Successful in Armed Struggle, A Failure in Negotiations - Essay Example

Successful in armed struggle, a failure in negotiations." How far do you agree with this assessment of the PLO between 1967 and 2000? Introduction The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) has been synonymous with armed struggle for decades leading up to the end of the twentieth century. This mindset is reflected in their political charter, their strategies as well as their tactical responses in negotiations; however, the ideology has done little to end perpetual conflict in Palestine. Arafat, as leader of the PLO, had numerous opportunities to negotiate and end the stalemate in his country, but fragmentations within political outfits, a culture of blaming others and numerous tactical mistakes caused this organisation to fail in negotiations. Poor negotiation strategy Perhaps one of the most relevant opportunities for negotiation between the PLO and its adversaries was Camp David; in this engagement, Chairman Arafat met with The Prime Minister of Israel at the time and members of the Clinton administration. During this time, minimal progress towards peace was made owing to a number of reasons; chief among them was the PLO’s inability to comply or accept any of Israel’s offers. Supporters of the PLO side claim that Palestinians had little to bargain with, so as a result, it made sense for them to wait it out and listen to what the American and Israeli sides had to offer. No doubt exists about failures on their part, but the PLO side appeared so fixated on protecting themselves from foreign traps that they were unwilling to concede to anything (Ross and Grinstein, 2001). Several offers were made in these peace negotiations, with some being trivial while others had the potential to end years of turmoil in the region. PLO leader, Chairman Arafat had a right to reject the minor ideas because they would have made his party appear weak and overeager. Notwithstanding, Arafat’s team needed to rethink their passive attitude towards the negotiations when serious proposals were put on the table; it was their prerogative to decipher when these situations arose in order for them to move forward (Ross and Grinstein, 2001). Effective negotiations can only take place when the concerned entities refrain from taking hard-line positions, yet this seemed to be the order of the day for Arafat’s team especially at the above-mentioned peace negotiations. The Chairman and his team decided that they would not agree to anything unless Israel gave up the Eastern border, which was a sensitive matter that needed to be handled tactfully. It was particularly alarming for Israel when Arafat began backtracking on previous concessions; he even went as far as claiming that the Temple was not in Jerusalem. These claims were wounding to the Israeli side because the Temple is a primary component of their faith, so pouring mud over it was futile, to say the least. Perhaps another reason why the PLO has failed in negotiations is due to their perpetual mistrust and victimised mentally throughout the years. One may argue that many of the problems faced by the Palestinians have been brought on by foreigners, and Israel has been more than unjust to this group. However, betrayal in the hands of foreigners is insufficient to justify perpetual blame games; Palestine must take responsibility for its own fate or suffer from a repeat of the same history in the future (Morris and Barak, 2002). The PLO needed to come to terms with the fact that some wrongs cannot be undone, and some of their demands simply cannot be met. On other hand, they also needed to realise that they too had made some mistakes; furthermore, referring to mythologies about aspects of their adversaries’ geography would only inflame them. Since the PLO leadership has encountered massive opportunities to end perpetual conflict in their land, but chosen to reject them, then it may be stated that they are indeed failed negotiators (Ashton, 2007, p.32). Party fragmentation One of the causes of never-ending stalemates during negotiations between the PLO and Israel is the fragmented nature of the organisation. A history of the institution shows that it has always wrestled within itself to have control over politics in the land. Whenever PLO comes to the negotiating table, it rarely articulates one position, and party members sometimes display their internal strife publicly (Riad 1981, p.84). It is almost impossible to negotiate with a divided team because each concession may be deemed as a power threat to other organisational members. Some may feel that advancements made may be attributed to their peers, and this could undermine their legitimacy in the party. If the PLO had one leader who took full responsible for all strategies in peace meetings, then Palestine would not have suffered from a continuous conflict (Bailey, 1990). Needless to say, this disunity sometimes rendered its ugly head in the form of negotiation turnarounds; some party members made demands that had already been shelved in years past. These individuals have been notorious for making new claims that were not even up for discussion at the beginning of the peace agreement. For these reasons, it comes as no surprise that minimal impact was felt after the PLO engaged with others concerning the conflict in their region. In order to understand why fragmentation has come in the way of effective negotiation, it is imperative to study the history of the organisation as well as guerrilla warfare in Palestine. During the period between 1967 and 1972, the PLO had a vast representation of guerrilla groups within its ranks – by the end of the 60s, there were about nine of these. Previously, these guerrilla groups were regarded as minor nuisances since Fateh had overall control over the organisation, and often defined the rules governing the entity (Sayigh 1999, p.209). However, with time, it became clear that Fateh needed to consolidate other armed groups in order to speak with one voice and articulate the wishes of its people clearly. Smaller factions such as the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) resisted this sort of pluralism because they felt that it would threaten their control; their biggest concern was domination by the leading entity in PLO. Fragmentation had reared its early head and would haunt the party for decades to come, even when prospects of peace were at hand. PLO was characterised by a myriad of feudal elements that had little to do with the party objectives set out during its creation; these were individuals who had economic control in institutions that mattered. Some of these members were merchants and bank owners, representing a clique of elites who had ties to the Arab states. Fateh despised this Arabian link because it meant reducing the PLO to nothing more than a cog in the Arab machinery (Sayigh, 1999, p.211). Too much influence from the Arab states would undermine the Palestine movement, and weaken the identity and goals that have propelled armed resistance within the country’s borders. The PLO often wrestled with organisational members’ exists, such as the Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine, who often left because of disagreements over control of logistics or finances. When these organisations broke off, they would sometimes get support from Arab states, in which they resided; Lebanon, Syria and Egypt were some of the countries with influence over them (Sayigh 1999, p.221). Arafat, as leader of Fateh, felt that it was necessary to take in these splinter groups since other governments accommodated them, and involuntary unity was unsustainable. The tactical response made by PLO to include these different guerrilla groups would eventually cause a degree of harmony within its ranks; nonetheless, the party could never do enough to satisfy its diverse followership. PLO departments were heavily staffed with Fateh members in the 70s and 80s while the other guerrilla organisations were given positions on the basis of a quota system. It frequently opened up its party framework in order to take in different levels of armed resistance groups, and even guaranteed them a certain level of control over the organisational resources (Hass 2000, p.308). This semblance of order was a fragile one because the PLO was still at an early stage of armed struggle; it did not have full control over the economic, social and autonomous territories of its land (Sayigh, 1999, 221). Therefore, conflicts, misgivings and disagreements were bound to arise within the internal party structure, with several guerrilla groups finding reasons for discontentment. For instance, union membership was initially regarded as a symbol of national identity, since Palestinians alone were accepted into these groups. The unions had a political dimension as well as professional and economic ones; regardless, some guerrilla groups felt that the trade unions overlapped with their functions and threatened their validity. Integration of unions into the PLO created a lot of friction, with activists from some of the guerrilla groups planting the seeds for disunity. Such kinds of differences would continue to plague the organisation in subsequent years. Concerns about domination by Fateh, succession politics and control over organisational resources made it difficult to present a united front in future negotiations (Rogers 1970, p.62). It is for this reason that the PLO was able to achieve little in terms of international negotiations. There were simply too many demands to meet, tempers to cool and ambitions to contain within the organisation’s structure. Sometimes these tendencies paralysed decision-making as disgruntled officials were never in short supply; furthermore, the quest for autonomy amongst the groups was never far from their mind. Armed struggle as a basis for PLO’s foundation The PLO was successful in armed struggle because this was the very foundation of the institution; it therefore had minimal resources and time to dedicate towards peace negotiations. Palestinian revolutionaries have dominated the political landscape from as far back as 1917, but many of them claim that armed struggle is not an end in itself. These individuals believe that it is the only mechanism of achieving lasting peace in Palestine; all other strategies, including negotiations are short-lived (Zayigh 1979, p.144). They also believe that Israel has been too aggressive against them, and was driven by racist motivates. Therefore, they believed that the only way out of their situation was to fight for peace through armed struggle. Palestinians’ ego had been wounded after 1967, so many citizens were wary of conceding to Israeli demands from this position of loss. A number of PLO members regarded the guerrilla movements within their wings as an arsenal against the Israelis, as this has the ability to pressure them into making certain concessions (Zayigh 1979, p.145). Many PLO followers also believed in armed struggle because they felt that it would always rekindle Arab unity against foreign imperialism. This belief in armed struggle became a central component of Palestine identity, such that the PLO had no choice but to focus on its throughout their term in power. It should be noted that the support for armed struggle was not just a hidden notion that could be speculated upon at will. The philosophy was articulated clearly in the Palestinian National Charter, Article 9, which states: “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical place. The Palestinian Arab People assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it.” (PNC, 1968) To some extent, armed struggle was a long term strategy, but was also viewed as a means to an end. Palestinians felt that partition of their state was done against their will, and it was illegal as seen in Article 19 of the same document (PNC, 1968). The PLO was regarded as an instrument for safeguarding a return to the homeland; a mechanism for liberation and revolutionary force. It is for this reason that the organisation frequently engaged in armed conflict; the formation of Israel was regarded as a depiction of the Zionist movement, which was perceived as imperialist in nature. Such ideologies steered organisational positions in negotiations despite the fact that they contradicted the very essence of their adversary’s existence. It should come as no surprise that the PLO would adopt hard-line positions and fail to concede to lucrative opportunities during negotiations. Conclusion Palestine Liberation Organisation failed in negotiations due to possession of a victimised mindset, in which it perpetually blamed others for its misgivings. The issue of fragmentation in the institution’s structure compounded the failures, as the group had difficulties in communicating a central position. Members often undermined each other due to infightings, ideological differences and succession concerns. Finally, armed struggle was the basis for creation of the PLO; it was to be a solution to the problem of foreign imperialism and Zionism, so peaceful negotiations were not their primary concern between 1967 and 2000. References Ashton, N., 2007. The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967–1973. London: Routledge. Bailey, S., 1990. Four Arab–Israeli Wars and the Peace Process. London: Macmillan. Hass, A., 2000. Drinking the sea at Gaza: Days and nights in a land under siege. Tel Aviv: Picador. PNC, 1968. The Palestinian National Charter. [online]. Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/plocov.asp [Accessed 24 April 2014] Riad, M., 1981. The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East. London: Quartet Book. Rogers, W., 1970. A lasting peace in the Middle East: an American view. Department of State Bulletin, p. 62. Ross, D. and Grinstein, G., 2001. Camp David: An exchange. [online]. Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/sep/20/camp-david-an-exchange/ [Accessed 24 April 2014] Sayigh, Y., 1999. Armed struggle and the search for state: Years of Revolution, 1967-1972. Oxford: OUP. Morris, B. and Barak, E., 2002. Camp David and after-continued. [online]. Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2002/jun/27/camp-david-and-aftercontinued/ [Accessed 24 April 2014] Zayigh, R., 1979. Palestinians: From peasants to revolutionaries. London: Zed Press Read More