How Gorbachev's regime come to an end, collapsing the Soviet Union - Research Paper Example

?Introduction There are many reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed under Mikhail Gorbachev. Ironically, probably the major reason for the collapse was the reforms that Gorbachev put into place, especially glasnost, which was a policy that allowed the people to speak more freely. As there were brewing tensions within the nationalities, who demanded independence from the Soviet State, and the intelligentsia, who demanded governmental reform, Gorbachev's policy of letting the people speak ultimately led to the demise of the Union, argues some commentators. Other commentators contend that the Soviet Union was weak, the United States strong, and this is what led the Soviet Union to make the reforms that ultimately led to the breakup of the country. Still other commentators state that Ronald Reagan's policy of drastically increasing the military budget to bring the Soviet Union to its knees economically is the reason for the Soviet Union's breakup. In the end, it was a combination of all these factors, in a perfect storm, which led to the demise of the Soviet Union and the end to Communism. Discussion There are a variety of reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed, bringing the era of Communism with it. Wohlworth (1994-1995) states that the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War is a complex event that has no easy answers. He also states that the theories which have been put forth to explain the end of the Cold War have been weak, and that it is necessary to disaggregate the end of the Cold War to get to a theory which might be plausible. He states that there were three keys to understanding what happened with the Soviet Union at the end of the Gorbachev era. The first key is that the “decision-makers' assessments of power are what matters” (Wohlworth, 1994-1995, p. 97). In particular, Wohlworth states that power is complex and it can be thought of either in terms of capabilities or influence. Capabilities are reassessed according to new and different information about non-material elements of capability, even when there is only a slight change in the material measures. He also states that expectations inform policy, as all policies are future oriented. Therefore, a decision to reform, go to war, or retrench is contingent upon an assessment of what the future may hold. For instance, a nation may look and see that it is in decline. If this decline is reversible, then the nation may decide against a risky decision, such as warfare, and opt instead of a less-risky course of action, such as reform or retrenchment. The second key, according to Wohlworth (1994-1995), is that if the nation in the decline is a challenger, as opposed to a hegemon, that nation is more likely to retrench and reform instead of opting for war. This would help explain the end of the Soviet Union, as it was not a declining hegemon, but, rather, a declining challenger. The Soviet Union, while chafing against the American-dominated system of global influence, knew that it was not the predominant influence in the world. Therefore, as the Soviet Union was aware of its status on the world stage – that it was not the dominant influence in the world, but, rather, a challenger, it did not want to go to war to preserve the status quo of its country. This theory is in contrast of an early theory of hegemonic war, put forth by Thucydides, that war may occur when there is a dynamic challenger and a moribund hegemon. In Thucydides' theory, the Soviet Union would have to have been dynamic, which means that it was in the process of transitioning to a hegemon, and the United States would have to be a moribund, which would mean that it was on the decline. While Wohlworth acknowledges that, at one point, the Soviet Union was a dynamic challenger, in the 1950s and 1960s, by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, it was a moribund challenger. In contrast, at this same point, the United States was a dynamic defender and hegemon. Therefore, the Soviet Union could not, rationally, have chosen to go to war to protect itself, because it saw the end game and saw that it would lose. The third key put forth by Wohlworth to understand what happened to the Soviet Union at the time of its collapse is that the “sudden decline or civil strife on the losing side of a struggle is less destabilizing globally then such decline or strife on the winning side” (Wohlworth, 1994-1995, p. 99). In this case, when a side is already losing, and it has internal strife, then this is simply an acknowledgment of what is already occurring. All the actors on the world stage knows that is happening with the country on the losing side of a struggle, so internal strife is merely confirmation, so that this internal strife is not globally destabilizing. On the other hand, if there is civil strife on a country that is on the winning side of a global struggle, then the political actors within that country are more emboldened to keep fighting and trying to carry on with the struggle. These three keys, according to Wohlworth, help explain the end of the Soviet Union and why the collapse of the Soviet Union was relatively peaceful. If the Soviet Union were ascendent, and the United State descendent, according to Wohlworth, then this would have been a dangerous situation, much more dangerous then what occurred, because the Soviet Union most likely would have went to war instead of collapsing into reform. Wohlworth's theory is different from a theory of structural realism, because a theory of structural realism would state that the Soviet Union and the United States were both superpowers at the time of the Soviet collapse, and are therefore identitcal, and, in this case, the outcome would have been quite different if the theory of structural realism held true. Petersen (1993) states that the Soviet policy of perestroika, which was a restructuring of the Soviet economy and society, was a direct result of the Soviet Union seeing that its power and influence were on the wane, while the power and influence of the United States is on the rise. Thus, Petersen would concur that the Soviet Union saw no option but to reform due to the imbalance in the two super-powers during this time (Petersen, 1993, p. 473). Petersen saw detente, explained below, in a similar vein, as the Soviet Union realized that it did not have the power to reduce tensions with the United States in any other way but to, essentially, kowtow to what the United States wanted (Petersen, 1993, p. 473). Wohlworth theorized that the relative power structure between the Soviet Union and the United States caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, in that, in a nutshell, Gorbachev saw the handwriting on the wall, so to speak, and had to make a major change due to the pressure of the United States. That change would have been either go to war or reform, and, as the Soviet Union saw that it was moribund and the United States dynamic, it decided to reform, because it knew that it could never win a war. In contrast, Crozier states that the Soviet Union collapsed because of the inherent failure of communism. Crozier's theory does not state that Gorbachev just reformed because he knew that he couldn't win. Rather, Crozier states that Gorbachev tried, and failed, to get rich countries to support the Soviet system and to help the USSR financially and economically. If this occurred, according to Crozier, Gorbachev wanted to drain the West financially so that communism could take over the world. Gorbachev, according to Crozier, was a true believer in communism, and was tireless in proclaiming his allegiance to Karl Marx, the founder of the communism theory. This was shown by Gorbachev's tributes to Lenin, published in his book, Perestroika (Crozier). Therefore, the portrait that Crozier paints of Gorbachev is much different from that painted by Wohlworth. Far from the leader who knew that he was in charge of a tired country, who made the calculated guess that reform was his only option, Crozier paints a picture of a dynamic leader who is a true believer in Communism, and who desired for Communism to take over the entire world. And, according to Crozier, it was not the failure of Gorbachev that prevented this from occurring. Rather, it was the failure of Communism itself. Crozier states that Communism is unreformable and a failure. According to him, the capitalist countries were thriving and becoming richer, while the Communist countries were becoming poorer, and the masses in these countries were living in poverty. Meanwhile, in the Communist countries, the leaders had the privilege and the wealth. Because of this inherent failure of the Communist system, the Soviet Union was doomed to fail, according to Crozier (Crozier). Kremenyuk (1996) concurs with this analysis, stating that the success of the capitalist countries exerted influence upon the Soviet Union for reform, as these other countries were clearly surpassing the Soviet Union in terms of technological innovation. This, in turn, led the Soviet Union to surmise that it must adapt the Western model of freedom of information, free elections and free political parties to survive. While the Soviet Union naively hoped that they could adapt certain elements of the Western model while keeping their core economic premise of Communism intact, this was not to be (Kremenyuk, 1996, p. 220). Krygier (1994) states that Marxist regimes, such as Communism, fail because it cannot “deliver on its promises to create a better world or at least a truly human society” (Krygier, 1994, p. 258). Another theory is that the United States, specifically Ronald Reagan, was the cause of the end of the Soviet Union. This, like the theory put forth by Crozier that communism's failures caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, is a theory which is widely held (Farnham, 2001, p. 225). Schulzinger (1994) traces the attitude of the United States towards the Soviet Union from the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s to Ronald Reagan. According to Schulzinger, Kennedy opened up a policy of detente with the Soviet Union after the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the two countries closer to nuclear war then at any other time during the Cold War. Detente produced an uneasy peace between the two countries, as they agreed on a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, promised to work together to ban nuclear testing and also promised to work together on future agreements limiting the growth of the number of nuclear armed missiles on both sides (Schulzinger, 1994, p. 14). Detente was the focus of the United States policy towards the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1976, according to Schulzinger, ending with Jimmy Carter, although Carter did support some elements of detente. From 1976 to 1979, the two countries fitfully progressed towards arms control. Then, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and the period of detente was officially over (Schulzinger, 1994, p. 14). Ronald Reagan came to power in 1980, and promptly declared the era of detente to be dead. Therefore, one of his first actions was to build up the United States military, spearheading the largest increase in peacetime military spending in the history of the United States (Patman, 1999, p. 579). During this period of time, Reagan increased defense spending from $117 billion per year to $290 billion per year, while employing harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, the harshest rhetoric used by an American official since the 1960s. Some of the things that Regan said were that the Soviet leaders “reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat,” and that “the Soviet Union runs against the tide of human history,” not to mention referring to the Soviet Union as an evil empire (Schulzinger, 1994, p. 16). At this point, Schulzinger concurs with Wohlworth's analysis, stating that Gorbachev, when he came to power, quickly realized that his country could not keep up in the arms race, due to his country's backwards economy, and this realization made him willing to ease towards another period of detente with the United States and Ronald Reagan. The two countries moved towards nuclear disarmament, and, in 1987, Ronald Reagan saw that the Soviets had changed from the blustering country that he called an evil empire back in 1982 (Schulzinger, 1994, p. 17). The theories above focus on other factors other than Gorbachev himself, though. While Reagan, Communism's failure and the reality that the Soviet Union was on a decline while the United States was ascendent, are all factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union, there should be some examination of Gorbachev himself. This is the focus of Kaiser's (1991) analysis. Kaiser states that Gorbachev had two chinks in his armor which contributed to the Soviet Union collapsing. One is nationalities issues and the second is economics. The nationalities issues refers to the internal ethnic strife. This ethnic strife was an internal war between the Lithuanians, the Latvians and the Russians. The Armenians and the Azerbaijanis were another source of conflict. Yet Gorbachev believed that the Soviet Union was harmonious, according to Kaiser, and it was this obtuseness that cost him dearly. It was this internal conflict which made the Soviet Union so difficult to preserve. Kaiser states that Gorbachev gave these different groups the right to speak, and that this action, ironically, it was effectively brought an end to the Soviet Union. Once these different ethnic groups could speak their mind, organize politically and express their aspirations, it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would crumble (Kaiser, 1991, p. 160). Buraway (1990) states that the conflict between dominant classes and between dominant and subordinate classes will bring an end to socialist countries, and this is essentially what happened here (Buraway, 1990, p. 121). Therefore, Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and democratization ultimately led to the demise of the country (Kaiser, 1991, p. 169). This argument actually forms the focus of another analysis, put forth by Beissinger (2009). Beissinger states that nationalism was a contributing force in the fall of the Soviet State. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost made such nationalism a possibility, as did the mobilization of millions of people during the period of 1987 to 1993. Beissinger states that nationalism was the predominant internal force which brought about the end of the Soviet Union, far ahead of other internal forces such as labor unrest, consumer shortages and environmental justice. The nationalities which were a part of the Soviet Union were finally allowed to demonstrate under the policy of glasnost, and this is exactly what happened. The nationalities protested and demanded independence, and the Russians were largely silent and did not come to the defense of the Soviet State. According to Beissinger, these protests and mobilisations, more than anything else, led to the demise of the Soviet Union (Beissinger, 2009, p. 332). Applebaum (2005) states that the Pope John Paul II contributed to this mobilization because he was able to get people into the streets, as millions of people of all ages greeted him in his visits to the Soviet Union. Because of this, Applebaum contends that Pope John Paul II helped end Communism (Applebaum, 2005, p. A20). The second major chink in Gorbachev's armor was his economic policy. He could not make progress in reforming his economic policy. Because Gorbachev only managed, in his first five years, to launch one private sector successfully, and many of the other sectors were deteriorating, this was another major cause of the collapse of the country. Gorbachev was incompetent, according to Kaiser, and even his economist advisers knew this. Gorbachev, stated these economists in private, did not understand how dire the economic picture was of the country and could not come to terms with the pain that economic reform would inflict on the country. Therefore, the budget deficit under Gorbachev ballooned from 3 percent of the gross domestic product to 10 percent in 1989, and higher still in 1990. The pseudo solution to this issue was printing more money, which drastically increased inflation. Add to this destabilization brought by a coal miner's strike and a sugar crisis, and a perfect storm of economic incompetence was realized (Kaiser, 1991, p. 171). However, there is some indication that Gorbachev himself does not see events in quite this way. According to Lukyanov (2009), Gorbachev, to this day, did not see his failure as being economic, but, rather political, contending that the only reason why the Soviet Union was lost was because his rival, Boris Yeltsin, stabbed him in the back (Lukyanov, 2009). Therefore proving Kaiser's analysis that Gorbachev was unaware of dire economic conditions, which made him unable to tackle these conditions in any meaningful way. Kremenyuk (1996) states that another factor of the Soviet collapse which is focused upon Gorbachev as his status, at the outset, of a reformer. Gorbachev was put into power to become a modernizer of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's initial plan to do this included liberalizing the regime, introducing some elements of democracy and destroying the Cold War relationship with the West. Therefore, Gorbachev moved toward democratizing his country, and the country moved rapidly in this direction. Because Gorbachev was a democratizer, this threatened the conservatives in that country, and they staged a coup because of it. This coup drove a wedge between the hard-core Communists, and the modernizers, and, according to Kremenyuk, this strife brought an end to the Communist party altogether (Kremenyuk, 1996, p. 221). According to Petersen (1993), these reforms, especially that of glasnost, ultimately is what led to the demise of the union, which is essentially the argument put forth by Kaiser, (1991). However, while Kaiser focused on how glasnost brought an end to the union because it gave different ethnic groups a platform to speak, Petersen states that glasnost brought an end to the union because it gave the intelligentsia in the country, which was a growing influence, this same chance to challenge and speak. The Soviet Union was becoming urbanized and educated during the 1970s, while getting a better exposure to Western ideas and culture, due to the Nixon-Breshnev period of detente. While this was occurring, the state bureaucracies were not serving the people, and were becoming increasingly corrupt. Once again, it was a perfect storm - the middle class was growing and becoming better organized, and being more exposed to the West. Meanwhile, their own government was failing them. The glasnost reform gave them an openness to speak, and speak they did, leading to rebelliousness (Petersen, 1991). Meanwhile, perestroika, Gorbachev's other reform, also helped bring an end to the Soviet Union, as it diverted resources from the military towards economic and social programs, which, in turn, forced it to relax tensions towards the United States (Petersen, 1993, p. 481). McCreath (1999) stated that perestroika was doomed to fail, as it centered around economic reform that centered around free enterprise, and the Soviet Union, for 70 years, with its focus upon production quotas, had killed personal incentive (McCreath, 1999, p. 16). Pollitt (2006) expands upon the argument that Gorbachev was ultimately the cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Pollitt does not buy into the argument put forth by Crozier that Gorbachev was a hard-core Communist who had the desire to rally the world around his country and his Communist philosophy and pursue world domination of Communism. Rather, Pollitt states that Gorbachev was essentially ready to end the Cold War even before there were peace talks in Iceland. He bases this analysis on what Gorbachev said in 1986. One of Gorbachev's speeches focused upon the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States, stating that their country must respect the United States, and recognizing that there cannot be peace without cooperating with the United States. The other speech in 1986 which showed that Gorbachev was ready to end the Cold War was his speech about perestroika, and, in this speech, Gorbachev criticized the Soviet system (Pollitt, 2006, p. 39). Pollitt stated that Gorbachev, recognizing his country's weakened position, came to the table with the United States in a mood to preserve his country, and recognized that appeasing the United States was the best way to do this (Pollitt, 2006, p. 39). Conclusion What is evident from the analyses put forth by the different commentators in these journals is that the collapse of the Soviet Union was caused by a multitude of different factors that all came to a head during Gorbachev's regime. Gorbachev came into power as a reformer, and he put forth reforms that, ironically, weakened his country considerably. The major reform which led to the demise of the Soviet Union, according to these theories, was that of glasnost. As glasnost was a policy which enabled the people to speak more freely, this gave a platform both to nationalists who wanted their countries to be independent of the Soviet Union, and the middle-class intelligentsia, who were growing more and more disgusted with the Soviet Union's inability to provide services to the people. The other internal issue that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union was that it was weak economically, and Gorbachev did not get a handle on the economic problems, nor see how dire the country really was. This was proven by the fact that Gorbachev still, to this day, refuses to understand that dire economic straits of his country, choosing only to blame Boris Yeltsin for the breakup of his country. While the internal forces were rotting the Soviet Union from within, the country also had to deal with external pressure exerted from the United States and Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan recognized that the Soviet Union was weakening, and also recognized that it was attempting to reform its economy, therefore would need resources for that. Therefore, Reagan saw a chance to force the Soviet Union to its knees by increasing military spending beyond the Soviet Union's capacity to keep up. This, in turn, led the Soviet Union to realize that they needed to make peace with the United States, and the only way to do this was to kowtow to this country. Add to all of this is the theory that the Soviet Union knew that it was beat, because its country was moribund and the United States was dynamic. Although they were both superpowers at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, they were not on equal footing, and the Soviet Union knew this. Seeing the handwriting on the wall because of its inferior position to the United States, the country had no choice but to reform, and the reform led to the collapse of the Communist regime. It was therefore a “perfect storm” of pressures and events, both internal and external, that led to the demise of the Soviet Union. Bibliography Applebaum, Anne. “How the Pope Defeated Communism.” Washington Post 6 April 2005: A19. Beissinger, Mark. “Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism.” Contemporary European History 18.3 (2009): 331-347. Buraway, Michael. “Buried in the Rubble of Communism.” Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 58 (2010): 121-123. Crozier, Brian. “The Other Side of Perestroika: The Hidden Dimension of the Gorbachev Era.” Demoikratizatsiya.com. 12 December 2011 Farnham, Barbara. “Reagan and Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of Threat.” Political Science Quarterly 116.2 (2001): 225-252. 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