Analysis Fire Investigation in Scarborough Civic Hall - Report Example

SCARBOROUGH CIVIC HALL FIRE INCIDENT FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT Incident Number: Date of Incident: 05/12/03 Time of Call: 0311.26 Date & Time Investigation Commenced: Trade/Business: Public Hall 1. INTRODUCTION AND CURRICULUM VITAE 1.1 I am KHALFAN ALMAZROOEI employed by Abu Dhabi Fire and Rescue Service (ADFRS) as a watch manager, my current role is that of Incident Intelligence Officer, I have been employed by AD Fire and Rescue Service since 2006. My role is to support and conduct the investigation of fire in Abu Dhabi, but my government decided to send me to the UK to learn more and get experience because I have completed all Fire Services statutory promotion exams and have successfully completed Fire investigation courses at Service Training Centre. Furthermore, I have Bachelors in Fire Safety and Risk Management, which include fire investigation. Thus, my function is to investigate the fires involving fatalities, serious injury, high financial loss, and those of criminal arson. By the way, I was asked to attend fire incident, which was occurred at the Scarborough Civic Hall as a new mission to do fire investigation procedure. I was posted to Scarborough, which is a small village within the jurisdiction of Scarborough Fire and Rescue department, when I was told to investigate and report on the Scarborough Civic Hall fire incident. 1.2 The information and diagrams that are mentioned within this paper can be found in Appendix A. 1.3 The opinions, comments and views that are expressed in this report are based on the information provided at the time of compilation. This means that additional information requires alteration or amending of the report. 2.0 DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES 2.1 The building is a single storey that is utilized as a public amenity, and was constructed in 1965. The building with a floor dimension of 36m by 22m is utilised for catering facilities, recreation facilities, and a licensed bar. The building was constructed with laminated timber portal frame that had framed walls, fibre boarding to the inside and cedar boarding to the outside while the internal wall linings was plaster bard supported with glass fibre fill. The roof was built with superimposed layers of bitumen felt timber particle board, and the floor was made of concrete. 2.2 Lightning was important in the building because it was mostly used for recreational activities. The main area was illuminated by six double fluorescent (hung down from each end of the ceiling), nine glass pendant lights that hung from the ceiling in sets of three, and each fitting had nine bulbs, eight one in total. The stage lights were fitted to the scaffolding that was around four meters from the edge of the stage. The entire lightning system was controlled from an elevated platform that was made of timber while it could be accessed by the use of Jacobs Ladder (Figure 7 cross section). 2.3 The building was severed with water and main gas that was used to heat the building (powered the heating system). 2.4 The primary source of heat was the two walls mounted and a fan assisted heater. The other heater that was located at the main hall was defective, and this problem was rectified by introduction of a wall mounted electric heater that was located in the bar area. 2.5 Polyurethane foam sittings were located in the building. Polyurethane foam chairs were stacked in the cloakroom (110 chairs), main hall (200 in piles of ten), and bar lounge (50). Formica tables with measures of 1.3m by 0.66 m were located in the bar language and main hall. Six more chairs and stools were in the building. 2.6 Christmas decorations were placed in the building and between the hall and the bar lounge, draping with fabric was positioned. At the either side of the stage, two-2 meter large Christmas trees were situated. Other decorations within the building included streamers and tinsel that hung from the ceiling. The Green Room was a stored that was used to store stage propping, clothes, three carpets and other miscellaneous items. 2.7 Six plastic bells hanged from the ceiling were the largest decorations. 2.8 Generally, there were numerous furniture and fittings that could have contributed to the extent in which the fire burnt. 3.0 TYPE OF INCIDENT 3.1 The fire incident was reported at 0311.11 hours on Saturday 6th December 2003 by Mrs. Earnshaw who observed the incident from her bedroom window. She saw flames in are near the entrance pf the South East part of the building. 3.2 No body was in the building because the Caretaker had secured the building at 0255 hours. However, at 0306 hours an intruder alarm system went off and Frank Davies was contacted by ADT alarm call centre. 3.3 The call was received by Scarborough Fire and Rescue Service (nine calls were received), two appliances from station P730 were released, and Assistant Divisional Officer Smith was informed. 3.4 A total of nine calls were made and the first been at 0311.11 to the Civic Market Street Scarborough. 3.5 It took four minutes for the appliances to reach the incident area, and while travelling, the crews planned how they will operate. 3.6 The key holder had approached the building through the entrance off Market Street and opposite the war memorial. The appliances approached the scene area through Industry Street and Milford, and the tracks were packed in the car par behind the premises halfway down a building that was adjacent to the exit doors. 3.7 The first appliance reached the incident at 0321.56 hours (figure 1 General Location Map), and was situated at the car park adjacent to the external double fire exit doors (Figure 5 Rear Elevation). 3.8 At attendance was ADO Smith, Leading Fire-fighter Brown, and Sub Officer Jones. Sub Officer Jones through instructions from Fire-fighter Brown prompted ‘made pumps 4’, and the message was timed at 0322.54 hours. 3.9 Fire fighters Brown and Dodson knew that the fire had fully developed, but Fire-fighters Gordon, Laycock, and O’Riley, ADO Smith and Sub Officer Jones believed otherwise. 3.10 A Northerly wind had been reported blowing approximately at 5mph. This wind may have contributed to worsening of the situation. 3.11 Through the North gable elevation, a former fighter who was a key holder directed them to an entrance that was adjacent to the kitchen (Gable Elevation 2, Floor Plan). When he entered the building, he saw the fire in the main hall and realised the blue room door was ajar and this is usually not possible because of rules and regulations in place. 3.12 The Key Holder informed Fire fighter O’Riley that he had observed fire in the main hall, and the fire had developed. However, he never fully said the extent of the fire. 3.13 Appliance P731 was booked 1.12 after appliance P730, and approached the incident through Market Street. The appliance P731 was parked within the view of P730 on the South West corner. 3.14 Sub Officer Lobby directed Fire-fighters Oaks and Mores to secure a water supply and fight the fire from the inside. 3.15 ADO Smith directed Sub Officer Jones to access and attempt to locate, fight the fire while he was assessing the incident walking towards the appliance P731. Sub Officer Jones entered the building through the door unlocked by the key holder, opened high levelled window to allow the smoke to vent out. 3.16 Sub Officer Jones instructed a BA team (with air on) to enter the building with a hose reel, locate and the fight the fire. At the same time, Leading Fire fighter Brown with the help of Fire fighter Laycock obtained a water supply. 3.17 The Key Holder directed the BA team to enter the main hall building and the team carried a Dragon Light, Delta Brach fitted hose reel, and Motorola MT2100 set on ‘Channel 1’. 3.18 The leader of this BA team and who carried the radio was Fire fighter Oaks while Fire fighter Mores carried the Dragon Light. Figure 10 shows the route that was followed by this team. 3.19 When the team entered the building they realised the visibility had decreased to a half a meter while the temperatures was getting hotter. However, they did not see any flame but they believed that they had heard fire travelling above their heads. 3.20 Sub Officer Lobby informed Sub Officer Jones that the fire had developed well inside the kitchen. At this time, ADO Smith ordered the Breathing Apparatus Team to withdraw because he had observed the extent of the fire. Moreover, when the orders had been passed that, the fire fighters should evacuate the building; the temperatures were very hot while the visibility had decreased to negligible. 3.21 ADO Smith directed Fire fighter O’Connor at 0328.53 hours to make six pumps. 3.22 A message was sent out at 0332.26 hours stating that the BA had been withdrawn while the approach that was been utilised in tackling the incident was ‘defensive’ 3.23 The time span between the arrival of appliance P730 at 0321.56 and the time the ‘defensive’ mode had been activated at 0332.26was just ten minutes and thirty seconds; this ten minutes was the period that the driver had sent assistance message re-positioned the appliance and utilised the hose reel. 3.24 A total of two appliances were released from P73 3.25 Generally, the message was sent and entire process may e assumed that it took approximately 7 minutes 3.26 The time can be summarised as: ADO Smith requested for Aerial Appliance at 0342.47 hours He requested for the EPU at 0342.53 hours The sector command was established at 0349.46 hours DO Bowerman was incident commander at0409.06 hours The stop message was sent at 0608.54 hours 4. SITUATION PRIOR TO DISCOVERY 4.1 At 0255 the Caretaker (David Moreton) secured the building 4.2 The hall had been used for a talent contest on the previous evening 4.3 An intruder alarm system went off at 0306 hours, and the fire incident was immediately reported after this distress call. 5. DISCOVERY OF FIRE 5.1 Mrs. Earnshaw saw the fire incident from her bedroom window and thus she raised the alarm. 5.2 Mrs. Earnshaw observed the flames in the main entrance at the South East corner of the hall. 5.3 David, the Caretaker, came and discovered the fire and alerted the fire and rescue department who had already respondent 5.4 He guided the fire fighters and providing them with access to the building. 5.5 Smoke was seen issuing from the building where the appliances had been packed. 5.6 The Keyholder had seen fire development since the flames was showing under the eaves and at a roof vent. 5.7 The Keyholder told Fire Fighter O’Reiley that he saw fir in the main hall and he said that he thought the flame was situated in the South East Corner of the hall. However, he never expounded on the idea. 5.8 The crew appliance observed fire development n the bar lounge area and main foyer 5.9 Sub Officer Jones saw some light smoke in the ceiling level of the kitchen, but never understood its adversity. 6. AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED 6.1 Numerous theories have been provided to determine the cause of the paper but there is no definite region where the fire started. 7. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE 7.1 The fire was able to develop first resulting to its entire destruction because of availability of combustible material and the fact that these combustibles were stacked together reaching stacks of ten. 7.2 The polyurethane chairs are flammable and may have contributed to the speed in which the fire developed. The chairs were distributed into the rooms include polyurethane in the main hall, cloakroom, and bar lounge. Six of these chairs had been placed on the high level lighting platform. 7.3 The building was constructed of laminated timber, cedar and fibre boarding, and had been painted with vanish, and thus such vanishes are vulnerable to fire incidents. 7.4 The roof of he building had been constructed with timber particle board that had been superimposed layers of bitumen felt. 7.5 The lighting system was wanting since the six double fluorescent tubes were hanging from the roof, the lightning system was fitted to a scaffolding, he building was served by main gas and numerous heaters were in the building. 7.6 The openings between the main hall and bar lounge had fabric drapes while in the building there were two decorated large artificial Christmas trees. Moreover, there were additional decorations that included streamers and tinsel that hung fro the roof of the building. 7.7 In the Green Room, there were miscellaneous items that included clothes and carpets and may have contributed n fire development, and the flying gallery that was above the stage had fabric backdrops. 8. CAUSES CONSIDERED Electrical Defects 8.1 A reoccurring problem was associated with four 32-amp circuit breaks. 8.2 On 3rd December, the Caretaker had called a technician who inspected the electrical system, and acknowledge that the electrical installation would work well. 8.3 The major fault that was linked to the electrical system is the portable lights that were connected in such a way that the weight of the supply cables was supported by the plug conductor clamp; it be concluded that this electrical approach strained the supply cables and may have contributed to the frequent circuit breakers to trip. 8.4 A technician, Mr. Arnold Addis admitted that one of the stages light had tripped during the show, and this problem was resolved through plugging the light into another spare electrical socket. 8.5 There were allegations that after the trip, the circuit breakers were tempered with, and Dave Moreton claimed that he had a buzzing noise while he was clearing up the show. Building Security 8.6 The intruder alarm system went off at 0306 hours, and it may be assumed the intruder may have caused or contributed towards causing the fire. Moreover, this can be substantiated by the fact that when Frank opened the door to let the fire fighters enter, he noted that the internal fire exit that was linked to the blue room was ajar, and stated that this situation was unusual. Heating Systems 8.7 One of the gas-heating units was reported to be defective, and two walled mounted gas heaters were present but the Caretaker stated that he had switched them off. Moreover, there was a disagreement between Frank Davies and Dave Moreton when they did not state clearly whether the electric heater was functioning but Dave Moreton stated that the heater was working but Frank Davies stated that the heater was not working. Smoking Materials 8.8 People were allowed to smoke in the bar lounge and ashtrays had been provide. Additionally, there were three plastic swing that the smokers may have dropped cigarette tubs, which are outside the bar store and gents toilets, and adjacent to the entrance foyer. 9.0 CONCLUSION 9.1 No specific details that can point the fire either has been caused accidental or was caused by arson attack. 9.2 The fire was reported in the early hours of 6th December 2003, after a talent show had been completed while the Caretaker secured the building. 9.3 The details and outcome of the investigations indicates that the main cause of the fire could have been smoking, electrical or heating system. This is because people were allowed to smoke; some electrical heater was not switched off while the electricity tripped continuously because of overload. 9.4 Since the time the fire fighters arrived at the site, and the time that they left it only took about seven minutes, however, the building was completely destroyed (demolished because it was a threat to the society). 9.5 The fire department reported at the most convenient time and they employed strategies to ensure the fire is put off. Read More

SITUATION PRIOR TO DISCOVERY 4.1 At 0255 the Caretaker (David Moreton) secured the building 4.2 The hall had been used for a talent contest on the previous evening 4.3 An intruder alarm system went off at 0306 hours, and the fire incident was immediately reported after this distress call. 5. DISCOVERY OF FIRE 5.1 Mrs. Earnshaw saw the fire incident from her bedroom window and thus she raised the alarm. 5.2 Mrs. Earnshaw observed the flames in the main entrance at the South East corner of the hall. 5.3 David, the Caretaker, came and discovered the fire and alerted the fire and rescue department who had already respondent 5.

4 He guided the fire fighters and providing them with access to the building. 5.5 Smoke was seen issuing from the building where the appliances had been packed. 5.6 The Keyholder had seen fire development since the flames was showing under the eaves and at a roof vent. 5.7 The Keyholder told Fire Fighter O’Reiley that he saw fir in the main hall and he said that he thought the flame was situated in the South East Corner of the hall. However, he never expounded on the idea. 5.8 The crew appliance observed fire development n the bar lounge area and main foyer 5.

9 Sub Officer Jones saw some light smoke in the ceiling level of the kitchen, but never understood its adversity. 6. AREA WHERE THE FIRE STARTED 6.1 Numerous theories have been provided to determine the cause of the paper but there is no definite region where the fire started. 7. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRE 7.1 The fire was able to develop first resulting to its entire destruction because of availability of combustible material and the fact that these combustibles were stacked together reaching stacks of ten. 7.2 The polyurethane chairs are flammable and may have contributed to the speed in which the fire developed.

The chairs were distributed into the rooms include polyurethane in the main hall, cloakroom, and bar lounge. Six of these chairs had been placed on the high level lighting platform. 7.3 The building was constructed of laminated timber, cedar and fibre boarding, and had been painted with vanish, and thus such vanishes are vulnerable to fire incidents. 7.4 The roof of he building had been constructed with timber particle board that had been superimposed layers of bitumen felt. 7.5 The lighting system was wanting since the six double fluorescent tubes were hanging from the roof, the lightning system was fitted to a scaffolding, he building was served by main gas and numerous heaters were in the building. 7.6 The openings between the main hall and bar lounge had fabric drapes while in the building there were two decorated large artificial Christmas trees.

Moreover, there were additional decorations that included streamers and tinsel that hung fro the roof of the building. 7.7 In the Green Room, there were miscellaneous items that included clothes and carpets and may have contributed n fire development, and the flying gallery that was above the stage had fabric backdrops. 8. CAUSES CONSIDERED Electrical Defects 8.1 A reoccurring problem was associated with four 32-amp circuit breaks. 8.2 On 3rd December, the Caretaker had called a technician who inspected the electrical system, and acknowledge that the electrical installation would work well. 8.3 The major fault that was linked to the electrical system is the portable lights that were connected in such a way that the weight of the supply cables was supported by the plug conductor clamp; it be concluded that this electrical approach strained the supply cables and may have contributed to the frequent circuit breakers to trip. 8.4 A technician, Mr.

Arnold Addis admitted that one of the stages light had tripped during the show, and this problem was resolved through plugging the light into another spare electrical socket. 8.5 There were allegations that after the trip, the circuit breakers were tempered with, and Dave Moreton claimed that he had a buzzing noise while he was clearing up the show.

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