Overview of Operations at Buncefield - Case Study Example

Site Conditions and Constraints Improperly and poorly managed and controlled construction sites can pose danger to not only aquatic life, but drainage and public roadways systems and networks. These problems generally stem out of the initial condition of site prior to the construction efforts, for instance excessive soil erosion and pollution. It is therefore crucial first to institute appropriate set of procedures aimed at controlling the excessive environmental contamination as well as soil erosion. Basically this should first begin with the necessary legal procedures and regulatory practices then followed by the methods for reviewing and analyzing such types of construction sites. For instance the case to be considered involved a site where a huge fire erupted in a fuel storage site in Buncefield. After effectively reclaiming such sites, the planned development activities through appropriate designing, installation and maintenance of structures required. Case Study: Buncefield Incidence Ideal Design and Operation Buncefield Accident incident consisted of case whereby the means provided to store fuel and water necessary for fire fighting (‘fire-water’) failed at the three levels, namely: primary, secondary and tertiary. The principal need was to make certain that the stored fuel does not get out from the vessels where it is contained or stored. Extra precautions are necessary to prevent the development of flammable vapor. This being the primary level, did not trivialize the need for secondary and tertiary control (mainly drains and bunds) that check pollutants from getting out of the site and ultimately polluting the external environment should the arranged primary preventive measures fail. Overview of Operations at Buncefield East of England Development Agency (2006) asserts that the oil storage and transfer depots at Buncefield consisted of a large tank owned by three companies, namely West London Pipeline limited, United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Limited and Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited; a Joint venture between Chevron Limited and total UK Limited. The West London Pipeline and Storage Limited was managed by British Petroleum Oil UK limited and British Pipeline Agency Limited. Under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) laws of 1999, each of the sites is categorized as a ‘top tier’ site. Ideally, Buncefield depot is a crucial part of the national petroleum refinery, storage and pipeline framework. Overview of the Incident at Buncefield As shown in the Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (2006) the incident happened on Sunday December 11, 2005 when huge quantities vapor was seen rising from a bund on the North western corner of the site steady loss of containment from the pipe work and tanks adjacent to the bund. The trouncing of the containment preceded a massive and bombastic explosion and a series of minor explosions. A huge fire immediately overwhelmed 21 of the tanks in the Buncefield site. Timeline Chronology of Major Happening on the Buncefield incident December 10, 2005 19:00, In the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited West Site, Tank 912 of Bund A received motor fuel (unleaded) from the TK pipeline, the fuel was being pumped at a rate of 550,000 liters per hour. December 11, 2005 00:00 (approximately midnight), tankers were halted from entering the terminal in order to carry out the stock checking. This was completed at around 0200hrs and from the results no abnormalities that were detected. Approximately one hour later, the gauge level at Tank 912 indicted a static meter reading despite filling proceeding at 550m3 per hour. Calculations and approximately showed that by around 0500 hrs, the tank was supposed to be full and overflowing. Investigation and evidence suggested that the installed protection system which was meant to shut off the ongoing petrol supply to the tank was faulty and thus not operating. From that time, prolonged pumping led to the fuel cascading down the tank walls and through the atmosphere, causing the quick formation of a concentrated air/fuel mixture that gathered in Bund A. At 0538 hours the highly concentrated vapor from the tank was now visible with the CCTV footage as viewed from a camera attached on the western side of Bund A. The vapor was seen flowing to the west from the westerner corner of bund A. At 0546 hours the resulting air/fuel vapor had condensed to a level of 2m and was extending and spreading out of Bund A in diverse directions. At 0550 hours, the resulting air/fuel mixture vapor cloud began to flow off the oil site at the intersection of Buncefield lane and Cherry Tree Lane, as a result of the sloppy topography. The vapor flew west to the Fuji car parks, Northgate House and further towards the Catherine house. From 0550 and 06hrs, the pumping speed of the T/k pipeline that was filling the Tank 912 from the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited West, drastically rose to 890 m3 per hour. At 0601 hours, the mixture vapor moved to the west in the boundary way in the gaps between Northgate, Fuji Buildings and 3-Com, northern wise it extended to corner of Catherine House and eastwards it spread to the British pipeline Agency Limited site. Almost at the same time, the first explosion occurred, this immediately preceded other smaller explosions and a large fire that engulfed the over 20 storage tanks resulted. This main explosion seemed to occur at the car parks adjacent to the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited site, Northgate buildings and Fuji. At around 0900 hours ‘Gold command’ i.e. the incident’s met for the first time to strategize on the rescue and disaster response plan. By that time a huge smoke was spreading all over and beyond southern England. The intense hat from the combustion led to the loss of the installed secondary containment as the available bunds could not hold further the spreading of the fire as the fuel and fire- water spilt over the bund walls. There was also destruction of the tertiary containment which led to the escaping of huge amounts of contaminating fluid such as the “fire- water” used on the site. Although a lot was done to control further loss, this did not guarantee on the potential danger of contaminating the surface and underground water. Generally, major conclusions of the investigations done revealed that the incidence was relating to the malfunctioning of the systems meant to close the fuel delivery pipe immediately the tank is full. More studies are being conducted in order to reveal the likely fuel composition at the time of the accident as well as the ongoing and continuous monitoring of the environmental consequences of the incident, especially in relation to the contamination of groundwater. Though substantial information concerning this incident at Buncefield is still deficient, a lot has been revealed concerning the major happenings that can aid in the drawing of general conclusions on the necessity of action in the design and operation of the fuel storage sites. Most of the released fuel turned into vapour by 0600 hours leading to a massive ignition which caused ac great earth tremor of about 2.4 on the Seismic Richter scale with structural destruction to physical properties up to three miles. As described above, the resulting blaze spread to the over 20 tanks for storing fuel. This is in fact one of the largest fire in Western Europe since World War II in 1945. Rescue and emergency response led by the firefighters and police was immediately dispatched to the ground to control the fire and the ensuing destruction. Over 180 firefighters were literally tackling the huge blaze with the help of the 26 fire engines and over 800,000 litres of foam. The explosive led to extensive damage of up to two kilometers from the Buncefield site. Some neighboring residential homesteads were severely destroyed while several hundreds suffered slight, non-structural damage. Huge black smoke as a result of the fire was spread to high altitudes of beyond southern England. Intense fire and heat arising from the destruction of the bunds thus the secondary containment of the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited site as well as British Pipeline Agency Limited Sites. The resulting fire combusted for three days and as described above huge quantities of foam and water was actually used to extinguish it. More than 2000 people were evacuated and sections of some motorways such as M1 were temporarily closed. The off site connotations are of unique interest as the Buncefield incident gives an explicit phenomenon of the potential effects of major accidents on commercial and business community. The shear magnitude of Buncefield incident and the consequences on local, regional as well as national infrastructure translates that the consequences were indeed felt in diverse places. Fortunately the incident did not cause any fatalities and thus offered an opportunity to exercise and learn from a range of effects in the UK national disaster and calamity preparedness response. Fire-water Disposal As a result of the incident, the resulting contaminated water was discarded from the accident sited during the initial three weeks after the Buncefield accident fire. As a result, an unknown volume of the same ended up into the grounds water and surface waters as well. Subsequently, extra quantities of polluted water following the rains and cleaning operations was taken away from the incident site by tanker and kept together with the discarded fire-water in various locations in UK. A number of reports were released regarding the reasons for the accident as a result of the ignition of the fuel vapor cloud. Most of the progressive reports released concurred with the first report which revealed the overfilling of Tank 912 with the unleaded petrol. Some assessment was carried out to unearth what happened to the instrumentation and control mechanism of the tank which includes: the alarm system and the automatic fuel gauging system in the tank. The assessors were determined to investigate what happened with the installed automatic control system for shutdown mechanism as well as the capacity limit level of the tank. Environmental Consequences and Monitoring It is important to understand than such volumes of water stored on such unprecedented magnitude required a number of processes to render it suitable for recycling to the external environment. The oil companies are examining the available options of achieving the above as assessed by the Environmental Agency. In May 2006, the Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) published the first report on the effects on air quality and the consequent effects of the cloud on vegetation and general human health. In general, the report wrapped up that there was less likelihood of air pollutants from Buncefield fire contaminating the ground level. In conclusion, the report showed that fire from the incident did not lead to substantial contamination on soil and water. This should the pollution and contamination levels as a result of Buncefield fire incidents was typical and common with most of the UK’s urban life and environment and thus unexceptional. Due to the then prevailing weather and meteorological conditions at the day and time of the Buncefield fire incident and also the lofty buoyancy of the smoke cloud made this smoke cloud to rise to high altitudes or atmospheric heights and thus spreading over a vast geographical area. This led to minimal interaction of the pollutants smoke and ground level thus less mixing.  Atkins (2006) reveals that in February 2005, test trials were dug on surrounding areas of the Buncefield site to investigate the effects on land surface. The first judgment revealed the immediate top layer on the surface was heavily contaminated with fuel and used fire-fighting chemicals and other products. The magnitude and degree of pollution and contamination on land within the Buncefield site has not been fully established. Majority of the excavations carried out concentrated on the assessment of contamination of soil below the concrete cover and beneath the bases of the bunds. The information to be generated is crucial in aiding the ongoing investigations as well as allowing the Environment Agencies to establish the required remedy.  Atkins (2006) maintains that, immediately after the incident, extensive investigations were carried out on the possible contamination of both surface and ground water on several selected locations. Further examinations are being carried out to determine any long term effects on the aquatic ecosystems. The Environmental Impact Agency have commenced on a process of monitoring the surface and ground water around the Buncefield incident site immediately after the fire accident. This has effective revealed traces of contamination and pollution of the existing surface and underground water by not only fuel, but other chemical resulting from fire- fighting products and fuel associated substances and products. In addition to the numerous studies carried out, the Environment Agency came up with the conceptual model to help in understanding the engagements of the contaminants within the aquifers and groundwater. This is crucial in analyzing the extent of water pollution. Necessary Steps in Reclaiming Contaminated Environment As a result of the Buncefield incident, the area around Buncefield has suffered extensively as a result of loss of business and commercial confidence and great concern on the uncertainty surrounding the redevelopment and reconstruction. This has ultimately affected the nearby Heathrow Airport as a result of resilience in the fuel industry of UK. The aim of this is to mitigate on the impacts of a major accident on the environment and population in the areas adjacent to the vicinity of the dangerous and hazardous installations, by following a steady and organized approach in provision of advice necessary for planning consent around such locations. In order to fully utilize such land, it is necessary for the developer to carry out extensive investigations through sampling of the various fuel products at this depot as well as verifying the distribution of the products within the site and from diverse fuel supply pipelines. This should be followed by the assessment of the composition of the released fuel type during the incident. This samples need to be collected from all pipelines included those that give out unleaded petrol. Since prior to the fire incident, substance of unleaded petrol were initially released thus creating a favorable atmosphere for explosion then followed by fire. This means that all the collected samples need to be compared and tested against the BS EN 228 standard for combustible fuels. This should be followed by an extensive chemical analysis by an accredited testing firm. This laboratory tests are important for testing their identity. As a result of the combustion, the volatile composition of the fuel was lost and therefore it is impossible to carry out direct comparison of the resulting analytical outcome thus assisting in the tracking of the original product source of the pollutants. For instance, remnants from Tank 912 are completely burnt out hence unavailable, in some cases combusted residuals can be retrieved from bottom of the tank. Landscaping Before engaging in any land reclamation of the fire incident site, it is important first to restore the initial aesthetic quality of the area through landscaping. It is necessary first to carry out landscape enhancement features and measures such planting of trees and other vegetation to promote the regeneration and renewal of the hedgerows thus boosting biodiversity. This will ultimately screen and conceal the site from the adjacent access roads. It is also necessary to construct earthen berms and other vegetative cover and barriers crucial in offering site screening as well. References Angus Fire, Buncefield Oil Terminal Incident December 2005: Review of part played by Angus Fire and lessons learned www.angusfire.co.uk  Atkins, W.S 2006,  “Science and Technology: Derivation of fatality probability functions for occupants of buildings subject to blast loads Phases 1, 2, & 3 147/1997 and Phase 4 151/2007 Biomedical Sciences Chemical and Biological Defense Sector Defence Evaluation and Research Agency: Review of blast injury data and models 192/1998 DEFRA: Initial review of Air Quality aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion www.defra.gov.uk/environment/airquality/buncefield/buncefieldreport.pdf. East of England Development Agency – report by SQW, Economic Developments Consultants on: The Buncefield Oil Depot Incident: Economic and Business Confidence Impact Study, June 2006, Read More