The Development of an Incident Command System - Case Study Example

Name : xxxxxxxxxxxx Institution : xxxxxxxxxxxx Course : xxxxxxxxxxx Title : Incident Command System Tutor : xxxxxxxxxxx @ 2010 Incident Command System Introduction Incident Command System is a uniform on-scene incident management concept formulated specifically to enable responders of an incident like the explosions at Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot to adopt an incorporated organizational structure equal to the intensity and demands of every incident. ICS prevents the interference of jurisdictional boundaries in response procedures. ICS which was developed in the 1970s assist in addressing various problems affecting response patterns. Such problems include: too many individuals reporting to a single supervisor, diverse emergency response organizational patterns, and lack of dependable incident information, insufficient and irreconcilable communications and unclear lines of authority. It also assists in solving the problem of terminology disparities among agencies and imprecise or undetermined incident objectives. An ICS enables incorporated communication and planning by instituting controllable functions necessary for disaster response operations: Command, Operations, scheduling, Logistics, and funding and Administration (O'Neill, 2008). The figure below shows a representative ICS structure: Incident Command System structure The ICS is headed by the Incident Commander or the Unified Command who is responsible for all phases of the response, which include the creation of incident objectives and controlling all incident operations. The Incident Commander is responsible for establishing direct priorities particularly the safety of responders, emergency workers, onlookers and anyone involved in the incident and stabilizing the incident by making certain that life safety and resource management procedures are carried out effectively. IC also creates the objectives of the incident and the means of achieving the objective (O'Neill, 2008). Significance of an Incident Command System The modular planning of the ICS enables responders to level their efforts and relate the components of the ICS structure that excellently fit the demands of the tragedy. In simple terms, the ICS organization operates on rules which vary depending on the nature of the incidences. Various incidences will not need the establishment of Planning, Logistics, or Finance/Administration Departments, while others will need some or all the departments to be established. The main advantage of the ICS organization is the capacity to utilize the departments of a firm that are absolutely necessary. For specific incidents, and in some applications, only a few of the firm’s functional essentials may be necessary. However, if it is required that the firm enhances its scale of operation, extra positions exist within the ICS structure to cater for any emerging need. For instance, in responses involving responders from one jurisdiction, the ICS creates a firm for all-inclusive response management. However, when an occurrence involves more than one agency or jurisdiction, responders can enlarge the ICS structure to cater for multi-jurisdictional incidences. The responsibilities of the ICS participants will also differ on the basis of the incident and may even differ in the course of the same incident. Staffing considerations depend on the nature of the incident in question while the number of participants and the organizational structure vary on the basis of size and complexity of the episode (O'Neill, 2008). Commands to handle large scale incidences Three stages of decision making are involved when responding to major incidences such as the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot. To start with, the top tier of the emergency organization command structure is the Gold command in which the responsible representatives set the strategic objectives of the response. Second in command is the silver command which in using the strategic functions already established in the former stage, manages the firm’s tactics. The organization’s tactics are the means in which the organization allocates its resources and therefore determines the course of action on incident grounds. The last command is the Bronze command which directly oversees operations on site. This multi-sectional decision making controls all the operations in a rescue mission. In contrast, failure to have a clearly defined pattern in decision making is responsible for improper management of emergency responses. On a local and regional altitude, the local authorities have the duty of implementing of the emergency scheduling and the harmonization of the resources as described in the plans set before the emergencies. In all cases, a non-predetermined command structure hinders decision making processes. The failure of setting strategic objectives on a national level and to synchronize the mobilization and allocation of resources on a local or regional level greatly affects the management of an incident. This de-organizes the operations units at the ground level. Incident commanders should be a position to manage the allocation and monitoring of all the resources that are available to them and should also avoid giving contradicting orders to the operations crew (O'Neill, 2008). Confusion in the commanding framework on the incident grounds can result to self-deployment of some teams. In summary, the command structure has the following basic levels: The strategic level: The IC’s duties involve the entire command of the incident and include creation of key objectives, prioritizing activities, allotment of resources, predicting outcome, deciding on the appropriate method of operation and assigning roles to tactical level units. The Tactical Level: This level includes intermediary level officers overseeing activities toward particular objectives. Tactical level officer encompass the Sector Officers who are responsible for managing grouped resources and operations in prescribed areas or supervise exceptional functions at the scene of an accident. Command will allocate sectors and outline the strategy or task for every Sector Officer. The sectors are usually ordered by the incident situation and designed to realize the tactical objectives or strategic goals established by the Incident Commander. The Sector Officer has the duty to decide the tactics and fire fighting activities that are best suited to accomplish the tactical objectives in the sector assigned. The Sector Officer then upholds communications with the IC or Operations Officer through progress reports. The Task Level: This describes the activities usually carried out by individual groups or particular personnel. The firm line officers or team leaders regularly oversee task level activities. The joint efforts of the task level activities should be able to achieve the tactical objectives. The tasks include particular actions such as ventilation, search and rescue, extinguishment and renovation (O'Neill, 2008). The Control Level: This is usually the implementation at complex and large incidences. As the command framework enlarges in complexity, the IC may implement an extra intermediary level position from the command post. The control level entails creating an operations Officer, who offers direct supervision over Sector Officers and takes care of several radio communications for the IC. This relieves the IC of the immediate pressures of radio traffic. Team Leaders; under normal circumstances, all the leadership positions in an emergency operation are occupied by company line officers. In case the operation is too large, the IC will experience difficulty in filing all the positions with line officers (O'Neill, 2008). Dynamic Risk Assessment Dynamic Risk Assessment is the consistent assessment of risk in the swiftly changing conditions of an operational occurrence, in order to apply the control channels necessary to ensure an acceptable level of safety. Dynamic Risk Assessment Flowchart Dynamic Risk Assessment Method EVALUATE THE SITUATION, TASKS AND PEOPLE AT RISK Issues to be put into consideration: What operational information is accessible for instance, local risk assessments emergency plans? What tasks need to be executed? What hazards exist in carrying out the task in this circumstance? What risks are connected in carrying out the activities to team members or the public? What resources are available for use, for instance, experienced personnel, ambulances and doctors? SELECT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES Take into account the various alternatives and choose the most suitable for the condition The first step must be procedures arrived at in pre-planning and training Ensure that the staffs are competent to execute the activities in play. ASSESS THE CHOSEN OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE Assess the selected procedure by comparing the benefits versus the risks of the procedure. If the benefits out way the risks, proceed with the task after ensuring that: The objectives and activities both individual and team are comprehended The duties have been clearly allocated Safety measures and practices are comprehended If the risks out way the benefits then proceed as follows: ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL CONTROLS Eliminate, or decrease any remaining risks to a satisfactory level, if possible by extra control measures like: The application of PPE such as protective gloves, hard hats, overalls etc. Application specialist equipment Assistance from other agencies such as ,Fire Service and Ambulance Trusts Seeking the aid of event marshals and safety officers. RE-ASSESS SYSTEMS OF OPERATION & extra CONTROL MEASURES If any risks exist, does the benefit realized from carrying out the tasks overshadow the probable consequences if the risks are realized? If the benefits outweigh the risks, execute the activities. If the risks outweigh the benefits do not execute the plan, but think about other alternatives. Incident Action Plan Incident Action Plan ensures that all the participants in a response mission work in harmony towards the realization of the intended goals. The goals are usually set for a particular operational period by giving all incident administrative personnel with directives for activities to be carried out in the course of the operational period described in the plan. Incident Action Plan offers a rational method of communicating the entire incident goals for both operational and support activities. Role of public agencies Competent Authority and Cabinet office The Competent Authority should have re-examined the existing Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) directives on preparing on-site emergency strategy. This directive needs to consider the She’s Hazardous Installations Directorate (HID) and the Chemical Industries Division Assessment Manual. The manual is normally used by supervisors to gauge the quality of the on-site preparation in adhering to the COMAH Stipulations. In particular, emphasis should be accorded to the need to check with health advisors and disaster responders. The Competent Authority should have checked that the operators at Buncefield reviewed their onsite emergency strategies to adhere to preparation guidelines. The authorities should also have reviewed the COMAH stipulations to help operators in adhering to on-site preparation directives and should also collaborate with Cabinet office to combine the COMAH guidance with the CCA Communications with the public. The Cabinet Office should also have launched an initiative to review the arrangements and to decide on a minister and also to play a role in complementing the services of the responders. The review should also entail communications, public reassurance, the interface with preparation for a return to social normality and activities to ensure that commendations made following major occurrences are put into action (HSC, 2005). The Civil Contingencies Secretariat The Civil Contingencies in collaboration with Competent Authority should have ensured that COMAH emergency plan are fully incorporated with those under the CCA with the objective of ensuring that the main hazard events are handled consistently at all levels, from on site to nationwide, in terms of preparation, allocation of resources, and practical engagements. The review should comprise, but not be limited to, verification that: response activities take account of entrusted duties and lead accountability in government for certifying emergency response arrangements at COMAH. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat, in collaboration with the Competent Authority, should organize for national guidance to local authorities to be arranged, taking care of a minimum the areas covered on-site preparation plans. Guidance should also take into account the issue of competencies necessary for emergency planners and be clear on the resources that may be required for an efficient emergency planning function (HSC, 2005). Local authorities Local authorities should have been involved in Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot in reviewing the off-site emergency plans for COMAH sites in line with the reviewed guidance procedures. In considerations to fuel storage sites, the local authorities should consider the cases of explosions and multi-tank fire scenarios. The objective is to ensure that plans entail the main information from relevant COMAH safety reports without necessarily compromising the safety reports’ privacy. The plans should be provided by site operators. The review should include the following: input from trained and skilled disaster planners based on clear guidance and working in collaborations with Regional Resilience Forums and their counterparts in Scotland and Wales in organizing their off-site emergency procedures to comprehend possible impacts on the Region. The Local Resilience Forum Framework promotes multi-agency collaboration and information sharing within a nation. The Regional Resilience Forum and their equivalents should decide where additional consultation is appropriate and establish the manner in which this is to be done within and across regions (HSC, 2005). Communication in major incidences In the course of a major fire incident like the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, it is necessary to directly get involved in the interaction with emergency services particularly when it affects your business. In the preliminary stages of an incident the Emergency Services are likely to require access to different types of information. This information may include building plans or layouts, verification that the building is empty and location and type of potentially hazardous material. In the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, the emergency service may need information concerning the type of oil stored and the volume (Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service, 2006). Following this preliminary stage, they are likely to require collaborating with other people who are likely to make significant decisions on behalf of the firm. The considerations to make include identification of liaise with the emergency services and the type of training required. In case the incident affects several businesses, then communication and liaison will be considered on the basis of all the people concerned. The responding agencies will endeavour to obtain information from as many sources as possible using various methods. Such methods include: Media: The Police and other emergency services have well established plans for obtaining vital information from the media or passing on vital information to the media. In major incidences such as explosion at Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, both the local news like the radio stations and 24 hour news channels will be a good source of information. Web-sites: The Local Authority, police and any other affected agencies will provide vital information on their corporate web sites. Call Centres: Local Authorities, Police and affected agencies will have information available to the public through usual call centres, though they may issue a separate number specifically for that particular incident (Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service, 2006). Conclusion The main problem in inter-organizational analysis in reference to responding to fire incidences is the co-ordination of the participants. Lack of a structured authority can hinder inter-organizational co-ordination in various levels. The development of an Incident Command System as an emergency management procedure is essential in every organization since it systematizes the functions of responding participants and consequently creates a structured authority. Proper communication is also necessary to prevent confusion or issuance of contradicting commands in the course of responding to incidences. Bibliography Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service’s review of the fire response Hertfordshire Fire & Rescue Service 2006 Emergency planning for major accidents, 1999, Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH) Hemel, 2005, Initial Report to the Health and Safety Commission and the Environment Agency of the investigation into the explosions and fires at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hempstead, 2005, Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board 2006, O'Neill, B., 2008, A Model Assessment Tool for the Incident Command System: A Case Study of the San Antonio Fire Department. Recommendations on the design and operation of fuel storage sites Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board March 2007 The Buncefield Investigation, 2006, First progress report Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board Read More