Analysis of Kyoto Protocol and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty - Research Paper Example

? ANALYSIS OF KYOTO PROTOCOL AND CTBT Contents International Environmental Agreements 3 Kyoto Protocol 3 Introduction 3 Key issues regarding climate protection 4 Uncertainty 4 Incentives 4 Kyoto protocol review 5 Assessing flaws of Kyoto Protocol 6 Fixing the protocol or finding an alternative 8 Conclusion 10 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 10 Introduction: 10 Environmental impacts of nuclear testing: 11 Monitoring methods implemented 13 Seismic technology 13 Radioactive gas detection 14 An analytical study of detection methods 15 United States ratification issue: 15 Conclusion 16 Bibliography 18 International Environmental Agreements Our planet has a number of characteristics that enables it to support life. Of these characteristics the air we breathe, the water we drink and the soil in which we grow our food are of extreme importance. Human activities over the years have had great adverse impacts on these characteristics. To protect these characteristics and the overall environment of our planet it is of extreme importance that such human activities are kept in check. To carry out such a task international environmental agreements are agreed upon, enforced and implemented in different regions around the globe. Kyoto Protocol Introduction Greenhouse gasses are rapidly becoming a concern for developed and developing countries alike. The accumulation of carbon-dioxide, produced mainly from the burning of fossil fuels, has played a major role in increasing the average global temperature and other drastic climate changes. The changing global climate conditions led developed countries into formulating the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 (United Nations 2003). The Protocol identified developed countries as the main contributors to the increase in carbon-dioxide emissions. The Protocol provided binding obligations regarding Carbon-dioxide emissions produced by an industrialized country (United Nations 2003). The Protocol is widely considered as a breakthrough regarding environmental and climate policies. The Protocol was the first major agreement between developed countries that promised a substantial decrease in the amount of greenhouse gasses being emitted. Moreover, the Protocol provided a base for future climate protection measures that could be implemented (Bohringer 2003). Critics argue that the Protocol is flawed in a number of ways and in no way can be economically efficient or politically practical (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002). Till this day negotiations are being conducted regarding the implementation of the Protocol. United States refusal to ratify the Protocol could imply that Kyoto Protocol would accomplish very little in terms of its objectives. Initial evaluation of the Protocol tends to suggest that approach of the protocol may have some serious flaws (Bohringer 2003). Key issues regarding climate protection The most widely used decision making process for the assessment of a climate policy is cost-benefit analysis. Under cost benefit analysis the cost of reduction of Greenhouse Gasses is compared with the benefits of reduction in global warming. Cost benefit analysis enables an understanding of the positive and negative impacts of climate policies in terms of monetary benefits and losses (Bohringer 2003). Policies regarding global climate change must take into account interests of all countries. Accurate and complete data and cost benefit analysis could be used to help determine the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that a party should reduce and by what time. However in practicality most countries only work towards the achievements of objectives that are valuable to them and neglect the needs of other countries (Bohringer 2003). Uncertainty As mentioned above cost benefit analysis is used to assess the feasibility of environmental policies and requires detailed information to arrive to any conclusion. The effects of greenhouse gasses have still not been completely understood and the causality chain of these phenomenons is complex in nature (Bohringer 2003). Furthermore, there is even uncertainty regarding the measurement of impact that greenhouse gases have had on the environment (Bohringer 2003). Incentives Chartering policies to help cope with the ever increasing threat of global warming is achievable and has been done in the past. However, the lack of any authoritative body which could force countries to implement these policies renders these policies useless. This basically means that countries are free to either adopt those policies or to completely ignore them (Bohringer 2003). Policies then have to be structured in a manner that provides these countries with incentives to adopt these policies (Finus 2004). One of the most prime incentives that can be provided to these countries is the realization that these countries would be better off by adopting the environmental policy rather than ignoring it. This however, gives rise to another issue (Botteon and Carraro 1997). Understanding the profitability of the policy several countries tend to become free riders. Free riders tend to benefit from efforts of other countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without making any efforts themselves (Botteon and Carraro 1997). Kyoto protocol review Keeping in mind the issues mentioned above, Kyoto Protocol can be considered as a remarkable achievement in itself. However controversial aspects of Kyoto Protocol cannot be overlooked. Problems with the Protocol surfaced in March 2001 when the Bush administration refused to ratify the protocol stating that the cost of implementing measures to reduce greenhouse gasses emission was much greater than the benefit (Bohringer 2003). In July of the same year delegates of more than 180 countries met again to discuss the open implementation of the Protocol. However little was achieved regarding its implementation restrictions (Bohringer 2003). Critics of the Protocol argue that the Protocol is doomed to fail due to some major problems within its architecture. The basic problems that have been sighted are i) Kyoto Protocol fails to take action against free riding nations and does little regarding non-compliance of countries (Barrett and Stavins 2003). ii) Efficiency criteria have deemed the Kyoto Protocol as defective. This is because the Protocol fails to outline a significant long term plan and it disregards a significant fraction of emissions (Nordhaus 2001). iii) Some argue that the allocation of transfers is biased and the omission of developing countries means they are ignored in transfers (Nordhaus 2001). iv) None of the participating countries have any significant incentive in overlooking the administration of the protocol. The Protocol can only achieve its objective if its implementation is monitored by a particular governing body (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002). From the criticism that the Protocol faces two main questions can be drawn. The first question is if the Protocol is completely flawed and the second question that arises is if there is a better approach regarding climate policy and if there isn’t then how can Kyoto Protocol be made more effective and object oriented (Bohringer 2003). Assessing flaws of Kyoto Protocol Decision making process done through cost benefit analysis tends to be efficient and reliable. Due to the complex nature of the phenomenon of global warming and climate change the targets and time tables drawn within the protocol were not a product of cost benefit analysis. These targets were instead formed through various political processes. Pressure placed by participating countries and difference in incentives contributed to a significantly low reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (Barrett 1998). Even though Kyoto Protocol lacks a long term plan its short term targets given a significant boost to climate change policies and have started a political process through which future environmental policies can be established. There is still however the issue of free riding. Lack of penalties on countries and lenient approach regarding its adoption can be cited as the reason (Barrett 1998). Cost efficient implementation methods that are to be used by participant countries to meet their targets are not performing up to the mark. Economists still however, favored the Protocol as it was the first international environmental agreement that took into account economical objectives of the participating countries and their environmental implications (Bohringer 2003). Regarding the use of Kyoto Protocol, three tools have been created that use the basic concepts of tradable pollution rights. The first tool is international emissions trading carried out within the Annex B countries, second tool is the Joint implementation by Annex B countries and the third tool is the Clean Development Mechanism that is implemented between Annex B and non-Annex B countries (Bohringer 2003). Clean Development Mechanism allows developing countries to be a part of the Protocol and provides them exemptions from implementing measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, Annex B countries are allowed to make reductions in their abatement efforts by funding emission reduction projects in such developing countries (UNFCCC 1997). The issue of transfers has been a topic of great debate. Equity during the distribution of transfers has been a concern amongst a number of participating countries. Equity in this context can be referred to as the implementation of just and fair methods in the distribution of transfers. Normally economists emphasize on separating efficiency from equity. This however, is not possible as the two factors are linked to each other (Bohringer 2003). Annex B countries are subjected to various emission reduction policies while developing countries have been exempted from following any such policies. The main reason for their exemption has mainly been due to these countries failure to handle expenditures of implementing emission reduction measures (Bohringer 2003). One of the main concerns about the protocol is its measures against free riding and non-compliant countries. In case of non-compliance the Kyoto protocol suggests that the non-compliant country would have to reduce its emissions by 1.3 times than originally set for the next period of commitment (Bohringer 2003). As expected the Kyoto Protocol takes ineffective or weak measures against violators. Moreover, the penalty of the violations cannot be placed into effect until and unless the violator complies with countries that are placing the sanctions. The penalties suggested by the protocol fail to address the issue of free riding clearly. The sanction mechanism, of penalties coming into effect in future periods, encourages free riding instead of discouraging it (Bohringer 2003). The exclusion from emission trading also has little effect on the violators and can even harm the country enforcing the punishment on to the violator. In short sanctions suggested by Kyoto Protocol seem very weak and have little impact on the signatory countries in case of a violation (Bohringer 2003). Fixing the protocol or finding an alternative Since the formation of Kyoto protocol numerous alternatives have been proposed by a number of economists and experts (Alday, Orszag and Stiglitz 2001). These proposals can be classified into two categories. The first type of proposals adopts a price and quantity approach, using these factors as tools. The second type of proposal supports Research and Development towards finding solutions to reduce emissions. Proposals that fall into the first category are subjected to some sort of a financial limit. These financial limits can be considered as a part of policies suggested within the proposal. Some proposals within this category suggest that a harmonized carbon tax that should be implemented across regions as a part of an abatement program (Cooper 1998). A harmonized carbon tax approach might seem like an appealing idea, issues would arrive regarding the monitoring and enforcement of such a policy. Countries have great interest in the enforcement of policies that do not emphasize on the paying large sums in the form of compensation. Moreover negotiations would have to be conducted on compensation schemes that include side payments, something that is expected to be more difficult and controversial than the abatement duties (Bohringer 2003). The second category places its emphasis on the importance of research and development. Policies neither set any targets nor use market based assessment tools to form policies instead it focuses on cooperation among countries of a region and research and development protocols to allow countries to self impose such policies. This approach however adds encouragement of free ride effect and there are shortcomings regarding economic efficiency of such policies (Barrett and Stavins 2003). Scrutinized analysis shows that there is little to suggest that there would be a better alternative to Kyoto Protocol. Architecture suggested by the Protocol provides a great deal of flexibility to participating countries. Moreover, certain amendments within the Protocol might make the protocol more effective and practical (Bohringer 2003). The first thing to take into consideration while proposing amendments for the Proposal is that the developing countries are rapidly becoming involved in the global economy. The emissions produced by these countries cannot be ignored. Therefore participation of developing countries is essential. Placing emission restrictions on these countries is bound to increase a great deal of equity debate. In order to avoid such a situation the short term objective of such a move should focus on reducing the overall abatement bill (Barrett 1998). Moreover the sanctioning mechanism must be significantly improved. One proposal for its improvement is to force violators to pay a fine to some fund. The fund would then in turn be used to compensate other signatory countries of the Protocol (Finus 2004). Inclusion of trade and Research and Development agreements would help encourage numerous countries to become a part of the protocol (Barrett and Stavins 2003). A safety valve could be placed within the Kyoto Protocol to tackle the uncertainty factor (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002). This would significantly aid the member countries in deciding a financial limit to the Kyoto Protocol. If this limit or the penalty is set well below the marginal cost the emission abatement targets could significantly be reduced which in turn would shift the control instrument from quantity to price (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002). Conclusion As mentioned before formation of Kyoto Protocol is an achievement in itself and with the ever changing circumstances of the world another environmental protocol of such a magnitude is not expected to emerge any time soon. Even though the protocol may have a great deal of flaws that need to be addressed the Protocol can be amended to ensure that it becomes a practical enforcement set of policies. To achieve this great deal of participation would be required not only from the signatory countries but also from developing and non-compliant countries. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Introduction: Ban on nuclear testing has been one of the oldest environmental debates that are still going on. The origins of CTBT can be traced all the way back to 1960s during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was of the view that nuclear weapons would become the sole reason for the annihilation of this world and feared that the entire human population would be engulfed by these weapons of mass destruction (Medalia 2008). Kennedy addressed the environmental issues of nuclear testing in his speech at the American University. In the same speech Kennedy proposed drawing up a treaty that would ban testing of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was chartered up in ten days and was put into effect in October 1963. Tests indeed no longer were carried out neither on the surface, underwater nor in outer space. However, United States continued to carry out these tests underground. In 1976 Soviet Union and United States entered into a pact limiting the testing of nuclear weapons to 150 kiloton (Medalia 2008). Even though the treaty limited Soviet Union and United States testing of nuclear weapons the treaty however did not prevent the rest of the world from testing nuclear weapons and adding pollutants to the environment (Medalia 2008). In 1991 efforts were being made by superpowers around the globe to come up with a solution to the ever rising nuclear threat. In 1993 negotiations began between countries from all regions of the globe. These negotiations were heavily backed by the United Nations General Assembly. The next two years were spent on negotiations of the terms of CTBT. CTBT was generally accepted by a large number of countries in September 1996 (United Nations 1996). Environmental impacts of nuclear testing: Production of nuclear weapons has had adverse effects on the environment. These effects have not been limited to a certain medium but have polluted water, air and soil alike. Moreover contaminants produced from nuclear tests have been known to produce contaminants that travel miles through wind and down streams (Friends of Earth 2003). Manufacture and leakage often results in the leakage of radioactive material. Long term exposure to such material could cause radiation poisoning within a person and could even affect the vegetation of that area. In addition radiation poisoning could even render the soil of the effected region useless (Tolgyessy 1993). In addition underground testing of nuclear weapons has also contaminates the soil and adds contaminants to underground streams and water bodies (Tolgyessy 1993). The production of nuclear weapons requires a regular supply of heavy elements such as Plutonium and Uranium. Countries in search for these ores often desecrate forests and vast plains of lands. In addition the mining processes causes damage to the health of workers at the site and to releases radioactive pollutants that reach nearby towns and cities (Tolgyessy 1993). In addition transportation of these ores adds to pollution of the atmosphere. Disposing of nuclear waste is no easy task and there are a number of complex issues involved. The main problem with radioactive waste is its long half life, with some of these components having half lives of more than a million years (Xie 2013). With such a low decomposing rate these wastes remain a risk to everyone for generations. The most effective methods used currently by nuclear powered countries is storage of this waste either in metal containers that shield the surroundings from its radioactive properties or storage in geological formations that are known to be stable (Xie 2013). This however cannot be categorized as a permanent solution as there is always a risk of leakage. CTBT is considered by many as a tool which would prevent a number of countries from obtaining nuclear weapons and carrying out nuclear tests. Others consider the treaty to be of little value as it cannot stop Nonproliferation members from working towards and developing nuclear weapons. Moreover any country that is interested in development of nuclear weapons and in carrying out nuclear tests could simply choose not to be a part of treaty as was done by India and Pakistan in 1998 (Medalia 2008). Monitoring of nations under the treaty has come under great scrutiny by many experts. Moreover, verification has also been regarded as a high priority issue of the treaty. In a number of cases the two terms of monitoring and verification have been confused with each other (Medalia 2008). The process of monitoring involves searching for signs and symptoms that suggest a nuclear activity such as a nuclear weapon test has been conducted. Verification on the other hand helps with understanding if a country is indeed following the provisions of the treaty or not (Medalia 2008). The issue with the treaty is not verification but the issue is effective verification. Effective verification has been defined as the assurance that a particular party has violated the treaty and has crossed the limit in a significant manner. Moreover, the process of verification is conducted within a time frame in which appropriate action can be taken to stop the guilty country from benefiting from the violation (U.S. Congress 1988). Monitoring methods implemented There have always been concerns by participating countries that a violation of the treaty could result a shift in the strategic balance of the world (Medalia 2008). Monitoring methods implemented under the treaty are integral part of CTBT itself. Monitoring of underground nuclear tests is harder to detect than those conducted in space and underwater. It is for this reason would discuss methods used to detect underground nuclear tests implemented under the treaty (Medalia 2008). Seismic technology The use of seismology to differentiate between an explosion and an earthquake has been around for decades. Explosion like earthquake generate seismic waves within the surface of the earth. These waves are propagate across the surface and are felt in different parts of the region (IRIS 2013). A particular region hosts about 5 to 30 seismometers, which are separated from each other by a distance of several kilometers. The time at which the waves arrive at each seismometer helps to determine the origin of the waves (IRIS 2013). Another technique implemented using the seismometer is by detecting teleseismic waves. Teleseismic waves tend to travel as far as 9000 km and can travel along the earth’s surface or can travel within its surface (Enviroscan Inc. 2003). Those that travel within the earth’s crust are divided into two categories shear waves and pressure waves. Shear waves are produced naturally during an earthquake whereas pressure waves are a result of explosion. A seismometer is easily able to differ between the two types of waves giving a clue as to whether the event was that of an earthquake or an explosion. Another difference between the two is the time elapsed in origination from the source and arrival to the seismometer. Shear waves tends to build up over a period of short time whereas pressure wave tends to arrive instantly (Enviroscan Inc. 2003). Radioactive gas detection Explosion of nuclear nature tend to produce certain gases that are not easily observed naturally. Gases such as xenon 133 and xenon 131 are inert in nature and to not easily bond with elements in its surrounding. This enables them to escape to the surface of the atmosphere (Pacific Northwest National Labratory 1998). Radioxenon Sampler can easily detect the increase in the concentration of the level of Xenon and other radioactive isotopes of such inert gases (Pacific Northwest National Labratory 1998). An analytical study of detection methods Critics argue that monitoring systems being used under CTBT are not well equipped to detect any incidents that are taking place around the globe. Furthermore they tend to suggest that the cloaking technology has far surpassed the detection technology (Medalia 2008). Another claim that experts claim regarding the effective verification and monitoring processes is that detection threshold is very high. The detection threshold allows the system to detect a nuclear event of a particular intensity while ignores the rest. With the threshold set quite high significant nuclear events could easily go unnoticed (Medalia 2008). Furthermore they feel that the containment would easily allow perpetrators to be able to contain any radioactive gases from escaping to the surface. Regarding Seismic technology opponents of the act claim that coupling method has been used as an effective measure to muffle the impacts of the explosion. These claims are however branded as preposterous by most experts claiming that coupling can only be used in the case of a small explosion (Medalia 2008). Supporters of the act state that containment of these gases is next to impossible and that these gases tend to leak through small cracks and vents that lead to the surface. United States ratification issue: One of the main hurdles that the act is facing is United States ratification. Even though United States was one of the first countries to sign CTBT it has not yet ratified the treaty. United States has placed a number of conditions which accepted would result in U.S ratification of CTBT (Medalia 2005). Ratification has been cited by many as one of the major obstacles that halt the progress of the treaty. One has to bear in mind that United States has one of the greatest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Moreover, since 1960 it has carried out the greatest number of nuclear weapons tests (Medalia 2005). Ratification by United States would help set an international norm that would apply great pressure on Annex B countries that have neither signed nor ratified the treaty. Experts hope that the pressure would eventually lead countries like India and Pakistan to sign the treaty and ratify it (National Academies 2012). Moreover, United States active participation in the enforcement of the treaty would help ensure that countries are unable to carry out tests that not only harm human lives but also affects the entire natural system of a particular ecosystem. The ratification of the treaty would not necessarily mean that national security of the country would be compromised as many believe Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program would help United States to maintain its stockpile without having to physically detonate these bombs (National Academies 2012). There are, however, a number of issues and concerns that United States government thinks need to be addressed. The treaty can easily be cheated out of and there is no guarantee that once United States ratifies the treaty other countries such as North Korea would ratify the treaty as well (Bailey and Barker 2003). Moreover Congress feels that there is little or no benefit of nuclear nonproliferation to the country or the world for that matter. Finally even with its Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program the country feels that its nuclear arsenal would be unsafe in the absence of physical testing (Bailey and Barker 2003). Conclusion Nuclear testing is one of the greatest environmental threats that our globe faces. Not only does the detonation of a nuclear bomb release radioactive pollutants into the atmosphere its production generates physical waste that can remain hazardous for generations to come. CTBT is one of the first few steps that have been taken to ensure that nuclear testing prevents any damage to the environment through testing of nuclear weapons via physical detonation. The treaty needs to have a strong enforcement policy that ensures that annex B countries prevent physical detonation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore concerns of signatory countries must be addressed and steps should be taken to make sure that every country ratifies CTBT and abides by its policies. Bibliography Alday, J.E., P.R. Orszag, and J.E. Stiglitz. Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action. Summary Paper, Washington D.C.: Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2001. Bailey, K., and R. Barker. 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