Prioritization of Hard Power in Counterterrorism - Coursework Example

Prioritization of Hard Power in Counterterrorism Introduction Counterterrorism is widely understood to incorporate various strategies, techniques, military tactics, and practice used by police, military, and government organizations to prevent, as well as combat, terrorism. The question of evaluating counterterrorism measures and their effectiveness has proven difficult, especially where the main measure is from the viewpoint of security services and intelligence services. As a result of this difficulty in proving the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures, Lum and Kennedy (2012: p5) argue that the concept of performative power of counterterrorism should be used in depicting the political choices made in counterterrorism and their importance. In this case, it can be argued that the manner in which the counterterrorism efforts are conducted matters more than the possible process outcomes. Power, however, is a contestable aspect of political theory, especially with commentators and scholars distinguishing between hard and soft power. Whereas counterterrorism efforts achieve the former through use of military and economic threats or reward, the latter involves the co-opting of terrorist actors to share similar values to those of the counterterrorism players (Lum & Kennedy, 2012: p6). Thus, while hard power seeks to oblige terrorist actors to consider their interests in relation to calculable benefits and costs, soft power seeks to use the persuasive potency of ideas that terrorist actors may find attractive. This paper will argue that the prioritisation of hard power instruments can lead to a more effective response to terrorism. Counterterrorism For western democracies like the UK, counterterrorism has proven a difficult concept to define with no universally accepted policy of counterterrorism because each terrorism conflict is unique. Whereas Spence (2012: p113) and other proponents of liberal democracy argue that the rule of law and civil liberties must be at the centre in any counterterrorism efforts to comply with the democratic principles championed by the UK and other democracies, this are not a counterterrorism strategy but, rather, are valued principles to guide counterterrorism efforts. One concrete definition of counterterrorism is provided by the NATO Field Manual that is, in turn, adapted from the American manual, which holds that counterterrorism involves offensive measures as part of operations to pre-empt, deter, respond, and prevent terrorism. This definition identifies the all encompassing nature of counterterrorism, requiring the use of a nation’s international and domestic power (Spence, 2012: p113). Such an all-encompassing definition enables state governments to recognize that the responses to terrorism are complex, while also presenting a rhetorical tool for governments to reinforce notions that terrorist problems do not have a simple fix. Counterterrorism operations, according to the type and level of terrorist threats, are subject to change with Al-Qaeda terrorism, for example, remaining persistent because of its adaptive nature (Plümper & Neumayer, 2014: p583). Although the tactic of terrorism cannot be entirely eradicated, there are steps that may be used to dismantle, disrupt, and eventually defeat terrorist groups. As such, counterterrorism policy tactics addressing threats from groups like Hezbollah and Hamas will differ due to the present threat environment, the political context, and the government undertaking counterterrorism efforts compared to groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. For instance, western governments will possibly resist the use of drone strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon because the ultimate goal is to entice Hezbollah to join the democratic political process by renouncing terrorism (Plümper & Neumayer, 2014: p583). On the other hand, groups like Al-Qaeda with more ambitious political, social, and economic objectives that no government can seriously consider will require a more robust response that seeks to defeat them by dismantling and disrupting their activities. Plümper and Neumayer (2014: p584) also argue that the best way to frame counterterrorism efforts by western countries is to appreciate the difference between counterterrorism operations and counterterrorism policy, while also understanding the differing and competing mandates and objectives within western governments. For instance, the UK government, as with the US government, has long upheld its no-concessions policy towards terrorists, which was defined early on during the struggle against terrorist activities in Palestine involving Jewish nationalists. However, although this policy remains intact, following the 9/11 attacks in the US and the July 7th bombings in London, counterterrorism operations highlight the evolution of counterterrorism into asymmetric warfare that is more lethal, blurring the lines between operations and policy. This has been reinforced by the notion that the war on terror has become increasingly all-encompassing. Indeed, counterterrorism operations and policy globally sometimes appear to contradict each other, which have been attributed to issues of understanding western government bureaucracies and the competing efforts of the defence industry, the state, and intelligence agencies (Plümper & Neumayer, 2014: p585). As a result, there have been suggestions that western governments should begin to negotiate with terrorists or run the risk of losing the counterterrorism effort. In this argument, it may be claimed that the US and its NATO allies already violated the no-negotiation policy when they negotiated settlements with tribal militias during the Iraq War (Weston & Wing, 2012: p9). Using this logic, western governments should also be expected to engage with other groups like Hezbollah and Hamas that present rational and realistic social, economic, and political goals. It is, however, important to note that the use of negotiations with insurgent enemies in Iraq was meant to quell and control violence within the context of conflict and ongoing war. Future negotiations with groups like Hezbollah or Hamas, on the other hand, would have to take place in a non-war context. Weston and Wing (2012: p10) argue that attempts to weaken and isolate groups like Hamas and Hezbollah that present viable and realistic goals to their populations has failed, meaning that direct engagement appears to be the only option to resolve these conflicts. However, the same cannot be said for Al-Qaeda and ISIS, highlighting that counterterrorism strategy will have to account for different contexts of terrorist engagement. In short, the ability of western governments to successfully tackle terrorist threats is subject to debate regarding strategy, where the role of “soft” and “hard” power have arisen as complementary yet contradictory counterterrorism strategies (Weston & Wing, 2012: p10). Hard and Soft Power in Counterterrorism Matos (2012: p122) identifies the current discourse of counterterrorism as revolving around two main approaches, which are the criminal justice model and the military or war model. Whereas the war model frames counterterrorism operations militarily in relation to enemy-centric conflict with armed forces primarily responsible for developing counterterrorism strategy, the criminal justice model primarily champions democratic values and the rule of law prevalent in western states. The latter model restricts the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategy by restricting government actions. However, both models rarely work as promised by academic theory, especially when counterterrorism campaigns are underway. Whereas western democracies have sought to champion civil liberties and democratic ideals, the boundaries of a criminal justice model have been tested by attempts to forcefully combat terrorism (Matos, 2012: p122). As such, it is important to approach counterterrorism from other perspectives, especially as the need for a new framework that can measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism successfully becomes a priority for increasingly budget-conscious western governments. Taking into account how counterterrorism has evolved, Price (2012: p21) argues that viewing counterterrorism efforts in terms of soft and hard power would be more useful, which will require the restructuring of counterterrorism discourse around indirect and direct counterterrorism approaches. The direct approach that involves the use of hard power involves an enemy-centric strategy, primarily consisting of offensive tactics like special-forces operations, drone strikes, and increased intelligence operations. These tools are specifically useful in disrupting and degrading the capabilities of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. On the other hand, the soft power approach involves a more population-centric strategy, which includes features like economic development, capacity building, and counter-radicalization. The hard power approach, while straightforward in terms of objectives, raises pertinent issues about the legal and ethical use of force, while also posing uncomfortable questions on intelligence collection and its impact on a democratic society’s civil liberties (Price, 2012: p21). However, it remains to be seen whether the use of soft power effectively address the real cause of terrorism, which, as of today, are still ill defined. Indeed, it may even be argued that even if poverty, weak states, oppression, and economic equality were identified as terrorism’s real causes, there is little chance that western governments would be able to effectively deal with these issues. Soft power in relation to its de-radicalization and counter-radicalization components of counterterrorism is viewed as a complex issue and process with numerous interdependent triggering events and push-and-pull factors, which drive individuals towards and away from terror activities (Perliger, 2012: p499). So far, however, radicalization theories have failed to explain the reasons why people are involved in terrorism, specifically because of a lack of any single profile of the quintessential terrorist. In spite of this, counter-radicalization and soft power are still viewed as critical aspects of counterterrorism, especially in stopping potential terrorist recruits from becoming terrorists. Soft power also provides a way for terrorists to exit from these groups, particularly if western governments facilitate disengagement and rehabilitation for these terrorists. In this case, local governments would play a critical role with the financial and logistical backing of western countries. The soft power approach, including increased capacity building and political engagement may also influence groups like Hezbollah to disarm, as well as to fully integrate into the political system of Lebanon (Perliger, 2012: p499). However, it is important to note that Hezbollah continues to run what is for all purposes a terrorist militia. Therefore, while soft power counterterrorism strategies offer groups a way to exit terrorism, some terrorist groups are unwilling to dismantle their military apparatus as insurance against future conflict (Nye, 2004: p1). While soft and hard power in counterterrorism efforts do not provide a magical bullet to necessarily end terrorism, this framework is essential in the analysis and characterization of counterterrorism strategies and initiatives. However, in countering increasingly violent groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIL, western governments seem to prefer hard power, specifically because the primary goals of these organizations is to reverse the foreign policy of western countries in the Middle East, as well as to overthrow secular Arab governments that support their policies. Moreover, there is evidence that western governments have minimal appetite for tackling the root causes of terrorism (Nye, 2004: p1). It is clear and rightfully so, with the approval of lethal and covert counterterrorism efforts by western governments, that hard power instruments remain the core strategy of counterterrorism efforts. Effectiveness of Hard Power Instruments in Counterterrorism In order to achieve policy objectives, including those involving counterterrorism efforts, governments normally utilize their power to accomplish their goals and influence other actors to achieve desired outcomes. In this case, they may use either soft or hard power that cover an array of options such as economic power, military power, and diplomatic power. Hard power involves the use of economic and military strategies to influence the actions, interests, or behaviour of political bodies, including terrorist groups (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p202). Compared to soft power that draws from history, culture, and diplomacy, hard power is more aggressive in nature, while it is especially effective when countering organizations of inferior economic and/or military power. Nacos and Rubin (2010: p219) argues for the superiority of hard power in counterterrorism, noting that soft power and the criminal justice system are ineffective without the use of military force and intelligence. Military tactics are essential in counterterrorism because of the very nature of terrorism, which makes it an attractive and relatively cheap weapon for states to achieve political objectives. State sponsors have enabled the sustained aggression of otherwise weak groups, such as the PKK in Turkey, the FARC rebels in Venezuela, and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. The diplomatic component of soft power means that it is only truly effective if the country hosting or sponsoring the terrorist group is cooperative with western governments. However, even in cases where governments are cooperative, it is often out of self-interest. Indeed, the use of soft power to counter terrorism groups may serve to draw more attention to their cause by offering them diplomatic legitimacy and, subsequently, legitimizes terror tactics as a monopoly of force in the regions under terrorist control (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p219). Such an outcome would, invariably, end up perpetuating the terrorist groups while overlooking the initial objective; to counter their ability to use terror on western governments and their allies. In addition, mistakes in identifying root causes of terrorism may also undercut the effectiveness of soft power. Also, the use of financial assistance in soft power may actually subsidize terrorists and fund their propaganda, while attempting to address grievances presented by terrorist groups is ineffective. This is because responding to threats of terror with diplomacy provides incentives for further terrorism, as well as the fact that many grievances presented by tourist groups rarely correspond to their real goals (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p220). In fact, terrorists tend to either change their goals if grievances are met, or maintain their terror infrastructure as they expand their goals. The most effective counterterrorism strategy is to increase the costs of taking part or sponsoring terrorism by striking them militarily to amplify costs for anyone attempting to achieve political objectives through terror. Targeted killings are especially effective by escalating personal costs for engaging in terrorist acts for its leaders, which may push them towards diplomacy (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p224). Targeted killings also eliminate trainers and recruiters of terrorists, as well as increasing rates of detection as terrorists seek to avenge these targeted killings, all of which erode their capabilities and enhance the effectiveness of counterterrorism. Using hard power is also the most effective way of denying terrorist groups a safe haven, which is critical to counterterrorist efforts. Although soft power plays a critical role in preventing the failure of states that is the precursor for safe havens, hard power is the most effective strategy where terrorists are based in failed states. Finally, the expressed desire of terror organizations to kill on a mass scale means that they cannot be allowed to access WMDs and, because WMDs are of a military concern rather than a criminal justice one, hard power is the most effective way to prevent access to WMDs (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p226). Therefore, it is increasingly evident that hard power is an essential component of any counterterrorism strategy and that the use of soft power must be underpinned by a credible military threat to the terror organizations in the absence of a diplomatic deal (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p228). For example, the Shi’a militias of Muqtada al-Sadr only agreed to engage in diplomacy when the personal costs of the surge became too great for its leaders to bear. Indeed, military force has been the most successful strategy where diplomacy and soft power have failed, especially where the force is directed at the top leadership. In spite of the increased interest in the role of soft power by the UN and western democracies willing for the rule of law and civil liberties to reverse the failure of states that either sponsor terror organizations or host terror organizations, the threat of force provides a more effective deterrent to terrorists (Nacos & Rubin, 2010: p229). While diplomacy is essential because of the transnational nature of terrorism and the need to win cooperation against terror, it must not be an alternative to the threat of military action. Hence, the importance of hard power as the foundation for more diplomatic negotiations cannot be overlooked as an effective counterterrorism strategy. By killing or capturing leaders of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, the ability of the organization to recruit more potential terrorists is degraded, while it is also easier to pursue negotiations with the remaining leadership if they fear for their personal lives. Cronin (2006: p43) argues that cutting the link between Al-Qaeda leadership and its local supporters holds promise, specifically by squeezing its fundraising capabilities and weakening its communication infrastructure. Whereas the US and its allies have had prior success in using economic sanctions and other instruments of soft power to degrade funding capabilities of terrorist organizations, the increased prevalence of the internet indicates the need for a more aggressive strategy. Of course, the uses of intelligence countermeasures to intercept, monitor, and deny terrorist access to funds have proven unpopular with liberal democracies, especially in the west (Cronin, 2011: p44). The internet, on top of being a prime tool for future cyber-terrorism, is also a recruiting tool with invaluable importance for terrorist groups like ISIS to shore up support in their constituency. Full integration of hard and soft power requires empowerment and budgetary flexibility, along with the integration of tools that each actor brings to the negotiation table. The asymmetrical environment of the threat posed by terrorist groups has, over the past few years, pushed counterterrorism efforts towards soft power, especially as western countries increasingly learn that they cannot employ hard power alone against a sophisticated enemy (Cronin, 2011: p45). However, it is important that hard power instruments are not neglected, specifically as it serves an effective purpose as a complement for soft power instruments. This is especially so where there a region is conflict, as well as where the normal structures of society have broken down as a result of state failure. Indeed, even though current discourse tends towards the increasing importance of balancing soft and hard power, this should not be construed to imply that resources and tools from each power paradigm should be used equally. In addition, balancing soft and hard does not imply that all terrorist groups and contexts require the use of both. Instead, balancing soft and hard power requires the coordination and accessibility of soft and hard instruments (Cronin, 2011: p45). Hard power is also an effective instrument in counterterrorism where the threat of military force becomes an incentive for terrorist groups to negotiate, as well as stop the use of violent tactics. Crenshaw (2011: p140) notes that coercive diplomacy in counterterrorism is effective in persuading terrorist organizations to de-escalate from actively threatened actions, as well as stop actions already underway. The hard power element of coercive diplomacy in terms of threats to use military force is particularly effective where the terrorist organization is also involved in attempts to coerce its enemy, such as when Al-Qaeda wants to force a reversal of US foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, it is important for governments undertaking counterterrorism efforts to identify the terrorist organizations that they can coerce, as well as those that they cannot. Possibly the biggest challenge in using coercive diplomacy is that it leans too much on the use of soft power, particularly since threatening the use of military force may not be enough to bring terrorist organizations to negotiations (Crenshaw, 2011: p141). Indeed, there are some state sponsors of terrorism that would rather lose power than negotiate because negotiations would eventually erode their legitimacy if it were viewed as surrender. Since the eventual goal of coercive democracy is to persuade terrorist organizations to engage diplomatically, the demonstrative use of hard power becomes difficult since this would significantly reduce any chance of diplomacy (Crenshaw, 2011: p142). Implementing a coercive diplomatic strategy has several complications, most or all of which arise from its dependence on the soft power approach. Moreover, coercive diplomacy faces a major limitation in the sense that terrorist cells operate almost autonomously from the organizational leadership. This means that threats of using force against organizational heads in Afghanistan, for instance, would have little effect on a terrorist cell operating in the UK. However, using hard power instruments, rather than threatening to use force, may force terrorist organizations to scale down on their terror activities and engage diplomacy. The ambiguities that exist in the sue of coercive diplomacy decrease the effectiveness of such a strategy and, as a result, an imbalance of counterterrorism measures with a bias to soft power may end up reducing the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures (Crenshaw, 2011: p142). The importance of hard power in counterterrorism, therefore, cannot be overstated for its ability to force negotiations. Conclusion The effective countering of terrorism on the global stage, as has been seen in the discussion above, requires the use of an array of options that may seem contradictory; hard power and soft power. The balance between the two, however, is the critical aspect of effective counterterrorism strategy that, at its core, seeks to weaken the capabilities of terror organizations from launching attacks on western democracies and creating disconnect with their support base. Whereas the role of soft power is not in doubt given the importance of winning the support of local communities, such efforts are doomed to fail if the terrorist groups monopolize the use of force in these local communities. Therefore, the role of hard power and its major elements of military force and the use of intelligence are more effective in countering terrorist organizations in comparison to soft power approaches that may only act to legitimize and perpetuate terrorist organizations. References Crenshaw, M. (2011). Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences. New York: Routledge Cronin, A. K. (2006). ‘How Al-Qaida Ends’. International Security, vol. 31(1), pp 7-48 Lum, C., & Kennedy, L. W. (2012). Evidence-based counterterrorism policy. New York: Springer Nacos, B.L. and Rubin, M. (2010). Counterterrorism strategies: do we need bombs over bridges? In: Gottlieb, S. ed. Debating terrorism and counterterrorism. 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