End of Cold War and Collapse of Soviet Union - Essay Example

The collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, 1989 highlighted a dramatic year which saw the end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and effectively brought the protracted and costly Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union to a close. The peaceful nature and the lack of bloodshed (Romania excepted) was perhaps the most remarkable facet about the events of Eastern Europe in 1989, especially in the light of previous Soviet experiences with independence movements during the Cold War.1 In dealing with this change, a number of key questions arise: What happened to change Soviet perspective and policy concerning the importance of Eastern Europe, a region in which during the Cold War it twice used force to repress popular political movements and maintain uniformity In what ways did the "New Political Thinking" of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev mark a radical break from the past, and how did this departure influence events in Eastern Europe Why did the Soviet Union peacefully allow the members of the Warsaw Pact the right to choose their own future and sociopolitical system What was happening in CEE in the 1980s that had an impact on the thinking of Gorbachev and other key figures involved in Soviet policy formation, leading them to abandon CEE and, in so doing, facilitate the collapse of communism This research will examine the relevant events of the late 1980s in order to determine why the Soviet Union left Eastern Europe and the extent to which Gorbachev can be held responsible for the subsequent collapse of communism. Though the reasons for the collapse of communism in the CEE countries are numerous, Gorbachev is at the heart of the said event. Historians have examined the dramatic end of the Cold War almost since the day the Berlin Wall came crashing down. Some, most notably Karen Dawisha, predicted the event earlier. She released her book Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform in 1988, and understood that Gorbachev knew the regimes in Eastern Europe were illegitimate, placed in power by the Soviet Union on the coattails of the Red Army's entrance into the area during the closing days of World War II.2 However, she argued that if Gorbachev was serious in his intentions concerning noninterference in the affairs of sovereign states, then Eastern Europe would likely soon break away from the Soviet grasp and attempt to move west.3 Charles Gati theorized in his important work The Bloc that Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition, that the Soviet Union lost control of Eastern Europe due to an extraordinary domestic crisis which consumed their attention and resources.4 Moreover, The Warsaw Pact was an ineffective mechanism for collective security, according to Gati, since its member states each had different perceived enemies, oftentimes another member of the Warsaw Pact.5 Joseph Rothschild stated that the stability of Eastern Europe depended directly on the economic performance of the country in question.6 By the time Gorbachev came to power, he realized that a serious overhaul of the system was necessary due to the flagging economies of the Eastern Europe satellite states, in crisis before but never this severely. Like Charles Gati, Rothschild stated that by the 1980s, Eastern Europe had broken out of the conformist mold placed on it after World War II by Joseph Stalin, and each country began to pursue its own different interests.7 Thus the "Soviet bloc" was a collection of different states each moving in its own direction; Gorbachev had very limited choices, and ultimately let them Return to Diversity. These views hold to the tenet that the breakup of the Soviet bloc was due to internal factors in the countries of Eastern Europe.8 Other authors have studied the internal demise of the Soviet Union, placing the emphasis on themes ranging from the nationalities problem to incorrect decisions by the General Secretary. Helene Carrere d' Encausse examined the former in her work The End of the Soviet Empire, in which she chronicled the difficulty of governing an empire of over 120 various nationalities.9 As the late 1980s grew into the early 1990s, the center proved inept at deciding nationalities questions, and conflicts flared up in many republics, perhaps best illustrated by the struggle between Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Carrere d' Encausse, the people, through heightened nationalist feelings, caused communism to collapse by throwing off the shackles of the Soviet empire. The center, constantly wavering and inept, had no answer to pacify nationalist feelings.10 Aslund, the Swedish economist, placed the blame for the Soviet collapse squarely on the economy, which fell apart beginning in 1986 due to half-hearted measures by the center in a time when decisive leadership was necessary.11 Gorbachev, according to Aslund, could never rule with majority support in the Politburo, and thus his measures tried to please both liberal reformers and conservatives. This resulted in watered-down reforms that were half-hearted attempts to introduce market mechanisms while retaining some central control. Gorbachev churned out a series of reforms in 1989 that were totally uncoordinated, resulting in a command economy completely out of gear, with the center and the periphery often at odds. This caused Eastern Europe to separate from a quickly collapsing Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and also caused the later parade of sovereignties in the Soviet Union, which he predicted would seal the fate of that superpower.12 Aslund concluded that every possible mistake in Perestroika was indeed made, and while the intentions were good, they most likely would result in the total collapse of the community.13 Such works help explain why the Soviet Union was in trouble domestically by the late 1980s, but they do not fully examine why Gorbachev voluntarily left Eastern Europe and, thus, facilitate the collapse of communism. Scholars have investigated this question from several perspectives. David Cox inspected the problem of the cost of empire in his work Retreating from the Cold War. He assigned the figure of 10% of a country's Gross National Product as a line of demarcation, greater than which an empire becomes an onerous burden for the imperial power. He estimated that the Soviet Won was spending an aordshing1 7-25% of their GNP on maintaining the communist empire.14 Gorbachev realized that the Soviet Union was tremendously overextended, and later admitted that when he became General Secretary he finally understood the burden of the military-industrial complex saying that the Soviet Union was spending 20% of its gross national product on military expenditure. Thus, Cox maintains, Gorbachev sought to cut military spending by hoping that Eastern Europe would pay more for their own defense, and consequently he allowed Warsaw Pact countries greater autonomy. Eastern Europe responded to this by seizing the autonomy and turning it into independence. However, Cox spends the majority of the book on the keystone in Eastern Europe, East Germany, and reunification, rather than the Warsaw Pact as a whole.15 There is no doubt that the personality of Mikhail Gorbachev plays a crucial role in Soviet foreign policy and, hence, the collapse of communism in the CEE countries. Moshe Levin had stated that Gorbachev was more a product of Soviet societal development than its instigator in his book The Gorbachev Phenomenon. The country had undergone a revolution while Brezhnev slept, with quickly growing rates of literacy and an expanding Soviet middle class. Cities were no longer overgrown villages, such as during Stalin's time of forced urbanization with peasants flowing in, but rather urban cosmopolitan centers. As such, Soviet citizens could not easily be forced into a repressive system which stifled their freedom of expression.16 Levin concluded that Gorbachev was the manifestation of this process of generational change on the national level, and thus needed to alter the political system to conform with the new social realities. Similarly, Archie Brown rightly concluding that Gorbachev was central to foreign policy decision making along with his team of advisor for eastern European affairs. Such liberal-minded men broke the mold of traditional foreign policy and helped shape the drastic changes that occurred.17 Perhaps the most intriguing study of the collapse of communism in CEE is Jacques Levesque's The Enigma of 1989. In essence, he examined the question of why the Soviet Union peacefully allowed Eastern Europe to go free in 1989.18 Levesque's ultimate conclusion was that in the muddle and rapidity with which events were changing, the Soviet Union never had a comprehensive plan for Eastern Europe, and that this program of neglect allowed the events of 1989 to happen. However, Levesque did not adequately examine the security needs of the Soviet Union as a reason that would force the reevaluation of their policy in Eastern Europe. It is also hard to believe that the Soviet Union had no plan for the region and basically neglected it.19 While it is obvious that this was no ordinary period of time in the history of the Soviet Union, the country simply could not neglect its policy towards a region of so vital importance. Another reason why Gorbachev deliberately withdrew Soviet control over Central and Eastern Europe is strategic, as explained in a letter from Bogomolov to Georgi Shakhnazarov (advisor to Gorbachev for Eastern European affairs).. In it Bogomolov wrote that the Soviet Union needed a free Eastern Europe in order to overcome the bloc nature of Europe and establish the Common European Home. He stated that the Soviet command model of economic affairs was a total dead end, and communist parties everywhere in Eastern Europe were in a state of collapse. Since military intervention was out of the question, the belt of security created after World War II was now a belt of insecurity. He concluded that this was not against the interests of the Soviet Union, and that these changes opened up doors for the fulfillment of Soviet policy, a chance that should not be missed.20 A final greatly influential document was submitted by Dashichev to Eduard Shevardnadze and Gorbachev on the 24th of April, 1989. It concerned the conception of the Common European Home and the German Question. He also noted the failure of the Soviet economic model, that Eastern Europe had become a belt of insecurity, and the need to free Eastern Europe from the legacy of Stalin and World War II. Its important conclusion was that the creation of a Common European Home and an end to the Cold War, the latter listed as the number one foreign policy goal of the Soviet Union, were impossible without the reunification of Germany.21 Proceeding from the above stated it should be noted that while it is obvious that Soviet power was on the wane in Eastern Europe in the 1980's and that the Soviet political-economic model was at a dead end, the events of 1989 were the result of the Soviet decision to leave the area and not interfere with the domestic events of sovereign countries. Thus the revolutions of 1989 were caused by the people inheriting a power vacuum when it was clear that the Soviet Union would not use the Red Army to suppress indignation with the regime in question.22 In other words, 1989 was the result of Soviet policy formation and decision-making, as immediately influenced by Gorbachev. To argue that the collapse of communism in the CEE countries was a direct outcome of Gorbachev's decision to withdrew from these countries, does not mean to imply that none but Gorbachev influenced the aforementioned events. While Gorbachev's advisors held a strong grasp over foreign policy, "many researchers/authors in the Bogomolov Institute had their say cm foreign affairs in Eastern Europe, and dearly their voice was heard."23 Archie Brown commented that "this [Bogornolov's] institute had been a haven for a higher proportion of capable and independent-minded social scientists than any other. That they were able to keep in touch with developments in the outside world (and especially Eastern Europe) through their professional work prepared them for their role as significant sources of new thinking during the Gorbachev years and as prominent political action in the post-Soviet era."24 While certainly many people were involved in the creation of foreign policy ideas and issues, Gorbachev's small team of experts were ultimately responsible for their execution. The implication here is that even while conceding to the influence of others, Gorbachev was ultimately responsible for the formation of Soviet foreign policy and, in the final analysis, for the collapse of communism in the CEE countries. In final commentary upon the question raised, it needs to be emphasized that events do not happen in a vacuum, and there was always dialectic of interaction occurring among the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev was the most important statesman in Eastern European affairs leading up to the events of 1989, but he was as often reacting to the events happening there as he was molding them. Therefore, while Gorbachev's own philosophy and personality contributed to his decision to withdraw from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, thus, instigate the collapse of communism, the utter stagnation of the Central and East European economies, resistance to Pestroika, social tension, and unprofitable nature of COMECON all contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw from these countries. Thus, while Gorbachev is largely responsible for the collapse of communism in the CEE countries, the economic and political circumstances of the time played an integral role in the determination of the aforementioned event. Bibliography Aslund, A. (1990) Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform. New York: Cornell University Press. Brown, A. (1996) The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cox, D. (1996) Retreating from the Cold War. New York: New York University Press. Cox, M. (2004) Rethinking the Soviet Collapse, Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia. New York: Cassell. Dawisha, K. (1988) Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. d'Encausse, H.C. (1993) The End of the Soviet Empire. New York: Harper Collins. Gati, C. (1990) The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Levesque, J. (1997) The Enigma of 1989. Berkeley: University of California Press. Levin, M. (1988) The Gorbachev Phenomenon. Berkley: University of California Press. Rothschild, J. (1994) Return to Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read More