British Policy in the Middle East from 1945 until 1967 - Essay Example

From Imperialism to Non-intervention British Policy in the Middle East from 1945 until 1967 The end of the Second World War marked a turning point in British Policy abroad. While in the past Britain's superpower status was congruent with its behavior on the international scene, by the end of the Second World War , Britain no longer had the might with which to back up superpower initiatives. Britain, with her Imperial interests, remained a power, but not a superpower, and it would take some time for her to adjust to this new position in the International Community. An examination of Policy in the Middle East from 1945 until 1967 gives a clear picture of this decline in influence. Britain emerged from the Second World War in a precarious position both domestically and internationally. It faced repayment of a staggering 3.75 billion dollar loan from the United States, a convertibility crisis in 1947, a devaluation in 1949 and a balance of payment crisis in 1947. During this time there was prolonged public debate on the proper use of Britain's economic and military resources. The Labor government, committed to the eradication of Imperialism, believed foreign policy aims could be achieved in the long run by dealing with the peoples of the newly liberated nations as equals. Britain played an integral role in the Middle East since the close of World War I, and faced many difficulties in the region during the inter-war years. In large part these problems were brought on when they reneged on the pledge of independence they made to various Ethnic groups during their campaign against the Ottoman Turks. In addition, the parceling out land and creation of artificial states and borders resulted in various uprisings, most noticeably that in Iraq in 1920. Finally, their handling of the Palestine issue was not well met by Arab nations. The handling of the Palestine issue in the War's aftermath was a foreshadowing of Britain's coming impotence in the region. Unable to resolve the issue, Britain gave administration of Palestine to the United Nations in 1946. On Nov 29th 1947, the UN put forth a resolution calling for the partitioning of Palestine into two parts, one Jewish, one Arab. The results were not favorable to the Palestinians: three states, including the Soviet Union and the United States said yes, thirteen said no-mostly Arab and Muslim states-and ten abstained, among them Britain. Blackwell (1993) believes that the failure to hold Palestine, coupled with Britain's economic weakness and financial dependence on the United States all contributed to the undermining of British views on its world role at the end of the war (p.107). Despite the policy slump of the years following the war, in the 1950's there was a resurgence of foreign policy aims, most noticeably in the Middle East. Almog and Watt (2003) believe that this was due largely to Britain's interest in the Suez Canal. They claim, "The Suez Canal still remained a vital route of communication to Britain's interests in the Far East, e.g. Malaya and the empire in East Africa and Australia. In addition, in was an important link to British oil interests, largely those in Iran; in 1939, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was one of Britain's most important economic assets (Olmag and Watt, 2003, p. 1). Changing views by the British government on foreign policy were, to a large extent, an impetuous for policy expansion. Young (1997, p. 147) states, "By 1951 the Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, a former trades union leader of lowly background but forceful personality, had abandoned all idea of isolationism and led Britain into a peacetime, permanent alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)." In 1952 Sir John Harding defined two fundamental principles that were to govern British initiatives and most importantly requirements for bases, in the Middle East. Cohen (2004) states, These principles marked the recognition that the UK could no longer aspire on its own to provide an effective defence of this theatre against foreign aggression. First, Harding asserted that the defence of the Middle East would have to depend in the future upon 'a military coalition of the land and air forces of all the countries in the area'. He hoped that these forces would be 'backed by a hard core of British forces' and that this theatre would come under 'predominantly British overall command and control'. And second, a prerequisite for any serious defence of the region would be a fully developed infrastructure of bases, communications and storage facilities in the region (p. 38). British interests during the 1950s were also largely influenced by the Cold War. It was doubtful that Britain could stand alone against an attack on the region by Soviet forces. Cohen claims that great importance was placed upon the psychological effect that a strong force would have on the indigenous states of the region in convincing them of the seriousness of Allied intentions. Yet, in 1954 GHQ Middle East warned that "'There is already considerable concern amongst Middle East countries as to whether the Western Powers will have sufficient forces in the area to make it worth their while relying on them in a future war'" (qtd. in Cohen, 2004, p. 38) In 1955 Britain attempted to develop a closer relationship with Iraq through its integration into the Baghdad Pact. While the agreement may have prompted a short-lived connection between London and Baghdad - Iraq quit the treaty in 1957 - it also served to embarass an important Arab leader, President Nasser of Egypt. Nasser interpreted the Pact as an Allied decision to base their Middle Eastern policy on Nuri Said and the Hashemites of Iraq, his arch rivals for leadership of the Arab world, rather than upon himself. Cohen believes, He clearly resented Nuri Said having stolen a march on him, and suspected that this was yet another attempt by the Iraqi politician to further his own ambitions to establish a Hashemite hegemony over the Fertile Crescent. The scenario envisioned by Nasser was quite different - one of Egypt, with himself at the helm, leading an independent, united Arab bloc into a new, post-colonialist era. The resulting rivalry would dominate the Arab world for the next four years" (Cohen, 2004, p. 85). The Pact may have been one of the precursors of the Suez conflict, which would follow the agreements signing by a few years. The period prior to the Suez crisis was marked by increasing hostility between Israel and its neighbours and a decline in the British position in the region, but it would be the crisis and its outcome that would deal a terrible blow to British influence in the Middle East. Margaret Thatcher claims, "Suez was the last occasion when the European powers might have withstood and brought down a Third World dictator who had shown no interest in international agreements, except where he could profit from them. (qtd. in Gorst and Johnman, 1996, P.16). Although the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, by 1882 the British had occupied Egypt with the intention of protecting the Canal. They remained in Egypt and the British government installed a Consul-General to rule the country. The rise to power of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser would put pressure on this arrangement and on relations between Britain and Egypt. On July 26th, 1956, Nasser nationalized the canal. Anthony Eden, feared an Arab Alliance that would cut off oil supplies to Europe could be a negative outcome of this seizure and took action. On 21st October Anthony Eden, Guy Mollet, and David Ben-Gurion met in secret to discuss the problem. During these talks they agreed to make a joint attack on Egypt. In correspondence to Eisenhower, Eden all but stated his intentions; "If we take a firm stand over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime Powers. If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed (qtd. in Borthwick, R.L., Burch, M., Giddings, P., Hodder-Wiliams, R., Lee, J.M., Seymour-Ure, C., Shell, D, p. 23). On October 29th, 1956, the Israeli Army invaded Egypt. Two days later British and French planes bombed Egyptian airfields and on November 5th British and French troops landed at Port Said at the northern end of the Suez Canal. By this time the Israelis had captured the Sinai Peninsula. Eisenhower promptly condemned the attack and announced his intention of suspending aid to Israel in protest, but it wasn't until the matter was brought before the U.N., and the General Assembly voted by 64-5 for a cease-fire, that Britain, France and Israel were forced to withdraw their troops. The war had several outcomes for Britain: the canal was closed, Eden was forced to resign from office and Gamal Abdel Nasser used his new found status to incite Arab nations into reducing oil exports to Western Europe, resulting in petrol rationing in several countries. The loss of access to Middle Eastern oil and of American support sent the UK into a serious economic crisis. The years 1958 to 1967 were ones of marked British retreat. According to Young (1997) this time period was marked by, the continuing poor performance by the British economy, the rapid decline of the Sterling Area, the independence of almost all that remained of the formal Empire and deep uncertainty among political leaders about the country's place in the world. It was an American commentator, the former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who remarked in 1962 that 'Britain has lost an Empire and ... not yet found a role'. (p.168) An analysis of Policy in the Middle East from 1945 until 1967 shows the declining role of Britain in world politics. Britain's role in the Palestinian question, its failed attempts to create ties with the areas leading powers, and its disastrous role in the Suez conflict are all examples of this decline. Britain's status in the world community had caught up with it and it was forced to re-direct foreign policy into the realms of non-intervention and 'partnership' as alternative means of preserving power. References Almog, O., Watt, D.C. (2003). Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955-1958. Frank Cass Blackwell, M. (1993) Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War. Greenwood Press Borthwick, R.L., Burch, M., Giddings, P., Hodder-Wiliams, R., Lee, J.M., Seymour-Ure, C., Shell, D (1995) Churchill to Major: The British Primeministership since 1945. M.E. Sharpe Cohen, M. J. (2004) Strategy and Politics in the Middle East 1954-1960: Defending the Northern Tie. Routledge Gorst, A., Johnman, L., (1996) Suez Crisis. Routledge Louis, W.R. (1984) The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Clarendon Press Woodhouse, C.M. (1962) British Foreign Policy since the Second World War. Praeger Publishers Young, John W. 1997 Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century Arnold Read More