Bibliography Checkel, J. (2001), "Social Construction and European Integration" in Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K. and Wiener, A. The Social Construction of Europe (SAGE, London) Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K. and Wiener, A. (2001), "Introduction" in Christiansen, T., Jorgensen, K. and Wiener, A. The Social Construction of Europe (SAGE, London) Dinan, D. (1999), Ever Closer Union (Macmillan: Basingstoke). 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(2005), Introduction to International Relations (Persons Education Limited: Essex) Wind, M. (1996) Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order A Constructivist Theory of European Integration (Robert Schuman Centre: Florence) Wise, M. and Gibb, R. (1993), Single Market to Social Europe (Longman Science & Technical: London). Wind, M. (1997) "Rediscovering Institutions: A reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism" in Jorgensen, K. E. Reflective Approaches to European Governance (Macmillan: Houndmills) Web site: Europa (2007): Gateway to the European Union, Available: http://europa.eu.int/pol/env/overview_en.htm Read More