Safety Issues in Commercial Avionics: The Case of Air-Funnel Malfunction - Coursework Example

Safety Issues in Commercial Avionics: The Case of Air-Funnel Malfunction AFFILIATION: Contents Introduction 2 Cause and Effect 3 Results of Investigation 3 Regulatory Changes in the Industry 4 Behavioral Flaws of the Ground and Flight Crew 4 Conclusion 6 References 7 Safety Issues in Commercial Avionics: The Case of Air-Funnel Malfunction Introduction The field of airlines has its advantages and disadvantages as well. The benefit side is far greater than the cost’s one. However, there is always a possibility of an accident associated with each flight even in the modern era of the 21st century. The flights have to face storms, rains, fog, and risk of catching fire during the journey in the midair. The flights have to live with the certain level of risks, but in recent times, the brilliant designs and technology has minimized the possibility of human error. The case that this paper will discuss involved a Boeing 777 that experienced problems with the speed funnel. The speed funnel is a device that measures the speed of the jet by calculating pressures in the funnels that are present at the both sides of the cockpit. The pilot and copilot have two speedometers that each uses to know the exact speed of the craft. During the takeoff, chief pilot reported that his gauge is malfunctioning, and therefore, he had to rely on the reading that his copilot was getting. The chief had to make a decision when the issue was first surfaced, but he decided to continue the journey because the crew was away from their homes for months, and they were hurriedly waiting for seeing their families again so the mind of the chief rejected the possibility of further delays. The previously mentioned decision proved to be fatal in nature, but the incident was inevitable when the aircraft was airborne with a faulty air-funnel. The pilot and copilot faced the same dilemma during the flight as well, and this time there was no turning back. The speed was measured to be too slow by one gauge, and other was telling that it was too high. The contradictory information left the cockpit crew confused. They however, had to act because the situation had to be managed after all. The pilot trusted the gauge of his copilot once again, and decided to lower the speed. They lifted the nose in order to accomplish the goal, but the speed was already too low that the jet could not maintain its altitude, and therefore, it initiated rapid descent. The autopilot gave way and the crew had to steer manually, but it was too late. The flight crashed into the middle of the Mediterranean (Cramoisi, 2012). Cause and Effect The control room on the other hand did not have any idea about what was going on with the flight until it vanished from radar’s screen altogether. The copilot transmitted the last communication and he stated to the tower to standby. However, the unfortunate fate of the flight did not give them another chance to communicate. The last known aerial location of the jet was triangulated, and after days’ search, the rescue teams found out the resultant wreckage of the flight (Brescoll, Dawson, & Uhlmann, 2010). The central black box revealed that pilot and copilot faced a disagreement in the cockpit, and they continued in spite of that. The investigative team spotted that various types of alarms went off in the cockpit that will have undermined the performance of the pilots. The plane notified the crew that the funnel is malfunctioning. Then, the autopilot gave way (Cramoisi, 2012). The speed alarm went off because the velocity was too high, after a moment’s pause in this regard, the alarm rung telling the crew that the speed is too low. The pilots exposed to confusion in the most sophisticated machinery, the time ran out on them eventually, and therefore, the unexpected incident took place. This time, there was no natural cause acted in order to cause the demise of the Boeing 777 after a very long time. Results of Investigation The catastrophe represented the unsolvable mystery to the investigative team at first. The team even does not have the answer to the questions raised by the incident till date. However, multiple theories were presented in order to explain the unexplainable. The captain had to face the blame of not calling the flight off when he spotted a malfunction in the speed gauge. The experts tried to explain the phenomenon by suspecting that the funnels were not properly covered when the jet was standing in the preflight mode (Grönroos & Ravald, 2011), and it is possible that some kind of bird will have constructed a nest in one of those structures. Another expert added that the technical ground crew might have forgotten to remove coverings from the funnel, and therefore it miscalculated the speed as too low, but in reality, the velocity was normal. The crew decided to lower the speed and by doing so, they compromised the lower threshold that was necessary for the jet to maintain its stature in the air (Cramoisi, 2012). The chain of events was set in motion, the lowering of the speed was the final straw in the recipe of the disaster, and when the jet took a turn for the worst then, there was not enough time left to change anything. Regulatory Changes in the Industry The regulatory outlook of the industry changed forever after the climax, and nowadays, pilots have a responsibility to inspect the airplane before taking-off. They have to sign the proper documents certifying that they are satisfied with the mechanical aspects of the craft. Secondly, they have to spend at least an hour with the bird before conducting the flight. They have to call off the flight, if they have a foggiest reservation about the operationality of the machine that they have to fly (Ivarsson & Jonsson, 2003). The bird’s nest theory is believed to be the most authentic one because the funnel was partially blocked, and that would not be possible, if the safety cover was on. The mechanical failure was a cause of the incident, but the presence of human error on the behalf of the pilots put the whole event into motion, and once the multi-ton aircraft was flying then, it was destined to doom sooner or later. Behavioral Flaws of the Ground and Flight Crew The pilots played a gamble because they had to choose from two courses of action, and they made a wrong decision. Two wrongs do not make one right. The lack of taking and exhibiting proper care and caution is the defining cause of the incident. The technology was not operating optimally, and there was a window of opportunity to ensure the safety of entire array of souls on the plane, but the captain did not care because he was too concerned to get home where he and his companions never arrived in the first place, and therefore, they never got what they were looking for. The ability to demonstrate patience will remain a defining attribute of the leader that captain of the fallen flight did not practice when the time called him to do so. They trusted the ground crew with their lives (Wasylyshyn, 2010), and they made a mistake too by not properly inspecting the bird when it was standing in the preflight mode. The cockpit crew had the chance to correct the mistake, but they did not avail that, and left the world in a hurry as they did with the airstrip at the airport. The aeroplane in question was not flight ready, and it is still the point of wonderment for the entire industry that how it got airborne. The answer is simple, it flew because the crew wanted it to do so (Salas, Rosen, & King, 2007). The readers might get a message that their wills and wishes will not make anything working, but they have to think empirically and scientifically in every dimension of their lives. Human intelligence is not the source of enlightenment as Greeks believed in the past. Today, we have to experiment in order to find out. The field of epistemology operates on the basis negation rather than the rule of acceptability. The knowledge implants fear in human beings that have rational natures, and therefore, they learn that they do not have to take unnecessary risks in life. The crew of the unlucky flight did not think about the consequences of their actions, and therefore, they defied logic that provides the basis of all knowledge (Shaw, Bailey, & Williams, 2011). They followed their gut feeling, and during the process, they neglected to follow the evidence that was right in front of their eyes (Jablin, 1979). The humans create their own realities, and that is proven by the abovementioned incident yet again. The professionals receive their training in order to take decisions in the specific line of work, and in commercial and military avionics, there is very little room to commit a mistake (Kelly, Murphy, Sikkema, & Kalichman, 1993). The specialized crew did not apply the basic level of regulations in the case of managing the potentially deadly situation that has proven deadly eventually. Conclusion The profession of flying is a risky one and therefore, one has to take great level of care while working in the industry. The equipment used in the professional field is expensive, and the flights carry human beings. In the very essence, the industry is more like the field of medical, and physicians do not operate until there are significant chances of survival present. References Brescoll, V., Dawson, E., & Uhlmann, E. (2010). Hard Won and Easily Lost. Psychological Science Vol 21 (11), 1640-1642. Cramoisi, G. (2012). Air Crash Investigations: Lost... The Crash of American Airlines Flight 965. . New York: Lulu. com. Grönroos, C., & Ravald, A. (2011). Service as business logic: implications for value creation and marketing. Journal of Service Management Vol 22 (1), 5 - 22. Ivarsson, I., & Jonsson, T. (2003). Local technological competence and asset-seeking FDI: an empirical study of manufacturing and wholesale affiliates in Sweden. International Business Review Vol 12 (3), 369–386. Jablin, F. (1979). Superior–subordinate communication: The state of the art. Psychological Bulletin Vol 86 (3), 1201-1222. Kelly, J., Murphy, D., Sikkema, K., & Kalichman, S. (1993). 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