Virus of Tribalism and Nature of Modern Warfare - Essay Example

 Does the Proliferation of Ethnic And Sectarian Conflict, Together With the Rise on Intra-State War Pose A Challenge to the Comprehensiveness of International Relations Theories? Introduction ‘The virus of tribalism...risks becoming the AIDS of international politics- lying dormant for years, then flaring up to destroy countries”-The Economist There are certain clear emerging trends that have been observed, in regards to the various studies on international relationships, which focus on the period after World War II. Firstly, it has been perceived that there is a gradual decrease in inter-state conflicts, while the numbers of intra-state conflicts continue to rise over the years. “By one count, between 1816 and 1945, there were 110 intrastate wars and 56 interstate wars. In the half century after 1945... There were 103 intrastate wars and 56 interstate wars. Thus before WWII the ratio of internal wars to external wars was about 2:1, while after the WWII the ratio increased to 4.7:1” (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2007, 19). Secondly, in these intrastate wars there is a rising trend in ethnic and sectarian and conflicts, with almost two thirds of the intrastate wars being ethnic in nature (Fearon & Laitin, 2001, 1). Next there has been noticed an increase in the number of intra state wars, particularly after the end of the Cold War; however this perceived increase in the percentage of such wars has been mainly due to the reason that these civil strives are particularly difficult to end, owing to their complex nature of origin. These wars that smoulder for a long time, tend to show depredating results for human rights conditions within the war torn states, while destabilising the country’s political situation, thus destroying any future implications for economic growth of that country. Observing the proliferation of ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the recent times, together with a significant increase in the percentage of intra-state wars; and keeping in view the disastrous implications that these wars generally produce on human lives; we find that the scholars are now re-examining the existent theories, and trying to explore the plausible solutions to this worrying problem. The international community in the meanwhile are trying to intervene; so that the warring factions can work out a peaceful resolution, instead of concentrating on finding the clear winner. In this context, we will try to find out whether this change in nature of the world violence as perceived in modern times, is sending out a challenge to the comprehensiveness of the established international relations theories (mainly focussing on the theories of liberalism and realism). Discussion Nature of the modern warfare and its relation with ethnicity and divergent sectarian groups: The end of the Cold War has seen a significant rise in the nature of ethnic, nationalistic, and religious conflicts worldwide, mainly in the region of Eurasia. This period has been marked by a decrease in the number of major wars (like the two World Wars) amongst the developed industrialised countries; however it has also been perceived that there is a change in the nature of violence that predominates the world, in today’s context. Since the 1950s there has been a constant rise in the number of ethno- nationalist civil wars (Wimmer and Min, 2006). One of the major distinctions that can be drawn between the modern wars and those of the pre-World War days is the fact that, in the former there are certain conventions that are followed by the two sides, where the civilians are not affected by the ongoing war. As Kalyvas tells us “modernity is inextricably linked with the attempt, however imperfect, to draw a line between the combatants and civilians, thus limiting violence to the battlefield” (Kalyvas, 2006, 54). Thus, according to this idea, as purported by Kalyvas, the warfare in our recent times are delegated to a group of professional soldiers who represent the civilians on both sides. Historians have further suggested that this change in warfare took place gradually over the centuries and started around 1700 AD and have finally metamorphosed into the modern form that we see today in the twenty first century, where there is there is “a growing antipathy towards cruelty of all kinds” (Garland, 1990, 232). Though the conclusion is to some extent correct, however even a casual glance would show us that in majority of the modern warfare, including that of the interstate wars and the associated wartime illegal occupations, civilians have been indiscriminately targeted. While in cases of intrastate war, it has been seen that civilians play a major role in these campaigns that are more often ethnic and sectarian in nature, thus dispelling the myth that civilians are not affected in the modern day warfare (Nabulsi, 1999). However, with the turn of the century the political violence or the so called wars that we observe, are every different in nature from the conventional wars. A recent change in trend is being noticed where we find that the wartime violence is not anymore a major occurrence between two rival politically divergent states and their professional soldiers; but more instances are coming forward where we observe that the civilians are either victims of violence; or perpetrators of violent acts; and even in some cases, both. Thus, twenty first century political warfare now involves violence, where the state has to fight against a section of its own civic populace that can be delineated in terms of national, ethnic, or even religious differences. Various non-state factors have been seen to attack with increasing frequencies, various state representatives, institutions, and anything that represents the symbol of the state power, but have always avoided direct confrontation with the state maintained professional armies. Thus these non-state factors that are mainly composed of rioters, terrorists, and also insurgents often coming from neighbouring countries with the chief aim of fomenting trouble so as to destabilise the economy and political order of a particular state; are completely different from what we see in trained professional soldiers. This is owing to the fact that not only are these non state actors that take part in these intrastate wars different; but the very nature of this kind of ethnic or sectarian warfare is disparate to the political violence that is observed when two states are involved in a warfare. Though these form of warfare has been in existence since times immemorial, however the decrease in the interstate warfare that involve major state players, have forced the scholars to focus on the conflict that takes place within a state, between the ruling government and various non-state actors that aim to topple the ruling political party in order to take over the reins of that particular state. This has brought in a new wave of interest in the studies of unconventional warfare and the changes that it may cause on the comprehensive theories of international relations, (it may also happen that a second state may find it morally correct to interfere, in order to stop a devastating intrastate violence; while there may be objections from other quarters, which say that what right does one have to interfere in the internal matters of another country) (Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud, 2008). In this context, it is necessary that we take a closer look at the term ‘ethnic or sectarian conflict’ and comprehend the various elements that form a part of this warfare, in order to understand better, the nature and implications of this sort of warfare, both on the state and also on the international theories that claim to be applicable in the context of this modern globalised warfare. Ethnic groups can be defined as a coterie that have been formed on the basis of religious, cultural, language, or biological attributes, which are perceived by the members to be a common characteristic amongst them. Though the factors that unite these ethnic members are not fundamental in nature, they are essentially delineated by a sense of certain degree of shared and common identity. In reviewing historic nature of the term ethnicity, Smith tells us that “the common denominator appears to be the sense of a number of people or animals living together and acting together, though not necessarily belonging to the same clan or tribe” (Smith, 1986, 21) In essentiality, the ‘constructivist view’ that is currently influencing the international relations perceives interaction as the key to a peaceful settlement, putting forth the theory that in this discussion the chief relevant issue should not consist of the term group, “but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable” (Brubaker, 2004, 38). Rising instances of intra-state wars and ethnicity differences: There are various divergent opinions on the issue of whether ethnicity can be the real cause behind the large number of civil war clashes that we see in the post Cold War era. According to Huntington, in the modern twenty first century, the “clashes of the [divergent] civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace” (Huntington, 1996, 321). He has also further added that “In the post-Cold War [the] culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilisation identities, are shaping patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict...[and during this post-Cold War era] the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural” (ibid, 20, 21). The 1979 Iranian civil war or revolution, according to Huntington, had opened up a sort of ‘quasi-war’ between the Islamic and the Christian civilisations, thus heralding the end of the decade long war between the ideologies of communism of the USSR, and capitalism of the US. This view of the ethnic clashes between two disparate civilisations, arise from the basic concept of differentiating between the in-group members and the outsiders, and is rooted firmly in social psychology (ibid, 67). This view is very similar to that what Simmel expressed in 1898, which was later further developed by Coser in 1956, and the application of this theory in international relations has achieved mixed results. This theory locus is on the point where one tries to find out the factors that cause better intra-group cohesion, while also highlighting the agents that help to achieve a breakdown of such intra-group unity. Supporting this theory of sociological psychology in ethnic group formation and clashes, is the opinion expressed by Shaw & Wang, which tell us “Humanity's propensity for war is the outcome of thousands of years of evolution during which cognition and intolerance of out-group members have been shaped by priorities of gene-culture co-evolution” (Shaw & Wang, 1988, 207). Diametrically opposite to the above stated theory of Huntington, is Gurr’s analysis on the concept of intrastate wars. According to him, if we take a look at the most violent ethno-political clashes that had taken place during the 1993-94 period; only 14 had any relevance to the sort of civilisation clashes as Huntington had theorised (Gurr, 1994, 347-377). In his later research paper published in 2000, Gurr further showed that, what many scholars had put forward as a significant increase in ethno-political wars globally after the Cold War era, had actually started during the 1960s, and they in reality they showed a sharp decrease during the mid-1990s. As per Gurr, the cultural conflicts also lost their vigour during the mid 90s, and the ones that occurred were primarily 'fratricidal' in nature, rather than involving two or three divergent civilizations. Gurr, further analysed from his research data that intrastate conflicts that were nationalist in nature during the time period 1989 to 1996, did not become violent in nature, nor did it inflict more casualties than in the wars seen in the pre Cold War era. Gurr showed that while 17 new conflicts did begin during that time period; however there were also 21 conflicts that were successfully closed within the same time frame. Divergent religions, ethnicity, or languages, do not form the instability causing factors, and on close analysis it has been seen that only a small percentage of ethnic clashes actually intensify into great violence; even in ethnically divergent states, as is seen in Russia, Africa, or other Asian countries. Thus, Gurr contends that divergent nature of cultural distinctiveness when combined with composite political or economic grouses becomes the basis of a group movement, which may eventually lead to ethnic clashes or intrastate wars. So Gurr’s theory puts Huntington’s theory at risk, where one automatically questions the authenticity of the divergent nature of the cultural and civilisation that are shown as reasons for the various intra-state wars. Kaufmann in a similar line of argument like that of Gurr, analyses three primary clauses that are necessary for a group mobilisation which could potentially create ethnic or sectarian clashes. First, there must be created certain accounts that would define and delineate the ‘ethnic in-group’, and the ‘out-group’ which would become the in-group’s opponent. Second, the future of the delineated ‘in-group’ has to be secured; this is done in most cases with the ‘in-group’ getting linked to some political element within the state, thus also avoiding civic discrimination. Lastly, there must be available some sort of a territorial base or a homeland, for the ethnic in-group, from they could base their operations. From the above discourse it stands out very clearly that ethnicity does indeed form a major factor in structuring the violent ethnic clashes that we see around us today; while the main debate centres on the issue as to whether the material, structural, or symbolic elements form the primary cause for the sectarian violence within intrastate civil wars. The complex forms that outline the term ‘ethnicity’, mean that an analysis through the state level may not always be deemed suitable to find counter means of handling this rather sensitive issue. In most instances it has been seen that ethnic clashes or sectarian violence primarily take place in regions where international/national borders still remain a matter of contention between two ethnic groups, owing to the lack of foresight of their former colonial rulers. In most cases these borders had been drawn only to help in governance, without keeping in mind the preferences of the local people. The colonial rulers being of foreign origin completely ignored the processes that had helped to create the local, political and ethnic identities, and which should have been taken into context, while drawing the borders. This lack of foresight has not only resulted in fomenting serious internal conflicts (intra-state wars,) but has in many cases spread the sectarian violence across international borders into neighbouring countries, thus making it imperative that we make an analysis of the issue of ethnic conflicts from the aspect of the various theories of international relationships. In this context we will now examine as to whether this worldwide increase in ethnic and sectarian conflicts, together with the rise on intra-state war have a link with the theories of international relationships (realism and liberalism), and pose a challenge to the comprehensiveness of these theories. Ethnicity and realism: Here the main idea would be to focus on “a basic concept from the realist tradition of international relations theory, 'the security dilemma" to the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security” (Barry, 1993, 27). As already discussed, most of the ethnic clashes and intra-state wars have been seen in countries, where after centuries of ruling there has been a breakdown of the imperial authority (in majority of the cases, the rulers were the European imperial colonial powers) and such dissipation of the imperial regime can be seen in the perspective of an emerging anarchic state within the country. With the theory of realism within international relations, one can analyse the consequences of an anarchic state, (a nation without any sovereign head at it helms), for political relations amongst states. As for example in the former state of USSR, after the disappearance of its sovereign head, fell into anarchy, and consequently gave rise to various cultural, ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups. According to the theory of realism, since the focal point is always on acquiring state security and power, thus an anarchic condition makes it imperative that all political concerns should be aimed at achieving national security. Thus as per the theory of realism, there will be an element of competition amongst these ethnically divergent groups, where each one will be eager to reach out for the main key to their security, which is power. This competition more often than not continues to a level, where once one group have amassed so much power that it can afford to threat its rivals, and once threatened the rival groups in most cases respond, thus creating a situation that may escalate into full scale ethnic clash. The realists view this world in the context of a billiards game, where the table forms the international arena; the balls form the various sovereign states and their differential powers. It is well known that in international politics, there are interactions amongst the various states (akin to balls colliding in the billiards game) and from these collisions are created new alliances and equations. This game of international politics is dominated by the world major powers that have sufficient or even surplus resources to attain whatever they aim. In such politics what matters most is how the states interact with their allies and rivals at any given point of time, while the internal matter of any state hardly comes into the picture. Thus, foreign policies are the means through the various states establish their relationships with other states in the global arena. The realists with their tendency to focus on the global arena, and in achieving means to forge a ‘national society’, they overlook the transnational and the supranational aspects of a state. This is very clear when we read what Morgenthau opines “The supranational forces such as universal religions...and [all other organisations] that bind individuals together across national boundaries, are infinitely weaker... than the forces that unite people within particular national boundary and separate them from the rest of the humanity” (cited in Stack, 1997, 18-19). Thus, we find that the emphasis that realism puts on the sovereignty, and military power to protect this sovereignty and thus keep the state secure, and the foreign policy channelling; allows it to overlook the power of ethnicity to structure international politics. Its focus on the state actors and the balance of power, which according to realism, forms a basis for all interstate relations; and combined with the various developmental western theories, makes it lose sight of the various non-state actors that form the various ethnic and sectarian groups within a state. Thus the theory of realism completely disregards the importance that the factor of ethnicity can have on the minds of the civic populace of a nation, while influencing national, regional, and even global level politics. It is for this very reason realism failed to observe the rising influences of ethnicity in the Eurasian states and also in other parts of the world. The emergence of various ethnic forces in Northern Ireland, Germany, France and Spain was something which the realists did not apprehend, thus finding it troublesome. Thus we find that realism’s stress on state power and achievements of national interests, have completely failed to deal with or even anticipate the rise of ethnicity in various parts of the Eurasian continent, or in other parts of the world. In view of these shortcomings, Nye and Keohane in 1972 had proposed a theory where they had integrated transnational relations into the dominion of world politics; thus promoting the inclusion of various non-state actors into the study of international relationships (1972, ix- xxix). In the modern context, “notwithstanding the reservations of some realists, transnational relations, especially in the areas of bureaucratic and non-governmental relations, seem to have initiated a new era of global interactions” (Stack, 1997, 21). Liberalism and ethnic conflicts: Under liberalism, we find that it gives emphasis on the state preferences and holds it as the primary factor in determining the behaviour of a state. In realism we have seen that the state forms the sole unitary actor within the realms of world politics; whereas liberalism allows the interplay of various other factors, like cultural aspects, and also economic aspects. Thus, one can say that “Liberal theory thereby rejects the utopian notion of an automatic harmony of interest among individuals and groups in society...Patterns of political order and conflict result from the variations in the underlying pattern of interaction in pursuit of these preferences for material and ideal welfare. As an empirical matter, societal demands so conflictual that social actors are likely to consider coercion as an acceptable means to promote them tend to be associated with three factors: divergent fundamental beliefs [ideational], scarcity of material goods [commercial], and inequalities in political power [republican liberalism]” (Moravcsik, 2003, 162). However, though the liberalists accept the notion of cultural divergence in our societies, and also allow the interplay of various non-state factors in the world politics, they too do not place much premium on this dimension, and merely see it as “recessive, readily explained by immigrant experience, but essentially transitional”(Moynihan, 1993, 27). Here Anthony Smith tells us that liberalism always believed that when a state moves from it ethnic or tribal origins, to an industrial and post industrial social structure, all the associated ethnic characteristics would gradually and naturally become obsolete (Smith, 1981, 2). As Stack frames it “the inexorable process of economic growth that liberalism champions will result in the proliferation of the rational and universal values of capitalism, which are antithetical to the pre-modern basis of ethnicity” (Stack, 1997, 14). Liberalism also believed that once a state having ethnic origins, established worldwide communication with other countries, the ethnic aspect would naturally disappear; since the people would be more attracted towards other societies around the world. It also believed that the concept of nation-state taking care of the primary needs of the state residents would be rendered obsolete with time, and there would a global economic world where all would show obeisance towards the institutions that represent world capitalism (Smith, 1981, 2-4). Thus, it is very evident that liberalism, though acknowledging ethnicity to a certain extent, like realism also decided to overlook its importance as a potential major factor in the domain of world politics and power. The very attributive and exclusive nature of ethnicity shows the deep chasm that lie between it and the positivist theories (enlightenment theory) pertaining to international relations. Both realism and liberalism feel that the factor of ethnicity is something out of the pre-modern era, which has the potential of taking back man and society into the so called “dark middle ages’, where irrationality, and non-intellectual thoughts and beliefs held sway. It is for this very reason, that the western scholars looked on with fear and dismay, as the Eurasian and African subcontinents plunged into a vortex of ethnic and sectarian clashes after the WII. Another very perplexing question that troubled these scholars of the realism and liberalism ideologies is that why did the ethnicity factor become so important suddenly at the turn of this century, instead of rearing its head 50-60 years earlier, and if ethnicity is indeed an important factor why did it suddenly appear now with such a vengeance. Here Connor in his research paper (1994) provides an answer to this puzzling question. He tells us that this aspect of nationalism is dependent on the time factor; and a consciousness of pride in one’s own nationalism or ethnicity takes time to seep down from the elite upper classes to the general populace, and this process often takes centuries. Thus Connor proposes that that the consciousness and pride in one’s own national identity is not one isolated factor, but is a continuous process and has developed continuously over the centuries. Ethnicity rises from a sense of belongingness to one’s own cultural roots, and “these congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz, 1973, 259). It is this sense of belongingness and the power in one’s sense of pride in his cultural and ethnic roots, which both realism and liberalism failed to anticipate in the domain of international relations. Thus, it is imperative that in the modern context, we change our outlook and create theories or alter the existing ones form new ones that would be more inclusive and would allow the non-state factors (like diverse religious and ethnic factors) to play their roles in world politics. Here it would be important to take heed of what Nelson Kasfir had analysed on ethnic political participation almost a decade ago, “1) particular objective indicators associated with common ancestry 2) become the focus of subjective participations amongst both members within the unit and by non-members 3) through social solidarity created by a resurgence, or the fictive creation, of traditional unity, 4) so that in certain situations political participation will occur” (Kasfir, 1979, 373). Conclusion From the above discourse it is very clear that the recent proliferation of ethnic and sectarian conflict, together with the rise on intra-state war, does indeed pose a challenge to the comprehensiveness of international relations theories (realism and liberalism). It is time that we bring forth a more inclusive perspective that would include the various ethnic and sectarian (all kinds of non-state factors) agents into the political power play, thus giving all a fair role in the world of international politics. Bibliography Barry, P. 1993. The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. Survival, 35 (Spring), 27– 47. Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. “Ethnicity Without Groups”. In, Andreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. Horowitz, Ulrike Joras, and Conrad Schetter (eds.) Facing Ethnic Conflict: Toward a new Realism, 34—52. Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 38. Connor, W. 1994. Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 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