US Homeland Security Department Activity - Research Paper Example

US Homeland Security Department Activity The CBRNC subgroup was instituted to identify and prioritize requirements by various multi-agency users, as well as to seek competitively technological solutions to counter the employment of terrorist CBRN materials. Originally, under the Energy Department, it was absorbed by the DHS after its formation in 2002 as part of its S & T directorate. Via participating in Equipment Standardization and Interoperability Inter-agency Board, as well coordinating with the NIJ, DHS, the EPA, and other components of the Department of Defense, it integrates technological requirements from the law enforcement, hazardous material, fire, and emergency medical services communities (Thedford, 2010). It works to identify, prioritize, and execute the CNBRC requirements of various agencies to combat terrorism, as well as provide solutions aimed at detecting, protecting, decontaminating, mitigating, containing, and disposing the material. This paper aims to provide a SWOT analysis for the CBRNC program. Strengths Inherent strength for the CBRNC program is an understood test standards. Majority of the CBRNC program, DHS acquisition programs for technology are reliant on off-the-shelf commercially available technologies. The requirements are also well defined by the various users (Gottron, 2010). The scale of purchases makes this market competitive for developers of systems, which, in turn, makes it easier for CBRNC program to come up with established standards to test these technologies. Through a partnership between DHS and the American Standard Institute for the management and maintenance of a security standards database, the CNBRC program catalogs all approved standards. Additionally, it uses various other consensus standards that come from the Interagency Committee on Standards Policy, as well as the DHS standards counsel (Gottron, 2010). The second inherent strength in the program is its promotion of partnerships with other agencies. The leadership of the program has promoted a culture of partnership and cooperation through vision statements that identify the need to cooperate with other federal programs and agencies (Gottron, 2010). This support given by DHS senior management can help to drive willingness for the seeking of external expertise in time of emergency. The management realizes that the program is not functioning in a vacuum and that the best method of dealing with a wide range of terrorist scenarios is via an integrated response team. An example is the solicitation of Department of Defense comments through the DHS for the development of its strategic plan (Gottron, 2010). The CBRNC program has another inherent strength in its flexibility. The program, through the DHS, has shown an ability to be flexible when adapting to its emerging needs. The program and the DHS have reorganized multiple times with continued stabilization as time advances. The size of its parent DHS and its mission let it shift its personnel and resources to meet emerging threats and needs. The program, working under the DHS S & T, operates in an extremely difficult political landscape. Additionally, for the most part, it has shown an ability to answer criticism and adjust accordingly (Gottron, 2010). Its public literature also acknowledges actions that are undertaken in order to make these adjustments. Weaknesses One weakness facing the CBRNC program is the acquisition of workforce. While the current workforce is currently growing, its focus is on the training, hiring, and development of contracting specialty. Such core competencies as systems engineering, logistics, and testing still remain relatively understaffed (Ibp USA, 2011). The program, just as other programs in science and technology sector, is also highly vulnerable to poaching by the parent DHS for positions of higher responsibility, as well as from other government agencies outside the DHS S&T sector. Acquisition of program longevity acts as another weakness for the CBRNC program. Its creation resulted in the combination of various acquisition programs of member agencies (Ibp USA, 2011). Since no single program of acquisition can satisfy all the requirements of the entire program, this leads to poor integration of acquisition systems. The instability of the DHS as a whole can be seen in the fact that seven organizational charts had to be developed, in the initial five years, to delineate its structure. The combination of systems was a momentous process that is still being refined and shaped as more terrorist issues are uncovered. Although the program is working for competency, its acquisition programs currently have limited accountability. Lack of coordinated evaluation and testing is yet another weakness inherent in the CBRNC program. Comprehending the need of attaining a higher level of understanding concerning evaluation and test issues, an office for testing and evaluation was formed. This office is only concerned with policy issues, and thus, there is no entity to manage facilities for testing or the coordination of testing activities (Ibp USA, 2011). The program has no independent organization that provides authority on the evaluation of limitations and capabilities of the technology being tested. Finally, there is limited U.S. DHS test infrastructure for use by the CBRNC program. This requires that they use other test facilities for the execution of their developmental test work, including Department of Energy labs, private industries, or MTTFBs (Ibp USA, 2011). While there are drives to develop its own facilities in coordination with its parent DHS, this may, unfortunately, lead to duplication of existing commercial and federal facilities without the support of leadership in the DHS. Opportunities The first opportunity for the CBRNC program is the external lessons they can learn from other agencies and departments. External organizations have been aiding the CBRNC program, through the DHS, in the formulation of long-term strategies for acquisition systems and a CBRNC-specific workforce. The University of Defense Acquisition is building a program for training and certification, whose coursework is aimed at the development of core competencies required for the acquisition of a CBRNC workforce (Lake, 2010). The CBRNC acquisition management system, through the DHS, is also set to benefit from years of lessons and development learnt from the Department of Defense. The information that they could feed off is codified in the Department of Defense directive 5000.01, the Department of defense instruction 5000.2, and the Defense Acquisition System (Lake, 2010). The CBRNC program also has another opportunity in leveraging of partnership programs. If other government agencies are coming up with technologies to meet common needs, then the CBRNC program has an opportunity to leverage or partner with them to reduce schedules and program costs (Lake, 2010). Additionally, if the program is not required to maintain or build its own infrastructure for testing, then it can utilize these resources on the development of technology instead of a test facilities and their required workforce. The DHS is an active member of the Technical Support Working group, an inter-agency organization coordinating interagency development and research programs (Lake, 2010). This provides the CBRNCP with an opportunity to coordinate technology R&D, as well as establish relationships aimed at addressing needs for testing. The CBRNCP has another opportunity in that it has a built-in objectivity. Over the after-action reviews of their major acquisition programs, many mistakes made during the testing phase were identified, which were found to be violations of protocol driven by loss of objectivity or inexperience by the DHS office in their attempt to develop technology (Lake, 2010). This conflict of interest acted was a political problem to CBRNCP and DHS, as a whole. The use of an external organization for the support of independent testing and evaluation of the programs can aid the CBRNCP and the DHS as a system of checks and balances. They could also leverage the test organization’s experience to support planning and scope. Threats The CBRNCP is faced by the threat of oversight. The United States’ Government Accountability Office has published numerous reports that question the DHS, as well as the CBRNCP, acquisition community including test programs like container security (Lansford et al, 2009). The time that the acquisition program development will take to be implemented fully is expected to take time, which could lead to continued scrutiny and more oversight (Lansford et al, 2009). The CBRNCP and other DHS programs, given their large mandate are subject to massive oversight with the DHS itself subject to eighty-six congressional oversight committees. This political influence in making of decisions threatens to decrease the efficiency of the program and DHS as a whole. The national economy and present political climate have had a negative impact on federal agency funding, and the DHS is not immune (Lansford et al, 2009). The potential for budget cuts and or freezes is alive, especially with regards to discretionary spending. The impact on DHS S&T is not known, but it is likely that, in this period, the DHS local, state, and private partners are most likely not going to fulfill all their long-term commitment to providing assistance and funding to DHS and, in turn, CBRNCP. References Gottron, Frank. (2010). Project BioShield: Purposes and Authorities. Darby: DIANE Publishing, . Ibp USA. (2011). United States Department of Homeland Security handbook. International Business Publications USA: Washington, DC. Lake, Jennifer. (2010). Homeland Security Department: FY 2010 Appropriations. Darby: DIANE Publishing. Lansford, Tom. Pauly, Robert. & Covarrubias, Jack. (2009). To Protect And Defend: US Homeland Security Policy. Aldershot :: Ashgate, cop. Thedford, Debra. (2010). Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Program. Darby: DIANE Publishing. Read More