Administrative Rights and Responsibilities of High Schools - Dissertation Example

Administrative Rights and Responsibilities of High Schools and Colleges To Set and Enforce Drug Policies and Consequences School districts in the United States have thought of considering and tried to make use of programs related to drug testing in order to promote the health and safety in schools (Jacobs 1). However, issues as to the Fourth Amendment rights of students have been raised as to such programs (Jacobs 1). In several cases, the Court has emphasized the so-called “balancing test” wherein the government must be able to show the compelling need of invading the privacy of an individual over that individual’s interest to protect his or her own privacy (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive’s Ass’n , 489 US 602, 628, 629, 103 L Ed 2d 639, 109 S Ct 1402, 1419 (1989). The court also stressed that such a policy must comply with the case of T.L.O. in having reasonable standard (Odenheim v. Carlstadt – East Rutherford Regional School Dist., 211 NJ Super 54, 510 A2d 709 (1985). In one case, the Court pointed out that individual suspicion must be the basis of any search on a school child under ordinary circumstances in that, such a search will be able to determine any “evidence of wrong doing” (Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 730 F Supp 759, 764 (SD Tex 1989, aff’d w/o op 930 F2d 915 (CA51991). In this case, the Court explained that the government was not able to justify its interest in interfering with a “student’s legitimate expectation of privacy” (Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 759, 764). The court stated that the program involving drug testing was unreasonable as it was unlikely that accomplished its goal of being a deterrent (Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 759, 764). The Court further explained that although the goal maybe to discourage the substance abuse of drugs and even alcohol, if the means used to achieve such goal is narrowly tailored then, it may be held to be unreasonable under the US Constitution (Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 759, 765). In another case, the Federal District Court in Oregon held that the urinalysis being conducted among students participating in the schools interscholastic athletics was valid (Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp 1354 (D Or 1992). Using the decision made in Schaill, the court explained any program involving a random urinalysis for interscholastic athletes which uses “the least intrusive means possible” so as to have a consequent protection on the safety and security on the public, may be able to hold out on any constitutional scrutiny if it is able to show particular evidence on problems related to drugs and its goal of addressing disciplinary concerns (Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp 1354, 1363 (D Or 1992). The court also took into consideration instances in upholding the drug testing policy such as, the evidence of particular instances wherein coaches detect that athletes functioned weakly and unsafely “while under the influence of some intoxicant,” that these athletes were considered as role models in the community of Vernonia, that there was such an importance of the drug testing program on prevention of drug abuse, that there was determination of other “less intrusive measures” that were attempted but proved to be ineffective, that there be a finding that the testing program was “limited in scope and narrowly tailored to accomplish the district’s objectives” and finally that the policy was restricted only to the an activity considered to have the greatest effect (Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp 1354, 1363 to 1364 (D Or 1992). The court upheld this policy mainly because of the uniqueness of the situation that the school staff dealt with (Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp 1354, 1363 to 1364 (D Or 1992). The court stressed that there must “evidence of drug related problems, attempts to address the problems in less intrusive ways, and establishing a connection between the stated objectives and the means chosen to achieve those objectives” in order that any drug testing policy may not come in conflict with the Constitution (Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp 1354, 1363 to 1365 (D Or 1992). Hence, as can be gleaned from the above-mentioned cases, drug testing programs must strictly adhere to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and avoid infringement of student’s rights under the said amendment (Jacobs 1). In making a policy of such nature, it must state the basis for testing, a well defined and preciseness of data collection procedures must be shown, and notification to students and their parents about the policy must necessarily be made (Jacobs 1). There must also be a request for “students’ consent” before any of such testing may be made (Jacobs 1). The student must also be given the chance to clarify and explain in cases where such student is found positive for drug use (Jacobs 1). The courts also approve and positively view programs that offer rehabilitation instead of punishment (Jacobs 1). The case of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in upholding a policy of “consent to drug testing” was the subject constitutional scrutiny (NCAA 1). The NCAA had a policy that all athletes sign a so-called “consent to drug testing” in order that one may be eligible and that their standard for any “recruitment, financial aid, amateur status, and involvement in organized gambling activities” involving their athletic competitions was subject to this drug testing (NCAA 1). In case of a student fails to follow this policy as their annual requirement, it will necessarily find the student ineligible to take part in any competition (NCAA 1). The NCAA was also said to have a “random, mandatory drug testing program” in relation to the “post-season intercollegiate athletic activities” wherein any student discovered to be on a substance included in the list of NCAA’s banned drug, will necessarily “ineligible for post-season competitions for 90 days after the test date’ (NCAA 1). If the student is found to be positive even after being reinstated to his or her eligibility, he or she will then “lose one season of post-season eligibility in all sports” (NCAA 1). Under NCAA’s Manual, students may also be directly tested for drugs but only in “post-season athletic competition” (NCAA 1). During the regular season, the individual college however, will decide on what it wants to do on drug testing (NCAA 1). With this policy, various courts have questioned its adherence to the Constitution. The Superior Court in California ruled that such post-season program “violated the athlete’s right to privacy under the California Constitution” (Lederman 1). Judge Rushing then held that such program impeded the athletes right to have appropriate over-the-counter prescriptions just like ordinary students would have made and thus determined that such was a violation of the equal protection clause under the Federal Constitution (Lederman 1). Judge Rushing further explained that NCAA was not able to establish the existence of a compelling reason for such a violation of the athletes rights (Lederman 1). The NCAA countered this by explaining that such a program was to safeguard the “health and safety of the athletes” and guarantee “fair and equitable competition” (Lederman 1). The judge further declared that alcohol which is considered as a major problem than the drug, was not even prohibited by NCAA’s program (Lederman 1). While the California Appeals Court upheld Judge Rushing’s ruling, stating that there was no compelling reason for such a program, the California Supreme Court however reversed such ruling stating that “NCAAs mandatory drug testing program did not violate the privacy rights of the athletes” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 327, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 716 (1994). The program of the NCAA in upholding the legality of “consent to drug testing” was also reflected in the case of OHalloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 677 (W.D. Wash. 1988) where it supported the use of a monitored urine testing by NCAA in order to implement drug testing programs stating that it did not unreasonably violate the privacy of a student-athlete (OHalloran v. University of Washington, 1988). Also in the Colorado Court of Appeals decision made in December 1991, the Court upheld the constitutionality and legality of a collegiate drug testing program at the University of Colorado which was made compulsory on athletes (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 832 P.2d 1031, 76 Ed. Law Rep. 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), judgment affd, 863 P.2d 929, 87 Ed. Law Rep. 1052 (Colo. 1993). In the said decision, it explained how the program of the university as regards drug testing has developed which variations permitted drug testing to be conducted if there is reasonable suspicion or if there is the existence of “random rapid eye examinations” (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). Under this program, students were obliged to “execute consent forms” and provided for penalties in case a student tested positive, which may be from a penalty of mandatory counseling up to permanent suspension (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). However, the Court declared as an unreasonable search, the part of the program involving urinalysis (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). The Court explained that the school has not shown that the purpose of having a drug-free athletics was a “compelling state interest” that escalated to a “public safety or law enforcement” level and hence, the urine testing program was found to have violated the Fourth Amendment (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). Furthermore, since the consent of the athlete was coerced, then such consent was declared invalid (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). The Court however, permitted the possible continuation of some drug testing on the condition that it must be grounded on some other circumstance aside from probable cause (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). Hence, the Colorado Court of Appeals declared the program as unconstitutional, but might have permitted another program if it was reasonably drawn, which decision was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court explaining that the University was not able to show that the consents of the athletes were indeed voluntary (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). Thus, the Court held that such drug testing program was in violation of “the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, § 7, of the Colorado Constitution” (Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 1993). In another case however, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the policy to conduct a random urine testing program where it somehow lessened the “expectation of privacy in athletic programs,” as the program proved that the school indeed had an evidence of a drug problem, and the dangers of using drugs that creates a risk to both the safety and the health of athletes (Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F2d 1309 (CA7 1988). In this case, athletes were made to execute a urinalysis consent form as a requirement before one can participate in any athletic activity (Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F2d 1309 (CA7 1988). The Court considered the random drug testing to be important as the policy involved a restricted discretion of school officials, the testing being random in nature, and further, the test results would not be applied or used for any criminal prosecution (Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F2d 1309 (CA7 1988). The policy was said to be “more narrowly drawn” compared to that in the previous case on Texas policy, and was substantiated by specific evidence regarding the drug problem in schools (Jacobs 1). This is similar to the policy of NCAA in that the legality of the high school consent program that involved urine analysis was upheld (Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F2d 1309 (CA7 1988). In contrast with the decision held in Hill where the California Appeal ruled against the policy of NCAA, the main issue then was the so-called “initial privacy” (Champion 1). However, as this case involved high schools, one would notice that there was “a higher standard in regards to protection of the athletes privacy than in college” (Champion 1). The Court in this case also determined that there is less expectation of privacy in athletics, for the reason of the so-called “locker room ambiance” (Champion 1). Thus, in order to advance a significant state interest, it is better that there be “limited drug testing” made which is considered favorably as an acceptable way by Courts to achieve this purpose (Champion 1). In yet another case, a college athlete who was found positive anabolic steroid testosterone was suspended, the decision of which was then questioned by the said athlete as to the validity of the test results as he claimed to have consumed alcohol, claims to have had sexual activity and has also taken nutritional supplements (Brennan v. Board of Trustees for University of Louisiana Systems, 691 So. 2d 324, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 803 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997). The suspension however was upheld on appeal, based on the finding that there was “no factual basis for the trial courts determination that the test results were false” (Brennan v. Board of Trustees for University of Louisiana Systems, 1997). The Court further explained that such drug testing was in line with NCAAs interest in making sure that “fair competition outweighed the athletes privacy interests;” that student-athletes involved in intercollegiate athletics do not have a “process, liberty, or property rights;” and that the university was not acting negligently when it failed to advise the athlete on taking nutritional supplements (Brennan v. Board of Trustees for University of Louisiana Systems, 1997). On cases decided pertaining to high schools, one case involved the parents who challenged a program that barred students from being involved in extracurricular activities unless these “students and their parents consented to random” which made “unannounced urinalysis testing for drugs, alcohol, and tobacco” (Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133 F.3d 984, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 18 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court decided that this kind of consent was not a violation of student’s rights (Todd v. Rush County Schools, 1998). On the other hand, the policy of the school in having a suspicionless urinalysis was determined to be unconstitutional that pertained to band members (Trinidad School Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez By and Through Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 129 Ed. Law Rep. 812 (Colo. 1998). From the decision made in Acton which had strict standards before a random urinalysis for interscholastic athletes may be held valid or that it was the least intrusive program, the position now is that it is the policy of the school district policy to mandate “random suspicionless drug testing of all students in grades 7-12” who participate in extracurricular activities which includes sports activities (Champion 1). In the case of Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., the policy also involved all extracurricular activities and persons who drive their way to school (Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 144 Ed. Law Rep. 866 (7th Cir. 2000). In this case, the Court of Appeals permitted the urinalysis testing for extracurricular students and also allowed drug and alcohol testing for student drivers but then did not have random testing of the usage of nicotine for student drivers (Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., 2000). Also, in the case of Board of Education v. Earls, drug testing was allowed by the Supreme Court for the students involved in extracurricular activities stating that such a policy was not an unreasonable search as such a policy carried out the boards purpose in determining and preventing drug use that are likely to involve students (Earls ex rel. Earls v. Board of Educ. of Tecumseh Public School Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 151 Ed. Law Rep. 752 (10th Cir. 2001). In one case, parents of students studying in a public school at the Washington state filed a suit against the school district, asserting that the random drug testing program being conducted on student athletes was a violation of the state and federal constitutions (York v. Wahkiakum School Dist. No. 200, 110 Wash. App. 383, 40 P.3d 1198, 161 Ed. Law Rep. 1023 (Div. 2 2002). On appellate review, the review was rendered moot by the court due to the district’s conformity that the testing be stopped pending trial and also it held that such a random drug testing of said student athletes did not intrude into “any clear legal or equitable right” to which students are entitled to (York v. Wahkiakum School Dist. No. 200, 147 Wash. 2d 1010, 56 P.3d 565 (2002). This decision was however reversed by the Supreme Court of Washington reversed holding that such policy of permitting random and suspicion less drug testing was in violation of the State Constitution that unlawfully invaded public affairs or the home (York v. Wahkiakum School Dist. No. 200, 163 Wash.2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). In another case however, the Court ruled that while both the policy on urinalysis not considered as an unreasonable search and revealing of prescription use in order to clarify positive test as reasonable policies, the policy however that required students to reveal their use of prescription medication before urinalysis testing is unreasonable (Weber v. Oakridge School Dist. 76, 184 Or. App. 415, 56 P.3d 504, 170 Ed. Law Rep. 830 (2002). In the case of Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003 WL 1738417 (Tex. App. Austin 2003), a father confronted the policy of the school district that mandated drug testing in extracurricular activities, stating that said policy is in violation of his children’s “religious freedom, right to due process and right to privacy” (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). He reasoned that his children, being of Jewish faith, would occasionally drink alcohol (wine) and hence such testing policy is in violation of their religious freedom (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). The school policy required that all junior high and high school students participating in extracurricular activities must undergo drug testing (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). Among those substances which students can be tested, include alcohol, barbiturates, cocaine, and steroids (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). Aside from this, the testing is to be conducted twice a year and will further be subjected to more random testing (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). Analysis of each student’s urine, hair, or saliva sample is done by an independent testing laboratory (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). If the test result is positive, the consequence would be suspension from participating in extracurricular activities of the concerned student (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). Suspension may vary which may range from three weeks to permanent suspension depending on the number of times a student has tested positive (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). The court in its decision held that there was no showing by the father of a “probable right to recover at trial” and that the school’s policy on drug testing did not constitute as a violation religious freedom, due process, or right to privacy (Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003). In Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Regional High School Bd. of Educ., 176 N.J. 568, 826 A.2d 624, 178 Ed. Law Rep. 349 (2003), an action for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought by the parents of three high school students as regards the high schools policy of having students’ random suspicionless drug testing who participate in extracurricular activities (Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Regional High School Bd. of Educ., 2003). The Supreme Court of New Jersey, upheld the high school’s drug testing policy stating that there was no violation of the state Constitution as this is considered as a special need of the school (Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Regional High School Bd. of Educ., 2003). In Bean v. Tulia Independent School District which had a series of cases, the constitutionality of Tulia Independent School District’s policy on having random, suspicionless drug-testing was examined by the federal district court of the Northern District of Texas (Bean ex rel. Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22087571 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22087567 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). This case however was stayed while the result of Supreme Courts decision in Board of Ed. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). After the decision made in Earls, this stay was lifted and the court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants (Champion 1). In Bean v. Tulia Independent School District, 2003 WL 22087571 (N.D. Tex. 2003), the student athlete’s father refused to agree to his son’s urine testing (Bean v. Tulia Independent School District, 2003). Nevertheless, the student’s urine sample was still collected and tested (Bean v. Tulia Independent School District, 2003). Bean then filed a pro se law suit alleging that such a policy was implemented with racial bias because of its unequal impact on Blacks and Hispanics and despite the fact that the plaintiff and his son are white are both white (Bean v. Tulia Independent School District, 2003). Defendants moved for summary judgment to which plaintiff rebutted stating that such drug testing policy in Tulia Independent School District is not of similar procedure as in the decision made in the Earl’s case which upheld the drug testing policy (Bean v. Tulia Independent School District, 2003). The Court found however that the allegations of the plaintiff were vague and explained that they needed facts related to the parties in this case (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22087567 (N.D. Tex. 2003). In the third case of Bean, the athlete, Amos Bean, had already graduated (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). The father in the third case alleged that the school district officials still performed drug testing on his son even though it was not consented to (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). The plaintiff argued that such a policy on its face, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). The drug testing procedures adopted by the school, as argued by the plaintiff, was different from what is written in the policy itself and is unconstitutional in nature (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). Plaintiff further alleges that “students are not randomly selected by a computer for testing but are individually selected by teachers for testing as part of a suspicion-based drug usage testing policy” (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). Despite this argument, the court upheld such a policy of drug testing similar to that held in Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 101 Ed. Law Rep. 37 (1995) and hence, “not unconstitutional as written” (Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). In yet another case questioning the school district’s policy in conducting random, suspicionless searches on their students including their belongings, the parents on behalf of a class of seventh grade students, filed declaratory and injunctive relief against a school district Parents brought an action against a school district, on behalf of a class of seventh grade students, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and challenging the constitutionality of a district policy of conducting random, suspicionless searches of students persons and belongings (Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock School Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 191 Ed. Law Rep. 608 (8th Cir. 2004). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that such a policy was in violation of the Fourth Amendment which guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by state officers, that includes public school officials (Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock School Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 191 Ed. Law Rep. 608 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court herein, that in order for any governmental search to be constitutional, it must be a reasonable search (Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock School Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 191 Ed. Law Rep. 608 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus the court held that such a policy was a violation of the Fourth Amendment since such searches intruded into privacy of students and their belongings without a showing of any circumstance that justified such an intrusion (Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock School Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 191 Ed. Law Rep. 608 (8th Cir. 2004). In one case, where the parents filed a civil rights action against the school which barred the student from continuing to be in the school swimming team unless he tested negative on his drug test (Dominic J. v. Wyoming Valley West High School, 362 F. Supp. 2d 560, 197 Ed. Law Rep. 154 (M.D. Pa. 2005). The US District Court in the Middle District of Pennsylvania however upheld such a rule and stated that such compulsory drug screening was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the student as participation in extracurricular activities was not a “due process-protected property (Dominic J. v. Wyoming Valley West High School, 2005). Hence, in these cases it is stressed that the reasonableness standard must also be applied to school searches, in that “school officials must have more than good faith (Lentz, 2008). The search done by school officials must satisfy the following requirements: 1) that such an action was justified from the very start or the beginning, and 2) that the search “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it” (Lentz, 1). As explained in Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., for a drug testing program to be legal the circumstance must be extraordinary and that such policy may not dilute the Fourth Amendment rights “any more than necessary to preserve order in schools (Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 1120 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915, 66 Ed. Law Rep. 982 (5th Cir. 1991). Thus, in order for a urinalysis program to be justified, there must be a showing that students who are involved in extra-curricular activities “are much more likely to use drugs than non-participants or that drug use by participants interfered with the schools educational mission much more seriously than does drug use by non-participants” (Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 764, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 1120 (S.D. Tex. 1989). In the case of Crager v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, KY., the Court explained that even though the state requires that there be an “individualized suspicion before performing drug tests,” such suspicion is not an “indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance” (Crager v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, KY., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 187 Ed. Law Rep. 892 (E.D. Ky. 2004). Hence, the United State District Court for the East District of Kentucky ruled that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment that could prevent the implementation of the school’s policy (Crager v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, KY., 2004). The court cited that “special needs” as an exception to the requirement of individualized suspicion, which includes minimal privacy interests and when such suspicion would only jeopardize governmental interests (Crager v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, KY., 2004). Procedures involving drug testing must be confidential in order to ensure the privacy of persons concerned as well as reliability and confidentiality of results (Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). Because of the number of schools conducting screening tests for drug use, federal money is made more available to schools (Lentz, 1). Testing is conducted either on a random basis in the general student population or conducted as part of the extracurricular activities of students (Lentz, 1). As a result of this requests in 2007, were made to Congress for additional funding for drug testing (Lentz, 1). Drug testing are protected by confidentiality laws and the proponents of drug testing in the schools regard such policy as a means to resist peer pressure by students (Lentz, 1). The Role of the Students in Following Policies and the Challenges on Parents or Guardians In attending school, students are subjected to all lawful rules and regulations prescribed and the conduct of students appropriately is within the regulation of the school authorities (Dorr, 1). Schools have a “wide latitude of discretion” relative to the formulation of school regulations but must ensure that such rules and regulations are reasonable (Dorr, 1). Any state law, rule, or regulation that directs the conduct of high school students must also ensure that it is sufficiently definite in order to provide notice to students so that they can conform to the said requirements (Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). It is thus importantly that students are knowledgeable on the rules and regulations and school policies promulgated by school authorities. Hence, in the case of drug test policies in schools, these form part of the rules and regulations of the school. If such drug test policy then is reasonable and valid as determined by courts, this policy must then be followed dutifully by students. Parents must also be knowledgeable and provided notice as to the school’s policy as this affects their children. If they find that such school policy does not comply with the reasonableness requirement as held in the cases provided previously, then they have the right to sue on the ground that it does not comply with the Fourth Amendment requirement to protect the rights of their children. Otherwise, if such policy complies with the requirement, then they are also duty bound to follow the said policy. Parents who usually file suits, claim for a violation of federal or state constitutional law under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Dorr 1). The elements that must usually be established are the following: “(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived the person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States” (Dorr 1). The court usually decides in favor of such a private entitys conduct, such entity must establish either that “(1) the entity was serving a function which was traditionally and exclusively the states prerogative, or (2) the state or its agencies caused, controlled or directed the entitys action” (Dorr 1). And although the rules implemented by a private entity are followed by public, state-subsidized institutions, this alone do not require that the private entitys decision rely on the decision of the state to promulgate drug testing procedures as there must be a further evidence that the state caused or procured the adoption of the private entitys regulations (Barbay v National Collegiate Athletic Asso. & La. (1987) DistLEXIS(R) 393). These then are grounds which parents usually rely upon in challenging the school’s policy on drug testing. Policy Variations by State As can be gleaned from the cases cited, one state may have a different policy as to a school’s drug testing. This depends on whether such a school policy is reasonable to justify intrusion to the privacy of students and the existence of circumstances that lead to a need to have a drug test policy. Usually the constitutional validity of school district policies authorizing the use of drug tests for students has been challenged on grounds mainly because it constitutes as an unreasonable search and seizure (Dorr, 1). Analysis Given the cases involving various school policies, the general rule is that drug testing policy should comply with the Constitution especially as to the Fourth amendment right. There must also be grounds or extraordinary circumstances to show that such a policy is necessary and that there are no other actions available to sufficiently suppress drug problem. Reasonableness of any school policy, rule or regulation must also be shown. In the various cases mentioned, the state usually has a higher and stricter standard in high schools than in colleges (Champion 1). Furthermore, it was mentioned in the case above cited that students do not enjoy due process protected property rights in joining extra-curricular activities and which include participation in sports, and hence, courts usually uphold the validity of drug test policy being conducted in different schools or colleges (Dominic J. v. Wyoming Valley West High School, 362 F. Supp. 2d 560, 197 Ed. Law Rep. 154 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Given these considerations, a drug test policy may differ from school or states depending on the circumstances. However, whatever school policy is promulgated, it must still stand the scrutiny as regards its constitutionality. Works Cited Acton v. Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 796 F Supp 1354 (D Or 1992). Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969). Barbay v National Collegiate Athletic Asso. & La. (1987) DistLEXIS(R) 393). Bean ex rel. Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22087571 (N.D. Tex. 2003) Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22087567 (N.D. Tex. 2003). Bean v. Tulia Independent School Dist., 2003 WL 22004511 (N.D. Tex. 2003). Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). Brennan v. Board of Trustees for University of Louisiana Systems, 691 So. 2d 324, 117 Ed. Law Rep. 803 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997). Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Independent School Dist., 730 F Supp 759, 764 (SD Tex 1989, aff’d w/o op 930 F2d 915 (CA51991). Champion, Jr. Walter. “Amateur Sports.” Fundamentals of Sports Law § 15:3. 2008. Crager v. Board of Educ. of Knott County, KY., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 187 Ed. Law Rep. 892 (E.D. Ky. 2004). Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder Through Regents of University of Colorado, 832 P.2d 1031, 76 Ed. Law Rep. 239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), judgment affd, 863 P.2d 929, 87 Ed. Law Rep. 1052 (Colo. 1993). Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock School Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 191 Ed. Law Rep. 608 (8th Cir. 2004). Dominic J. v. Wyoming Valley West High School, 362 F. Supp. 2d 560, 197 Ed. Law Rep. 154 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Dorr, Kathlene. “Validity, Under Federal Constitution, Of Regulations, Rules, Or Statutes Allowing Drug Testing Of Students.” 87 American Law Reports 148. 1988. Earls ex rel. Earls v. Board of Educ. of Tecumseh Public School Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 151 Ed. Law Rep. 752 (10th Cir. 2001). Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 327, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 716 (1994). Jacobs, Thomas. “Search and Seizure – Drug Testing.” 2 Children and the Law: Rights and Obligations. 2009. § 9:14. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 144 Ed. Law Rep. 866 (7th Cir. 2000). Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Regional High School Bd. of Educ., 176 N.J. 568, 826 A.2d 624, 178 Ed. Law Rep. 349 (2003). Lederman, Josh. “NCAAs Drug Tests of Athletes at Stanford U. Barred by Cal. Judge.” The Chronicle of Higher Education A30, Sept. 1, 1988. Lentz, Mary. “Drug Testing – Urinalysis.” Lentz School Security. § 3:10. 2008. Marble Falls Independent School Dist. v. Shell ex rel. Shell, 2003 WL 1738417 (Tex. App. Austin 2003). National Collegiate Athletic Association.1988-1989 Manual of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, Bylaw 5-2 (1988). Odenheim v. Carlstadt – East Rutherford Regional School Dist., 211 NJ Super 54, 510 A2d 709 (1985). OHalloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 677 (W.D. Wash. 1988). Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F2d 1309 (CA7 1988). Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive’s Ass’n , 489 US 602, 628, 629, 103 L Ed 2d 639, 109 S Ct 1402, 1419 (1989). Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133 F.3d 984, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 18 (7th Cir. 1998). Trinidad School Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez By and Through Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 129 Ed. Law Rep. 812 (Colo. 1998). Weber v. Oakridge School Dist. 76, 184 Or. App. 415, 56 P.3d 504, 170 Ed. Law Rep. 830 (2002). York v. Wahkiakum School Dist. No. 200, 110 Wash. App. 383, 40 P.3d 1198, 161 Ed. Law Rep. 1023 (Div. 2 2002). Read More