Labor Migration in the Gulf Region - Case Study Example

Running Head: LABOR MIGRATION IN THE GULF REGION LABOR MIGRATION IN THE GULF REGION [Name Of Student] [Name Of Institution] INTRODUCTION When a country has excessive imports, as indicated by a deficit in its balance of payments, the market responds by forcing the value of its currency to decline. Import costs go up, export prices go down, and a new equilibrium is established. No such simple mechanisms are at work when a country's immigration is excessive. There is no imbalance of emigration and immigration to be corrected. The market does not automatically push up the economic costs of immigration. It is not even clear as to what constitutes 'excessive' immigration. Nonetheless, many societies (and their governments) do come to regard the costs of immigration as excessive--in social, political, security and cultural, if not economic terms (Adams, 2003, 2027-048). There is no uniform notion as to what is excessive, nor are the responses uniform. As the world-wide flow of refugees and migrants continues, each country decides whether to accept immigrants, how many, under what terms, how it will treat those who have already entered, and whether it will force its migrants to go home. The responses vary from one country to another and they change over time (Alnasrawi, 199, 1950-2010). This paper will focus on labour migration to the gulf region. I will look into factors that caused people to move to this region, the policies for such people and their living conditions too. POULATION GROWTH AND DEMOGRAPHY IN GULF COUNTRIES The demography of the Middle East has twisted a lot of powerful labor market stress observed anyplace in the world, supplementary undermining the sustainability of the elderly expansion replica and the community contract supporting it (Yousef, 2001, 1-26, 1-26). The Middle East district has been experiencing a demographic conversion, moving from pre-industrial circumstances of elevated birth and death rates to a post-industrial balance of controlled poulation rates (Lee, 2003, 167-90). From the time of the 1950s, the district experienced momentous declines in child mortality. These population developments have had a gigantic impact on labor bringing in the region. Lofty population growth rates in the mid 90s led to the swift expansion of the working-age inhabitants, which, jointly with increasing labor force participation rates, have shaped strong pressures on labor markets. Labor force expansion hastened from 2 to 3.6% during the 1990s. (Desai, 2003, 45-54) Though Gulf governments have regarded immigrant workers as a means of fulfilling short-term labour needs it is clear that migrants are now structurally integrated into the economy. Temporary labour migrants are used to fill permanent jobs within these economies. Though some employment is temporary, particularly jobs in the construction industry (though even here there are long-term manpower needs), the oil-producing states have constructed new industries and service sectors that, for the foreseeable future, will require a labour force larger and more skilled than they themselves can provide. (Elbadawi, 2002, 78-152) Overall, the changes in the Arab economy wrought by the crisis suggest that a gradual and partial disassembly of the Arab oil economy has been in motion. Low levels of Arab conventional economic integration measured by such indicators as intra-regional trade or investment) will thus be compounded by a reduced transfers of labor, remittances and petrodollar foreign aid. (Brumberg, 2003, 47-52)The massive regional imbalances in wealth that were seized upon by Saddam Hussein (and recognized by the US and its Arab allies in their calls for a new regional development bank) will not be ameliorated. Instead, reduced exogenous revenues will serve to aggravate inequalities and economic hardship in much of the periphery of the Arab economy, hastening or confirming the decline of rentierism there. (Lee, 2003, 167-90) Based on these broad data, it is reasonable to posit two demand factors that stimulate labor migration to the Gulf. First, the creation of an infrastructure for exploiting the petroleum riches required both highly trained professionals and manual laborers. The GCC states are now liberalising their economies, establishing stock markets, and encouraging their nationals to take equity stakes in public utilities. There may still be inelasticities, for example, over the movement of capital and labour, and there may not yet be the opportunities for inward investment that the states badly need, but it is fair to say that a relatively new 'ism', Thatcherism, is alive and well in the Arabian Peninsula. Another enormous change in the region, at least on the Arab side of the Gulf, has been the advance of prosperity. (Alnasrawi, 1994, 1950-2010) GULF STATES ECONOMY Before touching the foreign labour migration to the Gulf States, it should describe the States economies, which are now liberalising their economies, establishing stock markets, and encouraging their nationals to take equity stakes in public utilities. There may still be inelasticities, for example, over the movement of capital and labour, and there may not yet be the opportunities for inward investment that the states badly need, but it is fair to say that a relatively new 'ism', Thatcherism, is alive and well in the Arabian Peninsula. Another enormous change in the region, at least on the Arab side of the Gulf, has been the advance of prosperity. (Alnasrawi, 1994, 1950-2010) One might ask at this point, why the Gulf region is so important. It is neither very large nor very populous. The total population of the six Gulf States, plus Iran and Iraq, is perhaps 110 million, of who about 60 per cent is Iranian. (Harik, 2004, 110-8) However, this small geographical area holds two-thirds of the entire world's known oil and gas reserves. The top five countries in terms of reserves--Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, and Abu Dhabi--straddle the Gulf. The Gulf states also account for nearly one-third of the world's production. Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil producer at over eight million barrels per day (Wahba, Jackline and May Mokhtar. 2002, 324). All are oil and gas producers; all are refiners and exporters of both crude and refined products. All are in the process of establishing petrochemical industries. (Anderson, 1995, 77-92)Taken together this represents one of the largest concentrations of hydrocarbon industries in the world. Some experts predict that world consumption may increase by as much as 20 million barrels per day by 2010, and that 75 per cent of the increase will be drawn from the Gulf. The majority of the products are exported through one narrow channel, the Straits of Hormuz at the eastern end of the Gulf, which, as we saw during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, can quite easily be blocked or disrupted by mines or by hostile naval action. The Western countries, and Japan, are very dependent on the region for their energy, and this guarantees that any threat to security receives prompt attention from the Western alliance. This is a comfort to the smaller states of the region since the extraction of oil and gas is the main motor of their economies. (Harik, 2004, 110-8) REASONS FOR THE LABOUR MIGRATION TO THE GULF STATES Based on these broad data, it is reasonable to posit three demand factors that stimulate labor migration to the Gulf. First, the creation of an infrastructure for exploiting the petroleum riches required both highly trained professionals and manual laborers. Neither the skill levels nor size of the indigenous population were adequate for this export-led growth. Second, as per-capita GDP rose, the demand for durable consumer goods, leisure services, educational and health services, and information technology generated a powerful employment multiplier effect that pulled foreign workers into a broad array of occupations. Second is the increasing national incomes in combination with state redistribution policies that are not linked to work effort have provided strong supply-side incentives for national households and businesses to substitute leisure for labor through the hiring of expatriate workers. Another reason for admitting guest workers rather than permanent migrants is that the countries of Gulf believed that they could thereby avoid becoming ethnically plural societies. Europeans subscribed to the notion that their countries should contain a single nationality, sharing a common language and culture, and in some instances a common religion. (Chaudery, 1997, 7-12) Similarly, the Gulf States regarded themselves as homogeneous Arab societies with a population sharing a common religion, language, and culture. LABOUR MIGRATION AFFECTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE GULF STATES Overall, the changes in the Arab economy wrought by the crisis suggest that a gradual and partial disassembly of the Arab oil economy has been in motion. Low levels of Arab conventional economic integration measured by such indicators as intra-regional trade or investment) will thus be compounded by a reduced transfers of labor, remittances and petrodollar foreign aid. (Brumberg, 2003, 47-52)The massive regional imbalances in wealth that were seized upon by Saddam Hussein (and recognized by the United States and its Arab allies in their calls for a new regional development bank) will not be ameliorated. Instead, reduced exogenous revenues will serve to aggravate inequalities and economic hardship in much of the periphery of the Arab economy, hastening or confirming the decline of rentierism there. (Lee, 2003, 167-90) GULF STATES POLICIES IN FIELD OF EXPATRIATE A central legal and political issue regarding temporary foreign workers is the question of what rights and benefits they are to be given by the host country--that is, the social contract between the state and the migrants. The way in which this question is resolved has an important impact on the relationship between the governments of the receiving and sending communities and on the political behavior of the foreign workers. (Nabli, 2003, 329-359) Among the five small Gulf States (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman) approximately two-thirds of the labour force is imported, and it is estimated that one-half of the Saudi labour force is imported. Foreign workers have been fully incorporated into the economic structure of these countries: they are employed in the health and education sectors, in the expanding industrial sector and in the civil service, as construction workers, domestic servants, doctors, engineers, and administrators. Each of the Gulf governments has rejected the notion that foreign workers should be politically and socially integrated within their own societies. On the contrary, they are committed to creating a sense of insecurity and impermanence among the migrants, even as the migration process has, for all practical purposes, become enduring. The Gulf States pursue the following policies towards their migrant workers: (Richards, 2001, 62) 1. Migrant workers cannot ordinarily become citizens no matter how long they reside in the country, nor can their locally born children become citizens. Citizenship may be bestowed by the ruling Sheikhs, but it is rarely given. The policy is non-discriminatory, applied to other Arabs who have spent many years in the Gulf (including locally born Palestinians), as well as to non-Arab migrants. 2. With the exception of Oman and Dubai, non-nationals are not usually permitted to own a business, purchase a house or acquire land. Similarly, import licenses and franchises are given only to citizens, though many businesses are actually financed and managed by foreigners with national Arab owners. 3. There is no free labour market. Migrant workers receive work permits only after obtaining No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from the government and they may not change jobs without the consent of both their employer and the ministry of labour and social affairs. If foreign workers change employment without consent they are liable to deportation. They can also be deported for 'incitement of workers to strike or to refrain from working' or 'physical or verbal attacks on employers or supervisors'. Work permits are of limited duration, renewable by the government at periodic intervals. (Elbadawi, 2002, 78-152) 4. The political rights of foreign Workers are restricted. They may neither form nor join trade unions or hold public meetings. In Kuwait they may join unions, but only after they have been in residence for five years In most of" the Gulf, associations of migrant workers are limited to social functions. Public manifestations of religious activities (such as religious processions among non-Muslims) are forbidden. Violations of these rules may lead to expulsion. Lawbreakers, including those found guilty of traffic violations, may also be expelled. There are no regular appeal procedures for non-nationals. (Said, 2001, 26) 5. Social welfare benefits given to citizens are generally not extended to foreigners. Free medical care, free education from primary school to university level and low-cost housing are provided to the local population, but (with the notable exception of Kuwait) not to migrant workers. Foreign communities are, however, permitted to create privately financed schools for their own children, while employers often provide medical facilities for their employees. 6. Migrant workers are not permitted to bring their wives and children with them unless their wages are above a level specified by the government. Generally, unskilled and semi-skilled workers are unable to bring their families. (Nabli, 2003, 329-59) 7. There is a declared official preference for migrant workers from other Arab countries, but many employers and government officials actually prefer Asians since they do not demand equal facilities in housing, education and health, are less likely to make demands upon employers and do not interact socially or politically with the locals due to language differences. These policies do more than simply establish the temporary position of the migrant workers: they institutionalise a pattern of dualism (with its implications of opposing principles) as distinct from pluralism (with its implications of equality). These arrangements set boundaries not only for the conduct of the migrant workers, but also for how the host and home countries relate to one another over the issues of foreign workers. The policies of the Gulf States, though unliberal from a Western perspective, are more consistent with the goal of preventing temporary migrants from becoming permanent settlers. One problem is that what is economically desirable to employers may be socially and politically unacceptable to the rest of the local population. For this reason employers are more resistant to restrictions on migration and more tolerant of illegal migrants than others. For employers migration can be a mechanism for keeping wages down, discouraging unionisation and, especially when migrants are illegal, for obtaining a more pliable, hard-working labour force at lower cost. Thus, the very elements that make certain categories of migration desirable to employers make migration undesirable to local labourers. Another problem is that what may be beneficial in the short term (when, for example, there are acute labour shortages) may be regarded as undesirable at a later time when there is high unemployment. (Girgis, Maurice, Faris Hadad-Zervos and Adama Coulibaly. 2003, 2002) The handling of migrant employees in the GCC countries can be clarified partially by the demographic unevenness between locals and expatriate populations (Anh Nga Longva , 1999, 20-22). In Bahrain and Oman, where a lesser fraction of expatriates is pooled with a greater contribution of the inhabitant workers, the common gap between natives and immigrants is narrower and the function of kafala as a societal institution is considerably diluted (Anh Nga Longva , 1999, 20-22). In Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, where the proportion of migrant workers reports for more than half the sum inhabitants, the backing system is not just one establishment amongst others, it is the middle institution, one that classifies identities, rights and responsibilities. Hence, the supremacy of the sponsor is habitually exaggerated in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE. In both cases, the sponsorship scheme finally defends local populations, who distinguish themselves as being "in siege." In doing so, backing severely restricts some of the mainly primary freedoms of immigrant workers and makes use of their dependence and helplessness (Anh Nga Longva , 1999, 20-22). The migrants' structural reliance explains their willingness to fulfill with the sponsor-employer's orders. LIVING CONDITION OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE GULF (CASE DUBAI) To exemplify the standing of labour state in the gulf countries, I shall discuss two cases of Dubai. On September 18, 2005 a large number of building workers, typically from India and Pakistan, set up a demonstration as they blocked a main road in Dubai, asking for their hard-earned yet unpaid wages. It caused a huge traffic mess in the fast moving metropolis of Dubai where these immigrants were demanding their mislaid salaries for the months of May and June and the truth that they did not have fresh drinking water or water in the toilets of the campground in which they were residing. A higher supervisor of the corporation that hires the employees, who refused to be name, deprived of the statements by the protesters saying that the Jebel Ali encampment where the employees existed had fresh drinking water. "We will disburse May's income this week and June's earnings next week. But the employees do have fresh water and contemporary restrooms," the supervisor was referenced as with an interview on Gulf news. There was also another protest in November for similar reasons where workers complained that they did not have access to basic human necessities. They had no protection in case of any catastrophe that affects them. All this hue was raised after a fire broke at one of the campgrounds and emergency and relief work was unsatisfactory if any at all. Cityscape 2005, a worldwide assets speculation and expansion event, is at present being apprehended in the metropolitan according to the Arab News daily it has engrossed a record 300 exhibitors from 51 nations around the earth. NATIONALIZATION GULF WORKFORCES AND CHALLENGES Currently, the Gulf States policies are moved toward emphasis the replacement of foreign workforces with local employees via a combination of compulsory and market-based mechanisms, and encouragement of alternative economical sources. Given this prominence of nationalization initiatives within the Middle East, it is somewhat surprising to note that international Journal of Human Resource Management (HRM) literature has provided scant coverage and analyses of them. In fact, the sheer scale of the discrepancy between the prominence of these strategies in the Middle East and their coverage in international HRM literature is quite remarkable. In August, 2005, an internet search of the terms Emiratization, Omanization and Saudization by the authors produced 38,000, 12,000 and 24,000 hits respectively. Meanwhile, using the same terms, a general Proquestw database search of international academic business and management literature using these three terms identified no peer-reviewed papers in relation to Emiratization, only two peer-reviewed papers in relation to Saudization (Henderson, 2005, 23-8) and only two peer-reviewed papers in relation to Omanization. Meanwhile a more specific EBSCOw electronic search of papers published in the International Journal of HRM between 1990 and 2005 located just one paper on Omanization (Richards, 1996, 97-112) and none which focused on either Emiratization or Saudization. It should be noted, however, that while international HRM literature has tended to eschew Middle Eastern nationalization programmes as a focus of research in their own right, the importance of these programmes has been highlighted in relation to more general HRM concerns and initiatives. For example, in their analysis of HRD in the Sultanate of Oman, Budhwar et al. (2002) note that HRD in Oman has been heavily influenced by the ‘reliance of Oman on foreign workers and professionals’ and, as a result, ‘national development policies made no attempt to link HRD strategies to organizational strategies’ (Shahhban, 2001: 200). These writers then proceed to note the impact of more recent Omanization initiatives on HRD including the education and training of Omani women to encourage them to enter the workforce (Shahban, 2001: 21-6). Similarly, researchers approach the subject of HRD in Saudi Arabia by offering an analysis of the country’s dependence upon foreign labour. This analysis contains discussion of the drawbacks of relying on overseas workers and then identifies nationalization options that could be utilized as elements of a strategic HRD initiative aimed as reducing the country’s dependence upon foreign labour. Despite contributions of this nature, however, we posit that the lack of international academic literature that is focused directly upon nationalization strategies such as Emiratization, Omanization and Saudization represents a glaring weakness in the international knowledge base as it relates to HRM in the Middle East. While a body of literature relating to HR practices in the region is emerging, the scene presented by this literature will remain rudimentary at least until such time as the influence and impact of nationalization strategies are better understood on the international stage. Among countries that chose to admit migrants to meet manpower needs, there were variations in how these labour shortages were met, especially regarding whether temporary or permanent migrants should be admitted. We might see these variations as different social contracts which specify the conditions under which migrants may enter the country for employment. (Chaudery, 1997, 320) Indeed, in some instances there are formal contracts which specify the wages and working conditions, duration of stay and who should bear the costs of return. But beyond these formal contracts between workers and employers there are what can be regarded in broad terms as social contracts between the state and the immigrant, specifying what (if any) social benefits the immigrant will receive, whether he can remain for an indefinite period, whether he is free to change employers, whether he can bring his family, and whether he can become a citizen. These social contracts are embodied not only in the contracts between employers and employees but in the formal government rules of entry. (Longva, 1997, 63-9) There are a number of reasons why the countries of Gulf opted for a policy of admitting temporary rather than permanent migrants. One is that manpower shortages were seen by governments as temporary. Western European governments assumed that the labour shortages of the 1950s and early 1960s would end when those born immediately after the war entered the labour force. Similarly, the Gulf countries imported large numbers of workers after the 1973 oil boom to handle what they presumed was a temporary construction boom (Longva, 1997, 63-9). Another reason for admitting guest workers rather than permanent migrants is that the countries of Gulf believed that they could thereby avoid becoming ethnically plural societies. Europeans subscribed to the notion that their countries should contain a single nationality, sharing a common language and culture, and in some instances a common religion. (Chaudery, 1997, 7-12) Similarly, the Gulf states regarded themselves as homogeneous Arab societies with a population sharing a common religion, language and culture. An alternative for the manpower-short, oil-rich Gulf states that would not seriously jeopardise their homogeneity was to admit permanent migrants from neighbouring countries. Such a policy would have been congruent with a pan-Arab perspective. But the governments evidently feared that Arab migrants might bring in the anti-monarchical ideologies that pervaded the Middle East--Nasserism, Baathism and Islamic fundamentalism--which would have undermined the existing regimes. Palestinians were refused right to become citizens partly so as not to dilute their claims for a Palestinian state, but also because of the concern of host governments that they might then attempt to transform the political system. (Desai, 2003, 45-54) CONCLUSION There are two diametrically opposed world trends. One is for greater openness of international borders to permit a freer movement of capital, trade, services, technology, and people. The other is for greater restrictive ness. Countries do not neatly conform to one or other of these trends: some want freer movement of capital and trade but not people, while others want freer movement of people but not capital and trade. (Sharon, 2000, 62-7) Governments do not easily control migration, like other international transactions. However much states may wish to restrict exit or entry, people will look for ways to flee from persecution, violence, poverty, and limited opportunities. For many of the world's people the right to move is the ultimate freedom. Under some circumstances, people will take extraordinary risks to leave their country and enter another. In the earlier period, global labor migration has been a shelter opening for the Middle East (Harik, 2004, 110-18) REFERENCES Adams, Richard and John Page. 2003. "Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Selected Middle East and North Africa Countries, 1980-2000." World Development. 31:12, pp. 2027-048. Agénor, Pierre-Richard, Mustapha K. Nabli, Tarik M. Yousef and Henning T. Jensen. 2003. "Labor Market Reforms, Growth, and Unemployment in Labor-Exporting MENA Countries." World Bank Working paper. Alnasrawi, Abbas. 1994. The Economy of Iraq : oil, wars, destruction of development and prospects, 1950-2010. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. Anderson, Lisa. 1995. "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach," in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World. R. Brynen, B. Korany and P. Noble, eds. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 77-92. Brumberg, Daniel. 2003. "Liberalization versus Democracy: Understanding Arab Political Reform." Working Paper No. 37, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 47-52 Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz. 1997. The Price of Wealth: Economics and Institutions in the Middle East. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Desai, Raj, Anders Olofsgard and Tarik M. Yousef. 2003. "Transitions from Authoritarianism: Demography, Rents, and Welfare." Georgetown University Press, 45-54 Elbadawi, Ibrahim A. 2002. "Reviving Growth in the Arab World." Working Paper No. 206, Arab Planning Institute. 78-152 Harik, Illiya and Denis J. Sullivan. 1992. Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.110-8 Khalidi, Rashid. 2004. Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East. Boston: Beacon Press.98-240 Lee, Ron. 2003. "The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental Change." Journal of Economic Perspectives. 17:4, pp. 167-90. Longva, Anh Nga, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait (1997). 63-9 Pissarides, Christopher A. 2001. "Employment Protection." Labour Economics. 8:2, pp. 131-59. Richards, Alan and John Waterbury. 1996. A Political Economy of the Middle East. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Shaban, R. A., R. Assaad and S. Al-Qudsi. 2001. "Employment Experience in the Middle East and North Africa," in Labor and Human Capital in the Middle East. D. Salehi-Eshfahani, ed. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, pp. 21-66. Sharon Russell, 'Politics and Ideology in Migration Policy Formation: The Case of Kuwait', 2001 Yousef, Tarik M. 2001. "Demography, the Social Contract and Intergenerational Relations in the Middle East and North Africa." 1-26 Zogby, James. 2002. What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs and Concerns. New York: Zogby International. APPENDIX TABLE 1 BASIC INDICATORS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, 2002 Legend for Chart: A - Country Name B - Population (millions) C - GDP, US$ (billions) D - GDP Per Capita, US$ A B C D Algeria 31 56 1,785 Bahrain 1 8 11,007 Djibouti 1 1 861 Egypt 66 90 1,354 Iran 66 108 1,652 Iraq 24 n.a. n.a. Jordan 5 9 1,799 Kuwait 2 35 15,193 Lebanon 4 17 3,894 Libya 5 19 3,512 Morocco 30 36 1,218 Oman 3 20 8,002 Qatar 1 17 28,634 Saudi Arabia 22 188 8,612 Syria 17 21 1,224 Tunisia 10 21 2,149 United Arab Emirates 4 71 18,902 West Bank and Gaza 3 3 1,051 Yemen 19 10 537 Middle East and North Africa 313 732 2,532 United States 288 10,383 36,006 Source: World Development Indicators (2004). TABLE 2 GROWTH IN OUTPUT, CAPITAL AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY BY REGION (PERCENTAGE PER LABORER) Legend for Chart: A - Region B - Decade C - GDP D - Physical capital E - Human capital F - Total factor productivity A B C D E F Middle East and North Africa 1960s 6.0 5.4 0.7 3.4 1970s 3.8 10.0 1.3 -1.0 1980s 0.3 2.4 1.4 -1.5 1990s 0.7 0.1 1.3 -0.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 1960s 2.8 3.6 0.3 1.2 1970s 1.4 3.2 0.3 -0.1 1980s -0.9 0.6 0.7 -1.6 1990s 0.4 0.7 0.6 -0.2 South Asia 1960s 2.1 4.0 0.6 0.2 1970s 0.6 1.9 1.0 -0.7 1980s 3.6 3.1 0.9 1.9 1990s 2.7 3.3 0.9 0.9 East Asia and the Pacific 1960s 2.6 2.9 0.7 1.0 1970s 3.7 6.2 0.9 0.7 1980s 5.9 6.1 1.0 2.9 1990s 7.0 8.4 0.7 3.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 1960s 2.7 2.9 0.5 1.2 1970s 2.9 4.0 0.6 1.0 1980s -1.7 0.2 0.9 -2.3 1990s 2.7 2.9 0.5 1.2 High Income/OECD 1960s 3.3 3.8 0.7 1.4 1970s 1.5 2.2 1.5 -0.2 1980s 1.6 1.9 0.2 0.7 1990s 1.6 2.0 0.6 0.4 Note: Regional averages weighted by average labor force over period. Source: Nabli and Keller (2002) and World Bank (2004a). TABLE 3 THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD Legend for Chart: A - Region B - Public accountability C - Institutional quality A B C Middle East and North Africa -0.78 -0.32 East Asia and Pacific 0.20 -0.11 Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.37 -0.16 Latin America and the Caribbean 0.77 -0.09 OECD 1.89 1.38 South Asia -0.29 -0.41 Sub-Saharan Africa -0.41 -0.66 TABLE 4 LABOR FORCE GROWTH IN DEVELOPING REGIONS, 1970-2010 (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE) Legend for Chart: B - 1970-1980 C - 1980-1990 D - 1990-2000 E - 2000-2010 A B C D E Middle East and North Africa 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.4 East Asia 2.4 2.5 1.2 0.8 Latin America and the Caribbean 3.3 3.1 2.5 2.0 South Asia 2.3 1.9 2.4 2.0 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.2 Source: World Bank (2004a) Read More