Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 - Essay Example

15 April Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 Introduction The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway which connects the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. It is a 160 km long channel which is made through the Sinai Desert. The canal was designed by a French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps. He was also a diplomat and won the approval for the construction of the canal through the Viceroy of Egypt (Lesseps and Volff 1). To undertake construction Ferdinand de Lesseps created a company with Egyptian partners known as the Universal Suez Ship Canal Company. At the time the Ottoman Empire had influence and control over Egypt’s politics. The economic crisis forced Egypt’s ruler to sell his shares of the Universal Suez Ship Canal Company to England. England now had considerable share in the operation of the canal along with French investors, whereas Egypt lost control over the canal and its profits. The period saw great turmoil and the wars made the potential and strategic importance of the canal apparent to all forces. The British Imperial Empire had colonies across the world and the canal proved to be essential for trade. In 1882 Egypt was invaded by the British and the country was termed an indispensable possession of the British Empire. The canal became a super highway for the British to link its trade to its colonies in East Africa, India, and Australia. Egyptian rebel groups tried to push British Colonial Empire but were not successful. 2. Weakening of the British Colonial Empire After the World War II, the British Empire faced economic difficulties to maintain its colonial empire. The Indian subcontinent was left after the war and the British forces were weakened. The time saw an uprising among the Egyptians to phase out the British from the country. The British maintained presence of a garrison at Suez to protect her strategic interests. The British were allowed to maintain presence of 10,000 troops on the basis of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 (Tucker 107). But Egyptian rebel groups started gaining popularity of the masses and pressure increased over Britain to vacate the area. The events ultimately led to a coup in 1952 and finished kingship in the country. Egypt was made a republic by the key member of the coup and the new president of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser. 3. Nationalization of Suez Canal Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second president of Egypt and gathered support against the colonialist. He shifted cooperation of Egypt towards the Soviets and the actions were against the two super powers of the time, the British and the French. He was viewed as a great threat by the two forces. At the time the US had very less influence in the Middle East. Its main ally in the region was Saudi Arabia. Gamal Abdel Nasser moved towards Saudi Arabia for its future ties and the US saw an opportunity to increase influence in the region. The biggest step that Gamal took against the British and the French was perhaps the nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 (Witte 51). This step was the basis of this crisis. The British and the French militaries were exhausted and their economies were at a low stage. Gamal took over the Suez Canal without firing a single shot and the Suez Canal came under Egypt. He cancelled the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and forced the British to vacate the canal within the next 20 months (Tucker 107). This was a surprise move by the army and the British forces were not given a chance to react. The Suez Canal Company was frozen and all its shareholders were given the share. 4. Buildup of Egyptian Army Foreseeing the threats, Gamal used his newly developed relations to build up his army on modern weapons through an arms deal with Czechoslovakia (DeRouen and Heo 346). These weapons were from the Soviets and the two countries became close allies. The Soviets equipped Egypt with modern tanks and its air force with fighters and bombers. Artillery guns were given to Egypt and Self Propelled Artillery pieces were procured from the Soviets to move along with the tanks in the desert operations. 5. The British Scheme With growing military power of Egypt, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden wanted a downfall of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. The country faced economic problems and soon realized the potential and strategic importance of the Suez Canal. He made a scheme to show the world that the Egyptians are incompetent to run the canal properly. He wanted European ship crews to resign and boycott against Egypt’s efficiency and incompetence to run the canal. The traffic was increased in another attempt to put pressure at the operating faculty on the Suez Canal. However, the scheme failed and the newly trained Egyptian operators were successful in managing increased traffic and the efficiency improved (Tignor 270). There were less accidents and the traffic was managed successfully. 6. Sevres Protocol A secret meeting took place in France by the leadership of British, French and Israel. The three coordinated an effort to bring down Gamal Abdel Nasser after a joint military and later a political action. The plan included Israel striking Egypt first. There was no strategic logic or need for the offensive action by Israel. The Sinai Desert is between Suez and Israel which is 45 kilometers. The plan was made to attack on the basis that Egyptian army was in close proximity of Israel. After the offensive by Israel, it was planned by the British and the French to intervene on political grounds (Levey and Podeh 95). The logic being that the canal is important for the world of commerce and this conflict needs to end, therefore, the British and the French will intervene to keep apart the two forces. A secret document emerged from this meeting for signatures. The copy of this event came out in 1996 and was revealed by BBC (Felton 81). 7. The War 7.1 Israel’s Offensive The map shows Israel’s attack on 29 October 1956 (“Arab-Israel Conflict” 1). The offensive is taken as planned in the Sevres Meeting. Israel launched a multi prong offensive. The air force started the operation at day time to soften up the targets. The Egyptian forces were in defensive positions. 365 Israeli paratroopers were dropped in the Mitla Pass which is the main supply route and a key strategic point in the Sinai Desert (McManners 41). The paratroopers were to be joined by main forces planned to run through Sinai and clearing Egyptian resistance along the way. As seen from the map the Israeli main effort was aimed at reinforcing the paratroopers and takes a dominating position along the Suez Canal. As seen from the map, the Sinai has few important features. Mitla Pass covers the approach and has the main supply route passing near high ground features. The pass was an Egyptian strong defensive position. Furthermore, the central area of the peninsula has a profound feature for defensive tactics. It dominates the main routes and was the strongest of Egyptian positions. The ridge is near the town of Abu Uwayulah. The Israelis could not breach the defensive positions even by attacking with an armor brigade. However, success came when another effort from the Northern side of the ridge was made at dawn. The Egyptian forces withdrew in almost a day and fell back to rear defensive positions along the Suez Canal on 1 November (Varble 36). The Israelis used the main routes in the area for advance operation and minor resistance was presented by Egyptian forces. Delay tactics were employed by Egyptians to present minor resistance and delay advance of Israel forces. Furthermore, Israel Air Force won air superiority at a very early stage. The Air Force helped ground operations and provided protection and freedom of movement to the Israeli forces. The night operation included an attack on Sharam al Skeikh. It was a key strategic blockade for the Gulf of Aqaba and Israel’s efforts to take control of the Port of Taufiq (Golani 163). Envelopment was used to take control of the port and clean up Egyptian resistance from all sides. Due to envelopment, there was no chance of Egyptian counter attack. The re deployment and counter positions for the Egyptians were overrun by the Israeli armor groups. 7.2 British and French Offensive As planned in Sevres Protocol, the British and French gave an ultimatum on 30 October that demanded both forces to vacate the Canal Zone by ten miles and the Allied forces would occupy the zone (McGregor 255). The British and French forces launched offensive after a day of Israel’s offensive. The main offensive operations in the start were by the paratroopers, who were to be reinforced by naval forces. The mission of the paratroopers was to seize the canal area. Air superiority by Israel was used and the major targets against the regime of Gamal were targeted. Though, the bombers were not effective and the conflict ultimately came to conventional ground forces fighting in close quarters. The canal area presented tough resistance from the Egyptians. Port Said was dominated after four days of fighting and was supported by the naval offensive. Assaulting troops tried taking the port and form a beach head. The Egyptian artillery presented resistance for the sea borne operations and in many ways similar to the World War II Operation Overlord for establishing a beach head. The Egyptians launched local counter attacks but were not successful. The main Egyptian strong hold was Port Said. These were fortified defensive positions and difficult to penetrate. Furthermore, the invading forces were fighting with the paratroopers and the main effort was to be joined at a later stage. The resistance was cleared, but the Egyptians took counter penetration positions near the canal. The invading forces almost had clear access to the canal. 8. Close Quarter Fighting and Civilian Involvement After securing key strategic points the British and the French forces were engaged in close quarter fight with the Egyptian army. Furthermore, civilians were given weapons to fight against the invasion. They were inexperienced and were given the latest Soviet rifles. The weapon shipments were delivered in Port Said and were available in street corners for civilians to fight for Egypt (Varble 86). The war shifted towards the cities and its scope became wider. The bombings by the British and the French were now area bombing. Targets were not precisely selected and instead bombardment was done in civilian areas. The result was heavy civilian casualties and the issue became critical internationally. 9. The Soviet Threats On November 5, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev releases a statement that warns France and Britain of a possible nuclear attack by the Soviets (Skardon 6). The statement was aimed to support their new ally Egypt. This was the first time that direct nuclear threats were made. The world came close to World War III. With these threats along with civil casualties raised concerns of the international community. 10. Economic Crisis and Pressure on Eden The cost of war and in particular mobilizing the British army in economic crisis amounted extreme pressure on Eden and he was lost support of the British public. The country came close to bankruptcy and asked the US for economic support. Furthermore, the Suez Canal was blocked by Egyptian army by sinking ships in the canal. This blockade effected oil transport and the prices increased in Britain. The war brought the British economy close to crumbling and the public had a negative opinion about this action. This anger was shown in the shape of protests and debates on Eden’s policy. 11. United Nations The United Nations Security Council called for a resolution on 30 October against the invasion by Israel. This resolution was vetoed by Britain and France. On 31 October the two veto powers joined the invasion. The United Nations called for a special session on 1 November to deal with the situation. A resolution was passed on 2 November which called upon immediate ceasefire. An Emergency Task Force was deployed on 7 November to implement the cease fire. Eden calls for the forces to stop fighting. Some of the British main effort just arrived Egypt a day prior to the ceasefire. The invading forces were given a deadline to vacate the area. After the invasion Israel stated against the UN resolution to vacate and demanded the territory captured belonged to Israel. Though, after international pressure it vacated the Sinai in March 1957, almost three months later than the UN deadline. 12. United Nations Emergency Force The United Nations Emergency Force was aimed to assist in withdrawal of the invading forces from the Sinai (“Establishment of UNEF”). The force helped to take out Israeli forces from the peninsula, but till March 1957 Gaza and Sharm al Sheikh were still under Israel’s control. It had access to the Gulf of Aqaba and therefore, was not ready to leave Sharm al Sheikh. However, after international pressure the United Nations Emergency Force was successful in clearing the area. The force was deployed for observation till the fallout of the Six Day War in 1967. 13. Egypt’s Reaction after the Invasion This crisis laid basis for future conflicts between Egypt and Israel. Due to the invasion the Jews were forced to leave Egypt. Their numbers in Egypt decreased dramatically. They were forced to voluntarily donate their property to Egypt and were forced to sign the papers. Furthermore, Gamal Abdel Nasser was given an opportunity to raise support against Israel in the Arab world. He was looked upon by the Arabs and taken as an influential figure in the Middle East. The crisis laid basis for strained ties between Egypt and Israel for almost a decade and in 1967 led to the Six Day War. 14. Conclusion The crisis demonstrated the need for political and military planning to supplement each other in any operation. The military campaign was very successful and almost achieved its main objectives; however, the political leadership could not support the invasion. The air force proved to be a potent arm. The air superiority was the major contributing factor in the operation. The initial damage by the Egyptian Air Force against the Israeli paratroopers proved the potential of Air Force in a desert. The targets were open and there was no protection against air observation. The outcome changed when Israel Air Force air superiority. Ground operations were supported by the air and the Egyptian forces faced casualties. Furthermore, the armor tactics and maneuvers in the Sinai along with infantry proved effective. The invading forces achieved success in conventional operations, but the forces were bogged down in close quarter combat. On the political front the operation was a disaster. Military action was taken in haste and lacked support and foresightedness. The British forces alone were ready for an invasion and wanted to take action before the winters. This factor forced Eden to make a decision in haste. The Sevres Meeting was a half cooked solution and lacked political sense. They were not in an economic position to afford war. Economic support was not gathered before the operation. Instead Eden looked for support during the invasion from the US. Contrary to Eden’s political failure, Gamal Abdel Nasser played his cards well. His politics is what changed the world opinion in Egypt’s favor. Even though his military strategies were not impressive, he was successful to convince the world that the British, French and Israel and committing crimes against civilians and must be intervened by the United Nations. With the involvement of the Soviets, the crisis could have led to World War III. The crisis had far reaching effects and changed the politics of the region forever. Works Cited Lesseps, Ferdinand and Henry Volff. History of the Suez Canal: A Personal Narrative. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print. Tucker, Spencer. Arab-Israel Conflict. California: ABC-CLIO, 2008. Print. Witte, Sam. Gamal Abdel Nasser. New York: Rosen Publishing, 2004. Print. DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo. Defense and Security: A Compendium of National Armed Forces and Security Policies. California: ABC-CLIO, 2005. Print. Tignor, Robert. Egypt: A Short History. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. Levey, Zach and Elie Podeh. Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner. Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, 2008. Print. Felton, John. The Contemporary Middle East: A Documentary History. Washington: CQ Press, 2008. Print. “Arab-Israel Conflict.” ibiblio.org. n.p., n.d. Web. 18 Apr. 2012. Golani, Moti. Israel in Search of a War: The Sinai Campaign, 1955-1956. Oregon: Sussex, 1998. Print. Varble, Derek. The Suez Crisis. New York: Rosen Publishing, 2009. Print. McManners, Hugh. Ultimate Special Forces. New York: Dorling Kindersley, 2003. Print. McGregor, Andrew. A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006. Print. Skardon, Philip. A Lesson for Our Times: How America Kept the Peace in the Hungary-Suez Crisis of 1956. Indiana: AuthorHouse, 2010. Print. Read More