A Realistic Definition of Realism - Report Example

A ‘Realistic’ Definition of Realism Realism as a theory of international relations is often disputed, but is not often well-defined by either its critics or its proponents. “Realism” in a general sense is understood intuitively by most people; the Encarta Dictionary gives one definition of it as “a practical understanding and acceptance of the actual nature of the world, rather than an idealized or romantic view of it.” As it applies to international relations, however, even the scholar most often cited as the “godfather” of realist thought, Hans Morgenthau, gives a somewhat confusing definition: “interest defined in terms of power.” (Morgenthau, 1978: 5) This of course assumes that the concepts of “interest” and “power” have clear definitions, but according to Morgenthau, (Ibid.: 7) “Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.” In other words, what defines “interest” and “power” may change over time, but whatever those two things are at any point will always define what a realistic approach to foreign policy is. What Morgenthau is actually describing with that idea are the specific issues that affect nations at particular times. In a broad sense, interests of nations are easy to define: security of their territories and populations and meeting the material needs of their people. Power, then, would be the ability of nations to manage these interests for themselves. A nation need not address these issues in the same way at all times, but rather may change its approach depending on the circumstances. While Morgenthau is considered the founder of realist theory, the ideas behind it are actually much older. The Greek philosophers Socrates and Plato both spoke of the duty of the state to seek “self-improvement,” (West, 2005) which can be interpreted in terms of Morgenthau’s views about “interest.” Morgenthau himself (1978:7) quotes Thucydides to support his theory, in that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals". Clearly, political realism is not a new idea, but attempts to define it have only been made in recent history. Even so, this “old” nature of realism is recognised by its detractors, whose criticism is based in part on its age. But as Morgenthau (1978:4) asserts, “To dismiss such a theory because it had its flowering in centuries past is to present not a rational argument but a modernistic prejudice that takes for granted the superiority of the present over the past.” As some of the other theories of international relations and their criticisms of realism are examined, it becomes clear that Morgenthau indeed is correct in recognising “modernistic prejudice,” and that “the superiority of the present over the past” may be, at least so far as foreign policy is concerned, a shibboleth. American Ideas About International Relations The German-American philosopher Leo Strauss, whose influence is often – and very wrongly – cited as the inspiration for the present “neoconservative” foreign policy of the United States, believed that the only purpose of a “political philosophy” was to “[remind] us of the limits set to all human hopes and wishes.” (quoted in Englander, 2007) He believed that because philosophy was a search for knowledge rather than a body of knowledge, it could not be applied to guide anyone what to do in a given situation. (Ibid.) Political theories as sets of guidelines for action in international relations are then only expressions of the limits of knowledge. Because human knowledge naturally increases over time, it is logically assumed that the newer a political theory is, the better it must be than all those that preceded it because it is formed from a greater body of knowledge; this is the “modernistic prejudice” described by Morgenthau. Gideon Rose in 1998 defined four theories of foreign policy, which he called “Innenpolitik,” “Offensive Realism,” “Defensive Realism,” and “Neoclassical Realism.” (Rose, 1998) Innenpolitik means nations’ foreign policies are direct extensions of their domestic policies, and that culture, ideology, and economic characteristics of the nations determine their actions in foreign affairs. Offensive Realism sees the world as a chaotic place where nations seek to maximise their limited security. Defensive Realism is similar, but rather than maximising their security actively, nations rather seek to maintain a balance of power. Neoclassical Realism rejects national security as the sole aim of foreign policy, with nations instead trying to change the international system to their own ideals and preferences. (Ibid.) The Neoclassical Realism theory is what guides the present foreign policy of the United States, where it is popularly called “neoconservatism.” One of the intellectual architects of American neoconservatism, Charles Krauthammer (2004), coined the term “Democratic Globalism” to describe what he felt was the best of all possible political theories, not unsurprisingly the one followed by the current administration of the U.S. Krauthammer also defined four theories of foreign policy, but they are different from the ones defined by Rose. Instead, Krauthammer identified Isolationism, Realism, and Liberal Internationalism as the other three. (Ibid.) Krauthammer’s definitions are based on his perception of the world as “unipolar,” where the United States is the only superpower. The implication is that his “Democratic Globalism” is the correct theory because of this; in other words, “might makes right.” He summarises Democratic Globalism as “a foreign policy that defines the national interest not as power but as values.” The best means to secure the national interests of America, he states, is to remove threats to those interests by spreading American ideals throughout the world. The major shortcoming of the theory of Democratic Globalism is, of course, that it does not work. The greatest test of the theory, the American war in Iraq, has been a failure by most any assessment. Whether or not it can be related to some degree to American foreign policy, the downturn in the U.S. economy does not seem to be a good example of the national interest in meeting the material needs of the population being properly maintained. Morgenthau (1978:4) stated that “A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience.” Democratic Globalism may or may not pass the first test, but it most demonstrably has not passed the second. Other American leaders and scholars have proposed alternatives to the “neoconservative” philosophy. Rather than the “unipolar” view of the world that Krauthammer has, other theorists recognise globalism as making all nations increasingly interdependent, and it is because of this that they still resist the notion of realism. One of the classic tenets of realism, that the internal affairs of other nations are of no concern so long as they do not threaten the national interest, is now highly disputed because of the global connections of trade, travel, and communications. (Wright, 2006) Bill Richardson, the governor of New Mexico and one-time candidate for the U.S. presidency, echoed the same sentiment in a speech in 2008. Because of globalism, he said, threats to one nation’s interests are shared by many, so that common interests and national interests are no longer different. In that case, the orthodox realistic approach to foreign policy – making the national interest the sole determining factor – can no longer be applied. Richardson calls his concept “New Realism” while Wright refers to it as “Progressive Realism,” but they are actually the same idea, and only significantly different from Krauthammer’s “Democratic Globalism” in two respects. They both continue to promote American ideals, making the perhaps inevitable assumption that these are the best for the entire world, but as opposed to Krauthammer’s unilateral approach – which sees no problem with the use of force if necessary -- call for greater engagement, and reliance on greater technology and economic interdependence to advance their values. While these ideas are perhaps less confrontational, they still regard the world as being made up of America and Everybody Else, a point of view with which other nations may quite correctly take issue. Foreign Policy Theory and Practice in the Non-Unipolar World While American thinkers might congratulate themselves for excising traditional realism from their foreign policy points of view, the same is not necessarily true of some other nations with which American foreign policy is deeply engaged. Singapore is one good example. After declaring independence in 1965, the city-state was in a precarious position both externally with respect to its larger and potentially hostile neighbours Malaysia and Indonesia, and internally with the need to build an economy and stable domestic structure. While developing a strictly-regimented national society, Singapore took a pragmatic view internationally, seeking alliances and economic ties to guarantee its security and prosperity without regard to whether the other countries it was aligning itself with fit the mould of its own ideals. Nor did Singapore, in later years, allow its national interests to be subordinate to its multilateral relations. During the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s, Singapore – as did some other Asian nations such as South Korea -- stepped outside its membership in APEC and AFTA to negotiate trade agreements on its own, frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the multinational groups in preventing or easing the crisis. (Ganesan, 2005) This tends to refute the Richardson view that national and shared interests are the same, and illustrates that idealism and multilateralism are somewhat fragile. When faced with a shared dilemma, countries will look after themselves and return to realism. One notion about realism that seems to bother most of its critics is that it does not promote any particular ideals, only the achievement of results. That does not mean, however, that idealism cannot be a part of a realistic approach to foreign relations, as the case of Israel demonstrates. The idealism that is the foundation of the Jewish nation is precisely the cause of their realism. (Dowty, 1999) For centuries, the Jews lived in scattered, isolated populations throughout the world and regarded, for good reason in many instances, the outside world as hostile. Within their communities they developed a sort of autonomy, forced mostly by circumstances but also partly by choice to live apart. When Israel was founded in 1948, this attitude was easily transformed into a national scale. (Ibid.) The open hostility of Israel’s neighbours dictates their extremely realistic, pragmatic approach, one good example of which is their surprise bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981. But paradoxically, Israeli realism is based in large part on subjective rather than objective factors: racial and religious intolerance, cultural differences, and ideology. (Ibid.) The Errors of the Non-Realists In reading the various criticisms of realism and the alternatives to it, one cannot help but draw the conclusion that those who would dismiss realism as a valid and effective way to approach international relations simply do not understand the concept. This is a common mistake, because many theories apart from realism do not take into consideration the natural evolution of societies and cultures. (Tang, 2007) The failure of U.S. foreign policy in places like Cuba and Southeast Asia can be directly attributed to a static, almost imperialistic, “us versus them” attitude. (Tehranian, 1998) Cohen and Dale (2005) in critiquing the ADVANCE Democracy Act passed by the U.S. Congress warn of the dangers of imposing an inflexible framework of values on foreign policy. This subordinates real national interest, which sometimes must address nuances or situations that do not fit a pat definition in order to maintain productive relations. In other words, they say, any moral or ideal basis for a foreign policy must first be based on national interest. It is this inflexibility that leads the anti-realists to misinterpret both realism and its alternatives. Leo Strauss is championed by the neoconservatives currently holding power in the U.S. because of his interpretations of Socrates’ views that philosophy sometimes required a “noble lie” for common people to understand it, but that if it led to the betterment of the nation – and as a side effect of the nation’s policies, the betterment of other nations – then it was justified. (West, 2005) That translates in modern times into an invasion and occupation of Iraq to enforce a democratic system, something that would have disturbed Strauss himself; one of the few commentaries he actually wrote on politics was a stinging criticism of the Allies’ imposition of a democratic government on his native Germany after World War II. (Englander, 2007) Uncomfortable with being called realists in any way, the anti-realists call what they do something else but end up being realistic anyway, at least in the view of outside observers. Allan Gotlieb, the former Canadian ambassador to the U.S., said in a speech in 2004 that for all America’s idealism, its one and only objective since 9/11 is national security. No matter how that objective is pursued, the objective itself is pure realism. Conclusion: Be a Realist, and You Can Be Anything You Want to Be The only theoretical framework of international relations that remains consistently valid and practical no matter what the shape of the world is realism. But it is important to recognise the true definition of political realism as Morgenthau expressed it: national interest expressed as power as a consistent concept, with the realisation that the particular factors that define the concept will change with time. Realism’s detractors, who are uncomfortable with it because it is a very old idea, wrongly attempt to impose fixed definitions upon it and believe that it represents a modus operandi in international relations wherein the internal ideals and circumstances of nations have no place. But the definition of realism does not necessarily say that, nor does history support their mistaken assumptions. The U.S., despite its idealism, has been obliged time and again to adopt realistic foreign policies, and even at its most idealistic cannot escape basing its foreign policy on a core tenet of realism, as Gotlieb recognised. Since World War II, the American pattern is one of idealism followed by realism enforced by internal ideals and circumstances, as exemplified by the foreign policy retrenchments following the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf wars. (Staten, 2005) Far from being apart from a realistic approach, internal conditions instead demand it. And noble ideals that benefit many nations can be perfectly expressed through realistic foreign policy, as the example of 19th century England at the height of its power shows. The Empire interpreted freedom and safety on the seas, a balance of power in Europe, and international trade as being important subjects of its national interests, which certainly benefitted England but were high-minded concepts that benefitted many other nations as well. (Nye, 2008) The world today is not the world of the 19th century British Empire of course, but the same theoretical framework of international relations can apply provided those around the world who are responsible for such things truly understand what it means. By suspending idealism and simply being realists, looking at the world as it now is instead of what they imagine it to be, and then defining their national interests in terms of what they see, foreign policy minds will find the best and most lasting means for the expression of their national ideals. If it makes them feel better, they can call it something other than realism; so long as it passes Morgenthau’s dual tests of reason and experience, it will work, and it will be realism, no matter its name. Works Cited Cohen, Ariel and Dale, Helle C. (2005) ‘The ADVANCE Democracy Act: A Dose of Realism Needed’. The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 968, 8 April 2005. Dowty, Alan. (1999) ‘Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question’. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3(1): 1-13. Englander, Julie. (2007) Defending Strauss [Internet], 24 August 2007. Chicago: Chicago Reader. Available from: < http://www.chicagoreader.com/features/stories/leostrauss/> [Accessed 26 May 2008] Ganesan, N. (2005) Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy. London/New York: Routledge. Gotlieb, Allan. (2004) Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy. 2004 C. D. Howe Institute Benefactors’ Lecture. [Transcript] 3 November 2004. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute. Krauthammer, Charles. (2004) Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World. 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture, AEI. [Internet/Transcript] 12 February 2004. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Available from: [Accessed 21 May 2008] Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Nye, Joseph F. Jr. (2008) ‘Toward a Liberal Realist Foreign Policy: A Memo for the Next President’. Harvard Magazine, 110(4): 36-38, 84. Richardson, Bill. (2008) ‘A New Realism: A Realistic and Principled Foreign Policy’. Foreign Affairs, 87(1): 68-74. Rose, Gideon. (1998) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’. World Politics, 51(1): 144-172. Staten, Cliff. (2005) U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II: An Essay on Reality’s Corrective Qualities [Internet], 30 July 2005. Chapel Hill, NC, americandiplomacy.org. Available from: [Accessed 26 May 2008] Tang, Shi-Ping. (2007) ‘From Offensive Realism to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy’. State of Security and International Study Series No. 3. Singapore: RSIS, Nanyang Technological University. Tehranian, Majid. (1998) ‘A Requiem for Realism?’ Peace and Policy, 3(1) [Internet]. Available from: [Accessed 24 May 2008] West, Thomas G. (2005) Leo Strauss and American Foreign Policy [Internet], 25 April 2005. The Claremont Institute. Available from: [Accessed 25 May 2008] Wright, Robert. (2006) An American Foreign Policy that Both Realists and Idealists Should Fall In Love With. The New York Times, 16 July 2006. Read More

American Ideas About International Relations The German-American philosopher Leo Strauss, whose influence is often – and very wrongly – cited as the inspiration for the present “neoconservative” foreign policy of the United States, believed that the only purpose of a “political philosophy” was to “[remind] us of the limits set to all human hopes and wishes.” (quoted in Englander, 2007) He believed that because philosophy was a search for knowledge rather than a body of knowledge, it could not be applied to guide anyone what to do in a given situation. (Ibid.) Political theories as sets of guidelines for action in international relations are then only expressions of the limits of knowledge.

Because human knowledge naturally increases over time, it is logically assumed that the newer a political theory is, the better it must be than all those that preceded it because it is formed from a greater body of knowledge; this is the “modernistic prejudice” described by Morgenthau. Gideon Rose in 1998 defined four theories of foreign policy, which he called “Innenpolitik,” “Offensive Realism,” “Defensive Realism,” and “Neoclassical Realism.” (Rose, 1998) Innenpolitik means nations’ foreign policies are direct extensions of their domestic policies, and that culture, ideology, and economic characteristics of the nations determine their actions in foreign affairs.

Offensive Realism sees the world as a chaotic place where nations seek to maximise their limited security. Defensive Realism is similar, but rather than maximising their security actively, nations rather seek to maintain a balance of power. Neoclassical Realism rejects national security as the sole aim of foreign policy, with nations instead trying to change the international system to their own ideals and preferences. (Ibid.) The Neoclassical Realism theory is what guides the present foreign policy of the United States, where it is popularly called “neoconservatism.

” One of the intellectual architects of American neoconservatism, Charles Krauthammer (2004), coined the term “Democratic Globalism” to describe what he felt was the best of all possible political theories, not unsurprisingly the one followed by the current administration of the U.S. Krauthammer also defined four theories of foreign policy, but they are different from the ones defined by Rose. Instead, Krauthammer identified Isolationism, Realism, and Liberal Internationalism as the other three. (Ibid.) Krauthammer’s definitions are based on his perception of the world as “unipolar,” where the United States is the only superpower.

The implication is that his “Democratic Globalism” is the correct theory because of this; in other words, “might makes right.” He summarises Democratic Globalism as “a foreign policy that defines the national interest not as power but as values.” The best means to secure the national interests of America, he states, is to remove threats to those interests by spreading American ideals throughout the world. The major shortcoming of the theory of Democratic Globalism is, of course, that it does not work.

The greatest test of the theory, the American war in Iraq, has been a failure by most any assessment. Whether or not it can be related to some degree to American foreign policy, the downturn in the U.S. economy does not seem to be a good example of the national interest in meeting the material needs of the population being properly maintained. Morgenthau (1978:4) stated that “A theory of politics must be subjected to the dual test of reason and experience.” Democratic Globalism may or may not pass the first test, but it most demonstrably has not passed the second.

Other American leaders and scholars have proposed alternatives to the “neoconservative” philosophy. Rather than the “unipolar” view of the world that Krauthammer has, other theorists recognise globalism as making all nations increasingly interdependent, and it is because of this that they still resist the notion of realism.

Read More