Defining Corruption in Society - Essay Example

 Corruption Introduction Corruption, which literally means ‘utterly broken’ if used in its adjectival form, is a complex phenomenon with deep roots in political and bureaucratic institutions and varying effects on development depending on the conditions of the specific society. Although the costs of corruption may vary from one society to the next, and while systemically corrupt societies may also experience strong economic growth, Clausen et al (2011: p220) argue that corruption is ultimately ‘poisonous’ for longer term development. For example, corruption often leads to government intervention where they are not needed, in turn significantly affecting their ability to pursue policies where they are needed most, such as in safety and health regulation, environmental regulation, contract enforcement, or macroeconomic stabilisation. In moral and philosophical discourse, corruption is considered as the misuse and abuse of position or power bestowed on an individual for their personal gain. Such corrupt actions may take the form of bribery, theft of state assets, bureaucratic/political corruption, or systematic and isolated corruption (Clausen et al, 2011: p220). While nepotism, favouritism, and cronyism are also considered acts of corruption in this discourse, the family-based nature of specific societies, especially in Asia, means that these acts are more acceptable. Defining Corruption Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013: p245) writes that corruption, which in this case means political corruption, is the use of public position and power illegitimately to accrue positive private gains. Another economically-inclined definition identifies corruption as actions that secretly provide services or products to third parties in order for them to influence their actions to their benefit, that of the third party, or even both and where this individual has authority. Legally, the definition of corruption is an activity that involves the abuse of power within legal confines, especially since those with authority and power are in a position to pursue laws and policies for their protection. Corruption as a concept covers a wide array of human actions. Thus, in order to comprehend how corruption may impact on socio-economic and socio-political systems, deconstruction of the term to identify particular transactions and activities that could be corrupt is important (Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013: p245). Essentially, corruption involves the misuse or abuse of public power and office for private gain. An individual may abuse public position for private gain when they extort, solicit, or accept a bribe, which constitutes a major instrument of corruption. These bribes could be meant to achieve several outcomes, such as in an attempt to influence the award of government contracts and the terms of these contracts (Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013: p247). In addition, bribes may also influence how government benefits like in-kind benefits and monetary benefits are allocated. Bribes may also be used to influence reduction in taxes from private parties to the authorities, as well as for the issuance of licenses that give exclusive rights to firms for mining or land development concessions. Moreover, bribes may also be offered in order to speed up government processes required for firms to operate legally, including construction permits or company registration (Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013: p247). This may also be the case where an entity pays a bribe to alter the outcome of a judicial or legal process, especially where the goal is to induce authorities to favour one party or ignore illegal activities like pollution. Corruption also involves the theft of state assets, particularly where the guilty party has been charged with the stewardship of these assets. One of the more extreme forms of such corruption is the spontaneous and large-scale privatisations of assets belonging to the state by government officials and enterprise mangers, mostly in economies that are in transition (Drugov et al, 2014: p83). A less extreme form is the petty theft of office stationery and equipment, fuel, and vehicles belonging to the state, which is mainly perpetrated by lower and middle-level officials as ‘compensation’ for insufficient remuneration. Government systems in place for such asset control are non-existent or weak, while the capacity of government institutions to identify such individuals and punish them is also weak. Theft of financial resources belonging to the state is also considered as corruption, in this case where state officers pocket fees or tax revenues, extend advances that are not paid, siphon money away from the treasury, or pay wages and salaries to ‘ghost’ workers (Drugov et al, 2014: p83). Government corruption may occur at both the bureaucratic level and the political level. Political level corruption could take place independent of bureaucratic corruption, although there are instances of collusion between both levels of government (Drugov et al, 2014: p84). The control of political corruption, on one level, is tackled through regulation of campaign financing, enforcing election laws, and rules on conflict of interest for members of parliament. While these laws are rarely fully enforced, they are, nevertheless, a critical part of any anti-corruption policy. Corruption at the bureaucratic level mainly manifests as intrinsically embedded in how power is exercised, which means that the ability to use laws alone in countering the vice is significantly reduced (Drugov et al, 2014: p85). In some extreme cases, criminal elements may infiltrate bureaucratic state institutions. In this case, the state institution is used as a tool for the organizations to enrich themselves from public money. In different societies, corruption may be either widespread or rare and, in the latter case, it may be straightforward to detect and act upon. Systemic corruption, however, is entrenched and pervasive, involving the routine dealing of bribes on small or large-scale levels between individuals or firms and the public sector. In societies with systemic corruption, informal and formal rules and regulations appear at odds with bribery widely understood to be illegal but also understood to be routine by all in government-related transactions. Lambsdorff et al (2015: p106) also writes about the ‘systemic corruption trap’, where officials, individuals, and firms have a strong incentive to comply with the corrupt system, rather than fight it. Moreover, the degree of coordination may vary between the bribe-takers, from highly organised systems of bribe collection and distribution to multiple officials perpetuating uncontrolled extortion. Systemic corruption could be a uniform occurrence across the entire public sector where bribery characterizes its interactions with the private sector, or it may be only prevalent in specific sectors like the tax and customs authorities (Lambsdorff et al, 2015: p107). Bribery and fraud in the private sector also constitute corruption and they often have costly consequences. For instance, highly unregulated financial systems may deter foreign investment and undermine savings if they are permeated with fraud, while this may also make the entire state vulnerable to macroeconomic stability and financial crises (Lambsdorff et al, 2015: p108). Criminal enterprises may also take over entire loans and savings institutions, specifically to perpetuate widespread fraud and money laundering. Where poor regulation leads to small savers or shareholders suffering at the hands of insider dealings in firms, in turn, this could erode the popular support for deeper financial markets or privatization. Furthermore, societies with systemic corruption ensure that the dealings between private firms and public agencies mean that the former seldom escape taking part in corruption. However, corruption in the private sector rarely gets as much coverage as that in public agencies, perhaps because the later involves public money. This is in spite of the fact that private-sector activities, especially in banks, are culpable in the perpetuation of bribery and fraud between the public sector and private sector (Lambsdorff et al, 2015: p108). Finally, favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism are also considered as perpetuations of corruption, although its negative impact on society is still a matter of debate. Clausen et al (2011: p222) define favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism as not favouring the corrupt individual, but someone close or related to them such as members of an association, family members, and friends, This form of corruption is not expressly forbidden in some Asian countries, especially those in Central Asia. Favouritism involves the favouring of individuals or firms they represent based on extraneous feature-membership in specific favoured groups, while it is also related to patronage in political office for supporters of a winning candidate. Cronyism, on the other hand, is a more particular type of favouritism, in which an individual shows partiality towards their associates and friends. Nepotism, finally, is a narrower type of favouritism, in which the individual shows favouritism to their family members. It has been found that both cronyism and nepotism often come into play when candidates for public office are recruited by political parties (Clausen et al, 2011: p223). Favouritism, Cronyism, and Nepotism in Family-Based Societies Some societies, especially in Central Asia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam among others, have strong family ties that characterize their close-knit, family-based relations. Padgett et al (2014: p5) note that the level of closeness between family and kin in the Philippines, for example, is one that is rarely practiced and observed in other societies or cultures. These close ties have always been part of the core family values in such societies, in which there exists strong mutual relationships based on respect and understanding towards one another. Ultimately, such cultures normally result in favouritism and nepotism, which has resulted in several powerful political dynasties across Asia, from Kyrgyzstan to Thailand, India, South Korea, and North Korea. When this cultural affinity is misused, however, nepotistic tendencies may result in public service corruption and destabilization of social equilibrium between and among different elements of the society (Padgett et al, 2014: p5). Yet, it is still important to note that these family-based values are part of these societies’ traditions and are responsible for the uniqueness of these societies. Nepotism and cronyism, in description of various practices associated with favouritism, may simply refer to the hiring, promotion, and generally favouring their own family members and close friends by influential leaders, business leaders and politicians (Padgett et al, 2014: p6). Moreover, it may also mean the advancing or hiring of under-qualified or unqualified members of one family or close friends based solely on the familial relationship. Although attitudes towards favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism may vary depending on the type of society and cultural background, these are sensitive issues in western democracies like the US and the UK. Indeed, most companies and political establishments in these societies consider these practices unethical, specifically since they conflict with their traditional values of fairness and self-reliance. Indeed, these practices raise legal concerns and although there are no specific regulations and laws barring individuals from hiring their relatives and those close to them, almost 40% of firms in western democracies have formal policies against these practices. Majority of these anti-favouritism rules were passed during the 50s, particularly to prevent incompetent male relations from being hired by their male relatives (Padgett et al, 2014: p7). Whereas such rules applied in the 60s and 70s, they did not reflect the shifting dynamics of the workforce as females joined the workforce in droves and women tended to be victims of these rules that forced many to quit. Favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism are practices that are also tied to pragmatic concerns and issues of discrimination with substantial debate raging on whether employers showing favouritism tendencies in hiring, including nepotism, will survive in the current business environment notwithstanding issues of ethics (Alawamlah, 2013: p48). However, on the other hand, majority of companies in the top 500 firms are family-owned, which may be taken as an endorsement, albeit implicitly, of favouritism and nepotism. Most societies, even those where nepotism and cronyism are practiced widely, have four levels of anti-nepotism regulations and rules. These companies could institute policies prohibiting hiring of one’s own relatives at the same facility, anywhere within the organisation, in the same workgroup or department, or in positions that allow influence over their promotion, compensation, or work situation. Yet, in family-based societies, companies with clearly stated anti-nepotism and anti-cronyism policies usually encounter complications ion attempting to enforce these policies (Alawamlah, 2013: p48). For instance, increased dual-career marriages in such societies increase legal challenges related to anti-nepotism rules. Occasionally, employees may fall in love in the workplace and eventually marry and, in some cases, anti-nepotism rules may require that one of them to quit. This raises the question as to whether hiring family members and close friends in family-based societies actually constitute a form of corruption or discrimination. This becomes even more complicated where there is pressure from one’s in-laws or their close friends for their relations and friends to be considered favourably in hiring. Alawamlah (2013: p49) notes that there is a difference between nepotism and favouritism practices in family-owned enterprises and public agencies, especially since majority of family-owned businesses expect involvement of their families in the future, while in-laws joining these families also expect the same. However, publicly-held companies have different formal rules, which mean that they are increasingly cautious as their promotion and hiring procedures may come under scrutiny from external authorities and actors. When nepotism, favouritism, and cronyism in family-based societies are practiced fairly, although this term is a contentious one, it may be seen as a true asset (Alawamlah, 2013: p49). For example, the Thomas Publishing Company had 3rd and 4th generation family members directly working in and for the company. In fact, the company also encouraged favouritism and nepotism among their sales contractors as it resulted in stability, high performance, and longer-term commitment. Nepotism in such societies may also be viable in instances where the relative of a top official may possess similar qualities to those of their parents that enhance their success in their jobs. Therefore, the recruitment of family members and close friends may act as a boost for retention and performance. For example, in the example given above concerning the Thomas Publishing Company, one senior member joined the company in 1940 and, by 1998, his spouse and 3 adult children all worked at Thomas Publishing Company (Keleş et al, 2011: p13). When the son faced challenges in relation to dealing with clients who did not agree with the senior contractor, he was able to politely and easily deal with the situation as the involved parties had respect for his father, while he was able to use the techniques passed on by his father in dealing with the particular individuals. Indeed, the business tide in the 2000s seemed to be shifting towards rules and policies that encourage the hiring and promotion of qualified relations and friends. The idea behind this shift, especially in family-based societies, was that good people will normally associate more with similarly good people. In this case, respectable families will usually beget respectable offspring whom society is able to trust better than relatively unknown people (Keleş et al, 2011: p13). However, this does not mean that there are no drawbacks to the practice of favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism even in family-based societies. For instance, the Indian branch of Line Brothers was once a highly successful manufacturer of toys but was rendered bankrupt and worthless by its 2nd generation leaders in just a number of years (Keleş et al, 2011: p14). Moreover, the Yale express was bankrupt in five years after its reins were taken over by the 2nd generation leadership, while the Great Atlantic and Pacific tea Company became bankrupt under its 2nd generation heir, despite once being one of the largest supermarket chains in the US. Most of these troubles normally emanate from the conflicts between business and family. The purpose of families in such societies is to care for their members, while the business must manufacture products of high quality as profitably and as efficiently as possible. Where the company promotes or hires incompetent members of the family, some of the employees who had to work hard to get their positions may view it as an act of injustice, resulting in several complications (Keleş et al, 2011: p14). More importantly, favouritism and nepotism could publicize family prejudices and disagreements to other members of the company, while also making it difficult to attract high-quality employees and executives and to retain them. Away from the business environment, favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism are perpetuated by the class factor, especially in politics and government, which has been identified as a major cause of inequalities. As such, there are perceptions that in some family-based societies, being on the right side of a class and family divide could be an advantage in life, specifically by getting the contacts that really matter and make a difference (Aligica & Tarko, 2014: p162). However, the question remains whether abolishing patronage and royal families would actually help in dealing with meritocracies in societies where this is the norm. In societies governed by strong family ties, there are arguments that the core issue around these royal families is not only about their position and power, but also about the symbolism that they represent. In such societies, the royal family is the acme of the political system, although some may also see this as the epitome of an outdated aristocratic age. Indeed, it seems difficult to consider a society where political office is inherited or given to close friends and family as being modern, despite the level of socio-economic development (Aligica & Tarko, 2014: p162). In this case, individuals get employment and positions on the basis of their birth and birth order, no matter how incompetent or wise one is. For instance, Thailand and Nepal in the foreseeable future will never have an Obama as head of state because their society perpetuates and sustains the same family and class. Since a head of state represents a national symbol, it is seen as essential that such positions are open to all persons on the basis of character and merit, rather than familial relations (Fu, 2015: p6). However, it is also important to note that with regards to democracies, constitutional monarchies in societies with powerful family-based relations are more stable and freer, including the examples of Malaysia and Japan. This is also true of countries in Europe, such as the UK, Denmark, and Sweden. For example, despite the French getting rid of their familial-based patronage society with the revolution, politics in the country are still run by a centralized government that is mainly composed of an elite class (Fu, 2015: p6). Likewise, the Kennedy and Bush dynasties in the US have managed to amass position, and inherited wealth to become powerful families despite the presence of strict anti-favouritism rules. Taking this into consideration, it would be naive to expect that family ties and favouritism would be worse in societies that have political and economic systems that are familial-based. However, although being a republic does not guarantee the strength of a society’s meritocracy, republics can at least ensure that there are mechanisms in place to replace hereditary leaders in occasions where the society is in consensus that the leaders are not doing their duties as required or are incompetent (Barnett et al, 2013: p43). In this case, although there may still be high levels of favouritism and corruption, the principle holding that the right individual possessing the required solutions can be elected to improve performance of the state offers hope to the society that tings can be improved. As such, it is time to rethink the current social systems in societies based on strong family ties that pervade economic, social, and political life, which would encompass a more egalitarian society with rewards on the basis of character and merit, instead of family relations and favouritism. Although such societies would not find absolute egalitarianism desirable as a necessity, it is undeniable that all individuals in these societies have different inclinations, aspirations, and ambitions in life (Barnett et al, 2013: p43). Conclusion Therefore, there is need to ensure that the chances of people born into less privileged and dysfunctional situations in societies with strong family-based values also have a chance to achieve their ambitions. Such societies are known to have high levels of crime and violence, such as is the case in Thailand and the Philippines, which can be attributed to the poverty that results from a lack of opportunity in cases where belonging to the right family matters. In the end, favouritism, cronyism, and nepotism lead to an unfair and unjust society because opportunity is restricted to a few families with position and power. Leaders in any society must be held accountable for their actions to their subjects, rather than to their relations and friends. In societies where hiring and promotion is based on family relations and friendship, it is difficult to hold them accountable for their actions, especially when they undermine the principles of democracy and law. References Alawamlah, H. (2013). The Effect of Favouritism on the Discretionary Power of Administration in Selecting and Appointing Public Servants: A Case Study of Jordanian Government Administration. 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