Evolution of New Middle Class in Thailand - Literature review Example

Evolution of New Middle Class in Thailand Name: Institution: Date: Evolution of New Middle Class in Thailand There is growing interest in the recent past in the rise and growth of the middle class in Asia region, especially in the aftermath of Great Recession. The interest in the middle class and policies leading to its growth is entrenched in the perception that the middle class is a critical ingredient for strong, sustainable economic development and growth. Adams and Page (2003) state that in social and political definition of 1990s of Thailand, the urban middle class has been pointed out affluent social class comprising of urban-based elites different from other people in the lower status of the social ladder. This literature review discusses the emergence of the new middle class in Thailand and its political role since 2006 to present. The middle class in Thailand, despite being small in size, has strong political influence (White, 2009). It is an influential actor in political intrigues in Thailand in the past years and has played a crucial role in the process of democratization and political reforms after the bloody massacre of 1992. During the massacre the military cracked down on about 200 people who were demonstrating in central Bangkok resulting into fifty-two deaths, hundreds of injuries, disappearances and more than 3,500 arrests. The political discourse revolving on this solid perception of the middle class has placed a strong impact on the real course of Thailand political development. For instance, it is has been observed that proponents of political reforms in 1990s often placed pressure on parliament triggering the opinion of the middle class. The reformers were not happy with the military rule. The middle class has been linked to the rising of civil society and demands for more representative institutions (Joonkyung, 2010). There is no clear literature that has explored the emergence of social class divisions and conflicts in Thailand and the political roles of the middle class. There are gaps in the existing literature since they treat just one of the actors in the revolution without examining the source of confrontations. Other actors were students, farmers, professionals and activists. Thailand boasted having a huge, learned middle class, was among the performing economies globally, and had a vibrant civil society. In the course of 1990s Thailand had passed a reformist constitution and gone through several elections. There were more protections for civil liberties and institutions dealing with corruption and ensuring civil rights (King, 2008). When the 1997 Constitution was enacted, the reforms perpetrators planned for the coming Constitution to integrate political ideals targeting to appease the middle class. These comprised of stipulations with regard to the prerequisite for transparency in procedures and the requirement for minimum education regarding qualification for elective posts. However, the debate concerning the middle strata focusing on their instability and diversity changed suddenly following the Bloody May Massacre. This set the motion for the period of democratization in 1990s (King, 2008). Ockey (1999) observes that Thailand was ranked a ‘free’ nation in the 1999 by Freedom House, a monitoring organization. Presently Thailand appears like a success story on one side and on the other side, an illustration of failure of democracy. After the 2006 coup, Thailand has lapsed into soft authoritarianism. Soft authoritarianism describes many Asian societies where the political system has minimum elements of democracy like political parties and elections due to rapid modernization. The state controls the economy but political and social rights are often compromised. The coup will be explained later in this review. The military plays a critical role in determination of politics; the middle class has increasingly become antidemocratic; and the department of security has applied threats, arrests, online filtering frequently, and murders to silence the opponents and critics of the government. These actions are directed by the monarchy in Thailand and the armed forces. Kharas (2010) is of the opinion that Thailand has sunk miserably as compared to other developing nations when it comes to press freedom. After ousting the military and initiating a series of reforms in democracy, politics in Thailand took another direction to the worst commencing the deterioration that made it slide into soft authoritarianism (White, 2009). There are broad common issues that concerns the middle class which include law and order, political integrity and competence; the rights of citizenship, educational provision and merit, and private property existence. In the early 2000s and late 1990s, many leading reformers in Thailand, who actively participated and organized protest in 1992, kept away, a costly mistake. They believed for a moment that Thailand gone through a threshold hence making them to shut down their NGOs, their transparency monitors, and their media watchdogs. Ravallion (2003) argues that in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, majority of the idealist middle class Thai eventually found themselves without jobs making it challenging for them to volunteer at non-profitable night meeting about the course of politics in Thailand. Since the reformers in Thailand were no longer in the picture, Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecommunication tycoon used his massive resources to establish a political party. In 2001 he ascended to the prime minister post using the Thai Rak Thai Party (Pinches, 2005). Thaksin seized the opportunity to exercise excessive power since contrary to what reformers believed institutions in Thailand remained very weak. He bought politicians with his money to join his party and he used connections to get an acquittal about concealing of his wealth. In the History of Thailand no one had wooed the poor with comprehensive policies like Thaksin did (Kagoya & Funatsu, 2003). In the excitement of the previous democratic period, the middle class in Thailand apparently forgot that democracy will give power to the poor at the ballot and make it easier for Thaksin to sail through. Thaksin was elected with a landslide win in 2001 election and he began to show that he had no interest in strengthening democracy in Thailand. He was an elected autocrat. He used power in threatening freedom of media, interfered with the civil service and launched a smear campaign against rebels in the South region with Muslim-majority. Thaksin further rewarded his allies with lucrative government contracts and sabotaged financially political enemies through interfering with their business operations. He was reelected in 2005 with overwhelming support from the poor. The poor were the majority in the political landscape of the country. According to Go (2010), the Thai middle class who were champions of democratic reforms previously could have forced Thaksin out at the ballot but like other middle classes in emerging democracies currently, they thought democracy had delivered an elected autocracy. Contrary to choosing the democratic course, the urban middle class in Thailand started street protests in 2006 targeting to bring down a democratically elected government. The protesters preferred ‘the old form of democracy’ where an oligarchy controlled politics using positions that are unelected in parliament, the army and bureaucracy. Ravallion (2009) observes that the protests in the past weeks have demonstrated that the old establishment feels threatened by the power wielded by provincial masses. The champion of the protestors, a former executive in the Democrat Party, Suthep Thaugsuban has demanded that the country to forfeit the electoral system and revert to the ill-defined and unelected People’s Council. The source of mistrust of the electoral process is clear. The party has lost every election since 1992 since it failed to gain the support of the emerging middle class in the rural northern region of the country (Hewison, 2002). The old middle class is based in Bangkok while new middle class is found in the provinces and rose due to Thaksin’s policies. Eventually the military staged a coup in September 2006 causing Thaksin to flee into exile. Alongside a tussle between the leaders who were positioning themselves for the upcoming succession, this was a battle among middle classes of Thailand. An emerging middle class which had its ties in the provinces and owned its rise mildly redistributive policies used by Thaksin and growing market access classed with the old Bangkok-based middle class that had gotten prestige and wealth from associating with the monarchy and years of royalist-driven capitalist enterprises in the capital. Kagoya and Funatsu (2003) explain that all state institutions were caught up in the political melee and took sides. Discussions about The middle class in connection with the frequent changes in democratization development are common. After a short stint of democratization from 1973 to 1976, the new middle class that had cemented a notion of horizontal solidarity started to attract great interest as an emerging political force that is different from what been there. The newly constituted class comprised of people from the urban upper-middle bracket whose size increased from 1958 to 1970s when the national development scheme was started. They backed the student revolution in 1973. Eventually they changed their minds. Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) report that they regarded mayhem the rash political change and anticipated the military will restore political stability and protect their economic interests. It was observed that it was be better to classify the emerged middle class of 1970s not distinct class but a middle strata showing a mixture of class characteristics and lacked political orientation that is defined. In conclusion the affluent urban middle class came up in the 1990s in wake of two imbalances that had affected the economic development of Thailand for decades. The bloody massacre prompted by protests but perpetrated by the military and the coup dragged Thailand behind. There is need trace the political role of the middle class in Thailand and the emergence of the new middle class against the old middle class. The rage of the middle class in Thailand threatens the country’s democracy. The new middle class was empowered by Thaksin economic policies while the old middle class benefited from the monarchy and its benefit. The old middle class feels threatened by the growing influenced of the new middle class that was empowered by favorable policies by Thaksin. More research has to be done on the role of the new middle class and what is at stake for the old middle class. References Adams, R. H. & Page, J. (2003). Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Selected Middle East and North Africa Countries, 1980–2000, World Development, 31 (12): 2027–2048. Doepke, M. & Zilibotti, F. (2005). Social Class and the Spirit of Capitalism, Journal of the European Economic Association 3(2–3): 516–524 Go, J. (2010). Political Power and Social Theory, Melbourne: Emerald Group Publishing. Hewison, K. (2002). Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, New York: Routledge. Joonkyung, H. (2010), Korea’s Middle Class and Its Role in the Growth Process. Paper presented during the Workshop on Asia’s Middle Class held in ADB Headquarters, Manila, Philippines on 27–28 May. Kagoya, K., & Funatsu, T. (2003), The middle classes in Thailand: the rise of the urban intellectual elite and their social Consciousness, The Developing Economies, XLI (2): 243–63. Kharas, H. (2010). The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, Working Paper No.285. Paris: OECD Development Centre Paris. King, V.T. (2008). The Sociology of Southeast Asia: Transformations in a Developing Region, Kuala lumbar: NIAS Press. Ockey, J. (1999). “Creating the Thai Middle Class.” In Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, ed. Michael Pinches, London: Routledge. Pinches, M. (2005). Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, New York: Routledge. Ravallion, M. (2003). Measuring Aggregate Economic Welfare in Developing Countries: How Well do National Accounts and Surveys Agree? Review of Economics and Statistics, 85: 645–652. Ravallion, M. (2009). The Developing World’s Bulging (but Vulnerable) Middle Class, World Development 38(4): 445–454. White, L.T. (2009). Political Booms: Local Money and Power in Taiwan, East China, Thailand, and the Philippines, World Scientific. Read More