Domestic Animals and the Right to Dignified Lives - Essay Example

Animal Human Relations Client Inserts His/her Name Client Inserts Grade Course Client Inserts Tutor’s Name 20/06/2012 Domestic Animals and the Right to Dignified Lives Extended consciousness, of which there are “many levels and grades,” involves a self with memories of the past, anticipations of the future, and awareness of the present ... even dogs may have an autobiographical sense of self. Damasio (1999) cited in Francione (2004, pp.35-6). Animal rights has been a contentious issue since Charles Darwin researched animals and came out with his theories on evolution; they have become even more intensified after Jane Goodall’s discoveries that the great apes too, like human beings, possessed “cognitive abilities” and “we are not, after all, quite as different from the rest of the animal kingdom as we used to think” (Goodall 1993, p. 3). The gap between non-human animals and human beings, however, is still wide, and most human beings still consider that animals were created for their use. Animal rights activists have been partially successful in getting implemented some laws, rules and regulations that protect animals (Bryant 2006, p. 172-3). However, animals are given scant respect in terms of injury or ill-treatment as they are considered lower beings and therefore less worthy of respect than human beings. Animal rights activists like Francione (2004) point to fundamental flaw in the perspective of law in the inhuman way animals- especially domestic animals are treated and argue that, while “we should care for domestic animals presently alive, but we should bring no more into existence” (Francione 2004, p. 45). This essay shall discuss the ways in which human beings hold double-standards to justify the ill-treatment meted to domestic animals in particular, and consider the different approaches advocated by animal protectionists to enforce protection and animal rights, and point out some limitations in the approaches. Under this, the approaches are related to the relevance thereof of the animals to the lives of various communities alongside an insight in the suitability of the approaches employed to prove appreciation of animals. The dependency embedded the day-to-day lives of human beings, for example, are evident – domestic animals are integrated into the minds and lives of people in many ways: as pets, beasts of burden, as helpers and guides, as guards, food-providers, and as testing models in scientific research and lab experiments, and as commodities in markets (Bryant 2006, p. 167-8). Similarly, Bryant (2006, p. 173) recounts on the fact that some animals are completely not and cannot be wild and therefore requires human care to ensure their perpetuation. This inherent and evident interrelationship between animals (especially those for domestication) and human beings renders it a hard and probably impossible attempt to completely ban domestication of animals in the name of safeguarding them. This essay’s analytical task is intended to provide a comprehensive suggestion on what fate that lies ahead of the overall interaction of human beings and on-human animals, basing on the interdependency complexities therein. The most likely and most appealing view is that despite the justification of various animal activists like Francione (2004), it may be too idealistic to expect total abolition of domestication of animals – only education and awareness shall ensure more humane treatment of animals, in the long run. Anyhow, the non-human animals do not at all have the capacity to assert their rights and it is thus the keen understanding of these animals’ rights and acting on their behalf by the humans that can justify the loci of the decisions arrived to by people, in respect to animals’ life (Bryant 2006, pp. 135-6). Taimie Bryant (2006, pp. 133-6) discusses the plight of unwanted peafowls on the Palos Verdes Peninsula, to point to double standards adopted by human beings to circumvent law and have the birds removed. Bryant (2006) observes that finally, “only humans’ interests in protecting or removing the peafowl were at issue, only limited affirmative protection other than the right to live (somewhere not of the peafowl’s choice) was provided, … and basis for the demand that peafowl be removed.” (p. 137). Central to the arguments of those who advocated the removal of the birds is the justification of the apparent right of human beings to take advantage of animals as the latter are subservient to human beings, and have no legal rights on their own (Bryant 2006, p.137). Since they need the help of human beings to protect them and their rights legally, they are considered the legal property of human beings, they need to be taken care of (Bryant 2006, p. 137). Furthermore, since they are animals – inferior to human beings, and do not possess anything like a human identity or do not know suffering like humans, it was not necessary to consider whether it was a legitimate to trap and relocate them or kill them, or what the animals themselves would prefer, as Bryant (2006, p. 135) stipulates that literally, humans do not really have the rights and the capacity to imagine other animals’ would-be decisions about their own life. It was only the perspective of the human beings that was taken into consideration, leaving their very right of existence at the hands of human beings (Bryant 2006, p. 138). Censuring the duplicity of some sections of laws concerning animal rights, activists like Bryant (2006) highlight how laws are stretched and circumvented in order to make acts of cruelty to domestic animals look justified, legal and lawful. Citing the example of the inclusion of the ‘fallow deer’ under ‘domestic animals’ classification in order to enable its commodification by killing and dismembering its body in factory settings, Bryant (2006 p. 139), decries that by implementing such changes in definitions “law metaphorically modifies animals and also paves the way to biologically modify animals”. The focus on ‘domestic animals’ as commodities subject to manipulation by humans thus becomes a sensitive matter that requires substantial reviewing and specifically on the effects of various human actions on the animals; that is, the question of their rights. It would perhaps be in order to establish a ruling that favours natural evolution of animals as opposed to the above discussed ‘induced alteration’ of the very biological settings around animals. So what should be the deciding factor on whether animals can be trapped and eliminated or relocated? Two arguments have been the basis of animals’ rights advocates so far. One holds the view that, “if animals are similar to humans as to capacities and characteristics of humans that define humans, then animals should receive protections equivalent to the protections of humans because a just society treats like entities alike” (Bryant 2007, p. 208). This is called the ‘similarity’ argument; there is again a sub- division under this view: 1) people who advocate the abolition of all exploitation of animals by human beings, their debates focus on animals being considered as the private property of human beings being the cause of exploitation; 2) and another section of people who are not too concerned about the property status or ownership of animals, however, they focus their attention to the humane treatment of animals irrespective of their status (Bryant 2007, p 209). The other view holds that, “a just society would prevent harm or exclusion that is based on superficial or irrelevant differences among people” and it “would protect and amplify the values of diversity and inclusion” is the “the anti-discrimination approach” (Bryant 2007, p. 210). Applying this to our relationship with animals, the subscribers of this theory argue, shall offer a more equitable on the path to equality, as regards the way we treat animals. Describing both the viewpoints, Bryant (2007, p. 211) points out several limitations of the similarity argument; while it may be useful in spreading general awareness regarding animals and preventing cruelty against animals, it posed a number of problems legally. Even among the similar aspects, “If animals do not have characteristics considered essential to humans in the ways that those characteristics exist in humans, it is possible to dismiss claims of similarity raised for purposes of curtailing humans’ use of animals” (Bryant 2007, p. 211). Increasing evidences being discovered to prove similarities between animals and humans, may lead to a redefinition of what constitutes human beings that reduces the singular status of human beings (Bryant 2007, p. 212). Another very relevant aspect of critique put forth by Bryant (2007, p.211-13) is that the similarity argument in practical only serves to increase the ill-treatment of animals. More experiments have to be conducted in the lab to analyze and prove conclusively the cognitive abilities in animals like chimpanzees regarding similar and different between animals and human beings (Povinelli 1997; Ommaya 1973 cited in Bryant 2007, p. 213), and to what extent they are desirable, and so on. This will go against the very principles that animals’ rights activists like Bryant and Francione are striving to achieve. There also remains the question of other animals lower in the hierarchy (less similar to human beings) like fish and turkey, hens cows and goats who suffer pain in the name of domestication - whether their pain is similar to human beings or not. Despite the experiments conducted before by various scientists, the scientific community still has a role to conclude definitely on the extent of pain felt by animals (Bryant 2007, p.214). Still, given especially that animals too feel pain just as human beings do, subjecting them to the torture and ill-treatment of lab experiments only serves to defeat their own arguments by animal rights advocates. Furthermore, the similarity argument makes human being the top-most in hierarchy since they become the standard or comparison for other animals to be measured and tabulated upon (Bryant 2007, p.216). This makes humans the most important beings as compared to other animals therefore, non-human animals are dispensable. The problems of the similarity approach especially points to the manipulative methods used by human beings, on domestic animals to meet and suit the purposes of the former, with total disregard to the well-being or wishes of the animals themselves. Accusing human beings of exhibiting what is called “moral schizophrenia” in the double standards adopted towards their treatment of animals, Gary L. Francione (2004, p. 2) states that on the one hand people claim to desire a humane approach in their treatment of animals, however, “actual treatment of animals stands in stark contrast to our proclamations about our regard for their moral status”, pointing to the double standards maintained by human beings. Referring specifically to the apathy shown to domestic animals, Francione (2004, p. 2) points to the amount of violence perpetrated on a large number of farm animals in the food industry for human consumption. One can understand the extent of injustice that non-human animals have been subjected to; beginning from 1) torture and slaughter of domestic animals for food, the long lists includes 2) inhuman methods for trapping wild animals 3) torture and crippling caused in lab experiments under the banner of animal testing for the benefit of humans in pharmaceuticals 4) Animals that subjugated and made to do unnatural things in the entertainment industry 5) the violence on animals to harvest furs, skin and leather of animals for the fashion industry. Francione (2004) has forgotten to add exploitation of the beasts of burden in many third world countries (http://www.animalaware.org/en/about03.htm), including elephants, horses, camels, cows and bulls, donkeys, yaks and goats. It should also be noted that the plight of human beings in many of these places are hardly any better than the beasts themselves. Tracing the philosophy behind human treatment of non-human animals from the times of Descartes, to Immanuel Kant, Francione (2004, p. 5) states that animals were hardly considered as anything better than things or material possessions like ‘properties’ prior to the nineteenth century. Fundamental to Francione’s (2004) argument is the rejection of human beings treatment of animals as ‘things’ or possessions or ‘properties’ (p. 7). Citing extensively from Bentham’s philosophy, Francione (2004, p. 10) states that “Bentham’s views had a profound effect on various legal reformers … the legal systems of the United States and Britain (as well as other nations) purported to incorporate the humane treatment principle in animal welfare laws.” Two kinds of laws exist, “general and specific”; the former prohibits any general form of cruelty to animals while the latter relates to specific instances of cruelty like restricting laboratory tests to some types of animals and so on (Francione 2004 p. 10). A good score of Human beings have up to now recognized animal rights and some adhere to “the humane treatment principle” and to be aware of animal welfare laws (Francione 2004 p. 12). This calls for a balance of conflicting interests between human beings and animals and choose whichever is necessary. The problem with this view is that, human beings have vested interests in the issue and are also bestowed with the authority to make decisions, since animals cannot decide for themselves, the result is bound to be partisan and biased towards human interest. Francione (2004 p. 15) also rejects the property or possession status accorded to animals as it “renders meaningless any balancing that is supposedly required under the humane treatment principle or animal welfare laws, because what we really balance are the interests of property owners against the interests of their animal property.” Citing examples from specific legal cases of dispute related to human-animal rights conflicts, the author argues that humane treatment or animal welfare laws shall carry no meaning as long as animals continue to be viewed as properties of human beings (Francione 2004 p. 21). Alternately, another perspective to approach the issue of animal rights suggested is the anti-discrimination approach (Bryant 2007, p. 239-247). Taking laws that were formulated to prevent racial, gender discrimination in human beings, and laws that abolished slavery of human beings, the anti-discrimination approach constitute the following a) protection of animals have no relationship to their similarity to human beings; (2) basic necessities of the animals like their habitat and species conservation are ensured; (3) expenditure will not limit the futuristic plans made for the welfare of animals; (4) perpetrators of violence have to justify themselves validly to expect exoneration (Bryant 2007, p. 239). The benefits in this approach appear more encouraging than the other approach although there are limitations here too. Bryant (2007) explains that in the case of Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) and the development of Artificial Wildlife Corridors as they do not provide everything sought by animal protectionists (Bryant 2007, pp. 237-47). Nevertheless, the two are good examples of anti-discrimination approach, concludes Bryant (2007, p. 248) since they “support values of diversity and anticipatory accommodation of animals’ interests” and also display “several advantages over arguing for the increased protection of animals because of their similarities to humans”. The interactions between animals and human beings have been in place since time immemorial (whether animals are domesticated or wild) and humans have indeed used animals as tools to complement their own lives (as aforementioned) while simultaneously ensuring safe and healthy lives of these animals. As so, although the animals have not been given personhood as argued by Francione (2004, p. 41) they are deservingly treated with much affection and love usually accorded to human beings. The argument put forward by Francione (2004, p. 45) that, “We should care for domestic animals presently alive, but we should bring no more into existence” negates the opportunity for the development of such mutual benefit and healthy relationships, like in the dog and master. Furthermore, above argument implies that, treating animals as persons may not mean guaranteed protection to them from suffering from human beings or other animals, or treating them as human persons. However, it will certainly mean “moral obligation to stop using animals for food, entertainment, or clothing, or any other uses that assume that animals are merely resources, and that we ultimately prohibit the ownership of animals” (Francione 2004, p. 42), which is practically very difficult to implement. Animals and human beings have been interacting too inseparably for the above to take place. If animals should not be used as resources at all, then the conservation model studies pioneered by human beings like Jane Goodall will be prevented too, deny both human beings and animals the benefit of better understanding of each other. Instead, positive interaction between animals and human beings which do not infringe on either’s freedom yet, allows for mutual benefit, like for example, Jane Goodall’s Gombie research, can be encouraged (Goodall 1993, p. 17). Animal rights advocates have approached the issue of cruelty in two ways, viz., through the perspective of similarities of animals with human beings, and the anti-discrimination approach. Even though both approaches involve difficulties in their implementation the similarities approach, appears more contradictory and impractical. The anti-discriminatory approach on the other hand seems to hold better prospects of protecting animals, as demonstrated by the results of the Endangered Species Act and the development of Artificial Wildlife corridors originally practiced in the United States (Goodall 1993, p. 16). Total abolition of domestication of animals as a form of animals’ protection and rights may prove to be wishful thinking, given the long tradition of animal use and interaction with human beings, the religious consent to use animals as things or possessions since they were not sentient beings, the dependency on animals in various aspects for supply of food to fur. Educating people by means of lectures and exposure as carried out by Jane Goodall (1993) and spreading awareness may be a slow yet steady way to promote animal rights and protection, in combination with the anti-discrimination approach. List of References Bryant, L. Taimie, 2006. “Animals Unmodified: Defining Animals/Defining Human Obligations to Animals” University of Chicago Legal Forum 137-94 (2006). [Internet] Accessed on May 31, 2012. http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/missing%20files/bryant_-_animals_unmodified--july_18__2_.pdf Bryant, L. Taimie, 2007. “Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be Like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans? ” 70 Law & Contemporary Problems 207-254 (2007). [Internet] Accessed on May 31, 2012. http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. Francione, L. Gary, 2004. "Animals--Property or Persons?" Rutgers University (Newark) Legal Working Paper Series. Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers. Working Paper 21. Pp. 1-45. [Internet] Accessed on May 31, 2012. http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art21 Goodall, Jane ,1993. “Chimpanzees - Bridging the Gap” In The Great Ape Project (eds.) Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1993, pp. 10-18. http://www.animalaware.org/ “The Plight of Animals in Guatemala” [Internet] Accessed on May 31, 2012. http://www.animalaware.org/en/about03.htm Read More