Franco-British Cooperation: Its role in shaping NATO - Essay Example

?Franco-British Cooperation: Its role in shaping NATO During the height of the transatlantic crisis in 2003, Franco-British relations declined due toseveral disputes and conflicts on foreign policies over the European Union (EU) and the U.S. This includes the incident where France was held responsible for British casualties in the war in Iraq. However, despite the Franco-British conflicts, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) still remained as a priority policy for both nations (Howorth 2003). In the span of four years, the security and defence policy had rapid development and progress that will soon shape and have great implications in reviving the Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2000, the ESDP was born through the unison of France and UK at a summit meeting between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in Saint-Malo. With the policy’s steady progress, it was set to take over several peacekeeping operations of NATO in Balkan through the tight cooperation of France and UK military forces (Howorth 2003). Arising disputes regarding the policy were usually due to “relations with other third countries, desired mix of military and civilian instruments, funding , procurement and industrial strategy” (Howorth 2003). The US global policies are considered compatible to ESDP and even provide aide to it in terms of providing a unified military assistance to NATO and as well as take charge on other peacekeeping mission in Europe. However, several factors in the 1990s contributed to renewed French doubts about NATO with some French officials not wanting the United States to exercise strong leadership in the alliance when Washington appeared to be giving Europe diminished priority after the Cold War ” (Congressional Research Services 2011). As the U.S. positions on involvement in the Balkan conflicts early in the 1990s, some French and other European officials questioned the alliance’s effectiveness, provided that Europeans saw the Balkan wars as a major threat to security. The United States eventually engaged its forces in the Balkans in several NATO operations. Some French officials believe that the Bush Administration distanced the United States from NATO in its efforts to create the coalitions of the willing, “a practice that in their view undermines the principles of collective defence, allied unity, and the rationale behind enlarging the alliance to bring in a broad spectrum of new governments” (Congressional Research Services 2011, pp. 13-14). The Franco-British cooperation was challenged in 2001due mainly to the differences in principle and approach of each country. While the British goes against visionary approaches, and favours pragmatism and tactics above strategy, France, on the other hand, goes the opposite, favouring strategy with their differences emerging from the different ideologies of legislators of each country. Combining the British pragmatism and French strategy provides a great strength to the policy and works like a double-edged sword that also makes it its weakness (Howorth 2003). With different perspectives and approaches to issues, more viable options are explored and ideas become more developed. Policies created were also more unbiased and really geared towards the welfare of not just one dominating country. But while this may prove to be a real strength of such alliance, it also proves to be faulty in several, if not many, cases. Such scenario disabled the group to come up with swift and decisive actions and implementations because of these differences. The September 11 terrorist attack in the US initiated an immediate response of establishing critical policies to further support the goals of ESDP and address the threats of terrorism. Blair’s speech to the Labour Union in October 2001 conveyed the sudden shift of his focus from addressing European issues to going global, with the intention of re-ordering the world. His objectives was first to support the US on its campaign of war against terrorism. Second was a long term project which would address the “global roots of instability and inequality” (Howorth 2003, p. 174). Last, is to create new structures of international order to manage globalisation. The intention of UK is to take full part in Europe and for the EU to participate in transatlantic and global agenda (Howorth 2003). On the contrary, France supported the US from the outside and required conditions before supporting its actions. This limits the support of France to” political and diplomatic instruments in responding to the attacks, to limit military responses specific Al-Qaeda targets, military missions not beyond Afghanistan, the need of UN mandate and for the renewed efforts to deal with the Israel-Palestine crisis” (Howorth 2003, p. 177). France also maintained its focus on ESDP since the September 11 incidents requires to the need of a coordinated EU security and defence policy that is autonomous from US. Although most agree that the French military engagement in Afghanistan has been effective and beneficial, critics argue that France has done too little in the area of civilian development and capacity building (Congressional Research Services 2011. “France has long advocated a strict division between civilian and military personnel in overseas deployments. French military forces are generally trained for combat and stabilization operations.” (Congressional Research Services 2011, p. 17). French officials strongly believe that for the mission in Afghanistan to successful, efforts in civilian deployment and capacity building should be done. The U.S. remained deeply involved in the European affairs after the Second World War. By the mid-1990s, the U.S. somehow slowly kept its distance from Europe while keeping dominance in leadership across the continent. Also, this period was the start of efforts from France and Germany to create an EU security policy that would be independent from NATO and the United States. The European policy was primarily based on its assumption that U.S. has several priorities beyond Europe and also that America and Europe has differences on the means of safeguarding their interests (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Marked by examples of incidents in 2001 where America pursued Afghanistan and then after a few years, Iraq into war despite opposition of U.S. allies. Even though the top priorities of UK changed into a global scale, the progress on the alliance and EU security arrangements continued (Howorth 2003). Meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and EU political and security committee (COPS) took place in February 2001. A meeting between the EU and NATO Military Committee was also held in June 2001.Several advancements on the policy includes the German-Dutch Air Transport Coordination Cell in June 2001and significant advancements in the police and military capabilities (Howorth 2003). A report on conflict prevention was discussed that enhanced cooperation with NATO and the Russia and Ukraine, and its willingness to take over peacekeeping missions in Macedonia. Sudden shift of focus of London provided an avenue for NATO to be revived since both UK and NATO are going the same path of globalisation. The principle of taking the fight to the enemy was also employed in accordance with the British Army doctrine: ‘it is better to where possible to engage an enemy at longer range, before they get the opportunity to mount an assault on UK’ (Howorth 2003). Rapidity also adds up to distance, since it is advantageous to be able to strike very rapidly. Last, is the fight against terrorism became the new mission of the Alliance. These principles in turn became the basis of the establishment of a NATO Response Force in a NATO summit in 2002. The unit gave new life to NATO but poses a threat to the role of the European Rapid Reaction Force. UK’s decision was primarily focused on addressing the issue on terrorism and providing a solution in interoperability, having established the NATO Response Force would cater an easier interoperability with US forces in high-technology combat. (Howorth 2003). NATO also benefited from the policies of the joined forces of Spain and UK on its proposal of UK-Spanish Vision of the Future of NATO in the Prague Summit. The main agenda in the summit is the NATO Response Force, internal restructuring and reform, and the prioritisation of NATO enlargement and NATO-Russian Council. Internal reform and restructuring within NATO led to “a new, streamlined command structure, intended to make NATO leaner, more flexible and better be able to conduct full range of Alliance mission around the globe” (Howorth 2003, p.180), making the unit more relevant. On the other side of the picture, France has several doubts over most of the developments. In response to the events in UK, the French government veered to a different perspective on the relationship of NATO and the European Security Policy. Jacques Chiraz said that ESDP was incompatible with NATO. However, ESDP strengthens NATO by establishing a partnership which will be stronger when balanced. The programme was stressed in the French government’s LPM that enumerated the objectives of the partnership. The first objective was to “narrow the gap between the British and French military capabilities” (Howorth 2003, p. 181). This resulted to an increase in the military budget for equipment expenditure that increased from 12 billion pounds to 15 billion pounds. Great benefits was given to the upgrading of the French navy with the addition of one aircraft carrier, 60 raffle combat aircraft, four strategic nuclear submarines armed with M-51 missiles, 17 new horizon class frigates and six new nuclear attack submarines and will grow to 80 surface vessels and 136 support aircrafts in 2015. This will place France in a position of becoming an effective ally of the US (Howorth 2003). French assertiveness was generally seen in a different light in Europe (Congressional Research Service, 2011). Howorth (2003) tackles the difference between France’s notion of greater balance in the transatlantic relationship and Britain’s notion of partnership is one of political semantic rather than of political principle. Both countries have the ultimate goal of using the transatlantic relationship to promote European interests and influence US policies for a just and stable world. However, France and UK disapproves U.S. policies that they deem to be detrimental at the end. This in turn resulted to the difficulty in attaining a unified European position that tends to halt the progress of the ESDP. UK has been hesitant in pursuing the autonomy of the policy, which is a direct disregard of the primary objective to disengage U.S. forces from the EU. Also, the different notion of each state develops representation of strengthening NATO and on the hand threatening the existence of it. Thus, the only chance for NATO or the ESDP to have an ideal profile depends greatly on the condition of France and UK being able to reconcile their differences and create conscious and concerted efforts for developments of the policies (Howorth 2003). In September 2003, a trilateral meeting was held in Berlin, UK, France and Germany narrowed their differences when Tony Blair accepted the idea that the EU should be given a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without resorting to the resources and capacity of NATO (Howorth 2003). UK then went further closer to its European partners pointing out the need of a tighter EU structured cooperation on security and defence. The stand of UK alarmed NATO seeing it as a threat to the future of the organisation, and had a special meeting was called by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and other joint meetings with NAC and COPS to calm US fears. NATO’s strategic concept draws attention to one particular aspect of security, cooperative security by which is meant NATO’s ability to promote security and political change beyond its borders through strategic partnerships with third countries. In contrast to earlier versions of the strategic concept, cooperative security has been listed as one of the three so-called core tasks for the Alliance – thus, in principle, giving it importance equal to crisis management and collective defence. Cooperative security should therefore be taken seriously as a key task through which NATO tries to define itself as a political actor with the aim of exerting strategic influence beyond its borders. On the contrary, the strategic concept makes no explicit mention of the concrete geographical delimitation of cooperative security. It seems obvious that NATO is unable to exert influence in all major areas of the world; the more countries NATO grant partnership status, the more the concept’s practical efficiency is diluted. The discrepancy between the Western Balkans and the Eastern neighbourhood as to NATO’s political influence and hence inclination to invest in democracy promotion seems just to illustrate this case. NATO, though not explicit about this, has come to realise that strategic prioritisation between geographical entities is necessary to exert effective influence through partnerships, enlargement or even peacekeeping operations. The logical question then arises of how to understand the decline in democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood. What is interesting from a research perspective is the change in policy rather than the status quo. The Eastern neighbourhood, rather than the Western Balkans, is interesting therefore in its development in policy over time from one period before 2008 to another after 2008 and from the perspective of the causal factors that lead to changes in policy. The primary intention is not to understand the policy. For the purpose of the paper, outcome is interesting only as an external pressure with impact on policy output, i.e. the actual change in foreign policy. The Eastern neighbourhood can be taken as a case study demonstrating the dynamics of democracy promotion which may, in turn, contribute to theoretical learnings about the issue (Larsen 2011). An obvious explanation to democracy promotion decline in the Eastern neighbourhood is of course the increased geopolitical presence of Russia as great power creating the incentives for or directly promoting backlashes against Western power projection and values in the region. On the other hand, nothing for that matter hinders NATO in trying to uphold leverage through partnerships or credible enlargement incentives. The increased difficulties experienced in the actual facilitation of democratic change do not actually hinder NATO in maintaining its strong external value profile and to confront the authoritarian backlashes through effective counter-incentives. Enlargement fatigue is not adequately explained by the ‘rise’ of Russia as a mere external factor. It would seem, hence, that the change in policy is better understood from the perspective of the ‘internal’ processes leading to this change in policy output (Larsen 2011). Currently, France plays an important relationship with NATO having 3,000 troops under its command and is the third largest financial contributor (Cameron and Maulny 2009). With the good intention of France towards the Alliance, President Sarkozy gained the support for the French reintegration. In February 2009, the US security advisor and French diplomatic advisor had discussions and were seen to be the start for future policies (Cameron and Maulny 2009). “Multilateralism is important to all 27 members of the European Union, which is itself a multilateral entity painstakingly put together over a fifty-year period. For Europeans, decision-making in international institutions can lend legitimacy to governmental policies. Member states of the EU share certain areas of sovereignty and pursue joint policies intended to provide political and economic stability, goals that the United States has supported since the 1950s. Globally, Europeans perceive the U.N. as the locus for decision-making that can provide an international imprimatur for member states’ actions in international security. The U.N. carries special significance for European countries that experienced two world wars. Europeans see the EU and the U.N. as belonging to a civilizing evolution towards cooperation rather than confrontation in world affairs” (Congressional Research Services 2011). France is in a good position in the framework of multilateral institutions, holding a permanent seat and possesses a veto in U.N. Security Council. Thus making important policies in the EU dependent on the support of the French government; among the institutions where France had a critical role in, includes the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF (Congressional Research Services 2011). Over 20 years, the French defence and national security policy has progressively developed by creating a downsized military force and more flexible units. The current president of France has sought to build further on these efforts and also it has increased France’s military expenditures to 2% of its GDP each year and encourages other European countries to do the same. “The French government, like many of its allies, could struggle to realize ambitious defence spending goals in the face of severe budgetary constraints. Against this backdrop of fiscal austerity, France has heightened calls for increased defence cooperation both within NATO and the European Union. Paris has also shown a willingness to pursue enhanced military cooperation with individual countries, as evidenced by what some consider a watershed November 2010 defence cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom” (Congressional Research Services 2011, p. 10). On the position of counter terrorism, many U.S. and French officials believed that strong bilateral cooperation between the United States and France in law-enforcement efforts to combat terrorism is necessary after the September 11. Over the past years, France had long experiences on the combat against terrorism, which can be attributed to its tight centralized system of law enforcement, and a far-reaching intelligence network that gathers information on extremist groups. Several violent groups have been operating in France for many decades and state had employed strong actions to respond to it in order to control unlikely situations to happen (Congressional Research Service 2011). France has long championed free speech and freedom of religion, there is also a prevailing requirement for public order. Strong central authority in France has traditionally meant that the government constrains civil liberties when there is a real or perceived threat. Police frequently check individuals’ identities and inspect carried items, particularly in large public places such as airports. Since the subway bombing of 1995, France has pursued vigorous surveillance of suspected terrorist groups with, for example, increased authority to eavesdrop on conversations and to view electronic mail. On September 12, 2001, France revived an existing law enforcement measure, called Vigipirate, which “enhances the ability of the government to ensure order. This kind of system provides for greater surveillance of public places, government authority to cancel holidays or public gatherings that could be the target of terrorist attacks, the activation of elements of the military to secure infrastructure, and tighter security at airports, train stations, embassies, religious institutions, nuclear sites, and other locations that may come under threat.” When the Vigipirate was enforced, the government called 35,000 personnel from the police and military to employ such measures, including 4,000 personnel assigned to guard the Paris subway system. “Vigipirate is still in force, although not at the highest level of alert” (Congressional Research Services 2011). A unification of France and UK, and all their partners, would create a better policy that can have the transatlantic impact that both countries have been trying to do. The fate of ESDP lies on the hands on France and UK; if both can straighten out their conflict then the ESDP will have a clearer future and will have a greater chance of achieving its goals. A united Franco-British relation would make it possible for transatlantic and European objectives to be achieved. However, policies from UK and France would continually create an effect on the foreign policies of US and in turn of NATO. Bibliography Cameron, A. & Maulny JP (2009). France’s NATO Reintegration: Fresh views with the Sarkozy Presidency?. Royal United Services Institute. Congressional Research Service (2011). France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations, P. Belkin. Howorth, J. (2003). France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis. The International Institution for Strategic Studies . Survival vol. 45 no. 4, pp. 173-192. Larsen, H. (2011). When Democracy Promotion Fades: NATO in the Eastern Neighbourhood. PhD dissertation, Danish Institute for International Studies. Read More