The Crimean Crisis - Case Study Example

THE CRIMEAN CRISIS OF by of the of the Introduction In November Victor Yanukovych, the former President of Ukraine, rejected to sign the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement and the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU). In response, anti-government protests, led by pro-Western citizens, erupted in the capital city, Kiev. As protests turned intense and violent, the government of Victor Yanukovych collapsed and replaced by new pro-western government under the leadership of Arseniy Yatsenyuk in the early 2014 (Yuhas 2014). The collapse of pro-Russian government and growing dominance of pro-Western groups in Ukraine was seen as a threat to Russia’s control over the region. Consequently, under the justification of “responsibility to protect” the Russian minorities in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea in March, 2014 (Yuhas 2014). The Russian annexation of Crimea caused a massive stir on a global level and the action was condemned by majority of global leaders. The Crimean crisis has been considered as a significant global issue which has caused severe impact on relations between western world and Russia and their allies. Also, the crisis caused massive blow to economic stability in Ukraine and Russia. The clashes between the West and Russia through economic sanctions, energy politics, and political pressure have threatened the global stability and brought the world on the verge of Cold War II (Koshkin 2014). The causes of Crimean crisis can be traced in current global politics and contested perceptions of the state identity in Ukrainian society. The purpose of this case study is to investigate the Crimean crisis of 2014. By means of various researches and available reports, the paper will examine the root causes of crisis and its impact on various groups. The paper will also present potential solutions in order to abate the negative effects of the crisis. Overview The Autonomous Republic of Crimea, internationally recognized as a part of Ukraine, is situated on a peninsula which has spread between the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea with Russian border to its east (BBC Monitoring 2014). In the late 2013, Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych faced a choice when the country was moving towards economic crisis. He could select a long-term, but initially troublesome deal with the EU to boost trade and integration, or he could secure a $15 billion loan from Russia and join the Eurasian Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (Woehrel 2014, p. 1-2). After continuous flip-flop and lengthy deliberation, Yankovych, who has a good relationship with Russian president Vladimir Putin and was sacked in 2004 over a corruption case, chose the money over the deal with the EU. The decision triggered massive protests on Independence Square (also known as the Maidan) of Kiev. When the government forces tried to crush the protests and gain control by forceful means, the protests turned into widespread anti-government movement. Over 3 months, thousands of protestors from all over the country literally fortified the Maidan. When clashes between the government forces and protestors turned violent, the movement received new objective to fight against the Yanukovych regime and establish new corruption-free, liberal, and pro-European government. Over 500 people died in the protests, many were severely beaten or killed by the Berkut (special armed police force). Meanwhile, Yanukovych left the country and a new government was formed under a coalition of major political parties, UDAR, Batkivshchyna, and Svoboda, agreeing to conduct new elections on 25 May, 2014 (Woehrel 2014, p. 1-2). At the same time, Russian-ethnic citizens in Crimean felt isolated from their own country and saw themselves and their culture as threatened by the growing nationalism in the capital city, the formation of new pro-western government in the country, and growing dominance of Tatar in Crimea. In response, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered emergency military drills on the Russia-Ukraine border and at Russian naval base in Crimea. Simultaneously, armed militia in masks and unmarked military uniformed seized major government buildings and airports in Crimea. Though these unidentified armed forced were accused of being Russian, Russia strongly denied such claims by characterizing them as “regional self-defense militia” (Yuhas 2014). On 16 March, 2014, majority of Crimean citizens (i.e. around 97%) due to strong ties to Russian culture and history voted to join Russia Federation in the referendum conducted by Russia, which was later condemned by Ukraine, the EU, and the US as illegal (Yuhas 2014). Few days later, Putin signed a treaty for officially annexing Crimea and addressed Crimean citizens in his speech by criticizing western powers and congratulating locals for a victory “without any violence and casualties” (Yuhas 2014). Analysis of the Root Causes and the Politics of the Crisis The Crimean crisis of 2014 is the aftermath of series of political conflicts, contested identity issues in the Ukrainian society, and long-term historical, cultural, religious, and political connection between Crimea and Russia. After Roman and Greek dominance for centuries, Crimea became the hub of a Tatar Khanate in 1443, later falling under control of Ottoman Empire (BBC Monitoring 2014). In 1783, the region was conquered by the Russian Empire under the ruling of Catherine the Great. After the Bolshevik revolution, Crimea was provided an autonomous republic status within Soviet Union. Crimea remained a state of Russia until 1954, when it was added in Ukraine under the regime of Nikita Khrushchev (BBC Monitoring 2014). According to the 2001 census, ethnic Russian made up over 60% of the Crimean population. Almost 94% of its population speaks Russian (Smith & Harari 2014, p. 10). Consequently, Crimea has always inclined towards Russia rather than Ukraine, which is evident from the regular efforts of the local ethnic Russian political leaders to maintain unique autonomous identity of Crimea and strengthen relationship with Russia through a number of moves characterized unconstitutional by the Ukrainian central government. Basically, Ukrainians are profoundly divided over current national policies, and historical and linguistic background. Based on the reports of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission and an International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the country is culturally and politically divided between Western and Eastern region on the basis of linguistic and historical background. Ukraine’s western region, where over 90% people speak Ukrainian, tends to support pro-western ideology and consequently emphasizes (over 70% population) on joining the EU. On the other hand, eastern and southern region, where over 75% population’s native language is Russian, is more keen (around 68% population) to join the Eurasian Customs Union and strengthen ties with Russia (Smith & Harari 2014, p. 10-11). The deep disconnection between western Ukrainians’ and Crimean citizens’ vision about differentiating Russians has certainly provoked the crisis. For western Ukrainians, there is clear boundary between Russians and Ukrainians, but, majority of Crimean Russians classified Russians as “we”, reflecting strong bonds between Crimea and Russia (Olesker 2014, p. 10-12). A large number of Crimean Russians are originated from Russia and are strongly attached to the Moscow Patriarchy and the Russian Orthodox Church, which collectively explains extreme pro-Russian national identity and political support in Crimea (Olesker 2014, p. 11-12). When the pro-Russian regime of Yanukovych collapsed in Ukraine and new pro-western government initiated to enforce Ukrainian language all over the country in order to strengthen nationalism and eliminate Russian identity from Ukraine, ethnic Russians in Crimea felt highly insecure and isolated from the country. In other words, contested national identity in the Ukrainian society is the major cause of the crisis (Olesker 2014, p. 9-15). Besides, internal identity dispute, the Crimean Crisis is strongly influenced by the global geopolitics. In the 1990s, as the Cold War was coming to the end, Soviet leaders didn’t want the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) to gain any further power through expansion. But, the Clinton administration strongly emphasized on the growth of NATO and therefore, in the mid-1990s, it started to push for NATO’s expansion further in the east (Mearsheimer 2014, p. 2-3). In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic and in 2004, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Latvia, and Slovakia were given NATO’ membership. Russia bitterly criticized such western policies from the beginning. But, Russia was too weak at the time to constrain NATO’s eastern expansion. In 2008, NATO proposed membership to Ukraine and Georgia, which didn’t go well with Russia as the Russian President Putin considered it as a “direct threat” to Russian influence in the eastern European region. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 under R2P (responsibility to protect) justification was considered as Russia’s strong determination to stop Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO (Mearsheimer 2014, p. 2-4). Despite such clear warnings, NATO and EU didn’t quite on their goal to bring Ukraine and Georgia in the alliance. After including Croatia and Albania as NATO members in 2009, EU launched its Eastern Partnership program to integrate eastern European countries like, Ukraine into the EU. Not surprisingly, such growing western interference in the east was considered as a threat to Russian interests and danger of spreading western ideologies further in Russia, diminishing the Putin’s Russian imperialism ideology in the country (Mearsheimer 2014, p. 3-4). In a way, Putin’s Crimean annexation can be easily comprehended as a Russian response to western policies towards Eastern Europe and eliminate any possibility of the western advancement in the Russia’s sphere of influence. Also, Crimea’s strategic geographic location is crucial for Russia in terms of security and global trade. Crimean border runs along Russia’s southern side and it is hardly few hundred miles away from Moscow. Crimean Peninsula gives Russia direct access to the Black Sea and from there further to the Mediterranean Sea. Pro-western government in Ukraine and potential EU and NATO membership would have brought the western alliance within striking distance to Moscow (Walker & Berkeley 2015). Control of Crimean Peninsula gives continuous access to its naval base at Sevastopol, Crimea and doesn’t need to rely on the Ukrainian regime for the access. Prior to the Crimean Crisis, the naval base in Sevastopol was leased to Russia till 2042, but due to ongoing political instability in Ukraine, Russia had become highly insecure as its future access could be compromised (BBC Monitoring 2014). Furthermore, annexation of Crimea has significantly increased the strategic defense capacity of Russia and has allowed it to reclaim its dominance in the Eastern Europe. Findings: Overall Consequences and Impact of the Crisis The Crimean Crisis of 2014 has significantly affected the political, social, and economic stability in Ukraine. Also, due to severe economic and political sanction of the western powers, Russia’s economic growth has drastically declined. According to many experts, the Crimean Crisis could lead to the Cold War II. The western powers and Russia are trapped in their mutual accusation and mistrust, with both sides desperately willing to outstrip each other (Koshkin 2014). Through the annexation of Crimea, Russia has directly challenged the fundamental principles of the European order. Consequently, the EU and the US responded with the weapon of political and economic sanctions on Russia. Since 2014, the west has steadily increased sanctions against Russia, targeting its major businesses, and military, energy, and financial sectors (Dworkin et al. 2014). The economic sanctions have shaken the social and economic stability in Russia. The prices of wheat and other food products dramatically have increased up to 60-70%. Russian ruble currently trading around 65 to the US dollar, which is considerably low of its over 82 against the US dollar in the last month. Due to rapidly falling exchange rates, consumer panic is to its peak in the country (Boghani 2015). Furthermore, due to oil-politics of the US and its ally Saudi Arabia not to cut the oil production despite vast global oil supply and comparably lower demand, global oil prices have dropped to a 10-year low of $46 per barrel from $118 per barrel in June. The picture is clear. As petroleum exports constitute about 68% of Russia’s total exports, Russian economic, which is heavily dependent on the petroleum revenues, has come under immense pressure (Boghani 2015). Compare to Russia, the economic crisis is more intense in Ukraine. Soon after the Crimea Crisis, the “People’s Republic of Donetsk” and the “People’s Republic of Luhansk”, the self-proclaimed authorities in the eastern Ukrainian states Donetsk and Luhansk respectively declared themselves independent states in May 2014, triggering violent conflicts between the separatists and the Ukrainian army. The armed conflicts in the eastern regions of Ukraine have cost the overall damage over $ 610 millon (Shemetov 2014). As Donetsk and Luhansk constitute over 30% of nation’s industrial services and goods, the conflicts in these regions have cased over 16% GDP drop, while the loss of Crimea has led to 4% drop in the country’s GDP (Shemetov 2014). Ukrainian currency, hryvnia, dropped over 35% against the US dollar in recent week with decline of its foreign exchange reserves to $ 6.2 billion, which hardly enough to cover 5 weeks of country’s imports. According to experts, Ukraine’s 2015 economic outlook is gloomy. The country’s GDP is expected to contract over 2.9% in 2015. Even though the country has already received $4.7 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a portion of its $17 billion aid policy, the Ukrainian economy is on the verge of bankruptcy (Woehrel 2014, p. 4-6). In response to economic sanctions of the west, Russia has used its energy weapon against the EU. Ukraine and other European countries are highly dependent on Russia for natural gas supply. In 2013, Ukraine imported around 50.5 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia on a delivery contract of 2009-10, which was highly unfavorable to Ukraine due to high prices. However, in 2013, Russia offered cost reduction in return for Crimean base lease extension and rejection of EU offer of membership. However, after the political turmoil in Kiev, Russia is demanding to settle debt amount of $2 billon and higher price ($410 instead $270 per thousand cubic meters) for the gas (Westphal 2014, p. 2-3). European Union is highly dependent on Russia for natural gas supply too as almost 50% of its overall gas imports come from Russia. The majority of transport pipelines for Russia gas to Europe run through Ukraine. With ongoing tensions between Russia-Ukraine and growing economic and political pressures from western world, Russia has responded with threatening of gas cut-off to Europe (Westphal 2014, p. 2-5). Even though western European countries are looking for alternative to Russian gas, it is highly impossible to come in reality in the nearest future. Consequently, in the clashes between western world and Russia over the Crimean Crisis, Europe is at a high risk of facing 3rd energy crisis in a same decade (Dworkin et al. 2014). Discussion: Evaluation of the Crisis and Potential Solutions Ukraine is strategically important country for Russia as it serves as a buffer state to vast Russian territory. Consequently, Russia couldn’t afford its long-term competitors, i.e. , the Western powers, moving into Ukraine. Even though Washington opposed Moscow’s stance over Crimea, it is necessary to interpret the logic behind it. According to the geopolitical principles, great powers are always conscious over potential threats near its boundaries. After all, the US doesn’t tolerate other great powers deploy their military forces anywhere near its borders. Growing expansion of EU and NATO in the east has similarly considered as a threat to Russia’s security and its sphere of influence (Mearsheimer, J 2014, p. 3-5). Besides it, Ukraine has strong historical, culture, religious and linguistic ties with Russia rather than the west. Its majority of population in the eastern region and Crimea closely relates itself with Russia. Also, Ukraine is highly dependent on Russia for energy security and economic stability as its majority of businesses, industries, and trades are directly connected with Russia (Mearsheimer, J 2014, p. 3-7). When the pro-western government in Ukraine tried to ignore these facts and impose nationalism, it was obvious that Russian ethnic groups would have felt insecure and Russia anyhow would intervene under the justification of R2P (responsibility to protect Russian minorities) policy. Crimea is officially part of Ukraine and historically was part of Russia. A majority of region’s population speaks Russian and closely tied with Russia. Many experts and political leaders propose excessive sanctions on Russia. However, use of force or economic sanctions would further worsen the situation. The Canadian solution can be appropriate and more suitable solution in case of Crimea. Legally and officially, Quebec is only a state like all others in Canada. But, in reality, it has received special status. Similar is the case of Scotland in the UK and Catalonia in Spain (Gwyn 2014). Similar type of decentralization of Crimea would be required. Also, by assuring more legislative power to the autonomous government in Crimea, political and legal rights and interests of Crimean citizens could be protected. Overall, it is necessary to find diplomatic solutions to the issues with collective efforts and initiative. Conclusion The Crimean Crisis of 2014 has significantly affected the global security and peace. The crisis has led to massive political, social, and economic damage in Ukraine. Also, the crisis has brought two major powers, i.e., the western world and Russia, on the verge of another era of Cold War. It is necessary for the global leaders to find diplomatic solutions, such as increasing autonomous status and political powers of Crimea and its government and solve the issues without any military intervention. With the help of collective efforts of international organizations, Ukrainian and Russian governments, and the western leaders, it is possible to find the golden mean that would satisfy both the groups and promote stability and peace in the region. Reference List BBC Monitoring 2014, Crimea profile, BBC, 22 March, viewed10 February2015, . Boghani, P 2015, What’s been the effect of western sanctions on Russia?, PBS Frontline, 13 January, viewed10 February2015, . 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