International Relations - Is Realism Realistic - Coursework Example

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: IS REALISM REALISTIC? Introduction The current state of the international relations theory is characterized by the growing diversity of views on the diplomatic reality. Numerous theories and assumptions were developed, to explain the true causes and hidden implications of the changing balance of power in IR. The past years witnessed the rapid expansion of realism and the growing effects of realism on diplomacy. Realists keep to a state-centered view of diplomacy and do not recognize the power and influence of international organizations. Realism treats egoism, individuality, and the search for power and dominance as the principal drivers of political and diplomatic decision-making in IR. More often than not, realists are correct in how they perceive the postmodern international reality: the dominant, state-centered position of America and its continuous reluctance to recognize the principles of collective decision-making refute the assumption that international organizations have a voice in IR. Objectively, realism is the most realistic of all IR ideologies and the best prism for analyzing the current situation in the world. Realism is realistic, as long as it promotes state-centered principles of decision-making, denies the relevance and effectiveness of international organizations, and zeroes their influence on the power balance decisions in contemporary world. Realism: Understanding the theory and its implications for IR That realism dominated the IR theory during the 20th century cannot be denied. Two world wars, the Cold War, the East European communist states collapse and the development of new international organizations altogether contributed to chaos and anarchy in international relations. Given the growing tension between states and their striving to dominate the international relations arena, it comes as no surprise that realism became the main trend in IR the 20th century. Understanding the realistic implications of realism for IR is impossible without trying to grasp the meaning of realism in the IR theory and its implications for practice. It is essential to mention that realism is a rare example, when an IR theory is based on and reflects the fundamental elements of the human nature. Simply put, realism treats egoism as the definitive feature of the human activity and “denies the relevance of international government” (Donnelly 2000). Realism is realistic within the limits, which accept and promote un-changeability of the human nature: since ancient times and up to the present, human nature has exemplified a unique combination of egoism and immorality (Rathbum 2009). Machiavelli (1998) was correct in that “it must needs be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers” (p. 22). Realism positions human nature as something that cannot be trusted but resembles a disastrous heresy (Cozette 2008; Donnelly 2000). Egoism and the urge for power turn the striving for continuous political dominance into the principal driver of the international relations. In light of the power of egoism and self-interest in IR, realism reduces the relevance and significance of the moral principles in politics. Prominent realists associate political action with the evil and confirm that this evil is ineradicable (Donnelly 2000; Morgenthau 1952). Evil and the absence of the moral principles in IR results, on the one hand, in an international conflict and, on the other hand, proves this conflict inevitable (Donnelly 2000). Therefore, realism reflects and elaborates on a complex network of impulses and motives in the international politics, which are based on the human egoism, conflict, self-interest, and a necessity to control and manage these vices. Anarchy and the absence of international government present a different aspect of realism in the IR theory. Where international organizations and governments are irrelevant, ineffective, and virtually absent from an IR stage, the laws of the jungle define the course of the IR development in the world (Donnelly 2000; Gleason et al 2008). Realism creates a controversial picture of the international relations, in which the world lacks a civilized angle and is inherently barbarian (Donnelly 2000). Political power and hierarchical authority within the states do not always suffice to tame the egoistic nature of humans. In this situation, international relations, the way realism treats them, create and sustain the conditions that favor the expression of the worst human features (Donnelly 2000). This combination of egoism, self-interest, and anarchy turns power into an extraordinarily significant ingredient of IR (Donnelly 2000). A scholarly analysis of realism in IR places the fight for political power into the center of the modern system of international relations. In its turn, the fight for political power contributes to the growing skepticism over the ethical and moral principles in international relations and subordinates ethical concerns to the needs of the state (Donnelly 2000). Briefly stated, realism necessitates and further justifies purely individualistic policies and claims that universal moral principles can never work for the benefit of international politics (Donnelly 2000). The history of the IR theory witnessed the development of the six different realist paradigms, with each supporting the basic tenets of realism in IR and, simultaneously, presenting a different view on the IR reality. Thomas Hobbes is rightly considered as the carrier of the realist thinking in international relations. His ideas about the human nature and competition between states create a solid foundation for reconsidering the quality of international relations from a realistic angle (Chernoff 2009). Hobbes claimed that quarrels between men and states were usually a product of the three main causes – competition, diffidence, and glory (Donnelly 2000). States, like individuals, would choose to fight against each other and destroy one another, regardless of whether they were driven by competition, glory, or diffidence (Donnelly 2000). Even if there were a chance to tame the conflicts and fights between individuals and states, such task would be inexecutable in the absence of an international government or any other international organization (Dunne & Schmidt 2001). Anarchy does not leave the states a single opportunity to develop cooperative ties and turns war into a routine procedure. Hobbes’s ideas about IR were further extended by Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The former is believed to be one of the purest apostles of realism in the IR theory (Donnelly 2000). Morgenthau’s vision of international relations comprises six essential elements: (1) international politics and the laws of human nature are inseparable; (2) the concept of interest is the only way political realism can express itself in the international diplomatic arena; (3) self-interest and power balance shifts over time and space; (4) realism denies the applicability of the universal moral principles in international political decision-making; (5) the moral aspirations of a single state never apply to the universal moral principles; and (6) political realism confirms the role of political autonomy and egoism in IR (Donnelly 2000). This is also what Waltz tried to explain in his theories, when saying that states are inherently autonomous in their political decisions and, in their political decisions, have to rely on themselves (Donnelly 2000). In this context, states do not seem to differ in their functions: each state is naturally willing to acquire more power and dominance over other states. What makes states different is the capabilities and resources they possess to pursue their ends. All these ideas and assumptions were reflected in the ancient works on politics, the works of Machiavelli, as well as the writings concerning Prisoner’s Dilemma (Donnelly 2000). All these beliefs and assumptions are based on the several essential principles of realism: first, the world is never a bandwagon but a reflection of the balance of power; second, each state inherently aims at promoting self-interests and occupying a dominant position in IR; and third, the absence of international government contributes to anarchy in diplomacy and international politics and turns war into a routine form of international conflict between states. Realism is realistic: egoism, self-interest, and the balance of power That realism reflects the principal conventions of the IR practice in the modern and postmodern world is undeniable. Realism is realistic to the extent, which positions egoism, self-interest, the search for power and dominance as the principal drivers of political decision-making in IR. Throughout the history of state development, countries sought to re-establish themselves as the key carriers of the political ideas, influence, and decisions in the world. The 20th century marked the turning point in the development of the realist thinking, when two world wars and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union confirmed the relevance of the self-interest and balance of power in the contemporary system of IR. To prove this thesis, one should take a close look at how the United States, currently the leading political power in the system of IR, promoted its interests, treated other participants of IR, and was able to reach and sustain an unchangeably leading position in IR. Contrary to public beliefs, humanitarian principles and the need to defend the values of the humanitarian law had never been “at the core of the international relations decisions in the U.S” (Morgenthau 1952). Anyone who accepts the “humanitarian” vision of the U.S. expansion will, first of all, need to explain how the U.S. happened to expand its territorial presence in the American continent (Morgenthau 1952). Needless to say, from a country comprising only thirteen states, the U.S. gradually grew to occupy a good deal of the American continent (Morgenthau 1952). Today, the geographical frontiers of the U.S. run close to the River Elbe and the Asian coastline (Morgenthau 1952). Several aspects of the American foreign policy at that time help to explain this expansion phenomenon. First, the period between 1744 and 1812 in America was marked with the regular and successive shifts in the foreign policy preferences toward Great Britain and France (Morgenthau 1952). In other words, America regularly changed its foreign policy preferences. Those changed had nothing to do with humanitarian principles. Rather, they confirmed the striving of the American state to re-affirm its dominant position in the American continent and, later, the world. Second, America was persistently reluctant to recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies (Morgenthau 1952). Such unwillingness was logical, anticipated, and easy to explain: “the Floridas had been acquired from Spain and Spain had thereby been deprived of the ability to challenge the United States from within the hemisphere” (Morgenthau 1952, p.964). The decision to accept and recognize the independence of Spain would inevitably threaten the dominant position of America in the international system of relations. “Ultimately, the majority of the foreign policy decisions by the U.S. before 1919 reflected and were based on the principles of political self-interest, the balance of power, egoism, and negligence in regards to the political interests of other states” (Ikenberry 2002). Looking back at everything that had happened to America, realism, the balance of power, egoism, self-interest, and international anarchy seem the basic principles the United States always wanted to pursue. That was a reasonable choice, sometimes bloody, sometimes political and economic, which America made at the very beginning of its prosperous evolution. Bearing in mind the lack of the public appreciation of the American foreign policies, the country effectively used the “humanitarian principles” cover to veil its diplomatic interests and the striving to dominate the world. These “humanitarian” principles were the principal thread in the series of international decisions, which America took against Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries during last decade. It comes as no surprise that countries and diplomacies are no longer willing to take the “humanitarian ideas” of the American state for granted. These ideas are nothing but an effective cover to the American self-interests in the unipolar world (Schweller 2010). That America does not pay attention to these allegations and is not willing to account for other states’ interests once again confirms the relevance and realism of the realist philosophy in the contemporary system of international relations. Apparently, egoism and self-interest transcend the history of the international relations evolution over the past two centuries. The continuity of the U.S. presence in almost all violent conflicts during the 20th century supports a simple truth: realism remains the dominant force of political decision-making in the global IR. According to Chomsky, the period between 1939 and 1945 is of particular importance in “the analysis of the international relations development and the effects of power balance and anarchy on them” (Osborn 2009). At that time, the members of the State Department in the U.S., as well as the professional planners of the Council on Foreign Relations, were actively working to shape the ground for the development of the new world order, in which America would dominate (Osborn 2009). The planning procedures and diplomatic efforts by the U.S. between 1939 and 1945 had to create conditions needed to warrant the prevalence of the American financial and political capital in the system of IR (Osborn 2009). Planners had to guarantee that the U.S. would have sufficient opportunities to sustain its global dominance over years (Osborn 2009). The compilation of the U.S.-oriented diplomatic policies was later called “Grand Area strategy” (Osborn 2009). That the United States would emerge as the dominant power in IR was equally realistic and undeniable: in light of the discussed foreign policy decisions and acts, there was no way for America other than toward the top of the system of IR in the world. Since that time, America came to exemplify the source of the doctrinal language and the proponent of the economic freedom, which virtually meant freedom of American businesses and corporations to acquire and re-distribute profits anywhere in the world (Osborn 2009). The openness of the American society came to be associated with the U.S. penetration with any country’s political matters, ideas, and beliefs (Osborn 2009). That was the time when America decided to identify the countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Colonial Asia as potential threats to the world stability and peace: such dichotomy of dangerous/ non-dangerous states was extremely convenient to the U.S., which wanted to justify its violent intentions (Osborn 2009). By the end of the 20th century, America was able to create an atmosphere of unipolarity, with the American state and its political interests in its center. The reasons why America succeeded to retain its realistic position in IR are varied and numerous. On the one hand, states that had ever tried to balance against America ultimately recognized that they could not succeed (Glaser 2003). In a realist world, the U.S. foreign relations advantage was too enormous and undeniable to fail, and second-tier countries were simply unwilling to waste their resources on tasks and actions that could not be accomplished (Glaser 2003). Even the powers like China, India, and Russia will take years to become at least close to the position the United States currently occupies. The existing resource gap between the United States and other countries is too large to be ignored (Mearsheimer 2005). Therefore, these states are unlikely to succeed in their striving to balance the U.S. in the realist diplomatic world. On the other hand, many states perceive the need to balance against the United States as unnecessary (Glaser 2003). These perceptions grow from the information, which states posses about the United States. In simple terms, the U.S. positions itself as an extraordinarily powerful state, which seeks stability and security and, consequentially, will not pose a serious political or military threat that may warrant balancing against (Glaser 2003). This is, mostly, a perception held by the major countries of Western Europe and Japan (Glaser 2003). China does not support this view of the American threat but does not possess resources necessary to balance against the United States (Glaser 2003). All these arguments and aspects confirm the idea of unipolarity, which governs the current state of IR in the world and, simultaneously, re-affirms the realism and relevance of the realist traditions in international relations. Obviously, power remains the central criterion of the international relations in the modern and postmodern IR reality. The United States, as the biggest power, neglects the opinions and requirements of the international organizations, reinforcing the vision of realism in IR. More often than not, failure of the international organizations to establish themselves in the IR reality is used as the principal argument in favor of realism in the modern system of international relations. Realism and failure of international institutions Failure of international institutions to affect the course and development of IR in the modern world is rightly considered as the principal argument in defense of the realist traditions in international diplomacy. “Prominent realists always argued that the emergence of international organizations had not changed the unipolarity of the power distribution in the modern world” (Grieco 1999; Waltz 2000). Although the 20th century witnessed the rapid emergence of numerous international institutions and their political and diplomatic expansion, their role in IR was limited, to say the least, and none of the international organizations was ever able to reduce the dominant role of America in the unipolar world. The current state of the international relations theory treats international organizations as one of the principal forms of institutionalism in IR. International organizations include a variety of interstate formations and forms, non-governmental arrangements, and transnational organizational solutions (Thompson & Snidal 1999). Despite the fact that the concept of “international organization” is increasingly broad, the realist traditions in IR persistently denied their role and significance in IR, irrespective of their form, obligations, and goals. The first attempt to create a formal international institution occurred during the Congress of Vienna in 1814 when, following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe had to create new diplomatic foundations for the stability and security in its territory (Thompson & Snidal 1999). Needless to say, the new Congress system systematized and institutionalized sporadic decisions in regards to security issues in Europe, but with time, the balance within the international organization shifted toward the states that held stronger political position and exhibited more power compared with other European states (Thompson & Snidal 1999). Those were the first signs of realism in the evolving system of IR. Nevertheless, the Congress of Vienna reflected the growing interdependence of states and their willingness to contribute to one another’s security. Waltz (2000) is correct in that in a multipolar world, the states of similar size would perceive their alliances as crucial for their future stability and peace. Major allies were militarily interdependent, and they understood that “the defection of one would necessarily make its partners vulnerable to the emerging security threats” (Waltz 2000). It was not before the beginning of the Second World War that the world finally understood the fragility and irrelevance of the international institutions in the modern world. The League of Nations and its subsequent failure to avert the Second World War exemplified one of the most tragic mistakes and the most effective proves to the continuous dominance of the realist tradition in IR. The League of Nation and its failure to prevent the Second World War is, probably, the brightest proof to the assumption that realism was and remains realistic in the modern world. The First World War had changed the position and attitudes of the European countries toward their safety, security, and politics. As a result, the proliferation of international institutions became the distinctive feature of the post-World War I period (Thompson & Snidal 1999). All member states were obligated to help a member that had become the victim of military violence and aggression (Thompson & Snidal 1999). The United States did not join the organization, although Woodrow Wilson was its chief supporter (Thompson & Snidal 1999). It was mostly due to the non-participation of the United States that the League of Nation did not survive and failed to prevent the expansion of violence in Europe. The reason behind the U.S. refusal to join the League of Nation further contributes to the picture of realism in IR. Grieco (1999) claims relative capabilities are the principal object of trade in the International Relations scene: naturally, a state seeks to raise its relative political, diplomatic security capabilities and, simultaneously, prevent any increase in other states’ relative capabilities. To meet these purposes, states must regularly re-assess their performance, compared with the performance of other states (Grieco 1999). “States fear that their partners will achieve relatively greater gains; that, as a result, the partners will surge ahead of them in relative capabilities” (Grieco 1999, p.23). Apparently, the United States realized the increase in other states’ relative gains it would cause, by joining the League of Nations. Its goals of the dominant international position went against the principles of collective security, which the organization sought to promote. The positionality of the United States in the pre-war world engendered the relative gains problem to the point, when America grew increasingly reluctant to join the European block (Mearsheimer 1994). That such reluctance would threaten the stability and security in Europe did not worry the United States: all it wanted to do was to preserve its political leadership and IR superiority over European countries. Such states would decline an offer to join an international organization even if they are confident that other members would adhere to the terms and conditions of their membership and keep their commitments to collective security (Grieco 1999). Surprisingly or not, but even two world wars did not change the situation: today, the United States continues pursuing the politics of non-compliance with the international organizations’ requirements and follows the principles and norms of International politics which it establishes for itself. The more powerful the United States is becoming the more willing it is to use the existing and emerging international institutions to pursue its diplomatic ends. Profound transformations in the system of international relations over the past decade reflect the shifts in the American attitudes toward international institutions: while organizations are losing their functions, they become a convenient instrument of controlling, monitoring, and managing the military and foreign policies of the European and non-European states. That America is no longer reluctant to participate in the international organizations does not mean that realism is no longer realistic. On the contrary, the U.S. membership in the international organizations reflects the growing scope of the realistic trends in IR. The example of the NATO confirms that, while international organizations are losing their major function, America gradually comes to view them as the instrument of lengthening its grip on the European military and foreign policies (Waltz 2000). The NATO is just one of numerous examples of how the American vision of power is applied to establish a definite security order in Europe (Waltz 2000). American invasion to Iraq and Afghanistan against the will of the European collective majority was a bold move aimed to reinforce the sense of American dominance in IR. In the postmodern reality, international organizations do not function as multilateral entities (Waltz 2000). Rather, they demonstrate how the strongest states create and maintain such organizations to meet their misperceived interests (Waltz 2000). Given the complexity of the IR situation, the coming years will hardly change the situation. The current state of the IR development implies that America is likely to retain its dominant position in the next decade. Realism will continue to travel around the planet, with power, political dominance, and reduced role of international institutions in collective decision-making as the principal criteria of IR. Most of what is currently happening in IR reflects the failure of international organizations and separate states to raise their international significance and balance against the U.S. After so many years of undeniable leadership, the United States is unlikely to give up its position easily and without fight. Without sufficient resources, international organizations and states will keep their reluctance to resist to the American expansion to the East. Weak European states will experience serious problems with fashioning international organizations that help them to pursue their ends (Waltz 2000). International organizations and IR decisions will continue serving the interests of the strongest nations, namely, the United States, in short- and long-term perspective. Conclusion The past decades were marked with a profound change in the balance of forces in IR. However, like many years before, realism continues dominating the current system of international relations. Realism in IR is realistic to the extent, which treats self-interest and egoism as the principal drivers of international decision-making, denies the relevance of international institutions, and zeroes their influence on the contemporary world. The United States is rightly considered as the principal source of influence in the unipolar world. Since the earliest years of its history, the U.S. sought to expand and sustain its dominant position in the world. The failure of numerous international organizations to prevent military conflicts. The coming decades will hardly shift the balance away from the U.S. toward other, emerging political powers like China and Russia. Apparently, realism will continue serving the interest of the most powerful countries, namely, the United States. References Chernoff, F 2009, ‘The ontological fallacy: A rejoinder on the status of scientific realism in international relations’, Review of International Studies, vol.35, pp.371-395. 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