Children and Childhood in Western Society - Essay Example

Children and Childhood in Western Society Introduction Each society has its own criteria and definition of what makes a child. Not one definition can be said to be precise because the word ‘child’ has a social significance that varies depending on the context in which it is used (Goldston, 1997). Generally speaking though, concepts of children conjure up definitions that relate them to norms – i.e., the adults – and notions of a group exhibiting a wide range of dependence (Lucy 1994). Historically speaking, childhood has been inextricably linked with schooling which in turn has always had a strong influence on children and childhood since its inception (Cunningham 1995). Aries (1962), the first to analyse the construction of childhood, contended that the concept of childhood separate from adulthood emerged during the 15th to 18th century when institutions for the care of children were created. With mass schooling becoming compulsory in the 1880s, education became a pivotal role in children’s lives. Initially, the construct of education – the curricula, the materials, how learning is organized, etc. – was grounded on the predominant perceptions of childhood. And since mass schooling was first introduced where the industrial revolution first took hold – i.e., in the West – the Western perspective was very much the norm; it remained so even as compulsory education was exported to other countries of differing cultures. The predominately Western perspective remains much in evidence today. It is also, as has traditionally been, referenced on theories of child development that focus on how children acquire knowledge – that is, through progression in stages and with the acknowledgement that children are biologically, socially, emotionally, and intellectually immature. Education, of course, has continually evolved but the underlying theories with which each improvement was premised remains largely the same. The choice of education as a starting point for discussion was not arbitrary. Since education became central to childhood, the family no longer played as pivotal a role as it did in the Middle Ages; in fact, school regimens were even imposed on the family’s social structure (Kyle 1999). That is, the concepts of childhood construction underlying structure, principles and practice of education also underlies how children are perceived and treated in the family and indeed in the society. It then becomes important to examine how these perceptions and the consequent construction of children and childhood fare today. The influx of migration towards Western society, the greater accessibility of media, and the wealth of literature made available about various other nations, make us increasingly aware of the varying cultures different to and even contrasting our Western views. The assumptions upon which orthodox constructions were built upon have been questioned in light of this. The traditional notions of childhood and children especially have been widely critiqued and deconstructed as their inadequacies began to reveal a construction that runs counter to the recent move towards the conceptual emancipation of children. Particularly, traditional notions failed to take into consideration social and cultural diversity; this essay ponders on why that is problematic. Critiques will reveal to us the need for a new paradigm that will be able to answer the revolutionary trend of seeing children apart from how adults view them that has, in effect, confine them. The developmental theory Foucault’s ‘regime of truth’ articulated that where institutions such as psychology and pedagogy are concerned, discourses are linked to the disciplines and practices that dictate the conduct of those who work within those institutions (Jones et al 2005). Where children and education practices are concerned, those discourses have traditionally been dominated by child development theory, the basis of which is developmental psychology (Dockett YEAR). Indeed, the modern philosophy of the current British national curriculum and the Early Years Foundation Stage (2007) are largely grounded on developmental psychology influenced by stage-based theorists, foremost of these is Piaget. This theory views the development of children as a linear progression, moving from one supposed stage to another, that they passed through at certain chronological ages (Moss & Harre 1990). The theory underpins the practice which, after observation, is compared to statistical information from which childhood ‘norms’ are then assumed – i.e., the results give rise to notions regarding what children should be doing and at what point. As Piaget emphasised, children have been provided with opportunities that promote active learning. This was underscored by Piaget’s concept of a ‘young scientist’, which positions children as busily exploring their world to construct their own representations and understandings of the external world. An offshoot of this, and which serves as a good example for examining the concept, is the chance of free play. Critics though have questioned the validity of free play (Jones et al 2005): how much autonomy do children have to effect free play? How meaningful is free when it is sanctioned and the resources are provided for by adults? This is largely dependent on the decisions of adults of course, but that notion is enough to leave us with doubts whether free play is indeed free. Consequently, it raises questions as to how much autonomy children have in exploring and constructing an understanding of their own world. As we have doubtlessly observed in institutions, adults dictate what can be and cannot be learned. Therefore, such explorations are in fact confined and limited. Development psychology focuses on the individual learning and development of the child which has been derived from the understanding that children mature through a progression of stages of development towards a goal of achieving adult skills. Mayall (1996) believes this makes development psychology both individualist and universalist: it is individualist because it takes only the child into account independent of their surroundings; and universalist because the truths it wants to convey aim to apply to all children. This discourse recognizes that children are ‘biologically vulnerable’ and as such needs adult supervision and provision. The notion certainly has good points; in fact, it underpins the fundamentals upon which child care and children’s rights were built upon. But there is also the side to it that critics found problematic: adults translate children’s ‘biological vulnerability’ to another sort of vulnerability – that which confines children to a position that makes them inferior to and dependent on adults. This is what Mayall (1996) confirmed as ‘socially constructed vulnerability’ which undermines children’s political, social, and economic power by making them out to be weak and needy and denying them agency. The theoretical problems The first problem to the theory of development psychology is that it attempted to reduce development – a complex process – into simple and quantifiable representations through the concept of stages (Dahlberg et al, 1999). Moreover, by quantifying into stages the development of children, it attempts to generalize understanding by seeking to confine it to universal truths (Dahlberg et al, 1999). In other words, it sees the child as an individual instead of within the context of society, culture, politics, and economy (Kessen 1993). Mayall (2003) criticized the idea of individualizing children by arguing that in so doing, policy makers are able to apportion blame for dysfunction and laying it onto the child rather than the social framework that should have been established to support the child. A good example to highlight this may be abstracted from the documentary The abandoned children of Bulgaria. The mental and physical infirmities of the children were seen as their disease. Whilst it may be true that the fact that the government institutionalized them should mean that the government took responsibility for them, the way the children were treated and the appalling conditions in which they reside were clear indications that the institution was merely a repository for something unwanted, not much different from a sanitary landfill. While it may shock our sensibilities that such an atrocity is actually widespread in Bulgaria, we should also take into consideration that their norms are different from ours; this is evident in the actions of the nurses which indicates that they perceive nothing wrong in the practices at the institution. Even so, the dominant perception of child development to which we presently ascribe to and which individualizes the child is no different from that of Bulgaria’s which, in their case, resulted to them blaming the children’s dysfunction on the children themselves. This will also be gleaned from the following discussion wherein the concept of ‘normal’ gives rise to the concept of ‘abnormal’. The theory of linear progression or stages is also explicitly normative where those who deviate from the theory are deemed to be not normal (Cannella, 1997). Whilst this presumption of ‘norms’ garners for children their ‘much needed additional support’ (Powell 2007), there is, too, the distinction that those who do not fit the norm are labelled, and oftentimes discriminated, as ‘abnormal’ (MacNaughton 2005). Apart from becoming a stigma, the labels attached to, say misbehaving, children makes abnormality a foregone conclusion that it is dubious whether these children have been or will be given the chance to explain their non-conforming behaviours and attitudes (Penn 2005). Instead, those deemed abnormal because they digress from what is assumed to be typical are segregated and relegated to the peripheral of orthodox education. In this regard, having one dominant approach to pedagogy emphasises how all children are not valued equally as the rhetoric of Early Years Foundation Stage (2007) insists. The normative approach is also seen to privilege specific ways of thinking wherein abstract thought is regarded as the advanced way of thinking and understanding. That is, development is a progress towards abstract thought, the process implying a hierarchical system whereby children are seen to be moving from a ‘less to a more adequate way of thinking’ (Lubeck, 1996, p.157). Clearly, the practice justifies enforcing upon children particular outcomes for them to fit the norm. The EYFS (2007), despite having made a profound assertion of not being didactic as it is allegedly not based on stages, was nevertheless criticized because, as with primary pedagogic approach, it similarly demands ‘particular outcomes’ (Cannella 1997). The concept of progression does not only leave the children who cannot keep up with their peers behind. It also underscores how, in a general and universal manner, children are far behind adults; in fact, the innocent and intellectually-inferior children are the obverse to incisive adults (Cannella 1997). The underlying assumption then is that with age and size comes superior understanding despite the fact that a lot of adults still further their education in later years (Smidt 2006). This construct evidently places power in the hands of the adult, their position bestowing upon them the voice to advocate for children’s needs and the obligation to dispense only with knowledge they deem safe enough not to compromise children’s innocence (Smidt 2006). Gittins (1978) have argued that putting children in such a position makes them vulnerable precisely because of their dependence. That is, adults are in the position to impose their will upon children which may, in the long run and despite pro-children rhetoric, effectively silence the voice of the child and compromise the rights that frameworks such as those of the UNCRC (1989) have set out to value, like children’s autonomy and opinions. Another problem to developmental psychology is that, in being general and universal, it aims to be value-free; that is, it aspires to be objective instead of subjective. Cannella (1997), however, reveals that this concept is in fact gender- and status- biased. As men made the initial study, it was thus subject to the assumption that men are able to make a more unemotional and therefore scientific observation of children compared to women whose views tend to be more personalised. Men are also biased in thinking that they are intellectually superior to the object of their study and position women as well as children as their subordinates. As well as the gender bias, social disparity also coloured the earlier observations. Europe’s upper class gentry, in studying those they consider ‘in deficit’ (compared to them) to understand the subject better, concluded that the deficit, such as immaturity in children or the impoverished, is not a consequence of social circumstances but rather a human trait (Canella 1997). We tend to believe the truths revealed to us by science (Cannella 1997) and in both cases, arguments gained adherents because the findings were inferred to be scientific. Barron et al. (2005) also challenged the scientific underpinnings of traditional psychology, arguing that the results, apart from the basis, of the theory were not altogether sincere and un-biased. Barron further highlights how science cannot always be replicated and thus fails to reveal what we expect it to reveal. We tend to accept as truth what has been proven with science or scientific reasoning (Smidt 2006). But developing pedagogic approaches based on the scientific truths we have just covered now seem problematic because in the first place, the argument of it being scientific and therefore truth has collapsed under the criticism that it does not, in fact, reveal what it believed to reveal. The biases undercut the truth and prove only Foucault’s (YEAR) assertion that ‘truth is a human invention, possibly a Western illusion’. Another problem with the dominant discourse on child development is that it did not recognize that the theory was, in itself, not absolute fact but rather a cultural construction; that is, the theory stem from a particular context that reflects a particular, however dominant, cultural practice (Burman, 1994, Woodhead, 1997). Those who conceptualize the basis and assumptions that provide the fundamentals for the theories which we have since then accepted are in fact subject to the biases inherent within cultures and societies within which they were created. The understanding of the initial proponents and even those that succeed them were also confined and reflects the patterns of understanding prevalent and dominant in their society. Because of long practice and conventions, what was cultural could easily be taken, and in this case mistaken, for natural. In a world that has come to recognize diversity, these notions prove to be seriously insufficient. Social constructivism: the importance of society and culture on children construction The common thread that binds the above problems which undermine developmental psychology was actually the aim to uncover a truth that will make it a general statement applicable to all children. In light of the recognition of human diversity in terms of society and culture, the dominant perspective seems strangely myopic. Critics have for some decades now challenged this view claiming that children, too, are participants in the society (Mayall 2003). As such, they help shape the society and are in turn shaped by the circumstances within (James, Jenks and Prout 1998). This concept of society shaping children is elaborated by Vygotsky (1978) wherein he argues that each society has its own beliefs and practices about how the world operates. This knowledge resides in their history and developed throughout the generations. Moreover, each society’s knowledge, beliefs and practices are also found within customs and traditions that are passed on to the current generation, who subsequently participate in the continued development. Vygotsky (1978) views the child to be learning on two ‘planes’, one is at the interpersonal level and the other is on the intrapersonal level. The interpersonal learning process is when a child acquires knowledge from the society; intrapersonal, on the other hand, refers to the child’s own processing of the acquired knowledge. As opposed to child development view, Vygotsky’s alternative theory gives credit to the ‘child’s independent abilities’ achieved through interactions and the guidance of adults (Seifert 1993, p. 18). Rogoff (2003) agreed that understanding development largely depends upon contextualizing it with regard to the culture and circumstance of the community in which it is defined and recognizing that these too change. Furthermore, Rogoff views development where transformations take place: individuals transform in their roles and communities consequently being transformed. Rogoff’s theory may be said to have expanded the contentions made by Vygotsky in that another plane is revealed in the development of the child and that is the socio-cultural context wherein interaction occurs. That is, the participation that led to transformation is part of the process that shapes the development of the child as he or she interacts with adults (on the interpersonal level) and gives these meaning (at the intrapersonal plane). According to Rogoff (1990), development cannot be universal; rather, a child’s development is highly determined by the acquisition of the knowledge and skills important to the child and not what the general community imposed. Rogoff (1990) stresses this is not an aimless development; adults, through interpersonal exchange with learning children, guides development towards certain goals and skills. Although child development psychology predominates in practice such as in schools, the increasing influx of migration has given this new paradigm of social constructivism a greater audience and adherents. One way that schools thought to compromise with western pedagogic practices is through the social ‘add on’ theory that was also introduced by Rogoff (2003). Essentially, the practice calls for some reference to cultural diversity whilst practicing mainstream childhood education. Admittedly, this does answer the claims in the EFYS (2007) outcomes that diversity of cultures must be recognized and valued. In a U.K. setting for instance wherein a Chinese community also has settled, lessons on Chinese culture will be ‘added on’ to the curriculum. But to do so raises the question whether it is really in recognition of a culture made relevant with the presence of a different community – the Chinese in this case – or if it is merely adding on for the sake of conforming to a new mandated practice. Adding it on also raises the concern about how other students, who have not experienced it, can fully understand the cultural practice. Institutional intersubjectivity in this case was seen more as institution fitting in ‘with the culturally and linguistically diverse’ (Fleer 2006). More than merely adding on different cultural groups, Rogoff visualizes a new model wherein cultural groups belonging to the community are ‘woven into a new form’ of educational practice (Fleer 2006). Fleer (2006) envisions this new model to emphasise childhood development as a process involving culture, society and the individual. Conclusion In examining social constructivism theories, we will note that the arguments suggest that not only is consideration of the socio-cultural context important to the development of the child, so is the child’s goals. This approach would certainly complement and underpin the rhetoric that gives children the right to voice their opinions and to choose. It certainly contrasts with the notion of stages as this new theories neither underscore the same rigidity nor does it universalizes expected outcomes. What they underscore is learning within the society, using the tools of society, with the goals being specific to what the individual values. The normative aspect inherent in developmental psychology is also absent, emphasising instead the uniqueness of what each society can teach the child. Whether it is gender-bias, status-bias, or neither depends on the culture and is not imposed from outside that culture where development takes place. It is also not subject to the failings of perceived ‘scientific truths’ as it does not claim to be universal; i.e., one community’s practice could very well be different from another but it does not say that one is either the right or wrong practice. In a discourse, social constructivism stands up well on its own and can especially challenge the prevailing notions of child development that we, in these modern times, have found to be somehow inadequate. But child development psychologically is deeply entrenched in how we view children and profoundly influential in our educational systems. Moreover, additional research is required before a final conclusion can validate this new paradigm. The important lesson, however, is that we as adults are increasingly aware of the need to view children as citizens with rights and we should strive to conceptually liberate children. Thus will begin a new transformation in our and children’s participation in the community. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aries, P (1962), Centuries of childhood. A social history of family life, Vintage Books, New York. Cannella, GS (1997), Deconstructing early childhood education: Social justice and revolution, Peter Lang, New York. Cunningham, H (1995), Children and childhood in western society since 1500, Longman, New York. Cunningham, H (2003), ‘Children’s changing lives from 1800 to 2000’, in J Maybin & M Woodhead (eds) 2003, Childhoods in context, John Wiley, Chichester, pp. 82-123. Dahlberg, G, Moss, P, & Pence, A (1999), Beyond quality in early childhood education and care. Post modern perspectives, Falmer Press, London. Department for Education and Skills 2007, Early Years Foundation Stage, Department of Education and Skills viewed April 2, 2009 http://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/eyfs/site/1/2.htm Fleer, M (2006), ‘The cultural construction of child development: creating institutional and cultural intersubjectivity’, International Journal of Early Years Education, vol. 14, no. 2, June 2006, pp. 127–140 Goldson, B (1997), ‘Childhood: An introduction to historical and theoretical analyses’, in P Scraton (ed.) 1997, ‘Childhood’ in ‘Crisis’?, UCL Press, London. James, A, Jenks, C, and Prout, A (1998), Theorizing childhood, Polity, Cambridge. Kyle, N (1999), ‘Reconstructing childhood’, in D Meadmore, B Burnett & P O’Brien (eds), Understanding Education: Contexts and agendas for the new millennium, Prentice Hall, Frenchs Forest, pp.18−25. Lucy, S (1994), ‘Children in early medieval cemeteries’, Archaeological Review from Cambridge, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 21-32. Mayall, B (2003), Sociologies of childhood and educational thinking. Professorial lecture, Institute of Education, University of London, London. Penn, H (2005), Understanding Early Childhood: Issues and Controversies, OUP, Maidenhead. Rogoff, B (1990), Apprenticeship in thinking. Cognitive development in social context, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Rogoff, B (2003), The cultural nature of development, Oxford University Press, Oxford Seifert, K (1993) ‘Cognitive development and early childhood education’, in B Spodek (ed.) Handbook of research on the education of young children, Macmillan, New York, pp. 9–23. Smidt, S (2006), The Developing Child in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective on Child Development, Routledge, London. United Nations (1989), ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’, UN General Assembly Document A/RES/44/25. Vygotsky, L (1978) Mind in society, Harvard University Press, New York. Those that need details: Docket (NO YEAR) Moss and Herre 1990 Jones et al 2005 Kessen 1993 Powell 2007 Lubeck 1996 Barron 2005 Foucault (NO YEAR) Burman 1994 Woodhead 1997 Read More