Philosophers in the Scientific Community - Essay Example

Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper were two highly influential philosophers in the scientific community whose works are seen as pioneering in the field of the history of science. While many see the two is in complete opposition to each other, some similarities do exist between the two philosophies. Ultimately, though, Popper and Kuhn represent to very different schools of thought that allow for strikingly different views of scientific history. One problem with comparing and contrasting Thomas Kuhn is a matter of interpreting his ideas and work, which can easily become a debate about semantics rather than scientific or empirical data. In Karl Popper’s opinion Kuhn often uses the term theory when many would instead use the term model. In “Normal Science and its Dangers” Popper writes of his problem with the history of science and Kuhn’s interpretation of his work and often touches on this very issue, whether or not he intentionally meant it to become a central theme. Popper implies that the language Kuhn uses is inherently misleading and confusing, including references to “’normal’ science” (51), “applied scientist” (53) versus “pure scientist” (53), and “one ruling theory (a ‘paradigm’ in Kuhn’s terminology)” (54). Popper states “difficulty of discussion between people brought up in different frameworks is to be admitted [but] nothing is more fruitful than such a discussion” (57). More ideas and knowledge are exchanged when a more diverse group of people participate in the discussion. Unfortunately it seems that Popper himself has difficulty discussing Kuhn’s work because their communication frameworks are too different. While Popper acknowledges that people a re able to break out of pre-existing frameworks and continually develop better ones, he is hung up on language. It is difficult to compare one philosopher to another when they themselves have difficulty understanding each other. Once the problem of language has been recognized and rectified it is time to compare the philosophies of Popper and Kuhn. In his essay, Karl Popper makes an attempt to highlight similarities between his philosophy and Kuhn’s before pointing out perceived error’s in the latter’s work. Popper believed that science has a generally accepted framework that allows scientists to discuss theories rationally just as Kuhn believed that there is “an organized structure of science which provides the scientist with a generally accepted problem-situation into which his own work can be fitted” (“Normal Science and its Dangers” 51). Both philosophers recognized pre-existing frameworks in science that allow for certain theories to take hold. Additionally, both men thought, “science is essentially critical; that it consists of bold conjectures, controlled by criticism, and that it may, therefore, be described as revolutionary” (“Normal Science and its Dangers” 55). Science is affected by the criticisms of those surrounding the scientist and influenced by the mainstream ideas of the times. Aside from the similarities that Popper states exist between him and Kuhn, a majority of their philosophies not only contrast with each other but are indeed in opposition to one another. Thomas Kuhn can be viewed as a philosopher who strongly believed in specialized sciences and that these should not be subjected to public debate but should instead be studied and developed by the elite in the governmental and military sectors. Karl Popper, on the other hand, often presented his philosophies on a public stage in order to allow for discussion and debate, which he believed, would advance science. Debates should not be restricted to scientific elites and serve the interests of man’s needs and not those of the ruling government or ideology. (Fuller 2) One philosopher believed that science should be a privately controlled specialized area that was free from public debate and criticism while the other thought the essences of science exists in the ability to debate its theories by the public at large, no matter whether by laymen or scientific professionals. Karl Popper views science as something that not only can be debated but as something that should be debated. Ultimately, debate is the key to further development in the sciences. In “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”, Popper views argument and debate as the key to the development of science because “the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability” (48). If a person is looking for confirmation of a theory, he will always find it somewhere. The scientific validity of a theory comes from the ability to test it, thereby possibly refuting it. If a theory cannot be tested one cannot be certain that falseness lies in it. Personal observations without measurability can be shaped to fit whatever theory one is working with because there is no evidence that it is wrong, only examples that it can be correct. Discussion and debate among a variety of people and scientific frameworks allows for the study and implementation of tests which can validate or invalidate certain theories and thus assist in the evolvement of earlier theories into ones that can be applied with newly identified scientific principles. Thomas Kuhn, on the other hand, believed that historical science is marked by periods of normalcy and revolution. During normal times scientists follow a very specific framework with reasonable expectations of solving certain ‘puzzles’ that have become a concern in that time period. Scientists spend normal periods of science stockpiling solutions to problems, or these puzzles. Periods of revolution occur when there is an anomaly or paradigm, a significantly more difficult problem or puzzle that must be solved. Theories are not meant to be continually tested. Only in extreme cases should a revolution initiate a change in current scientific theory. If an anomaly can be explained away, it should be. Only when the anomaly is significant enough to pose serious problems should revolution occur. (“Thomas Kuhn”) When revolution happens, past theories are no longer applicable. The new theory is not built upon the old. In some cases events that were easily explained by a previous theory could be explained away by the current one. But in Kuhn’s view, differing theories cannot coexist. This is why only highly trained, specialized scientists and professionals should be concerned with real science. Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn offer two unique understandings of the history of science. Popper believed that through constant testing and retesting, theories could be improved upon in order to be more accurate than those in the past. Kuhn believed that only under extreme circumstances should scientific revolution take place and that in times of normal science, only one scientific framework should be viewed and accepted. So how does one determine which of these philosophers is “correct?” What kind of evidence should be sought in order to understand scientific change? Those questions do not have simple answers. Both Popper and Kuhn’s philosophies can be accepted and supported by historical evidence. It is all about observation. Therefore, one must decide for oneself whether science is a continually tested and changing thing or one that remains unchanged as long as change is not required by exceptional anomalies. Once this is decided, a person can go about looking for evidence to support his historical belief. The problem with this goes back to Popper’s problem with theories that can be proven in every situation. Proving that something can happen based on a theory does not prove the theory but only shows that it cannot properly be tested. When looking at historical science, this can also be applied to Kuhn’s theory and Popper’s. Therefore, science will always remain in the eye of the beholder and there can never be agreement on what is correct and what is not in terms of the approach to science and its history. Works Cited McLaughlin, Neil. “Steve Fuller. Kuhn vs. Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science.” Canadian Journal of Sociology Online. http://www.cjsonline.ca/reviews/kuhnpopper.html. Nov.-Dec. 2006. 5p. Popper, Karl. “Normal Science and Its Dangers.” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. p. 51-58. Popper, Karl. “Science: Conjectures and Refutations.” Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.” p. 43-51. “Thomas Kuhn.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progress/. 13 Aug. 2004. Read More