Construction of Scientific Knowledge - Essay Example

Constructivism This paper will discuss the construction of scientific knowledge by looking at contrasting views of Ludwik Fleck’s comparative epistemology which implies that scientific inquiry is socially constructed and Laudan’s normative approach to construction of scientific data. Ludwik Fleck Ludwik Fleck’s comparative epistemology is based on social constructivism. Fleck’s constructivist epistemology argues that social and cultural factors and perspective shape the construction of scientific facts. Scientific facts are based on mutually-supporting frameworks with are responsible for construction and constraining of thoughts in an individual. In this case, the social groups in which one is involved share typical features in terms of their thought structures which are structured in their traditions and cultures as a result of social interactions. His view of science is based in the historical perspectives of though styles and the relevant changes that have taken place over time to result to new and distinct scientific facts through social actions. In his view, science should objects to construct definite and certain facts which are objective leading to emergent of epistemology of scientific application. His view seeks to evaluate the different methods which are used in the establishment of scientific facts. Fleck criticizes normative epistemology as a method of producing scientific facts on the basis that it is rather “obsolete” (Fleck, 51). According to him, there are three stages for the construction of scientific facts; the first stage involves the signal of resistance in confused thinking on a person at initial stages of thinking, followed by a more definite thought construct and lastly, the thought produced is expressly apparent (Fleck, 95). The scientific facts contain both active and passive aspects which are aligned with controls forced by the thought- styles and possible impacts they may have. The facts increase with time while the wide range of differences in ideas decrease as the new ideas becomes constrained with time. He uses a model exhibiting the thought process in which thoughts are depicted using intersecting strands. The facts in the model function as nodes which merge and then diverge into many strands of different types of research. With the decrease in arguments and criticism over time, the model leads to production of new scientific facts. As such, the model is more efficient and leads to escalated knowledge development. Due to the emergence and widespread of historical process in the line of inquiry which extricates un-evidenced opinion from scientific facts, there is always a justification which determines the factualness of the inquiry. The rationale of distinguishing an opinion from a fact is based on dominant thought-style of science. The thought styles are able to change and take diverse disciplines in the field. The changes are of sociocogitative nature and therefore they cannot be examined epistemically. The facts can also not be compared substantially among themselves science the facts may become obsolete once their thought-style is gone. This focus is therefore significant in outlining the path taken by the thought process in their quest to establish new scientific knowledge, however, the focus in not able to provide for the evaluation of the facts established. From the perspective of Fleck’s theory, scientific knowledge is considered to have resulted from associations among different epistemic means with social values and norms which are different across communities and cultures. Thus, the scientific application is wide, dynamic, and intertwined in social interactions. The community is not static and thus it is characterized by diverse forms of contingent factors which cause changes in social structure, interests, norms and values. This leads to establishment of morals and principles which are related in some ways. These are major changes considering that facts which form scientific knowledge will be influenced by the social changes. This leads to social scientists constructing their knowledge based on social interaction between different agents and the community so as to take account of all the changes and incorporate them into scientific knowledge. Laudan’s normative approach In his approach, Laudan holds that there are two positive options of normative epistemology if social constructivism is endorsed. The first one is that the standards of epistemic justification are part of the historical unfolding of science; the second one is that they are obtained independently of this history. In the first perspective the justificatory standards are situated in the historical unfolding of our scientific practices, though they are not socially constructed. Laudan’s (1990) normative naturalism exemplifies this approach. According to him, the most effective strategies for investigating the natural world is given a very strong commitment, this is through its achievement via an empirical methodology that is in line with that of the natural sciences. Laudan conceives epistemic norms as methodological rules in the form of hypothetical imperatives linking means and ends (e.g., “if you want theories with high predictive reliability, reject ad hoc hypotheses”). The requirements of this subsequent specify a justificatory standard for cases in which the predecessor is satisfied. Epistemic norms are assessed on the basis of empirical correlations (relative frequencies) that will link epistemic means and outcomes (Laudan, 1987, 24; 1990, 46). Critical, normative epistemology is thus dealt with on theories about scientific inquiry, and like theories in science proper, changes in response to new information. Epistemic priority does not have rules or theories; but the two complement one another in the historical unfolding of scientific inquiry. In this regard epistemic justification and its normative assessment are related to scientific practice. The above account has been often criticized and categorized as descriptive rather normative, this is due to the fact that when epistemic norms are assessed they are in relation to epistemic ends that vary across scientific context and overtime. “If two communities… pose different aims of inquiry, is there any sense in which methodology can rationally adjudicate between them rather than merely describe the effectiveness of their respective “best strategies”?” (Psillos 1997, 707). This is the same challenge that is posed by sc. If normative naturalism is committed to a thoroughly historicized, context-dependent notion of epistemic justification, there is no rationale for normative naturalist to reject sc. On the other hand, the empirical case enormous body of historical case studies which implicate social structure, interests and values that aid in the advancement and maintenance of justificatory standards in scientific inquiry (Knorr Cetina, 1999; Bloor, 2004). When scientific justifications are characterized as historical when endorsing social constructivism, it requires that one should ignore this body of evidence from social-historical studies of science. This stand will make the historically-inclined normative neutralist to be uncomfortable. There are three distinct features that Laudan pointed out to secure normative aspect. First, when an epistemic end is issued, correlations between means and outcomes have normative consequences: there one should choose the means that best enhances ones end. This seems to be in concurrent with social constructivism. If correlations of means and ends are established via social interactions and/or values, then epistemic norms are socially constructed. The second one constrains permissible epistemic ends. Laudan’s proposed constraints are minimal: realizability and conservation of previous scientific paradigms as scientific. The compatibility of both are in line with social constructivism. The third feature with which Laudon defends the normative aspect of his view is rule R1, an invariant epistemic norm common to all theories of methodology: If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and rival actions, n, have failed to do so, then assume that future actions following the rule “if your aim is e, you ought to do m” are more likely to promote these ends than actions based on the rule “if your aim is e, you ought to do n” (1987, 25). References Bloor, David (2004), “Sociology of scientific knowledge”, in Niiniluoto, Illka, Matti Sintonen, and Jan Wolenski (eds.) Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 919- 962. Fagan, Melinda (in press), “Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. Fleck, Ludwik (1979/1935), Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Bradley, F. and T. J. Trenn (trans.), Trenn, T. J, and R. K. Merton (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Knorr Cetina, Karin (1999), Epistemic Cultures: How the Sciences Make Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Laudan, Larry (1987), “Progress or rationality? The prospects for normative naturalism”, American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 19-31. Laudan, Larry (1990), “Normative naturalism”, Philosophy of Science 57: 44-59. Naturalism. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Psillos, Stathos (1997), “Naturalism without truth?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 28: 669-713. Read More