Bhopal Disaster History and Reasons - Case Study Example

BHOPAL DISASTER: A CASE STUDY Science signifies progress. However, it also suggests an element of risk in case of some unforeseen mishap via route of scientific advancement. A study of such disasters, which have contributed to colossal mortality rates, is indispensable not only in understanding their causes but also in taking adequate measures to prevent similar occurrences in the future. This is principally essential in the present blooming industrial scenario where man and machines co-exist for good or bad in one big global community. Further, such a study would be of immense service to the developing nations that plan either to set up industries on their own or to invite corporate capital to their soil. A look at the innumerable industrial disasters that has occurred all over the globe will act as a case in point. The Boston Molasses Disaster which occurred on January 15, 1919 when a large molasses tank burst and a wave of molasses rushed through the streets at an estimated 35 mph, killed 21 and injured 150. In the Minamata Disaster (1932-1968) over 3,000 people suffered various deformities, severe mercury poisoning symptoms or death as a result of the dumping of mercury compounds in Minamata Bay in Japan by the Chisso Corporation. The Oppau explotion in Germany occurred on september 21, 1921. Around 600 people were killed and 2,000 more were injured when a tower storing 4500 tonnes of a mixture of ammonium sulfate and ammonium nitrate fertilizer exploded at a BASF plant in Oppau (Industrial Disasters 2008). Large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and beyond were contaminated in varying degrees in the Chernobyl accident in 1986. It was the result of a flawed reactor design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel and without proper regard for safety. “The resulting steam explosion and fire released at least five percent of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere” (Chernobyl Accident 2008). 28 people died within four months from radiation or thermal burns. 19 have subsequently died, and there have been around nine deaths from thyroid cancer apparently due to the accident. The long term death toll of Chernobyl is still a debated issue. But new studies say that up to 90,000 deaths and casulties can be attributed to radiation fallout from Chernobyl (Chernobyl Disaster 2008). Among similar man-made disasters with very high death tolls, the Bhopal disaster of 1984 ranks high. In the catastrophe many died within days and a greater number has since been succumbing to death and deformities. Bhopal, the capital of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh was chosen as the most appropriate location for the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)’s subsidiary pesticide plant Union Carbide India Ltd. (UCIL) chiefly due to its central location in the indian peninsula, its extensive rail connectivity, developed power supply system, and the availability of ready labour. Bhopal (2008) charts the district, also known as the City of Lakes, into two major areas, the old city and the new city. The major industries in the old city are electrical goods, cotton, chemicals and jewellery. Being a state capital, the new city accomodates the State Secretariat, and other State and Central Government offices. Consequently, it has a majority of residents working for the State and Central Government Departments. Bhopal's major commercial area, the Maharana Pratap Nagar, accommodates many business houses. The city also boasts of numerous schools and colleges, major national banks, insurance companies, and some industrial plants. This highly popuated city became one big cemetary when 40 tonnes of methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas was released accidentally form the Union Carbide India Ltd. factory some time past midnight on 3rd december 1984. The Union carbide Corporation’s Bhopal facility was part of India's Green Revolution aimed to increase the productivity of crops. Considered an essential factor in the effort to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural production, pesticide production use increased dramatically during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The decision to manufacture the pesticides in India, as opposed to relying on imports was based on India's goal of preserving foreign exchange and its policy of industrialization (Cassels 1993: 39). The Union Carbide India, Limited (UCIL) plant was established in 1969 and had expanded to produce carbaryl in 1979. The Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) facility in Bhopal was used for the production of various pesticides, mainly Sevin brand carbaryl insecticide and Temik brand aldicarb pesticide. Methyl isocyanate [CH3–N=C=O] is an intermediate product in the manufacture of carbaryl (Sevin), a carbamate pesticide. Table 1.—Manufacturing Process for Methyl Isocyanate CO + Cl2 → COCl2 (phosgene) COCl2 + CH3NH2 → CH3NHCOCl + HCl CH3NHCOCl → HCl + CH3NCO (methyl isocyanate) As is shown in Table 1(Dhara 2002), a mixture of carbon monoxide (CO) and chlorine (Cl2) forms phosgene (COCl2). Phosgene is then combined with monomethylamine (CH3NH2) to form MIC. Finally, MIC is mixed with naphthol to produce carbaryl. MIC is a clear, colorless liquid with a pungent odor. MIC is moderately soluble in water, and hydrolyzes to form carbon dioxide and methylamine. When MIC is pyrolyzed between 427 oC and 548 °C, it decomposes to hydrogen cyanide and carbon dioxide. MIC irritates the skin, eyes, and respiratory mucus membranes. It reacts with water to penetrate tissues, including skin; interacts with protein; and (p 391) has poor warning properties. Dhara (2002) also states the lethal dose values for MIC as given in Table 2. Table 2.—Lethal Dose (LD)/Lethal Concentration (LC) Values for Methyl Isocyanate, from Animal Studies Route Dose Model LD50/LC50 Oral 10% soln; single dose Male rat 71 mg/kg Inhalation Vapors (4 hr) Rat 1.25 mg/m3 Skin Undiluted Rabbit 0.22 ml/kg On the night of December 3, 1984, a dangerous chemical reaction occurred at the UCIL factory when a large amount of water got into the MIC storage tank no. 610. The immediate cause was the absence of the slip-blind water isolation plates due to an adjacent tank's maintenance procedure. The resulting reaction generated a major increase in the temperature of liquid inside the tank to over200°C. The MIC holding tank then gave off a large volume of toxic gas, forcing the emergency release of pressure. This was the long-term result of the series of cost-cutting measures adopted by the UCIL from around 1982 onwards. These measures affected the two interrelated areas of workers and their conditions, and the equipment and safety regulations installed at the plant. As a result, safety standards and maintenance procedures at the plant was left deteriorating and ignored for months. The Ted Case Studies: Bhopal Disaster (1997) identifies the following causes as having directly contributed to the Bhopal tragedy: Gauges measuring temperature and pressure in the various parts of the unit, including the crucial MIC storage tanks, were so notoriously unreliable that workers ignored early signs of trouble. The refrigeration unit for keeping MIC at low temperatures, thereby making it less likely to undergo overheating and expansion should a contaminant enter the tank, had been shut off for some time. The gas scrubber, designed to neutralize any escaping MIC, had been shut off for maintenance. Even had it been operative, post-disaster inquiries revealed, the maximum The pressure it could handle was only one-quarter that which was actually reached in the accident. The flare tower, designed to burn off MIC escaping from the scrubber, was also turned off, waiting for replacement of a corroded piece of pipe. The tower, however, was inadequately designed for its task, as it was capable of handling only a quarter of the volume of gas released. The water curtain, designed to neutralize any remaining gas, was too short to reach the top of the flare tower, from where the MIC was billowing. The lack of effective warning systems; the alarm on the storage tank failed to signal the increase in temperature on the night of the disaster. MIC storage tank number 610 was filled beyond recommended capacity; and The storage tank which was supposed to be held in reserve for excess MIC already contained around 20 tons of MIC. With regard to process standards, it was later discovered that the Union Carbide The Union Carbide Corporation had double standards when operating its plant in India and in West Virginia. In the words of Cassels (1993, p.19), an investigation of both the UCIL plant and its counterpart in Institute, West Virginia revealed that while the latter plant had computerized warning and monitoring system, the former relied on manual gauges and the human senses to detect gas leaks. The capacity of the storage tanks, gas scrubbers, and flare tower was greater at the Institute plant. Finally, emergency evacuation plans were in place in Institute, but nonexistent in Bhopal. All these contributed to the leak of about 40 tons of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC), for nearly two hours spreading within eight kilometers downwind, over the city of nearly 900,000. Thousands of people were killed in their sleep or as they fled in terror, and hundreds of thousands remain injured or affected to this day. The most seriously affected areas were the densely populated shantytowns immediately surrounding the plant -- Jayaprakash Nagar, Kazi Camp, Chola Kenchi, and the Railway Colony. Estimates of the number dead and injured vary widely. Poor documentation, mass burials and cremations, and conflicting medical opinions ensure that the precise number will never be known. Terming it one of the world's worst industrial accidents, the BBC (1984), alike the Indian Supreme Court, reports that nearly 3,000 people died from the effects of the poisonous gas in the days following the disaster. The account further states that some 50,000 people were treated in the first few days suffering terrible side-effects, including blindness, kidney and liver failure. It also quotes the campaigners as claiming that nearly 20,000 others have since died from the effects of the leak. Exposure to MIC has resulted in damage to the eyes and lungs and has caused respiratory ailments such as chronic bronchitis and emphysema, gastrointestinal problems like hyperacidity and chronic gastritis, ophthalmic problems like chronic conjunctivitis and early cataracts, vision problems, neurological disorders such as memory and motor skills, psychiatric problems of various types including varying grades of anxiety and depression, musculoskeletal problems and gynecological problems among the victims. A number of independent investigations were undertaken to arrive at the truth behind the Bhopal disaster. The Indian Government, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India, the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the Union Carbide Corporation, and the Greenpeace International are a few among them. While all the other agencies held the Union Carbide Corporation’s negligence as the culprit of the disaster, the Corporation itself, to this date has not acknowledged this. They instead argue the case referring to an unidentified employee sabotage. The claim is that such a large amount of water could not possibly enter the MIC tank accidentally. In their study report the Corporation concludes that the incident was caused when 1,000 to 2,000 pounds of water entered the tank. The report (Kalelkar 1988) further goes on to refute the water-washing theory by stating three allegedly independent and objective pieces of evidence. The report initially seeks the help of the bleeder valve hydraulics, which would limit the water-back pressure to no more than about 0.7 foot of hydraulic head. This in turn establishes that the water could not have accidentally climbed to 10.4 feet without the help from an external human agency. The second argument points at the closed intermediate valve, which is near the water-washing operation. The valve is said to have been physically tagged closed and approved with the authorization of the Indian Government that certified the integrity of this valve in July 1985. Finally the dry header piping in referred to. It sates that even though the vented gases were hot, the water in these sections could not have boiled or evaporated away, because these sections were dozens of feet away from the piping in which hot gases were flowing. When the branch vent lines on the ground floor of the production unit and the branch vent lines connected to tank 611 and to the spare tank were later drained, only normal, small amounts of water is said to have found. However, the Ted Case Studies: Bhopal Disaster (1997) reports that in mid-July 1985, the government of India Health Minister stated that 36 pregnant women had spontaneously aborted, 21 babies were born with deformities, and there were 27 stillbirths, all suspected to have been caused by the poison gas leak in Bhopal. An examination of 114 women in the field clinics in two of the gas affected slums in Bhopal three months after the disaster revealed that an extremely high proportion of these women had developed gynecological diseases such as leucorrhoea (90%), pelvic inflammatory disease (79%), cervical erosion and/or endocervicitis (75%), excessive menstrual bleeding since exposure to the gas (31%), and suppression of lactation (59%). Also, there were several thousand pregnant women in the communities that were among the worst affected by the gas. Respiratory complication and the resulting hypozyia were bound to affect the fetuses as much as it did the mothers. Taking in the seriousness of the situation, the Government of India passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. The Act gave power to the Central Government to represent all claimants in appropriate forums, appoint a Welfare Commissioner and other staff and to discharge duties connected with hearing of the claims and distribution of compensation. Under this Act, in 1985, the Government formulated a scheme known as the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Scheme, for the registration, processing, and determination of compensation to each claim and appeals arising from thereon. Accordingly, the Union Carbide Corporation was charged with culpable homicide, a criminal charge whose penalty has no upper limit. These charges have never been resolved, as Union Carbide, like its former CEO Warren Anderson, has refused to appear before an Indian court. Issues of jurisdiction were central to the legal battle that followed the tragedy. These centered on the relationship of the parent Union Carbide Corporation to its Indian subsidiary and the appropriateness of the place where litigation was to be conducted. The Union Carbide Corporation maintained that it's subsidiary is separate from the parent company and so it only should be liable instead of the whole corporation. The Indian government's petition argued that insofar as Union Carbide designed, constructed, owned, and operated the plant from which the chemical escaped, the company should be held absolutely liable for all the resulting damage. Also, the company, in undertaking an activity that it knew was ultra-hazardous to the public at large, is strictly liable for the harm that was the material consequence of such activity, regardless of whether the harm that resulted was through fault of another or its own negligence. Moreover, the company was negligent in designing, constructing, operating and maintaining its plant and thus, failed to exercise its duty of care to protect the public from the dangers inherent in its plant and processes Tracing the course of the legal battle, Bhopal Disaster (2008) states that in March 1986 the Union Carbide proposed a settlement figure of $350 million that would, according to the company, generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500-600 million over 20 years. In May, litigation was transferred from the US to Indian courts by US District Court Judge. Following an appeal of this decision, the US Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer in January 1987. Litigation continued in India during 1988. The Indian Supreme Court asked both sides to come to an agreement in November 1988. Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in 1989 , Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster, 15% of the original $3 billion claimed in the lawsuit. By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200. Nevertheless the Union Carbide Corporation still remains liable for the environmental devastation its operations have caused. Environmental damages were never addressed in the 1989 settlement, and the contamination that Union Carbide left behind continues to spread though the factory was shut down immediately after the disaster. In 2002, an inquiry found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5 trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing women’s breast milk. Well water and groundwater tests conducted in the surrounding areas in 1999 showed mercury levels to be at 20,000 and 6 million times higher than expected levels. To make things worse, heavy metals and organochlorines were found present in the soil. Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as trichloroethene, known to impair fetal development, at 50 times above safety limits specified by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) It is an alarming fact that the gas-affected people of Bhopal continue to succumb to injuries sustained during the disaster, dying at the rate of one each day. Treatment protocols are hampered by the UCC's continuing refusal to share information it holds on the toxic effects of MIC. Both Union Carbide and its new owner Dow Chemical claim the data is a trade secret, frustrating the efforts of doctors to treat gas-affected victims. The site being never thoroughly cleaned up, many successive generations are being poisoned by the chemicals that Union Carbide left behind. REFERENCE 1. Bhopal. (2008). Wikipedia, 5 March [Online]. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 2. Bhopal Disaster. (2008). Wikipedia, 4 March [Online]. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bhopal_disaster (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 3. Cassels, Jamie. (1993) The Uncertain Promise Of Law: Lessons From Bhopal, University Of Toronto Press Incorporated, Toronto. 4. Chernobyl Accident. (2008). World Nuclear Association, February [Online]. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.htm (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 5. Chernobyl Disaster. (2008). Wikipedia, 7 March [Online]. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 6. Dhara, Rosaline. and Dhara, V. Ramana. (2002) The Union Carbide Disaster in Bhopal: A Review of Health Eeffects. Highbeam Research, 1 Sept. [Online]. Available at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-98753140.html (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 7. IndustruialDisasters. (2008). Wikipedia, 7 March [Online]. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_disasters (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 8. Kalelkar , Ashok S. (1988) Investigation of Large- Magnitude Incidents: Bhopal as a Case Study. Union Carbide Corporation, [Online]. Available at: http:// www.bhopal.com/pdfs/casestdy.pdf (Accessed: 8 March 2008). 9. On This Day (1984). BBC, 3 Dec. [Online]. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/newsid_2698000/2698709.stm (Accessed: 8 March 2007). 10. Ted Case Studies: Bhopal Disaster (1997). American Education, 11 Jan [Online]. Available at: http://www.american.edu/ted/bhopal.htm (Accessed: 8 March 2008). Read More