The Boston Molasses Disaster - Essay Example

? The Boston Molasses Disaster On 15th January 1919, the Boston Molasses Disaster took place in the city of Boston, Massachusetts. The disaster left 21 people dead and many more injured. The disaster took place when a storage tank owned by the United States Industrial Alcohol Company blasted to release a gigantic wave of rushing molasses. A lawsuit was filed against the company and a bitter legal battle ensued after the disaster. Negligence and errors in design were finally proved to be the most obvious reasons explaining the tank failure. This event raised public morale to combat high handed corporates who did not pay much attention to environmental issues and public safety. And the technical aspects of the disaster are also extremely vital. A simple and stationary storage tank had behaved in a strange manner. This signals poor understanding of chemical engineering. Designing a storage tank is not just a mechanical engineering topic. Chemistry of the material to be stored in the tank is highly important. Continual research on the Boston Molasses Disaster can help the engineering community to learn from past mistakes and understand the importance of industrial safety in the context of holistic disaster management preparedness. Table of contents Abstract 2 Table of contents 3 1. Introduction 5 1.1 Background 5 1.1.1 The Boston Molasses Disaster: What happened? 5 1.1.2 The technology/engineering involved 7 2. Investigation into the disaster 8 2.1 The investigation 8 2.2 Findings 9 2.3 Recommendations 11 3. Impact on engineering practices 13 4. Conclusion 15 References 16 List of Figures Figure 1: Photographs showing the site of disaster before and after the molasses tank failure took place. Source: CCPS (2007) 6 Figure 2: A model of a modern storage tank. Note the projecting structures like valves, nozzles, and entry points for pipes. Source: Ladokun, Nabhani, and Zarei, (2010) 13 1. Introduction This paper is aimed at researching the Boston Molasses Disaster. It is also known as the Great Boston Molasses Flood. The paper contains a brief narration of the disaster along with the investigations that followed. Next, the engineering details of this event are discussed. Reputable science and technology publications have been used. The approach of writing the paper is completely focused on the engineering aspects and cross disciplinary nature of this disaster. 1.1 Background 1.1.1 The Boston Molasses Disaster: What happened? The Center for Chemical Process Safety or CCPS has furnished a very concise but informative description of the Boston Molasses Disaster. On 15th January 1919 morning, a large storage tank in northern Boston blasted releasing tons of molasses. The steel tank was 50 ft or 15 m high. It had a diameter of 90 ft or 27 m containing nearly 2.3 million US gallons of molasses. All the rivets sealing the tank walls were spattered in the manner of machine gun firing, and chunks of steel were hurled across the area. Consequently, a wave or molasses rising above 15 ft or 5m began to surge ahead from the site of the blast. The wave had a speed of about 60 km/hr and traveled across two bocks of the Boston city with great momentum. Consequently, 21 people were killed, above 150 were injured, several buildings and vehicles were smashed, and the municipal system was completely disrupted. See Figure – 1. (CCPS 2007) Figure 1: Photographs showing the site of disaster before and after the molasses tank failure took place. Source: CCPS (2007) 1.1.2 The technology/engineering involved The CCPS (2007) has utilized a sound technical approach to describe the disaster. This approach is contextual with relation to both the old and new paradigms of engineering. The old paradigm of early 20th century engineering technology was devoid of facilities like computer aided design (CAD), industrial control systems, etc. The new paradigm is modern 21st century engineering which has power of new discoveries and superior computing efficacy. In sum, even though almost one hundred years have passed, the topic of fluid dynamics remains enigmatic in industrial engineering. CCPS (2007) has described this disaster as the “Great Boston Molasses Flood of 1919,” which clearly indicates that fluid dynamics is important in understanding the disaster. More specifically, the matter deals with storage tank technology which can be regarded as an integral part of production and industrial engineering. Although mechanical engineering is the prime area of focus while constructing a storage tank, industrial requirements call for a cross disciplinary understanding of the projects concerned. For example, in the construction of oil tankers, fire safety management remains a key issue. Furthermore, when an oil tanker is mounted on a mobile platform, thermal effects of motion inside the petroleum fluid contained in the tanker becomes crucial. Apart from petroleum, there are other substances like ethylene, phosphates, etc. which must be stored in different industrial facilities for different commercial purposes. Therefore, knowledge of chemical engineering becomes necessary. A storage tank technologist might have to deal with the chemical nature of different substances that are stored for industrial purposes. The variety of these substances may range from water to phosphates and petroleum to molasses. (Towler and Sinnott 2013) 2. Investigation into the disaster 2.1 The investigation Historical researcher Puleo (2010) has considerably elucidated the investigation process that followed the disaster. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, local residents filed a civil law suit against the proprietor of the molasses tank, the U.S. Industrial Alcohol or USIA. This corporation was challenged in court and severely prosecuted by Damon Hall. He took up the task of investigating this matter and he went ahead with inspections and inquiries across the disaster hit region along with his colleagues. Forensic investigation techniques available in 1919 were not as advanced as those of today. Yet, eye witness accounts were not only crucial but helpful as well. In fact, the speed of the tidal wave was calculated with the help of the eye witness accounts. Hall also utilized surveying techniques to understand what had been the situation of the molasses tank prior to this disaster. Forensic examination of the pieces of steel that had fragmented from the original tank wall proved that there were fissures present in the structure. Moreover, public accounts suggested that molasses often used to leak from the doomed tank. In order to hide this, USIA had painted the steel tank with brown color, a color that is easily confused with that of the molasses. (Puleo 2010) Painting a defective container with the color of the leaking substance can be regarded as the use of chemical engineering knowledge to cover up negligence in structural design and construction. Last but not least, detectives from the investigation bureau found that there were no files available in the municipality that could show the original plan of USIA’s molasses tank. According to Sakalauskas (2001, paragraph 10): “They (the investigators) went to city hall and looked at the plans that were filed when the tank was built years earlier. They couldn't find any building plans. The building inspectors said that building plans were not required because the vat was not a building but an industrial device. The industrial department people said that it was not an industrial device but a structure.” Consequently, it can be understood that the tank did not have approved plans. No government officials had inspected the structure in proper time. So finally, the responsibly of this gigantic storage tank failure can be delegated to its owners and the lax attitude of the contemporary municipal and industrial supervisors. 2.2 Findings In the construction of an engineering structure, be that a bridge, a building, or a storage tank, it is generally the rule of thumb that twofold inspection and surveillance must be maintained. Firstly, prior to the construction of the engineering structure, it is necessary to get the plan of the structure checked by the government authorities. Secondly, the construction company and/or the proprietor must implement its own supervisors to oversee proper construction of the project. But in the case of the molasses tank, no proper inspection or supervision was done before or during its construction phase. (Puleo 2010) Further, the tank had not been tested subsequent to its construction. It was not tested even before loading it with molasses. (CCPS 2007) Hall’s investigation also revealed that the tank had been leaking at the welding points between its steel plates. This had been reported much before the disaster took place. However, the authorities took no action. Moreover, they painted the outside walls of the tank with brown color to hide the fissures. (Puleo 2010; CCPS 2007) It is important to note here that some environmental factors also contributed to the disaster. Majority of reasons behind incidents of storage tank failures involve mechanical fault or malfunction. But in the case of the molasses tank, chemical engineering aspects of its construction played a crucial role. According to the historical records, Puleo (2010) points out that the temperature before the day of the disaster was about 2o F. But on the day of the disaster, temperature soared up to about 40o F. This sudden and significant rise in temperature might have resulted into excessive fermentation inside the tank. Consequently, loads of carbon dioxide gas might have been released. In absence of any safety valve, the excess gaseous substances increased the internal pressure of the tank. The structure already had fissures and faults in its walls. The sudden change of pressure in the tank destroyed the balance of cohesive and adhesive forces inside the fluid. On the other hand, excessive stress developed rapidly athwart the solid steel sheets. Finally, they were torn apart. (Colton 2011; Puleo 2010) The USIA had its own version of the disaster. The company reported that its internal investigators had found evidence of sabotage. The company officials told that the blast was possibly due to arson done by anarchist forces. But the court turned down this argument. (Puleo 2010) Finally, a short note from Sakalauskas (2001) compels the researcher to criticize the government’s role as well. Absence of any map or document elaborating the architecture of USIA’s tank put a serious question mark on cotemporary municipal guidelines. When the investigators inquired about the plan of the structure, government authorities could not furnish them with the requisite information. In fact, it is revealed in the course of research that the government authorities did not have any system to properly classify engineering structures. According to the experts like Puleo (2010) and Sakalauskas (2001), it was not clear with the government authorities that how a storage tank could be marked in the municipal map of Boston: Was it a building, an industrial structure, or a production facility? And the result of this confusion was even more appalling … the authorities had not maintained any architectural record or detailed map of the structure that could be used to facilitate the investigations and rescue works! In sum, poor structural plan of the storage tank was the main reason behind the disaster. Negligence on the part of both the public and private authorities made the situation complicated. Serious flaws in the administrative system of the city were also detected. 2.3 Recommendations While suggesting recommendations on the basis of research on the Boston Molasses Disaster, it is to be noted that learning from mistakes is a crucial factor in engineering study and research. According to CCPS (2007), it is not a wise idea to throw off “old incident reports.” In fact, a maintenance engineer or a supervisor must reread old incident reports from time to time. And in the greater context of industrial safety and disaster management, continual research is necessary to look into the old and almost forgotten industrial disasters. So first of all, it is recommended that older and near forgotten industrial disasters like the one under discussion should be looked into once again. This must be done in the light of modern forensic science and technologies. The second recommendation is that storage tanks must not be regarded as static engineering structures. In this context, the term static is being applied to the substance that is being stored. A storage tank is generally immobile. But the substances stored in it may not remain immobile or static all the while. Particularly when a tank is used to store some kind of fluid, the mobility of the material inside the stationary tank is a complex issue. Due to variations in atmospheric pressure and temperature, the substance stored in a tank may expand (resulting into high internal pressure on the tank walls) or contract (resulting into vacuum and increased relative pressure outside the tank walls). This is why a storage tank must not be regarded as a relatively safe and entirely static structure. In fact, mechanisms of pressure vessels do act upon a seemingly simple and stationary storage tank. (Ladokun, Nabhani, and Zarei, 2010; Puleo 2010) Third recommendation is that the Boston Molasses Disaster must now be considered as something more complex than mere storage tank leakage. Nowadays, storage tanks (see Figure – 2) are provided with facilities like automated controls, pressure sensors, safety valves, etc. In the light of modern research, the storage tank in Boston had actually behaved like a pressure vessel due to increased fermentation of the organic compounds stored in it. If contemporary engineers do not try to understand this disaster as a kind of pressure vessel disaster, then future industrial designs may not be done keeping in mind the complex dynamics of a seemingly static storage tank. (Ladokun, Nabhani, and Zarei, 2010; CCPS 2007) Figure 2: A model of a modern storage tank. Note the projecting structures like valves, nozzles, and entry points for pipes. Source: Ladokun, Nabhani, and Zarei, (2010) 3. Impact on engineering practices Puleo (2010) adopts a historical and social approach to understand the consequences of the Boston Molasses Flood. Apparently, these are predominantly moral and legal topics. However, these topics remain extremely important in understanding the managerial aspects of engineering and construction processes. Prior to the disaster, big industrial companies in USA were generally exempted from public safety regulations. Public safety regulations as enforced by a court of law can lead to prevention of damage to environment. Also, these regulations help in minimizing the risk taking attitude of big business houses. Consequently, regulatory practices affect engineering practices as well. After the molasses disaster, American policy makers started to understand that the companies must built safer and greener engineering facilities and industrial complexes. Industrial designers have to take this responsibility. By 1925, USIA had lost the civil suit filed by the victims of the disaster. Consequently, the company had to pay hundreds and thousands of dollars to the plaintiffs (Colton 2011; Puleo 2010). Industrial storage technology is essentially cross-disciplinary in nature since chemistries of the substances stored and mechanics of the storage tanks are considerably distinct engineering fields of study. Towler and Sinnott (2013) have paid ample attention to this problem in their research. In order to provide an integrated treatment of chemical plants as a whole, the authors stress the importance of “general site considerations” (Towler and Sinnott 2013, p. 505). Locating and selecting the geographical space for a chemical facility (e.g. a storage tank) must be done with sufficient regard to environmental safety and human lives. In the case of USIA’s molasses tank, its location was quite wrong. Although fluids like molasses are relatively less dangerous because they are not flammable substances, they are organic compounds with varied viscosity and atypical Reynolds’s Numbers (see Jabr 2013). Moreover, chemical processes like fermentation and action of microbes may bring about substantial changes in the temperature and pressure of these substances. This is why site selection is crucial for the purpose of storing relatively safer chemical substances too. For example, in the case of USIA’s molasses tank, if the tank had been constructed in a less populated area, then damage might have been negligible during the tank failure. Therefore, Towler and Sinnott (2013, p. 505) have put emphasis on “plant location and site selection” while constructing any chemical engineering facility whatsoever. 4. Conclusion Disasters like the one witnessed in Boston have been instrumental in the development of engineering practice knowledge base. And the most profound effect of the knowledge gathered from research on similar disasters can be seen as improved engineering as a whole. In practical sense, the Boston Molasses Disaster marked the necessity of industrial safety management. Engineering practices were to be realigned accordingly. Now rigorous testing regimens were to be implemented before starting off an industrial facility. Construction of a production or storage site was to be done keeping in mind the factor of public safety and environmental integrity. And this trend has gathered force with the lapse of time. With respect to today’s disaster management systems, the molasses flood of 1919 thus remains a critically important engineering event. References CCPS (2007). The Great Boston Molasses Flood of 1919. Massages for Manufacturing Personnel. New York: American Institute of Chemical Engineers. Retrieved on 17th October from http://www.sache.org/beacon/files/2007/05/en/read/2007-05-Beacon-s.pdf Colton, J.S. (2011). Boston Molasses Disaster. In: ME 6222: Manufacturing Processes and Systems. Atlanta: Georgia Institute of Technology Jabr, F. (2013). The Science of the Great Molasses Flood. Scientific American. Retrieved on 17th October from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=molasses-flood-physics-science Ladokun, T., Nabhani, F., and Zarei, S. (2010). Accidents in pressure vessels: hazard awareness. In: Proceedings of the World Congress on Engineering 2010 Volume II. London: International Association of Engineers. Puleo, S. (2010). Dark Tide: The Great Molasses Flood of 1919. Boston: Beacon Press Sakalauskas, T. (2001). The Boston Molasses Flood of 1919. Retrieved on 16th October 2013 from http://www.3ammagazine.com/short_stories/non-fict/truetales/molasses.html Towler, G.P. and Sinnott, R.K. (2013). Chemical Engineering Design: Principles, Practice, and Economics of Plant and Process Design. Amsterdam: Elsevier Read More